Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The San Francisco County Human Services Agency filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of the Minor. At an initial detention hearing, Father appeared. The court appointed counsel. Counsel asked to set the matter for a contested detention hearing but explained she could not proceed immediately because her witnesses were not available and because she was in trial in another department. After a discussion about a continuance, the court found there had been a prima facie showing there was a substantial danger to Minor’s physical and emotional well-being and there were no reasonable means by which Minor’s physical and emotional safety could be safeguarded without removing Minor from Father’s custody. The court ordered Minor temporarily detained and approved Minor’s placement with his mother. Father’s counsel filed a declaration and disqualification motion, which the court found untimely because the court had “made substantive rulings on the detention.” Father sought review of the denial of his disqualification motion. The court of appeal granted the petition, finding that the court’s rulings did not preclude Father from making his Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 challenge because they did not “involv[e] a determination of contested fact issues related to the merits.” View "Johnny W. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

N.S. was placed in foster care at age 11. After she turned 18 in 2014, she remained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a nonminor dependent. (Welf. & Inst. Code 11400(v)), having been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and depressive disorder. She was participating in therapy and taking medication. The report indicated that N.S. would be enrolled in an educational program. A 2015 report indicated that N.S. qualified for extended foster care because her mental health, prevented her from participating in education or an employment program. In 2016, the Agency recommended that N.S.’s dependency be dismissed because her exact whereabouts were unknown and she had not participated in any services. N.S. had admitted she was using methamphetamine. She was not interested in treatment referrals or placement. She was meeting with her therapist, Chan, sporadically. At the contested hearing, both N.S. and Chan testified. Counsel asked Chan about N.S.’s diagnosis; she and N.S. asserted the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The juvenile court concluded the privilege did not apply because N.S. had put her mental state at issue. The court of appeal disagreed, rejecting an argument that the Agency and the court will be unable to verify the eligibility requirement without information from Chan. It is the Agency’s position that it is N.S.’s substance abuse, and not her mental health condition, that prevents her from meeting the criteria. View "N.S. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

B.V.G., a young woman with intellectual disabilities, has been in the sole custody of her father for many years. He was named her temporary guardian when B.V.G. reached age 18. Her maternal grandfather sought to intervene in B.V.G.'s father's permanent guardianship proceedings, asserting that his relationship with B.V.G. has been restricted by her father, that B.V.G. has indicated expressly her desire to communicate with him and has sought contact with him via social media, and that such a relationship is in B.V.G.'s best interests. Concluding that the grandfather lacked standing because he was not an "interested person" within the meaning of G.L. 190B, 5-306(c), a judge denied the motion. The Appeals Court affirmed the denial, on different grounds. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, first holding that the grandfather had standing. The statute is intended to provide a means by which an individual interested in the welfare of an incapacitated person can advocate on behalf of that person and the Massachusetts implementation of the Uniform Probate Code encourages a broad right of advocacy in favor of an incapacitated person's protected interest in a limited guardianship. Once a judge has concluded that a proposed intervener is an "interested person," nothing more is required to establish that person's entitlement to intervene. View "Guardianship of B.V.G." on Justia Law

When Mother was about one-month pregnant, she and N.S.’s father were arrested for illegally growing and possessing marijuana for sale in their Hayward home. About two weeks after N.S. was born, they were again arrested for possessing marijuana for sale in their home. The Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a dependency petition alleging that N.S. faced a substantial risk of harm (Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)). N.S. was placed with a maternal relative who lived in a two-unit building in Union City. Mother moved into the other unit. Visits between Mother and N.S. went well. Mother regularly attended a support group, participated in therapy, repeatedly tested negative for drugs, had no contact with Father, and moved out of the Hayward home, listing it for sale. N.S. had no medical issues and was not alleged to have suffered any physical harm in her parents’ care. The Agency nonetheless recommended that the juvenile court take jurisdiction because Mother had been arrested twice for serious charges. The court sustained the dependency petition, concluding that there was a current risk of harm. While appeal was pending, the juvenile court dismissed dependency jurisdiction, awarding custody to Mother, with supervised visits for Father. The court of appeal dismissed an appeal, noting that Mother suffered no harm as a result of the jurisdictional findings below. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law

A suit was filed on behalf of a minor, Jonnie, alleging that Jonnie, while a kindergartner at in the Hollister School District, was sexually molested at school by another male kindergartener on two occasions. The District sought an order compelling Jonnie to submit to an independent mental examination, which would include personal interviews of Jonnie and his parents by Dr. Kuo, a psychiatrist, and psychological testing of Jonnie by Dr. Hall, a psychologist. The superior court granted the motion. After imposing a stay, the court of appeal vacated the order insofar as it authorized collateral interviews of Jonnie’s parents. The court exceeded its authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.020.1 View "Roe v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 1999, detainees at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center claimed that Center personnel abused detainees. Eight years into the certified class action, the court appointed a “Transitional Administrator” to run the Center in compliance with state and federal requirements. State law, effective in 2008, moved the Center’s management from the county’s political branches to the Circuit Court of Cook County, 55 ILCS 75/3(b), and required the Chief Judge to appoint a new head within 180 days. When the case was argued in 2011, the appointment had not been made. In 2009 the Transitional Administrator proposed reorganization, which would terminate about 225 union employees. The union for Center employees intervened. The district court rejected its position that the proposal would violate several statutes and authorized the implementation, stating that collective-bargaining rights must give way, as a matter of Illinois law, when necessary to effective management. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the judge did not find that overriding the right to bargain was essential to solve any constitutional problem at the Center or about the necessity for a particular remedy to cure any violation. The plan has been in effect for years, and restoring union members to their old positions is not possible. View "Doe v. Teamsters Local Union" on Justia Law

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition, alleging that four minors were at risk of physical harm and emotional damage due to their mother’s conduct. The petition stated that mother had regularly complained (or prompted others to complain) that father physically or sexually abused the children, that these complaints were false, and that mother’s conduct subjected the children to repeated sexual assault examinations and law enforcement interviews, all of which had severe negative consequences on the children: All four had expressed suicidal thoughts; two were placed in involuntary mental health holds; one had gained 40 pounds; and all four were chronically absent from, or tardy to, school. Mother moved to dismiss the petition because she and father are already litigating custody in family court. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeal reversed, stating that to rob the Department of its chance to prove its allegations is to elevate judicial economy above the protection of children, in contravention of the Legislature’s express declaration that dependency jurisdiction be construed broadly. View "In re Nicholas E." on Justia Law

When E.G. was fifteen years old, the Youth Court found him to be delinquent and ordered that he be committed to the Department of Corrections until age eighteen. After remand, the Youth Court stated that it would retain jurisdiction until E.G. was twenty-one and consider transfer of the case to the district court. When E.G. turned eighteen, the Youth Court, after a hearing, transferred supervision of E.G. to the district court. E.G. subsequently violated his probation, and the district court sentenced him to the Department of Corrections until age twenty-five. E.G. appealed, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation and sentence because his parents did not receive notice of the hearing on the State’s motion to transfer supervision of his probation from the Youth Court to the District Court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory parental notice requirement did not withdraw, circumscribe, limit or affect the Youth Court’s jurisdiction over the issue of transferring supervision of E.G. to the District Court. View "In re E.G." on Justia Law

In 2001, the Bryan family’s adopted son, J.O., repeatedly raped and molested his younger foster brother, K.B., in the room the boys shared. After weeks of abuse, K.B. told his foster parents, who contacted the Erie County Office of Children and Youth (ECOCY), which had facilitated J.O.’s adoption, and had J.O. removed from their home. The Bryans blamed ECOCY for K.B.’s ordeal, claiming that ECOCY employees concealed J.O.’s history of violent behavior and sexual misconduct. The Bryans sued ECOCY and seven employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on a theory that permits recovery from state actors when “the state’s own actions create the very danger that causes the plaintiff’s injury.” During trial, the parties agreed to a high-low settlement. Regardless of the verdict, the Bryan family was to receive at least $900,000 and defendants were to pay no more than $2.7 million. The jury returned an $8.6 million verdict; the defendants tendered $2.7 million. The Bryans claimed breach of the settlement agreement’s confidentiality clause, rendering the deal unenforceable. The district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether to enforce those terms or the verdict. The Third Circuit remanded. The case was not dismissed, nor was the verdict satisfied. A district court’s jurisdiction does not terminate at the moment jury deliberations do. View "Bryan v. Erie Cnty. Office of Children & Youth" on Justia Law