Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Similar to "Colorado v. Johnson," (2016 CO 69 (2016)), at issue in this case were questions involving what a trial court could order when a juvenile seeks a reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. Defendant Brooke Higgins was a juvenile respondent before a magistrate judge. The district attorney requested, and Higgins' then-defense-counsel agreed to, a state administered mental health assessment of Higgins. Because the parties agreed, the magistrate judge ordered the assessment. Later, in front of a trial court, the DA dismissed the juvenile charges against Higgins and charged her as an adult with two counts of conspiracy to commit murder. Higgins sought, and the trial court granted, a reverse-transfer hearing to determine whether she should remain in adult court. Before that hearing, Higgins, now represented by different counsel, filed a motion to suppress the mental health assessment and disqualify the trial court judge. The trial court denied both requests, holding that the parties stipulated to the assessment, and there was independent statutory authority for the magistrate judge to order the assessment. Higgins appealed, arguing the trial court lacked authority to order a juvenile-charged-as-an-adult to undergo a mental health assessment for a reverse-transfer hearing. The Supreme Court found that based on the facts of this case, Higgins' arguments, while loosely related to those in "Johnson," were hypothetical and premature. The Court therefore vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Higgins v. Colorado" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were questions involving what a trial court could order when a juvenile seeks a reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. The district attorney directly filed a criminal complaint against defendant Sienna Johnson in trial court, treating her as an adult and charging her with two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Defendant requested a reverse-transfer hearing, and the trial court granted her request. The State appealed, arguing that C.R.S. 19-2-517(3)(b)(VI) (the reverse-transfer statute) required a trial court to evaluate the petitioner's mental health. The DA requested access to defendant's mental health and psychological records and requested a court-ordered mental health assessment. Defendant responded that she should not have to produce the records because she had not waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege in her request for a reverse-transfer, and the statute did not give the trial court authority to order an assessment. The trial court ruled in favor of the DA on both counts. The Supreme Court concluded after review: (1) nothing in the reverse-transfer statute stated that a juvenile waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege by requesting a reverse-transfer hearing, so the trial court could not order her to produce her mental records; and (2) nothing in the statute gave the trial court explicit authority to order the mental health assessment. The case was therefore remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this juvenile delinquency case, the prosecution filed an interlocutory appeal seeking the Supreme Court's review of a magistrate's order suppressing certain statements made by the juvenile during a police interrogation. Because the magistrate's suppression order was never reviewed and adopted (with or without modification) by the district court before the appeal was filed, the Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction, and accordingly dismissed the appeal. View "Colorado v. S.X.G." on Justia Law

The juvenile court found that Respondent J.L.B. (Father) had abandoned A.B. (Child) and that therefore the Child was available for adoption by Petitioner D.P.H. (Stepfather). The juvenile court also determined that the fact that Father had filed parenting-time motions in the dissolution court did not outweigh overwhelming evidence of abandonment, including the fact that Father had not seen the Child in the twenty-one months prior to the filing of the adoption proceeding. Father appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed. The court determined that a finding of abandonment was precluded by the fact that Father had filed motions for parenting time in the dissolution court. The court also concluded that the juvenile court should have delayed the adoption determination until the parenting-time motions were resolved. Upon review of the case by the Supreme Court, the Court concluded that the "[i]t is the trial court's responsibility to consider the totality of the circumstances and to make this factual determination, which is to be disturbed only if it is clearly erroneous. ...It was therefore error for the court of appeals to determine that a single circumstance (the father's filing of a parenting-time motion) precluded a finding of intent to abandon, essentially as a matter of law." In addition, the Court found it was unnecessary for a trial court to delay adoption proceedings until a parenting-time motion in another court is resolved, so long as the trial court adequately considered the parenting-time motion in making its abandonment determination. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "D.P.H. v. J.L.B" on Justia Law

Colorado state law makes it a felony for a person to have unlawful sexual contact with a child while occupying a "position of trust." Petitioner Mark Pellman appealed an order of the Court of Appeals that found that he was in a position of trust at the time of the unlawful contact between himself and his child victim. Petitioner was a friend of the victim's family, and from 2000-2005, visited with the family, attended the same church, and babysat the victim. In 2005, Petitioner chaperoned a trip to an amusement park when the alleged contact took place. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that he was only in a position of trust at specific times, the last of which was when he chaperoned the amusement park trip. The appellate court rejected this argument, and after review, the Supreme Court rejected it as well. The Supreme Court found that under the language of the applicable statute, a defendant might be in a position of trust through an ongoing a continuous supervisory relationship with the victim, regardless of whether or not the defendant was performing a specific supervisory task at the time of the unlawful contact. The Court found sufficient evidence to support the appellate court and affirmed its decision. View "Pellman v. Colorado" on Justia Law