Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A juvenile male, B.N.M., was accused of participating in the murder of his girlfriend’s parents when he was fifteen years old. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma transferred him to adult status, allowing him to be prosecuted as an adult. B.N.M. challenged this decision, arguing that the district court made errors in its analysis and that transferring him for adult prosecution was unconstitutional due to the severe penalties for first-degree murder.The district court's decision was based on the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, which outlines factors to consider when deciding whether to transfer a juvenile for adult prosecution. The magistrate judge found that the nature of the offense and the availability of programs to treat the juvenile’s behavioral problems weighed in favor of transfer. The magistrate judge noted that if B.N.M. were adjudicated as a juvenile, he would be released at twenty-one, and there was a low likelihood of sufficient rehabilitation by that age. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, despite B.N.M.'s objections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. B.N.M. argued that the district court erred by misattributing testimony from the government’s expert to his expert and by not properly considering his role as a follower in the crimes. He also argued that the district court improperly shifted the burden of proof regarding the availability of community programs for his rehabilitation. The Tenth Circuit found that the misattribution of testimony did not affect the outcome and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the factors. The court also held that B.N.M.'s constitutional argument was not ripe for review. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to transfer B.N.M. for adult prosecution. View "United States v. B.N.M." on Justia Law

In November 2004, a sixteen-year-old juvenile stalked and robbed a victim at gunpoint, repeatedly raped her in her home, and then bound, gagged, and robbed her roommate when she arrived. He was sentenced to state prison for aggravated rape and other offenses, with a period of parole ineligibility compliant with constitutional requirements. After serving his prison term, he was placed on probation for the remaining nonhomicide offenses.In March 2007, the juvenile was adjudicated as a youthful offender and sentenced to sixteen to twenty years in state prison for aggravated rape, with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for other offenses. In 2021, following a court decision, his sentence was restructured to comply with constitutional requirements, reducing his parole ineligibility to fifteen years. He was released from prison in January 2022 and began a five-year probation term. In August 2022, he was arrested for new offenses, leading to a probation violation notice and detention.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the restructured sentence, including the probation term, did not violate constitutional protections against cruel or unusual punishment. The court emphasized that the probation term provided the juvenile with an opportunity for rehabilitation and reintegration into the community. The court also noted that any potential further incarceration resulting from a probation violation would be subject to constitutional constraints, ensuring that the juvenile would not be treated more harshly than a juvenile convicted of murder for parole eligibility purposes. The court affirmed the order denying the juvenile's motion for relief from unlawful restraint. View "Commonwealth v. Sajid S." on Justia Law

In 2000, Antonio McDowell, a juvenile at the time, was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole. Following a 2012 Supreme Court ruling in Miller v. Alabama, which deemed mandatory life sentences without parole for juvenile defendants unconstitutional, McDowell's sentence was vacated. The trial court then proceeded with a jury trial for sentencing under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-101. The jury, after considering evidence related to the Miller criteria, was unable to agree on a sentence. The trial judge, instead of imposing a sentence of life, sentenced McDowell to life without parole, a decision that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.The Mississippi Supreme Court, on certiorari review, found that the trial court's decision to proceed with a jury trial for sentencing under Section 99-19-101 made the section applicable to the entirety of the proceedings. This applicability continued when the jury failed to agree on a sentence. Therefore, the trial court erred by conducting the Miller analysis and sentencing McDowell to life without parole. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court and remanded the case back to the trial court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "McDowell v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves Damon L. Taylor, who was charged with felony murder in the adult court after the juvenile court found probable cause to believe that Taylor was complicit in a murder. The adult court convicted Taylor of felony murder, but the Tenth District Court of Appeals vacated the conviction, arguing that the adult court lacked jurisdiction to convict Taylor of felony murder as the juvenile court had not found probable cause for that specific offense. The appellate court also ruled that Taylor's statements to the police should have been suppressed as his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated.The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed with the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the adult court did have jurisdiction over the felony-murder charge against Taylor. The court reasoned that the felony-murder charge was rooted in the same acts and events as the complicity-to-commit-murder charge, which was the subject of the juvenile complaint. Therefore, under former R.C. 2151.23(H), the adult court had jurisdiction over the felony-murder charge.Regarding Taylor's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Supreme Court held that this right did not attach until a criminal prosecution had commenced, which occurred after the police interrogated Taylor. Therefore, the state did not violate Taylor's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it interviewed him in the absence of his attorney. Even if the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached, Taylor validly waived it when he relinquished his Fifth Amendment right to counsel after he received the Miranda warnings.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and remanded the matter to that court for further proceedings. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The case involves a juvenile, J.L.J., who was charged with first-degree felony murder and several other offenses after he opened fire on a car, killing a 12-year-old boy. J.L.J. was certified for adult prosecution and testified that he was acting in self-defense. The jury rejected his self-defense claim and convicted him on all charges.The case was previously heard in the Leavenworth District Court where J.L.J. was convicted. On appeal, J.L.J. raised several claims of error, including prosecutorial errors and the argument that the State unconstitutionally pitted his right to prepare for his defense against his right to testify at trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that while the prosecutor erred by asking potential jurors if they would do their "job" and convict J.L.J., this error was harmless and did not affect the jury's verdict. The court also disagreed with J.L.J.'s argument that the prosecutor misstated the law on self-defense during closing argument. Furthermore, the court found that the State's impeachment of J.L.J. did not violate the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine. Lastly, the court declined to invoke an exception to the general preservation rule to address J.L.J.'s argument that the adult certification process violates his constitutional rights. View "State v. J.L.J." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Nevada addressed whether the provision under NRS 62C.200(1)(b) violates the separation of powers doctrine. This provision requires the district attorney's written approval before a juvenile court may dismiss a delinquency petition and refer a juvenile to informal supervision. The appellant, a juvenile referred to as I.S., was adjudicated a delinquent and placed on formal probation. I.S. appealed, arguing that the provision infringed upon the court's sentencing discretion, essentially granting an unconstitutional prosecutorial veto.The court concluded that I.S.'s appeal was not moot, despite the completion of his juvenile supervision, due to the presumption of collateral consequences of such an adjudication until the juvenile reaches age 18 and/or their juvenile record is sealed.On the main issue, the court held that the requirement under NRS 62C.200(1)(b) does not contravene the separation of powers doctrine. The court reasoned that this provision does not involve a sentencing decision. Rather, the court perceived it as akin to a charging decision, which is within the executive realm. The court further noted that, unlike adult courts, the juvenile court's authority is not derived from the constitution but is limited to the authority expressly prescribed to it by statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order, holding that the requirement for the district attorney's written approval before a juvenile court can dismiss a petition does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. View "In re I.S." on Justia Law

This case before the Indiana Supreme Court concerns a juvenile, A.W., who was adjudicated for possession of a machine gun and dangerous possession of a firearm. The court was asked to determine if these adjudications violated the principle of double jeopardy under Indiana law. A.W. asserted that he did not know the firearm he possessed had been modified to function as a machine gun.The court found that A.W.'s exclusive possession of the modified gun, along with his abrupt flight from police, supported the conclusion that he knowingly or intentionally possessed a machine gun. This satisfied the first part of the court's inquiry.On the issue of double jeopardy, the court noted that while the Indiana Constitution could apply in juvenile proceedings, it avoided deciding that issue. Instead, it focused on whether possession of a dangerous firearm is a lesser-included offense of possession of a machine gun under the test set out in the case Wadle v. State. The court found that it was, meaning A.W.'s adjudications for both offenses violated his rights under the principle of double jeopardy. Therefore, the court affirmed the finding that A.W. knowingly possessed a machine gun but reversed the adjudication that he committed dangerous possession of a firearm. View "A. W. v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, the appellant, the State of Kansas, challenged a trial court's decision to suppress the confession of a minor identified as G.O. The trial court had determined that the confession was not voluntary, and therefore inadmissible. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, prompting G.O. to appeal to the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Kansas considered whether G.O.'s waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights and his confession were voluntary. Under the Fifth Amendment, an individual has the right to remain silent and not incriminate themselves. This right can be waived if the individual voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently chooses to speak. The court also examined whether G.O.’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated, which protect against involuntary confessions being used as evidence.The court found that while G.O. had been read his Miranda rights, the detective conducting the interview had made misleading statements that suggested G.O. was not in trouble and would not be arrested. The detective further suggested that the purpose of the interview was to help G.O.'s stepsister, which the court found was deceptive.The court also took into account G.O.’s age, his mental health issues, his lack of experience with law enforcement, and his educational struggles. The court concluded that these factors, in combination with the detective’s misleading statements, induced G.O. to confess involuntarily.Therefore, the court held that the trial court was correct in suppressing G.O.'s confession. It reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "State v. G.O." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether a violation of a juvenile defendant's Fifth Amendment right is subject to appellate review for harmless error. The case involved Nazeer Taylor, who was charged with several serious felony offenses as a juvenile. The juvenile court transferred Taylor's case to adult criminal court, considering Taylor's refusal to admit guilt for his alleged offenses as a factor in its decision. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania previously held that such consideration violated Taylor's Fifth Amendment right. In this appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the violation constituted a structural error, not subject to a harmless error review. Given Taylor's current age of 27, neither the juvenile nor the adult criminal court had the statutory authority to conduct a new certification hearing. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court reversing Taylor's conviction and discharging him. View "Commonwealth v. Taylor" on Justia Law

In this case, a Superior Court judge in Massachusetts sought guidance from the Supreme Judicial Court on three questions involving the pretrial confinement of a juvenile charged with murder. The juvenile, who was sixteen years old when he was charged with second-degree murder, was initially held without bail at a Department of Youth Services (DYS) facility due to a "courtesy" arrangement with the county sheriff. As the juvenile neared his eighteenth birthday, he was informed that he would be moved to an adult facility. In response, a Superior Court judge released him on personal recognizance on the murder charge and set bail on a related non-murder charge, ordering that he stay at the DYS facility.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was asked to determine: 1) whether a Superior Court judge can commit a person under age eighteen charged with murder to DYS's care as a pre-trial detainee; 2) if not, can a Superior Court judge set bail on a charge related to, but other than murder, so that the person under eighteen is not held on bail on the murder charge and is committed to DYS's care; and 3) if the answers to questions 1 and 2 are "No," is the last paragraph of G. L. c. 119, § 68 (which mandates that juveniles charged with murder be committed to the custody of the sheriff) unconstitutional?The Supreme Judicial Court declined to answer the third question due to mootness, as the defendant had since turned eighteen and pleaded guilty to manslaughter. Regarding the first two questions, the court referred to its previous ruling in Nicholas-Taylor v. Commonwealth and affirmed that a Superior Court judge does not have the authority to commit a juvenile defendant charged with murder to the custody of DYS, nor can they sidestep this requirement by committing the juvenile to DYS on a related non-murder offense. Therefore, the answers to the first and second questions were "No." View "Commonwealth v. Padilla" on Justia Law