Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The State of New Jersey charged fourteen-year-old D.M. with delinquency based on conduct which, if committed by an adult, would constitute first-degree aggravated sexual assault. The State alleged D.M. committed acts of sexual penetration against an eleven-year-old acquaintance, Z.Y. With the parties’ consent, the Family Part judge considered the lesser-related charge of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on whether a juvenile could be adjudicated delinquent for endangering the welfare of a child when the juvenile and his alleged victim were fewer than four years apart in age and the Family Part judge made no findings of sexual penetration, force, or coercion. An Appellate Division panel reversed the juvenile adjudication, reasoning that the Legislature did not intend for the endangering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), to support a delinquency adjudication based on a juvenile’s sexual contact with another minor fewer than four years younger than he, in the absence of a finding of sexual penetration, force, or coercion. The New Jersey Supreme Court did not concur with the Appellate Division panel’s construction of the endangering statute. Although the Legislature may decide that statute: "nothing in the current text of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) precludes the adjudication in this case. We decline to rewrite the statute’s plain language in this appeal." The Court concluded, however, that the Family Part court’s adjudication had to be reversed: "When the court, at the disposition hearing, disavowed critical aspects of its previously-stated factual findings and characterized its decision to adjudicate D.M. under the lesser-related offense as a humanitarian gesture, it undermined its determination as to both offenses. In this extraordinary setting, it is unclear whether the State met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that D.M. violated N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1)." View "New Jersey in the Interest of D.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court ruling in favor of the Iowa Parole Board (Board) as to Petitioner's action challenging the manner in which the Board considers whether persons convicted of offenses while a juvenile should be granted parole, holding that the district court did not err.Petitioner was sixteen years old when he committed the crime of kidnapping. In his petition for judicial review brought pursuant to the Iowa Code 17A.19, Petitioner sought a declaratory judgment that a variety of substantive and procedural rights are required when a juvenile offender is considered for parole. The district court denied the Board's motion to dismiss and then proceeded to rule in favor of the Board on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) dismissal was not appropriate without analyzing the merits of the underlying constitutional claims; (2) the statute and rules governing the parole process can be applied in a constitutional manner through the required Graham-Miller lens; (3) a juvenile offender has a liberty interest in the proper application of Graham-Miller principles under the Due Process Clause; and (4) Petitioner failed to establish any constitutional violations. View "Bonilla v. Iowa Board of Parole" on Justia Law

J.M., a minor, was adjudged a ward of the court and placed on probation with various terms and conditions after he made a false report that a bomb or other explosive device would be placed in his school. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that J.M.'s words were not protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Penal Code section 148.1, subdivision (c) is not unconstitutionally overbroad. The court held that subdivision (c) of section 148.1 criminalizes the malicious communication of knowingly false information about placement of a bomb or other explosive, and such utterances are not constitutionally protected speech. View "People v. J.M." on Justia Law

This case presented a narrow question of whether Senate Bill No. 1391 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1012, section 1) (S.B. 1391) was void as an unconstitutional amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 as modified by the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Proposition 57). The State filed two petitions for a writ of mandate seeking relief from separate orders by respondent Superior Court of Sacramento County, which refused to transfer real parties in interest R.Z. and K.L. from juvenile to criminal court for purposes of criminal prosecution based on section 707 as modified by legislative enactment of S.B. 1391. The State charged K.L., 15 at the time of the alleged conduct, with felony murder, attempted murder and shooting into an occupied vehicle, with additional allegations K.L. personally discharged a firearm causing death or great bodily injury, all in association with involvement with a street gang. R.Z. was also 15 at the time of the alleged conduct, arraigned on a juvenile petition because he committed murder and personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death in the commission of the homicide. The trial court found R.Z. unfit for juvenile court and granted the State's motion transferring R.Z. to criminal court. However, the trial court stayed execution of that order until January 2019 so that it could determine the effect of S.B. 1391 on its order transferring the minor. Over the State's opposition, on January 10, 2019, the trial court dismissed the motion to transfer R.Z. to criminal court, vacated its prior order transferring the minor, and sent the matter to juvenile court. The State argued S.B. 1391’s bar on the transfer of minors under the age of 16 for criminal prosecution as adults was unconstitutional because it did not further the intent and purpose of Proposition 57. The Court of Appeal disagreed and denied the State's petitions for mandamus relief. View "California v. Superior Court (K.L.)" on Justia Law

Barry Garcia appealed a district court's denial of his request for a new trial and determining N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-13.1 did not apply to his criminal sentence. In 1996, Garcia was found guilty of the offense of murder, committed while he was a juvenile, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. In 2016, Garcia filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that imposing a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile violated the constitutional standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). While Garcia’s appeal was pending, the North Dakota legislature passed HB 1195, which was enacted on April 17, 2017 as N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-13.1 and effective August 1, 2017. The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to rule on Garcia’s request to apply N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-13.1 because it had not been raised at the district court, and ruled without remanding the issue. Following the appeal of the 2016 denial of post-conviction relief, Garcia filed a motion for a new trial in the district court. The court found that a motion for a new trial was not the correct vehicle for requesting relief under N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-13.1, but pursuant to the consent of both parties, agreed to consider whether N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-13.1 applied to Garcia. After a hearing, the court issued an order denying the motion for a new trial and finding N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-13.1 did not apply. The Supreme Court determined Garcia’s conviction was final before the statute’s effective date; granting his requested relief would require retroactive application of the statute and would constitute an infringement on the executive pardoning power. Furthermore, Garcia failed to provide newly discovered evidence to support his motion for a new trial. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Garcia v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

M.M. appeals from a juvenile court order denying his motion to dismiss a juvenile petition pertaining to an underlying juvenile delinquency case after entering conditional admissions to committing delinquent acts of simple assault and contact by bodily fluids. On October 17, 2017, a juvenile petition was filed with the juvenile court. At the time the juvenile petition was filed, M.M. resided at the Youth Correctional Center (“YCC”). M.M. made his initial appearance on November 7, 2017. A pretrial conference was scheduled for November 14, 2017, and trial was set for November 27, 2017. On November 21, 2017, M.M. moved to dismiss the petition, arguing the hearing on the petition was not held within the required time limits for a child in detention. M.M. simultaneously requested a continuance in order to allow him to complete discovery. The State opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing the motion itself was untimely and that M.M. was not a child in detention. The juvenile court denied M.M.’s motion to dismiss but granted his request for a continuance, delaying the trial an additional month. On January 16, 2018, M.M. admitted to the allegations of delinquent acts on a conditional basis, preserving his right to appeal. M.M. argued the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because the hearing on the petition was not held within 30 days of the filing of the petition. M.M. conceded at oral argument that he was no longer contesting a violation regarding the timing of the initial hearing on the petition. The North Dakota Supreme Court found M.M.’s initial and adjudicative hearings were scheduled within time constraints prescribed by North Dakota Rules of Juvenile Procedure, therefore affirming the juvenile court order denying his motion to dismiss. View "Interest of M.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that two Minnesota statutes - Minn. Stat. 609.749, subd. 2(6), the stalking-by-mail provision, and Minn. Stat. 609.795, subd. 1(3), the mail-harassment statute - are constitutional under the First Amendment, holding that both statutes are facially overbroad.A.J.B. was found guilty of gross-misdemeanor stalking by use of the mail, misdemeanor harassment by use of the mail, and felony stalking. The court of appeals affirmed A.J.B.'s adjudications for stalking by mail and mail harassment, thus rejecting his constitutional challenges. On appeal, A.J.B. argued that his adjudications under the stalking-by-mail provision and mail-harassment statute must be vacated as contravening the First Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) section 609.749, subd. 2(6), is facially overbroad and not subject to either a narrowing construction or severance of unconstitutional provisions; (2) section 609.795, subd. 1(3), is facially overbroad, but the statute can be saved through severance of the constitutionally problematic language; and (3) because it is unclear whether Defendant's adjudication of delinquency for mail-harassment is based on the severed language, Defendant's adjudication under section 609.795, subd. 1(3), is reversed and the case remanded. View "In re A.J.B." on Justia Law

In this case, a juvenile, "T.B." texted a picture of his erect penis to two underage girls and then repeatedly asked the girls to text him naked pictures of themselves. After initially resisting, both girls eventually complied and texted nude selfies to the juvenile. T.B. kept these sexts on his cell phone, where they were discovered by law enforcement in 2013. The question this case presented was whether T.B. could be adjudicated delinquent for sexual exploitation of a child under section 18-6-403(3), C.R.S. (2018), for possessing these images. At a bench trial, T.B. argued that the prosecution failed to prove that he knowingly possessed erotic nudity for the purpose of the overt sexual gratification of a “person involved.” The court rejected this argument and adjudicated T.B. delinquent on both counts. A split court of appeals affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court granted review to determine the proper standard of review for an unpreserved sufficiency of the evidence claim and to review whether the court of appeals misconstrued section 18-6-403(3)(b.5) in holding the evidence was sufficient to support T.B.’s adjudication for sexual exploitation of a child. The Court was satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that the images constituted “erotic nudity” (and therefore “sexually exploitative material”) for purposes of the sexual exploitation of a child statute. View "Colorado in the Interest of T.B." on Justia Law

After being charged with first degree murder as an adult in district court, Brandon Brown exercised his statutory right to request a “reverse transfer” to juvenile court. In doing so, he asked the Colorado Supreme Court to address whether he could temporarily waive privilege as to certain information at the reverse-transfer hearing without suffering a continued waiver at trial. The Court held he could not: nothing in the reverse-transfer statute gave Brown the ability to make such a limited waiver. "And, neither common law scope-of-waiver limitations nor constitutional principles regarding impermissibly burdening rights changes that result. By disclosing otherwise privileged information in open court during a reverse-transfer hearing, Brown would waive privilege as to any such information at trial." View "Colorado v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's sentence of three consecutive terms of life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole after forty-five years, in connection with his conviction of three counts of murder in the first degree, holding that the sentence was within constitutional bounds.Defendant was a juvenile homicide offender and sought resentencing when he was well into adulthood. After the Supreme Judicial Court decided Commonwealth v. Costa, 472 Mass. 139 (2015), the Commonwealth conceded that Defendant was entitled to a resentencing hearing. After a hearing, the sentencing judge reinstated Defendant's sentence. Defendant then filed an application with the Supreme Court pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E for leave to appeal from the resentencing judge's ruling, as well as a motion for direct entry of the appeal. The single justice directed entry of the appeal on the question of whether a juvenile homicide offender may be required to serve forty-five years in prison before his first opportunity to seek release based on rehabilitation. The Supreme Judicial Court held that Defendant's sentence did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment in violation of article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. View "Commonwealth v. LaPlante" on Justia Law