Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Daniel Marsh, one month shy of his 16th birthday, stalked a Davis neighborhood at night and randomly selected the home of two victims to satisfy a long-standing (and oft-expressed) desire to kill, after which he mutilated their bodies. He was found guilty by jury of two counts of first degree murder (finding that he personally used a deadly weapon in each instance) and sustained allegations of three special circumstances. Defendant was found sane at the time of the offenses. After making an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the sentence, the trial court imposed an indeterminate life sentence with a minimum term of 52 years. The case was not fully briefed until July 2017. On appeal, defendant argued Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which respectively prohibited the mandatory punishment of life without parole for minors for any offense, or the death penalty under any circumstances, even for minors who commit homicide. Both cases applied in the context of a sanity determination, requiring the resurrection of the doctrine abrogated under California law in which an “irresistible impulse” test was applied to determine a defendant’s sanity. Defendant argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that the sanity phase had to be reversed and retried with instructions on this rejected standard. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal noted that in supplemental briefing, defendant had “deeply disturbed mental functioning,” that did not of itself align with the criteria absolving a defendant on the ground of insanity. The judgment of the criminal court was conditionally reversed and the matter remanded to the juvenile court with direction to hold a juvenile transfer hearing to determine defendant’s suitability for treatment in juvenile or criminal court within 90 days of the issuance of the Court of Appeals’ remittitur. If the juvenile court determined that defendant was the proper subject of criminal proceedings, it shall reinstate the criminal judgment. If the juvenile court finds that it would not have transferred defendant to a court of criminal jurisdiction, then it shall deem defendant’s convictions to be juvenile adjudications and conduct a dispositional hearing within its usual time frame. View "California v. Marsh" on Justia Law

Robert Veal was convicted for crimes committed in the course of two armed robberies on November 22, 2010. After a jury found Veal guilty of malice murder and other offenses charged in the indictment against him, the trial court sentenced him to imprisonment for life without parole (“LWOP”) for malice murder; six consecutive life sentences for rape, aggravated sodomy, and four armed robbery convictions; and sentences totaling 60 consecutive years for other convictions involved in the case. Veal argued in his first appeal that because he was under 18 years of age at the time of his crimes, his LWOP sentence was improperly imposed. The Georgia Supreme Court agreed; the trial court made no determination on the record with respect to whether Veal was “irreparably corrupt or permanently incorrigible, as necessary to put him in the narrow class of juvenile murderers for whom an LWOP sentence was proportional under the Eighth Amendment.” Accordingly, the Court vacated the LWOP sentence and remanded the case for resentencing on that count. At the sentencing hearing the trial court conducted on remand, the State announced it would forgo seeking LWOP and, instead, asked the court to impose two additional consecutive life with parole sentences (for the malice murder conviction and one of the armed robbery counts that the trial court previously incorrectly merged with the murder conviction) in addition to the other consecutive life sentences already imposed. Veal introduced published life expectancy tables to support his assertion that the recommended sentence would exceed his life expectancy. The trial court, however, rejected Veal’s assertion that this would amount to a de facto life without parole sentence, and imposed the State’s recommended sentence without making an individualized determination regarding the appropriateness of the sentence pursuant to Miller. Finding no reversible error to this sentence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Veal v. Georgia" on Justia Law

This case presented the issue of whether a trial court has authority to dismiss a prosecutor’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty prior to trial. Appellant Tracen Franklin was eighteen years old at the time of the events involved in this case. He was one of four young men indicted for malice murder and felony murder (predicated on aggravated assault) for beating and kicking to death Bobby Tillman after a teen party. Several trial witnesses identified Franklin as one of three others who joined in, and the four men severely beat, kicked, and stomped Tillman, who was later pronounced dead at the hospital as a result of a ruptured right ventricle of the heart caused by blunt impact. After a period of jury deliberation, the trial court declared the jury to be deadlocked on the issue of punishment. The trial court then sentenced Franklin to life without parole. The trial court denied Franklin’s motion for new trial. On appeal, Franklin claimed the prosecutor sought the death penalty in this case in bad faith, in an attempt to improve the odds of a conviction by seating a death-qualified jury. Even though the death penalty was not imposed, Franklin argued the Georgia Supreme Court should have granted a new trial where a bad-faith purpose for seeking the death penalty is shown. He argued that bad faith was demonstrated in this case because, pursuant to the notice of statutory aggravating circumstances and the evidence the State could (and ultimately did) present in support of these circumstances, he was not eligible for the death penalty as a matter of law. The Supreme Court determined the issue raised by Franklin’s appeal had been decided adversely to appellant’s position, and the Court was not persuaded to change its longstanding ruling on the issue. View "Franklin v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Brian Buckman pleaded guilty to second degree rape of a child. After sentencing, Buckman learned that he had been misinformed of the sentencing range that applied to him. Based on this misinformation, Buckman sought to withdraw his plea as involuntary. Because Buckman's motion to withdraw was a collateral attack on his judgment and sentence, he had to show that his plea was involuntary, and actual and substantial prejudice resulting from that error. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Buckman's plea was involuntary because he was misinformed that he might be sentenced to life in prison despite the fact that the statute provided that a sentence of life in prison could not apply to a 17-year-old (Buckman's age at the time of the offense). But the Court also held he was not entitled to withdraw his plea because he failed to show that the misinformation provided at the time of his plea caused him actual and substantial prejudice. As a result, the Supreme Court denied the motion to withdraw and remanded for resentencing only. View "Washington v. Buckman" on Justia Law

At age of 19, defendant Montrell Woods shot Kenny Hernandez to death during a confrontation between the two men at an apartment complex. A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder and of being a felon in possession of a firearm and also found he personally discharged a firearm causing death. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 15 years to life for the murder and to a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53. At the time of defendant’s sentencing, the enhancement statute provided that “[n]otwithstanding [Penal Code s]ection 1385 or any other provision of law, the court shall not strike an allegation under this section or a finding bringing a person within the provisions of this section.” On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to bifurcate the possession of a firearm charge from the murder charge, the court erroneously excluded evidence of the victim’s propensity for violence, the prosecutor committed two acts of misconduct, the court committed multiple instances of instructional error, and cumulative error resulted. Defendant also argued should have been remanded to the trial court so that he can make an adequate record for a future youth offender parole hearing and so that the trial court can exercise its discretion as to whether to strike the firearm enhancement based on a recent change to Penal Code section 12022.53 that took effect on January 1, 2018. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found no merit to defendant’s claims of trial court error and prosecutorial misconduct. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court concluded defendant already had sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing, but agree that remand was necessary to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion as to whether to strike the firearm enhancement under the recent amendment to Penal Code section 12022.53. View "California v. Woods" on Justia Law

C.B. appealed a juvenile court order adopting a judicial referee's order finding C.B. failed to register as a sex offender. In June 2012, C.B. pled guilty to "assault IV with sexual motivation" in Washington state. The adjudication and disposition order did not require C.B. to register as a sex offender in Washington. In the fall of 2012, C.B. moved to North Dakota with his father. At the request of the juvenile court, C.B. registered as a sex offender in North Dakota in November 2013. In May 2015, C.B. updated his registration at the Bismarck Police Department. After updating his registration, an assistant Burleigh County state's attorney issued a juvenile petition to C.B. for committing the delinquent act of failure to register as a sex offender. The petition alleged C.B. failed to timely "alert law enforcement to a new job, a new place of residence, a telephone number or his facebook account." C.B. moved to dismiss the petition, arguing he should not be required to register. At an October 2015 hearing on the motion, an assistant attorney general testified C.B.'s assault IV with sexual motivation in Washington was equivalent to a class A misdemeanor sexual offense in North Dakota that required registration. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judicial referee stated he was dismissing the petition, and issued an order of dismissal. Shortly thereafter, the referee rescinded the order of dismissal, stating he decided the motion wrongly due to a legal error. The judicial referee provided notice to the parties the same day that they had the right to have the order reviewed by a juvenile court judge if the request was made within seven days. C.B. did not request review of the order. C.B. again moved to dismiss the petition in November 2015, arguing the judicial referee exceeded his authority when he rescinded the order dismissing the petition. The referee denied the motion. C.B. sought review of the referee's decision from the juvenile court. The juvenile court adopted the referee's decision denying the motion. C.B. filed another motion to dismiss in December 2015, arguing the State failed to give full faith and credit to the Washington order that did not require C.B. to register as a sex offender. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed: although C.B. was not required to register as a sex offender in Washington, Full Faith and Credit does not prohibit North Dakota from requiring C.B. to register. View "Interest of C.B." on Justia Law

The State of New Mexico appealed the suppression of two statements made by sixteen-year-old Filemon V. Filemon made the first statement to his probation officers. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that, absent a valid waiver, Section 32A-2-14(C) of the Delinquency Act of the Children’s Code precluded the admission of Filemon’s statement to his probation officers while in investigatory detention. The Court affirmed the district court’s order suppressing the use of the statement in a subsequent prosecution. The second contested statement was elicited by police officers at the Silver City Police Department. Filemon was at this point in custody, and entitled to be warned of his Miranda rights. At issue was whether the midstream Miranda warnings were sufficient to inform Filemon of his rights. The Supreme Court concluded the warnings were insufficient under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). Because the statement was elicited in clear violation of the Fifth Amendment and Section 32A-2- 19 14, the district court’s suppression of the statement was affirmed. View "New Mexico v. Filemon V." on Justia Law

School administrator Cushman received a text message indicating that a student had a loaded gun at school. The tipster had received a SnapChat video showing a student, in a classroom, displaying a gun and a magazine clip. Cushman saw the video and identified the student as K.J., based on the tipster's description. The principal removed K.J. from class and escorted him to the hallway where a school resource officer and a backup police officer were waiting. A search of K.J. revealed a semi-automatic handgun and rounds of ammunition. Cushman knew but declined to reveal the tipster's identity due to her fear of retaliation. The parties stipulated that she would be treated as an anonymous tipster. Following a combined motion to suppress and jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging K.J. possessed a weapon on school grounds. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting K.J.’s argument that he was detained and searched without reasonable suspicion. Substantial evidence supported findings that the actions of the school officer, detaining K.J. on school property, were neither arbitrary, capricious, nor harassment. In balancing the grave threat to students and staff posed by a student carrying a firearm against the minimally intrusive nature of removing a student from class, the detention was lawful. View "In re K.J." on Justia Law

In 2013, the juvenile court declared defendant-appellant, R.G. (Minor, born in April 2000), a dependent of the court. In 2016, while Minor remained a dependent of the juvenile court, the State filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging Minor had committed misdemeanor battery. After denying Minor’s request to refer the matter for a Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.12 assessment and report, Minor admitted the allegation that she had committed misdemeanor battery. The court declared Minor a ward of the court, placed her on formal probation, placed her in the custody of Children and Family Services (CFS), and scheduled the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 241.1. After subsequently receiving a section 241.1 report, the court again declared Minor a ward of the court with “CFS lead jurisdiction.” On appeal, Minor contended the juvenile court prejudicially erred by refusing to refer the matter for a section 241.1 assessment, report, and hearing prior to taking jurisdiction, resulting in violations of Minor’s statutory and due process rights. Moreover, Minor argued the subsequent section 241.1 report and hearing were statutorily inadequate. CFS countered Minor forfeited any contention the section 241.1 report was untimely or inadequate and that any error was harmless. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the court erred by refusing to refer the matter for a section 241.1 report prior to making a determination of Minor’s status and holding the jurisdictional hearing. Furthermore, the subsequent section 241.1 report was inadequate to overcome the court’s initial error, and this error was not harmless. View "In re R.G." on Justia Law

L.B.C. appeals the Forrest County Youth Court’s requirement that he register as a sex offender. In 2015, L.B.C. sexually battered two six-year-old girls. L.B.C. admitted to sexually penetrating the two victims with his fingers. At the time, L.B.C. was fourteen years old. Each of the four issues appealed by L.B.C. arose from the registration requirement: (1) his delinquency adjudication of sexual battery did not involve the use of force and was not an offense that required him to register as a sex offender; (2) requiring registration without an individual determination that he was a threat to the public violated his constitutional rights; (3) he should not be required to register as a sex offender since he had a mental age of nine and had been fourteen years old for only three months at the time of the incidents; and (4) requiring him to register as a sex offender violated the confidentiality requirements of youth-court proceedings. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the disposition of the youth court. View "In the Interest of L.B.C. v. Forrest County Youth Court" on Justia Law