Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In the midst of a group contacted by officers for smoking cannabis on the street, 16-year-old T.F.-G. witnessed first one and then another of his companions be restrained, searched, and made to sit on the curb as the officers worked their way through the group. T.F.-G. ran. Chased, tackled, and punched, he was arrested for resisting or delaying a peace officer (Pen. Code 148(a)). In a search incident to that arrest, the police found a loaded handgun in his pocket, which T.F.-G. was not licensed to carry.The court of appeal affirmed his convictions. The totality of the circumstances, establishing the existence of probable cause for his arrest for resisting or delaying a peace officer—the asserted basis for the eventual search that revealed his possession of a loaded handgun in public–indicated that a reasonable person in T.F.-G.’s position would have understood he was not free to leave. The court also rejected a Second Amendment facial challenge to the prohibition on the unlicensed public carrying of loaded firearms. Although California’s “good cause” licensing requirement is undisputedly unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s 2022 “Bruen” decision, the unconstitutionality of a discrete licensing requirement does not render section 25850 facially unconstitutional. View "In re T.F.-G." on Justia Law

The San Bernardino County District Attorney filed a petition against defendant-appellant J.P. alleging he committed second degree robbery, assault with a firearm and carrying a loaded firearm not registered to him in a vehicle. A court found all three allegations true and sustained the petition. On appeal, J.P. argued Welfare and Institutions Code section 875 precluded commitment to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) unless the juvenile’s most recent offense was listed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b), and J.P.’s most recent offense, the gun possession, was not such an offense. The State moved to dismiss the gun possession offense, to which J.P. objected, arguing that the court only had the power to strike the entre petition, not any single allegation. The court granted the State’s motion, dismissed the gun offense, and committed J.P. to an SYTF. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re J.P." on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Rodriguez pleaded guilty to felony offenses committed when he was sixteen years old under a plea and disposition agreement, and following an amenability hearing, the district court imposed an adult sentence. Defendant appealed the amenability determination, and on its own motion, the Court of Appeals held that under the plea and disposition agreement, Defendant waived his right to appeal. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a juvenile waives the right to appeal an amenability determination by entering into a plea and disposition agreement. To this, the Court held that the right was not waived, reversed the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to decide Defendant’s appeal on the merits. View "New Mexico v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Juvenile D.J. appealed a circuit court's finding of delinquency based on a petition alleging that he committed harassment under RSA 644:4, I(b) (Supp. 2021). The victim told the juveniles that they were not supposed to be riding bicycles on the sidewalk. D.J. told the victim to go “f**k himself.” D.J. continued to yell at the victim, who testified that D.J. was “swearing, saying f**k this and f**k that and you’re nothing but an old man.” The victim yelled back at D.J. and asserted that he could do martial arts. D.J. got off his bicycle, provoked the victim to fight, and took off his shirt. The owner of a store across the street from this encounter observed the confrontation and, after it had gone on for approximately five minutes, she began to record it using her cellphone. The store owner also called the police. The incident lasted approximately eight minutes, until a patrol officer arrived at the scene. D.J. argued there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding, and that RSA 644:4, I(b) was unconstitutional as applied and on its face. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re D.J." on Justia Law

Spectrum contracts with Michigan to house children who are ordered to be detained in facilities “similar to a prison setting.” The children are completely restricted in their movements. The state requires Spectrum to monitor them on a 24/7 basis. A court ordered the detention of 15-year-old Quintana at Spectrum’s facility on August 24, 2018. Quintana struggled with depression, anxiety, and difficulty sleeping, among other things. On September 11, 2018, Quintana took his life while alone in his bedroom. No one checked his room in the 45 minutes between the last time he was seen alive and when his body was found, violating a contractual requirement that Spectrum conduct “eye-on checks” every 15 minutes when the children are “outside of the direct supervision of staff.” Spectrum had a policy or custom of skipping many eye-on checks and falsifying supervision logs to reflect that the checks had been performed.Quintana’s estate sued Spectrum under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Spectrum functioned as a state actor and violated Quintana’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissed the dismissal of the suit. The complaint contains adequate facts to establish that Spectrum is a state actor. Spectrum was allegedly engaged in a public function similar to a correctional institution, a traditionally exclusive state function. View "Nugent v. Spectrum Juvenile Justice Services" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Gallimore pleaded guilty to committing three robberies on three consecutive days in different locations at age 16. These convictions pushed his criminal history category to VI under USSG § 4B1.4(c)(2) which, in turn, set his guideline imprisonment range at 188 to 235 months. The statutory range, because of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) enhancement, was fifteen years to life. The ACCA sentencing enhancement applied to defendants with three prior convictions for committing violent felonies on separate occasions. Defendant appealed the calculation of the sentence he received (200 months imprisonment), arguing he committed these robberies on one occasion (which would have reduced the range of his sentence). The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding that the time between each robbery and their different locations both decisively differentiated "occasions" here. View "United States v. Gallimore" on Justia Law

Petitioner Anthony Jones pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary and armed robbery, crimes he committed at the ages of sixteen and seventeen, respectively. Pursuant to subsection 63-19-20(1), South Carolina's definitional statute of chapter nineteen in the Juvenile Justice Code, the circuit court had jurisdiction over Jones's charges, rather than the family court. The circuit court judge sentenced Jones to ten years in prison for armed robbery and fifteen years for first-degree burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. Jones did not file a direct appeal. Instead, he filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") on several grounds, including a challenge to the constitutionality of subsection 63-19-20(1). After a hearing, the PCR court dismissed the application, finding the constitutional challenge was not a cognizable PCR claim and, even if it were, the statute was constitutional. The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded Jones properly brought this challenge in his PCR application and subsection 63-19-20(1) was constitutional. However, in keeping with prior decisions regarding sentencing juveniles, the Court held circuit court judges had to consider the mitigating factors of youth as identified in Aiken v. Byars when sentencing. "Consideration of these factors can be done at sentencing; therefore, a separate Aiken hearing is not required." Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Jones v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jon Smart and his co-defendant, Stephen Hutto, were in custody at a Department of Juvenile Justice detention facility near Rimini in Clarendon County in August 1999 when they brutally murdered a citizen volunteer who graciously allowed the boys to work on his family farm under his supervision as a part of their rehabilitation. Smart and Hutto then stole the man's truck and drove it on a violent crime spree. After Horry County Police officers stopped them for a traffic violation and discovered the truck was stolen, Smart and Hutto led officers on a thirty-mile high-speed chase during which Smart fired shots at pursuing law enforcement vehicles. Smart was sixteen years old. Smart pled guilty in 2001 to murder, armed robbery, grand larceny, criminal conspiracy, and escape. The plea court sentenced him to life in prison for the murder. The issue his appeal presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether a juvenile sentenced to life in prison, bore any burden of proof or persuasion when seeking resentencing under Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014). The Supreme Court held there was no such burden—on either party—and the resentencing court did not impose such a burden. View "South Carolina v. Smart" on Justia Law

Fox TV obtained permission from Superintendent Dixon to film scenes for the television series, Empire, at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center. Fox used the Center’s outdoor yard, visitation room, medical office, and certain living spaces for five days and returned to film retakes on seven additional days. During filming, several housing pods housed more detainees than the Center’s policy suggested; some detainees exercised indoors instead of in the outdoor yard; some classes were moved; and the Center postponed or canceled some extra‐curricular activities and held visitation hours in a smaller room.Three detainees filed a proposed class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted Dixon partial summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds because the plaintiffs had not shown “a clearly established right to be free of the arguably modest disruptions” but did not dismiss state law claims. The court reasoned that Dixon acted as the detainees’ guardian and had a fiduciary duty to “protect [them] from harm.” Under the holding, Dixon would only be entitled to sovereign immunity on the state law breach of fiduciary duty claim if he proved that he did not violate the detainees’ constitutional rights. On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Dixon is immune from suit under the Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act. The alleged wrongful conduct arose from decisions Dixon made within the scope of his authority. View "T. S. v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

After Appellant Cameron Moon was certified in juvenile court to stand trial as an adult, the juvenile court ordered his case transferred to the district court for adult criminal proceedings. Appellant then filed a pretrial application of writ of habeas corpus challenging the transfer. The district court denied relief, so Appellant took an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order denying relief, concluding the State had failed to establish the necessary statutory criteria for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction and transfer into the adult criminal court. As a result, the appellate court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the prosecution for lack of jurisdiction. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review to consider several issues related to the juvenile court's transfer order including whether the court of appeals erred to hold that such a challenge was even cognizable in pretrial habeas. However, the Court concluded that, even if Appellant’s claims were cognizable in a pretrial habeas proceeding, the court of appeals lacked the authority to entertain Appellant’s interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded to that court for an order dismissing Appellant’s appeal as premature. View "Ex parte Moon" on Justia Law