Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved a challenge to a juvenile court’s decision to waive its jurisdiction over a 13-year-old boy who was alleged to have committed aggravated murder. Under the relevant statutes, ORS 419C.352 and ORS 419C.349, a youth under age of 15 who is alleged to have committed murder may be waived into adult court only if, at the time of the conduct, he or she “was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved.” In this case, the evidence suggested that youth was of “average” sophistication and maturity for his age and was “just as effective” as peers of his age in understanding that his conduct was wrong. The juvenile court found that the statutory “sophistication and maturity” requirement had been satisfied. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the “sophistication and maturity” provision required only an awareness of the physical nature and criminality of the conduct at issue. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the youth that the “sophistication and maturity” requirement was more demanding, and reversed both the appellate and juvenile courts. The case was remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. J. C. N.-V." on Justia Law

Michigan charged and tried the named plaintiffs as adults for acts they committed while under the age of 18. Each received a conviction for first-degree murder and a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. In 2010, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Michigan statutory scheme that barred them from parole eligibility. Since then, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama (2012), “that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’” Michigan amended its juvenile offender laws in light of Miller, but made some changes contingent upon either the Michigan Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court announcing that Miller applied retroactively, and the U.S. Supreme Court held in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016), that Miller’s prohibition on mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders is retroactive. The district court held, in 2013, that Miller should apply retroactively and issued an injunction requiring compliance with Miller. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration of remedies in the context of the new legal landscape and to determine whether class certification is required to extend relief to non-plaintiffs. View "Hill v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Defendant, a juvenile, was bound over to the common pleas court and indicted on four counts of aggravated murder, among related crimes. Defendant moved to suppress statements he made during a custodial interrogation, arguing that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and that his statements were not voluntary. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant subsequently pled no contest to four counts of aggravated murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, and three counts of tampering with evidence, all with firearm specifications. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that where, as in this case, the interrogation of the defendant is recorded electronically, the statements made are presumed to have been made voluntarily pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2933.81(B). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 2933.81(B) does not affect the analysis of whether a suspect intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and therefore, the State retains the burden to prove a valid waiver; and (2) as applied to statements a juvenile makes during a custodial interrogation, the section 2933.81(B) presumption that such statements are voluntary is unconstitutional. Remanded. View "State v. Barker" on Justia Law

In 2013 and 2014, minor Y.A. had two petitions filed against her alleging offenses for unrelated incidents. For each petition, she was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and placed on probation. Y.A. satisfactorily completed the terms of probation for only the offense alleged in the later-filed petition, which was then dismissed and all records pertaining to it sealed. Records relating to the prior petition were not sealed. The issue in this appeal was whether, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, a juvenile court could seal the records pertaining to a prior petition against a minor when the minor satisfactorily completed probation for an offense alleged in a later-filed petition. Based on the plain language of the statute, the Court of Appeal concluded it could not. View "In re Y.A.." on Justia Law

In 2010, 15-year-old Turner fired a gun at a group of young men, killing Allen, and grazing two others. Turner knew the victims from high school. A jury convicted Turner of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187(a)), and two counts of attempted murder, and found true the allegations that Turner, personally used a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury. The court sentenced Turner to an aggregate state prison term of 84 years-to-life. The court of appeal affirmed the convictions, but modified the sentence, so that Turner will be entitled to a parole hearing after 25 years. The court upheld the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the theories imperfect self-defense and justifiable homicide based on self-defense; its use of the instructions on a kill zone theory. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to raise the issue of cruel and unusual punishment below and failure to present readily available mitigating evidence in support of a lesser sentence. View "People v. Turner" on Justia Law

In 2010, 15-year-old Turner fired a gun at a group of young men, killing Allen, and grazing two others. Turner knew the victims from high school. A jury convicted Turner of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187(a)), and two counts of attempted murder, and found true the allegations that Turner, personally used a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury. The court sentenced Turner to an aggregate state prison term of 84 years-to-life. The court of appeal affirmed the convictions, but modified the sentence, so that Turner will be entitled to a parole hearing after 25 years. The court upheld the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the theories imperfect self-defense and justifiable homicide based on self-defense; its use of the instructions on a kill zone theory. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to raise the issue of cruel and unusual punishment below and failure to present readily available mitigating evidence in support of a lesser sentence. View "People v. Turner" on Justia Law

The principal of a Pleasanton high school observed that P.O., who was then 17 years old, appeared to be under the influence of drugs. P.O. admitted to using hashish oil earlier that morning, and a search revealed 11 tablets of Xanax in his pockets. The juvenile court order declared P.O. a ward of the court and placed him on probation after he admitted to a misdemeanor count of public intoxication. A condition of his probation required him to submit to warrantless searches of his “electronics including passwords.” The court of appeal modified the condition and struck two other conditions. While electronic search condition is reasonably related to future criminality, the condition was overbroad. Another condition, requiring him to “be of good behavior and perform well” at school or work and another requiring him to “be of good citizenship and good conduct” are unconstitutionally vague. View "In re P.O." on Justia Law

A firearm was discovered at the minor’s school. School administrators suspected his involvement, and in the course of questioning him, they seized and searched the minor’s cell phone. Interspersed with the text messages on the phone were a number of digital images, including a photograph of the minor holding what appeared to be the firearm found on campus. When the prosecution sought to use these images as evidence in the proceeding below, the minor unsuccessfully moved to suppress them. The juvenile court found the minor had possessed an assault weapon, and declared him a ward of the juvenile court (Welfare & Institutions Code 602.1). The court of appeal affirmed in part, finding the search of the cell phone reasonable. Considering all the circumstances, the juvenile court properly found the search was justified at its inception and permissible in scope. The order must be modified to reflect his maximum term of confinement and the matter must be remanded to the juvenile court so that it may calculate the custody credits to which he is entitled. View "In re Rafael C." on Justia Law

A firearm was discovered at the minor’s school. School administrators suspected his involvement, and in the course of questioning him, they seized and searched the minor’s cell phone. Interspersed with the text messages on the phone were a number of digital images, including a photograph of the minor holding what appeared to be the firearm found on campus. When the prosecution sought to use these images as evidence in the proceeding below, the minor unsuccessfully moved to suppress them. The juvenile court found the minor had possessed an assault weapon, and declared him a ward of the juvenile court (Welfare & Institutions Code 602.1). The court of appeal affirmed in part, finding the search of the cell phone reasonable. Considering all the circumstances, the juvenile court properly found the search was justified at its inception and permissible in scope. The order must be modified to reflect his maximum term of confinement and the matter must be remanded to the juvenile court so that it may calculate the custody credits to which he is entitled. View "In re Rafael C." on Justia Law

The juvenile court adjudicated Appellant, a juvenile, delinquent on sex offenses. At disposition, the juvenile court did not record a finding regarding Appellant’s age at the time the offenses were committed. Upon Appellant’s release from the Ohio Department of Youth Services, the court scheduled a sex-offender-classification hearing. Appellant opposed his classification as a juvenile-sex-offender registrant, arguing that he was ineligible for classification because he was under the age of fourteen when the offenses were committed and because classification would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. After a hearing, the juvenile court found (1) Appellant had committed at least one offense when he was fourteen years of age, and (2) Appellant should be designated a juvenile offender registrant and classified as a Tier II offender. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a determination of a juvenile sex offender’s age at the time of the offense can be made at any time prior to or during the classification hearing; and (2) the imposition of classification upon release from a secure facility and for a time period beyond the juvenile offender’s attainment of age eighteen or twenty-one does not violate the offender’s due process rights or the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law