Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

After a school counselor found a bag containing 30-45 orange pills, in Erica's purse, left in the counselor's office during a meeting, the counselor took one pill and called the police. The pill tested positive for amphetamine. A juvenile wardship petition (Welfare and Institutions Code 602(a)), alleged that Erica had possessed ecstasy (Health and Safety Code 11377(a)), a felony. The petition was amended to allege misdemeanor possession of ecstasy, which Erica admitted. The juvenile court adjudged Erica a ward of the court and placed her under the supervision of the probation office, with conditions, including that she submit to blood, breath, or urine tests to detect the presence of drugs and to searches of her vehicle, residence, or electronics. The court stated that “part of that search will include giving your passwords to your [probation officer.]” Erica’s counsel objected that the electronic search condition was overbroad, that there had not been any “issue with social media,” and that Erica did not have a cell phone. The court of appeal struck the condition as unreasonable because there was no evidence connecting an electronic device or social media usage to her offense or to a risk of future criminal conduct. View "In re Erica R." on Justia Law

J.B., age 12, got into a fight and brandished a homemade knife over a neighborhood girl, stating that could kill her. A parent called the state police. J.B. admitted to threatening to break a girl’s arms and to holding the knife. J.B.’s father was told that charges of terroristic threats and summary harassment would be filed. Three weeks later, a juvenile allegation was filed. J.B. was transported to the Lancaster County Youth Intervention Center, processed, and subjected to a strip search pursuant to LYIC policy to look for signs of “injuries, markings, skin conditions, signs of abuse, or further contraband.” J.B. stood behind a curtain so that only the officer conducting the search could observe him, removed his pants and underwear for approximately 90 seconds, and was asked to bend over, spread his buttocks, and cough. J.B. was detained for three days. He ultimately entered into a consent decree with an opportunity to have his record expunged. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, and violations of due process, the Third Circuit concluded that defendants were entitled to partial summary judgment. The Supreme Court holding in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, that all arrestees committed to general population of a detention center may be subject to a close visual inspection while undressed, applies to juvenile offenders admitted to general population in a juvenile detention center. View "J. B. v. Fassnacht" on Justia Law

Delinquent minor Albert W. timely appeals from an order committing him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). The minor was made a ward at age 12 based on his May 1, 2008, admission to second degree robbery, after which a petition alleging residential burglary and knowing receipt of stolen property was dismissed with the understanding those charges could be used at disposition. The minor was sent to live with his father in Louisiana under the supervision of the probation department. Two sustained Louisiana petitions followed, alleging simple burglary, simple criminal damage, and disturbing the peace. In Spring 2010, Louisiana authorities closed the minor's case and returned him to his mother in California. Throughout 2011 and 2012, the minor would have multiple run-ins with the law including threatening his mother with a sawed-off shotgun, more burglary charges, and taking a loaded firearm to school. At a dispositional hearing in 2013, the juvenile court committed the minor to DJF for up to five years. On appeal, the minor argued: (1) insufficient evidence supported the finding that he was competent; (2) the most recent sustained petition filed against him was a Louisiana petition that precluded a DJF commitment; (3) he was misadvised about the possible consequences of his admission; and (4) the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to the DJF. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the minor's commitment. View "In re Albert W." on Justia Law

The State appealed the magistrate court's dismissal of the State's motion for contempt brought against Luis Juarez for failing to make payments ordered in a juvenile proceeding. In 2002, Juarez admitted to committing an offense that would have been a misdemeanor if he had been an adult. Much time passed and the court entered several orders directing Juarez to pay fees and restitution in varying sums. Eventually, on October 6, 2005, the magistrate court entered its Amended Financial Judgment and Order directing Juarez to pay restitution. Juarez failed to pay, and would fail to appear twice, resulting in bench warrants for his arrest being issued both times. By the second time Juarez came before the magistrate judge, he was over 26-years old, and outside of the juvenile court's jurisdiction. The court reasoned that now that Juarez had been brought in for an adult felony charge, it could no longer hear the contempt proceedings for failing to pay restitution. The district court reasoned that contempt was not available to compel payment of a restitution obligation arising from a proceeding under the JCA because the magistrate court's jurisdiction was conveyed by operation of Idaho Code section 20-505 and withdrawn by operation of Idaho Code section 20-507. The Supreme Court reversed the district court, concluding: (1) the magistrate court had jurisdiction over a charge of misdemeanor contempt under Idaho Code section 18-1801 (and if the offender was under eighteen years of age at the time of the criminal contempt, and the juvenile court exercises its discretion to treat the offense under the JCA, then Idaho Code section 20-507 would operate to terminate the juvenile court's jurisdiction as the proceedings would arise out of the JCA); (2) based on the State's own affidavit, the alleged crime was committed more than four years before these proceedings were commenced; (3) although this action was processed as a criminal case, no complaint was ever filed; (4) despite the lack of a complaint and without a finding of probable cause, the magistrate court issued warrants which resulted in Juarez's arrest; (5) the court's written "Statement of Rights and Explanation of Procedures for Contempt of Court" erroneously advised Juarez that the State bore the burden of proving the contempt "by a preponderance of the evidence;" (6) the court erroneously advised Juarez of the potential penalties upon conviction for misdemeanor contempt (18-1801 did not prescribe the penalty for misdemeanor contempt); (7) the magistrate court did not appear to recognize that Juarez had a right to a jury trial for misdemeanor contempt; and (8) Juarez appeared before the court without counsel, and Juarez discussed his case with the prosecutor without a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision affirming the magistrate court's order dismissing the State's motions for contempt. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Juarez" on Justia Law

Johnny Ray Davis was convicted of first-degree murder, for which he received a life sentence. After his state-court challenges to his conviction and sentence failed, Davis filed a pro se federal habeas petition alleging that: (1) his life without parole sentence violated the Constitution due to a “new standard [that had] been set in the U.S. Supreme Court” invalidating sentencing schemes mandating life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders; (2) his counsel was ineffective at trial and on appeal; and (3) as “a juvenile offender, [his] sentence of life without parole” was unconstitutional. The district court concluded that the last two issues were time-barred and that the first issue lacked merit because the case Davis claimed created a new standard, "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)), was inapposite. The court thus denied habeas relief and denied a COA. The Tenth Circuit affirmed: "while Miller certainly reiterated the relevance of youth at sentencing as a general matter, Davis’s argument at best relies on an extension of Miller’s logic. Two dispositive conclusions follow from that: (1) because this version of Davis’s argument does not assert the new right actually recognized in Miller, it suffers from the same timeliness flaw as his petition’s other contentions; and (2) because the state post-conviction trial court rejected this argument, [. . .]deference applies, and we cannot say declining to extend Miller was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court." View "Davis v. McCollum" on Justia Law

Andrew Garcia admitted to committing an offense that would have been a misdemeanor if he were an adult. He was ordered to pay court costs of $20.00. After Garcia admitted to committing another offense and a probation violation, he was ordered to pay court costs, probation fees, and community service fees. On May 10, 2010, Garcia admitted to committing another offense and was once again ordered to pay court costs and probation supervision fees. After he failed to make those payments, the State filed a motion for contempt. The magistrate court dismissed the motion, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction because Garcia was then over twenty-one and juvenile court jurisdiction was terminated by operation of Idaho Code section 20-507. The State appealed and the district court affirmed the magistrate court’s order. The State appealed the decision of the district court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court possessed the inherent power to adjudicate Garcia's alleged contempt, and incorrectly dismissed the State's motion for contempt for lack of jurisdiction. The district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Garcia" on Justia Law

In 1997, Frank Vigil, Jr. was convicted of first degree murder for his participation in the kidnapping, rape, torture, and murder of a 14-year-old girl. Vigil was sixteen at the time of the crime. The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), because it was the statutorily-mandated sentence for crimes committed between 1990 and 2006. In 2013, Vigil filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)). Finding that Miller applied retroactively to Vigil’s sentence, the trial court granted the motion. The State petitioned pursuant to C.A.R. 50, arguing that "Miller" did not apply retroactively. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that this case was governed by "Jensen v. Colorado," (2015 CO 42), which held that "Miller" did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review of a final judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of post-conviction relief. View "Colorado v. Vigil" on Justia Law

In 1997, Frank Vigil, Jr. was convicted of first degree murder for his participation in the kidnapping, rape, torture, and murder of a 14-year-old girl. Vigil was sixteen at the time of the crime. The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), because it was the statutorily-mandated sentence for crimes committed between 1990 and 2006. In 2013, Vigil filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)). Finding that Miller applied retroactively to Vigil’s sentence, the trial court granted the motion. The State petitioned pursuant to C.A.R. 50, arguing that "Miller" did not apply retroactively. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that this case was governed by "Jensen v. Colorado," (2015 CO 42), which held that "Miller" did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review of a final judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of post-conviction relief. View "Colorado v. Vigil" on Justia Law

Three cases concerning juvenile sentencing were consolidated by the Supreme Court for the purpose of this opinion. In each, the Court examined the appropriate remedies for the defendants whose sentences would otherwise be unconstitutional under "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. CT 2455 (2012)). Under the statutory schemen in place between 1990 and 2006, all three defendants in these cases were given mandatory life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the crimes they committed as juveniles. Two of the cases, "Colorado v. Tate" and "Banks v. Colorado," came to the Supreme Court on direct review. "Miller" applied to these cases and rendered their sentences unconstitutional. "In order to preserve as much of the legislature’s work as possible, Tate and Banks should be given individualized resentencing hearings that take into account their 'youth and attendant characteristics.'" The third case, "Jensen," was a C.A.R. 50 petition that came on collateral review of a final judgment. Because this case was on collateral review, the issue was whether "Miller" applied retroactively. The Colorado Court found that because the rule announced in "Miller" was procedural rather than substantive, and was not a "watershed" rule of procedure, it did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review of final judgment. Therefore, "Miller" did not apply to Jensen. View "Colorado v. Tate" on Justia Law

Three cases concerning juvenile sentencing were consolidated by the Supreme Court for the purpose of this opinion. In each, the Court examined the appropriate remedies for the defendants whose sentences would otherwise be unconstitutional under "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. CT 2455 (2012)). Under the statutory schemen in place between 1990 and 2006, all three defendants in these cases were given mandatory life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the crimes they committed as juveniles. Two of the cases, "Colorado v. Tate" and "Banks v. Colorado," came to the Supreme Court on direct review. "Miller" applied to these cases and rendered their sentences unconstitutional. "In order to preserve as much of the legislature’s work as possible, Tate and Banks should be given individualized resentencing hearings that take into account their 'youth and attendant characteristics.'" The third case, "Jensen," was a C.A.R. 50 petition that came on collateral review of a final judgment. Because this case was on collateral review, the issue was whether "Miller" applied retroactively. The Colorado Court found that because the rule announced in "Miller" was procedural rather than substantive, and was not a "watershed" rule of procedure, it did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review of final judgment. Therefore, "Miller" did not apply to Jensen. View "Colorado v. Tate" on Justia Law