Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

M.A., then 13 years old, fought with her 14-year-old brother and cut him with a kitchen knife. M.A. was adjudicated delinquent of several offenses and ordered to register under the Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act, 730 ILCS 154/1. M.A. argued that the registration provisions violated her rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection. The Appellate Court rejected the substantive due process claim, but found the registration provisions unconstitutional for violating procedural due process and equal protection. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the registration requirement. Current dangerousness is not relevant to the duty to register, so M.A. did not have a due process right to a hearing to address that issue. The Act requires registration solely based upon the fact of conviction or adjudication, which M.A. had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest during her juvenile adjudication proceedings. M.A. did not challenge her adjudication as a juvenile delinquent on appeal. Given that the charges for which M.A. is required to register would be felonies if M.A. committed those acts as an adult, and that those charges require a finding that the offender caused “great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement,” there is a rational relationship between M.A.’s registration and protection of the public. View "In re M.A." on Justia Law

Petitioners were 13-year-old girls who were dependents of the juvenile court. While they were residing at the Polinsky Children's Center, they knocked over a vending machine and took items from inside it. When staff confronted them, petitioners fled but later returned to the Center. Staff then reported the incident to police, who arrested petitioners and booked them into Juvenile Hall. The district attorney filed petitions in the juvenile court alleging petitioners committed two misdemeanors, petty theft and vandalism. The district attorney asked the court to declare them wards. The probation officer prepared detention reports recommending petitioners be detained in Juvenile Hall, on the unexplained grounds they were likely to flee the court's jurisdiction and such detention was necessary for the protection of person or property and of petitioners. The reports included detention screening forms that showed no grounds for mandatory secure detention and that petitioners' risk assessment scores did not warrant discretionary secure detention. Petitioners promptly challenged the detention orders by filing petitions for peremptory writs of mandate in the first instance directing the juvenile court to vacate the orders. The Court of Appeal treated the petitions as petitions for writs of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the juvenile court erred by ordering petitioners' detention in Juvenile Hall pending further hearing. The juvenile court made no findings regarding its decision to order petitioners' continued detention in Juvenile Hall. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal granted petitioners' petitions. View "In re Bianca S." on Justia Law

Relator was 14 years old when he committed murder in 1998. Relator was waived into adult court and convicted of aggravated murder. The court sentenced relator to life imprisonment with a 30-year mandatory minimum period of incarceration. After relator had served roughly half of that period, he obtained a “second look” hearing under ORS 420A.203. The trial court entered a preliminary order of conditional release, but the state appealed that order to the Court of Appeals. At issue in this mandamus proceeding was the trial court’s related “direction” to the Department of Corrections, pursuant to ORS 420A.206(1)(a), requiring it to prepare a proposed release plan. Relator sought, and the Supreme Court issued, an alternative writ of mandamus ordering the department to comply with the trial court’s direction or to show cause for not doing so. The department, however, contended that its obligation to comply was automatically stayed under ORS 138.160. The Supreme Court disagreed and ordered the department to comply with the trial court’s direction to prepare and submit a proposed plan of release. View "Oregon ex rel Walraven v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

In 2005, Martinez, Vallejo, and 47 others were indicted for crimes committed while they were members of the Milwaukee chapter of the Latin Kings gang organization. Martinez and Vallejo pled guilty to a RICO offense, 18 U.S.C. 1962, and admitted to engaging in predicate racketeering activities, including a 2003 murder. Vallejo, who was 17 years old at the time, and Martinez, who was 16, each fired several shots at the victim. Martinez also pled guilty to attempted murder of a rival gang member; Vallejo’s plea agreement included two attempted murders. All of the attempted murders occurred while the defendants were under the age of 18. In both cases, the court imposed the “maximum sentence”—life in prison.. Neither Martinez nor Vallejo filed a direct appeal. In 2012, the Supreme Court held, in Miller v. Alabama, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for juveniles. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of their motion to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Martinez and Vallejo’s life sentences were imposed after an individualized sentencing, and not by statutory mandate,and did not violate Miller. View "Vallejo v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant Terrence Roberson was charged with armed robbery and attempted second-degree murder for offenses which allegedly occurred in 2012, when the defendant was sixteen years old. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Juvenile Court’s dismissal of defendant's case for expiration of the time period for adjudication provided in the Children’s Code prevented the District Attorney from later obtaining a grand jury indictment against defendant and bringing the case to District Court. In this case, the District Court quashed the defendant’s indictment on the basis of the Juvenile Court’s prior dismissal of the juvenile petition with prejudice. The Court of Appeal reversed the District Court’s grant of the motion to quash. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Louisiana v. Roberson" on Justia Law

Defendant was serving 35 years to life after a jury convicted him as an adult of attempted murder and other charges for robbing and shooting a woman in the face when he was 15 years old. In this appeal, defendant argued, the State conceded, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that a three-year enhancement for great bodily harm under Penal Code section 12022.71 was unauthorized and should have been stayed. This reduced his sentence to 32 years to life. Defendant also contended his overall sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because the sentencing court did not comply with the requirements in "Miller v. Alabama" (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)) and "California v. Caballero," (55 Cal.4th 262(2012)) that it consider his youth and consequent reduced culpability and impose a sentence reflecting these considerations. While the Court of Appeal recognized that considerations of defendant's youth did not, and by statute could not, play a major part in determining his sentence, the sentence passed constitutional muster because he “shall be eligible for release on parole by the board during his or her 25th year of incarceration at a youth offender parole hearing” pursuant to section 3051. View "California v. Garcia" on Justia Law

After a school counselor found a bag containing 30-45 orange pills, in Erica's purse, left in the counselor's office during a meeting, the counselor took one pill and called the police. The pill tested positive for amphetamine. A juvenile wardship petition (Welfare and Institutions Code 602(a)), alleged that Erica had possessed ecstasy (Health and Safety Code 11377(a)), a felony. The petition was amended to allege misdemeanor possession of ecstasy, which Erica admitted. The juvenile court adjudged Erica a ward of the court and placed her under the supervision of the probation office, with conditions, including that she submit to blood, breath, or urine tests to detect the presence of drugs and to searches of her vehicle, residence, or electronics. The court stated that “part of that search will include giving your passwords to your [probation officer.]” Erica’s counsel objected that the electronic search condition was overbroad, that there had not been any “issue with social media,” and that Erica did not have a cell phone. The court of appeal struck the condition as unreasonable because there was no evidence connecting an electronic device or social media usage to her offense or to a risk of future criminal conduct. View "In re Erica R." on Justia Law

J.B., age 12, got into a fight and brandished a homemade knife over a neighborhood girl, stating that could kill her. A parent called the state police. J.B. admitted to threatening to break a girl’s arms and to holding the knife. J.B.’s father was told that charges of terroristic threats and summary harassment would be filed. Three weeks later, a juvenile allegation was filed. J.B. was transported to the Lancaster County Youth Intervention Center, processed, and subjected to a strip search pursuant to LYIC policy to look for signs of “injuries, markings, skin conditions, signs of abuse, or further contraband.” J.B. stood behind a curtain so that only the officer conducting the search could observe him, removed his pants and underwear for approximately 90 seconds, and was asked to bend over, spread his buttocks, and cough. J.B. was detained for three days. He ultimately entered into a consent decree with an opportunity to have his record expunged. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, and violations of due process, the Third Circuit concluded that defendants were entitled to partial summary judgment. The Supreme Court holding in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, that all arrestees committed to general population of a detention center may be subject to a close visual inspection while undressed, applies to juvenile offenders admitted to general population in a juvenile detention center. View "J. B. v. Fassnacht" on Justia Law

Delinquent minor Albert W. timely appeals from an order committing him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). The minor was made a ward at age 12 based on his May 1, 2008, admission to second degree robbery, after which a petition alleging residential burglary and knowing receipt of stolen property was dismissed with the understanding those charges could be used at disposition. The minor was sent to live with his father in Louisiana under the supervision of the probation department. Two sustained Louisiana petitions followed, alleging simple burglary, simple criminal damage, and disturbing the peace. In Spring 2010, Louisiana authorities closed the minor's case and returned him to his mother in California. Throughout 2011 and 2012, the minor would have multiple run-ins with the law including threatening his mother with a sawed-off shotgun, more burglary charges, and taking a loaded firearm to school. At a dispositional hearing in 2013, the juvenile court committed the minor to DJF for up to five years. On appeal, the minor argued: (1) insufficient evidence supported the finding that he was competent; (2) the most recent sustained petition filed against him was a Louisiana petition that precluded a DJF commitment; (3) he was misadvised about the possible consequences of his admission; and (4) the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to the DJF. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the minor's commitment. View "In re Albert W." on Justia Law

The State appealed the magistrate court's dismissal of the State's motion for contempt brought against Luis Juarez for failing to make payments ordered in a juvenile proceeding. In 2002, Juarez admitted to committing an offense that would have been a misdemeanor if he had been an adult. Much time passed and the court entered several orders directing Juarez to pay fees and restitution in varying sums. Eventually, on October 6, 2005, the magistrate court entered its Amended Financial Judgment and Order directing Juarez to pay restitution. Juarez failed to pay, and would fail to appear twice, resulting in bench warrants for his arrest being issued both times. By the second time Juarez came before the magistrate judge, he was over 26-years old, and outside of the juvenile court's jurisdiction. The court reasoned that now that Juarez had been brought in for an adult felony charge, it could no longer hear the contempt proceedings for failing to pay restitution. The district court reasoned that contempt was not available to compel payment of a restitution obligation arising from a proceeding under the JCA because the magistrate court's jurisdiction was conveyed by operation of Idaho Code section 20-505 and withdrawn by operation of Idaho Code section 20-507. The Supreme Court reversed the district court, concluding: (1) the magistrate court had jurisdiction over a charge of misdemeanor contempt under Idaho Code section 18-1801 (and if the offender was under eighteen years of age at the time of the criminal contempt, and the juvenile court exercises its discretion to treat the offense under the JCA, then Idaho Code section 20-507 would operate to terminate the juvenile court's jurisdiction as the proceedings would arise out of the JCA); (2) based on the State's own affidavit, the alleged crime was committed more than four years before these proceedings were commenced; (3) although this action was processed as a criminal case, no complaint was ever filed; (4) despite the lack of a complaint and without a finding of probable cause, the magistrate court issued warrants which resulted in Juarez's arrest; (5) the court's written "Statement of Rights and Explanation of Procedures for Contempt of Court" erroneously advised Juarez that the State bore the burden of proving the contempt "by a preponderance of the evidence;" (6) the court erroneously advised Juarez of the potential penalties upon conviction for misdemeanor contempt (18-1801 did not prescribe the penalty for misdemeanor contempt); (7) the magistrate court did not appear to recognize that Juarez had a right to a jury trial for misdemeanor contempt; and (8) Juarez appeared before the court without counsel, and Juarez discussed his case with the prosecutor without a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision affirming the magistrate court's order dismissing the State's motions for contempt. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Juarez" on Justia Law