Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014 the Third Circuit decided King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, rejecting a challenge brought by licensed counselors to the constitutionality of Assembly Bill A3371, a statute banning the provision of “sexual orientation change efforts” (SOCE) counseling to minors. A similar challenge was filed by a 15-year-old minor seeking to undergo SOCE counseling and by his parents. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. Having decided, in King, that the statute did not violate the First Amendment rights of those wishing to “speak” the message of SOCE, the court concluded that the statute does not violate the rights of those who wish to receive that message. The court also rejected a parental rights claim. The fundamental rights of parents do not include the right to choose a specific type of provider for a specific medical or mental health treatment that the state has reasonably deemed harmful. View "Doe v. Governor of New Jersey" on Justia Law

A Minnesota jury convicted Martin of first-degree murder, committed at age 17. Martin received a mandatory life sentence without possibility of release. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed and rejected a challenge to the jury’s composition under Batson. Martin filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. While it was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory life sentences without parole for defendants who commit homicide before age 18 violate the Eighth Amendment. Martin argued that Miller applied retroactively to him. The district court denied the petition. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Miller does not apply retroactively on collateral review. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not unreasonably determine that the trial court properly rejected Martin’s Batson challenge. View "Martin v. Symmes" on Justia Law

In August 2000, when Jimmy Williams, Jr. was 15 years old, he was convicted of murder made capital because it was committed during a robbery. In accordance with the applicable law at the time of Williams's sentencing, the trial court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the only possible sentence and one that was mandatory. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Williams's conviction and sentence. In June 2013, Williams petitioned the circuit court, asserting that under the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)), the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole to which he was sentenced in 2000 for an offense committed when he was 15 years old was unconstitutional and, consequently, that he was entitled to be resentenced based on the individualized sentencing factors discussed in Miller. The issue in this case presented for the Alabama Supreme Court's review was whether "Miller" applied retroactively to Williams' case. Because Miller did not categorically forbid a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a juvenile defendant and because Miller did not apply retroactively, Williams's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was legal. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in denying Williams the relief he requested. View "Ex parte Jimmy Williams, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with eligibility for parole after fifteen years. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the offense. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that his mandatory life sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) a mandatory life sentence with eligibility for parole after fifteen years for a juvenile homicide offender convicted of murder in the second degree does not offend the Eighth Amendment or article 26 or other constitutional rights; and (2) Defendant’s challenges to his underlying conviction were without merit. View "Commonwealth v. Okoro" on Justia Law

In 2013, Gregory Diatchenko filed the present action seeking a declaration that, because he was seventeen at the time he committed the offense leading to his conviction of murder in the first degree, his mandatory sentence of life without parole was unconstitutional. Following Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the mandatory imposition of such a sentence was unconstitutional. The Court held that a juvenile homicide offender who receives a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment must be afforded the opportunity for release on parole. Diatchenko and another petitioner, both of whom became immediately eligible for parole pursuant to the Court’s decision in Diatchenko I, contended that, to ensure their opportunity for release through parole was meaningful, they must have access to counsel, access to funds for counsel and for expert witnesses, and an opportunity for judicial review of the decision on their parole applications. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the petitioners, holding (1) the procedural protections of representation by counsel and the opportunity to obtain expert assistance in connection with that initial parole hearing are necessary for juvenile homicide offenders serving a mandatory life sentence; and (2) such offenders are entitled to limited judicial review of a parole board decision denying initial parole. View "Diatchenko v. District Attorney" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Javante Scott appealed the sentence he received at a resentencing hearing, when the trial court imposed the same 120-years-to-life term as at his original sentencing. Defendant was tried as an adult and convicted of three counts of attempted murder with firearm enhancements. Defendant argued the sentence is cruel and unusual because it imposed a de facto life sentence on him as a juvenile offender. The State argued that a new statute, Penal Code section 3051,1 which guaranteed defendant a future parole eligibility hearing, rendered the sentence constitutional. After review, the Court of Appeal held that section 3051 complied with the central constitutional requirement that the State provide a juvenile offender with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release within his or her expected lifetime. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "California v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 1994, at age 14, Ruelas admitted committing felony assault with a deadly weapon and misdemeanor annoying or molesting a child. Three years later, while Ruelas was still a minor, the juvenile court found true allegations that he had committed three felonies: robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and vehicle theft and committed Ruelas to the California Youth Authority. Upon his release, Ruelas was required to register as a sex offender because of his section 647.6 adjudication. In 2012, Ruelas sought relief on equal protection grounds, arguing that mandatory sex offender registration for a juvenile who is adjudicated of violating Penal Code section 647.61 and committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities only after committing another offense, but not for a juvenile who is adjudicated of violating section 647.6 and never committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities, violated the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. The trial court rejected the argument. On rehearing, the court of appeal affirmed. Ruelas is not similarly situated for purposes of mandatory sex offender registration to juvenile violators of section 647.6 who were never committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities. View "Ruelas v. Superior Court.\" on Justia Law

In Miller v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory sentencing schemes that impose on juvenile offenders a term of life imprisonment without parole violate the Eighth Amendment. At issue in this case was whether a life sentence without parole may be imposed on a juvenile homicide offender in the exercise of the sentencing authority’s discretion. Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time of the crimes leading to his convictions, was convicted of murder and other crimes. Defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 100 years imprisonment, which was the functional equivalent to life without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in considering whether to sentence a juvenile to a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the sentencer is required to take into account the factors that Miller deemed constitutionally significant before determining that such severe punishment is appropriate; and (2) in light of the uncertainty of Defendant’s sentence upon due consideration of the Miller factors, a new sentencing proceeding must be held that conforms with the dictates of Miller. View "State v. Riley" on Justia Law

The state charged a 16-year-old (Jordan) with three counts of unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm (UPF), alleging that he carried in a vehicle an uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible firearm (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)); carried a handgun in a vehicle while under 21 years of age (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I)); and carried a firearm in a vehicle without a valid FOID card (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C)). The UPF count alleged that Jordan, under 18 years of age, knowingly possessed a firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person (24-3.1(a)(1). Jordan moved to dismiss, contending that the AUUW statute had been found unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit in 2012, as violating the second amendment right to bear arms for self-defense outside the home. The circuit court dismissed the AUUW counts, but denied the motion as to the UPF count. The state conceded that one count had been properly dismissed but argued that the remaining counts remained constitutionally valid because they required proof of independent aggravating factors. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the first count based on section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), which it found to be facially unconstitutional in 2013; reversed dismissal of charges based on sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) and (a)(3)(I), which are severable from the unconstitutional provision. View "In re: Jordan G." on Justia Law

Following a 2012 Los Angeles shooting Castaneda died; Barragan and Villanueva survived. Two surveillance cameras recorded the shooting. Police directed their attention to Art, who was then 13 years old. Art’s custodial interrogation was videotaped and subsequently transcribed. After viewing a videotape of the shooting, Art said “Could I have an attorney? Because that’s not me." Art, denied a request to see his mother, subsequently made incriminating statements. The court of appeal reversed denial of a motion to suppress, holding that the statement was an unequivocal and unambiguous invocation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. A reasonable officer, in light of the circumstances known to the officer or that would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, including the juvenile’s age, would understand the statement by the juvenile to be a request for an attorney. The error was not harmless. View "In re Art T." on Justia Law