Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Gregory Diatchenko filed the present action seeking a declaration that, because he was seventeen at the time he committed the offense leading to his conviction of murder in the first degree, his mandatory sentence of life without parole was unconstitutional. Following Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the mandatory imposition of such a sentence was unconstitutional. The Court held that a juvenile homicide offender who receives a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment must be afforded the opportunity for release on parole. Diatchenko and another petitioner, both of whom became immediately eligible for parole pursuant to the Court’s decision in Diatchenko I, contended that, to ensure their opportunity for release through parole was meaningful, they must have access to counsel, access to funds for counsel and for expert witnesses, and an opportunity for judicial review of the decision on their parole applications. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the petitioners, holding (1) the procedural protections of representation by counsel and the opportunity to obtain expert assistance in connection with that initial parole hearing are necessary for juvenile homicide offenders serving a mandatory life sentence; and (2) such offenders are entitled to limited judicial review of a parole board decision denying initial parole. View "Diatchenko v. District Attorney" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Javante Scott appealed the sentence he received at a resentencing hearing, when the trial court imposed the same 120-years-to-life term as at his original sentencing. Defendant was tried as an adult and convicted of three counts of attempted murder with firearm enhancements. Defendant argued the sentence is cruel and unusual because it imposed a de facto life sentence on him as a juvenile offender. The State argued that a new statute, Penal Code section 3051,1 which guaranteed defendant a future parole eligibility hearing, rendered the sentence constitutional. After review, the Court of Appeal held that section 3051 complied with the central constitutional requirement that the State provide a juvenile offender with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release within his or her expected lifetime. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "California v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 1994, at age 14, Ruelas admitted committing felony assault with a deadly weapon and misdemeanor annoying or molesting a child. Three years later, while Ruelas was still a minor, the juvenile court found true allegations that he had committed three felonies: robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and vehicle theft and committed Ruelas to the California Youth Authority. Upon his release, Ruelas was required to register as a sex offender because of his section 647.6 adjudication. In 2012, Ruelas sought relief on equal protection grounds, arguing that mandatory sex offender registration for a juvenile who is adjudicated of violating Penal Code section 647.61 and committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities only after committing another offense, but not for a juvenile who is adjudicated of violating section 647.6 and never committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities, violated the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. The trial court rejected the argument. On rehearing, the court of appeal affirmed. Ruelas is not similarly situated for purposes of mandatory sex offender registration to juvenile violators of section 647.6 who were never committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities. View "Ruelas v. Superior Court.\" on Justia Law

In Miller v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory sentencing schemes that impose on juvenile offenders a term of life imprisonment without parole violate the Eighth Amendment. At issue in this case was whether a life sentence without parole may be imposed on a juvenile homicide offender in the exercise of the sentencing authority’s discretion. Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time of the crimes leading to his convictions, was convicted of murder and other crimes. Defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 100 years imprisonment, which was the functional equivalent to life without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in considering whether to sentence a juvenile to a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the sentencer is required to take into account the factors that Miller deemed constitutionally significant before determining that such severe punishment is appropriate; and (2) in light of the uncertainty of Defendant’s sentence upon due consideration of the Miller factors, a new sentencing proceeding must be held that conforms with the dictates of Miller. View "State v. Riley" on Justia Law

The state charged a 16-year-old (Jordan) with three counts of unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm (UPF), alleging that he carried in a vehicle an uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible firearm (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)); carried a handgun in a vehicle while under 21 years of age (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I)); and carried a firearm in a vehicle without a valid FOID card (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C)). The UPF count alleged that Jordan, under 18 years of age, knowingly possessed a firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person (24-3.1(a)(1). Jordan moved to dismiss, contending that the AUUW statute had been found unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit in 2012, as violating the second amendment right to bear arms for self-defense outside the home. The circuit court dismissed the AUUW counts, but denied the motion as to the UPF count. The state conceded that one count had been properly dismissed but argued that the remaining counts remained constitutionally valid because they required proof of independent aggravating factors. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the first count based on section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), which it found to be facially unconstitutional in 2013; reversed dismissal of charges based on sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) and (a)(3)(I), which are severable from the unconstitutional provision. View "In re: Jordan G." on Justia Law

Following a 2012 Los Angeles shooting Castaneda died; Barragan and Villanueva survived. Two surveillance cameras recorded the shooting. Police directed their attention to Art, who was then 13 years old. Art’s custodial interrogation was videotaped and subsequently transcribed. After viewing a videotape of the shooting, Art said “Could I have an attorney? Because that’s not me." Art, denied a request to see his mother, subsequently made incriminating statements. The court of appeal reversed denial of a motion to suppress, holding that the statement was an unequivocal and unambiguous invocation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. A reasonable officer, in light of the circumstances known to the officer or that would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, including the juvenile’s age, would understand the statement by the juvenile to be a request for an attorney. The error was not harmless. View "In re Art T." on Justia Law

B.C. (a juvenile) was fourteen years of age when she was arrested for shoplifting merchandise from "Claire's," a discount jewelry store in the Rockingham Mall. She was transported, in handcuffs, to the Salem Police station. The arresting officer telephoned the juvenile's mother to pick her up. While in the booking room, the juvenile asked if she could use the bathroom. An officer allowed her to use the bathroom in one of the holding cells. Another officer observed her via a closed circuit monitor in the supervisor's office flush the toilet. The arresting officer asked the juvenile "what she had flushed down the toilet." The juvenile told the arresting officer "that it was a necklace that she had taken and . . . had concealed in her pants." The officer did not inform the juvenile of her Miranda rights before questioning her or at any other time. The juvenile remained at the police station until her mother picked her up. After she admitted to flushing the necklace down the toilet, the juvenile was charged with falsifying evidence. After a hearing in August 2011, she was found delinquent. During the merits hearing, she moved to suppress her admission on the ground that it was the product of custodial interrogation and that she was not advised of her Miranda rights before making it. The court denied her motion, and the juvenile appealed. The State appealed the circuit court's grant of the juvenile's motion to suppress. But finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re B.C. " on Justia Law

In 1994, at age 14, Ruelas admitted committing felony assault with a deadly weapon and misdemeanor annoying or molesting a child. Three years later, while Ruelas was still a minor, the juvenile court found true allegations that he had committed three felonies: robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and vehicle theft, and committed Ruelas to the California Youth Authority for a maximum term of eight years two months, including four months imposed as a result of Ruelas’s prior admission of annoying or molesting a child. Upon his release, Ruelas was required to register as a sex offender because of his Penal Code 647.6 adjudication. In 2012, Ruelas unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandate arguing that his equal protection guarantees were violated by the requirement that he register as a sex offender. The court of appeal reversed. Requiring registration for those adjudicated of violating section 647.6 as juveniles only if they are committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice because they have committed another nonsex crime violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. View "Ruelas v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 1995, Wilson, White and Carr, all age 17, approached a Pomona bank, wearing masks and carrying handguns. One of them fired at the security guard who stood outside the bank. The guard fled and alerted police. Inside the bank, they told the customers to “hit the deck.” Theresa Hernandez, a bank employee, was shot and killed during the robbery. The three fled in a car driven by Smith. Another car occupied by Brown also waited nearby. White later admitted to his girlfriend that he had shot Hernandez during the robbery because he thought she was activating an alarm. Brown was arrested. Wilson, Carr and White turned themselves into the police a few days after the robbery. Wilson, sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, sought habeas relief in 2013, asserting, that under the principles announced by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama (2012) the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and that he is entitled to be resentenced based on the individual sentencing factors that the Miller Court directed trial courts to consider when sentencing a juvenile offender for a homicide conviction. The court of appeal vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "In re: Wilson" on Justia Law

A.L., a minor, was charged with felony second degree robbery of another minor, personally using a handgun. The juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional hearing; testimony focused on the sequence of events and on A.L.’s relative culpability. During closing argument, the juvenile court noted that it “didn’t think there was any evidence” of the section 12022(b) enhancement, which requires personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon. The prosecutor indicated that A.L. had been mistakenly charged under section 12022(b) and should have been charged with the section 12022(a) enhancement, for vicarious liability when another principal is armed. She moved to amend the petition to conform to proof. A.L.’s attorney objected. The judge concluded that A.L. would not be unfairly surprised or prejudiced by the change, permitted the amendment, sustained the second degree robbery allegation, and found true the section 12022(a) enhancement. At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court adjudged A.L. a ward of the juvenile court with a maximum period of confinement of six years, including one year for the section 12022(a) enhancement. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court violated A.L.’s due process rights by allowing amendment of his delinquency petition during closing arguments. View "In re A.L." on Justia Law