Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

When J.W.M. was 17½ years old, he pointed what he thought was an unloaded gun at his friend W.B. and pulled the trigger. The gun was loaded, it discharged, W.B. died two days later. The State charged J.W.M. with first degree manslaughter while being armed with a firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm (UPFA). Because first degree manslaughter was a serious violent offense subject to the Washington “auto-decline” statute, RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A), J.W.M. was tried in adult court, and a jury found him guilty of second-degree manslaughter, a lesser included offense. The trial court found him guilty of UPFA in a bifurcated bench trial. With neither offense being an auto-decline offense, J.W.M. was not sentenced in adult court but instead proceeded to a juvenile disposition hearing. More than two weeks before the disposition hearing, for the first time the State recommended a manifest injustice disposition. The juvenile court imposed the maximum possible manifest injustice upward disposition: confinement until age 25. J.W.M. challenged his disposition on several grounds, including that the juvenile court’s primary reason for imposing the disposition was J.W.M.’s need for treatment and services was an invalid basis under our decision in State v. B.O.J., 449 P.3d 1006 (2019). The Washington Supreme Court agreed a new disposition hearing was required, as a manifest injustice disposition was not justified by a juvenile offender’s need for services. View "Washington v. J.W.M." on Justia Law

In 2016, Hunter W. was charged with attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon, as well as allegations that he personally used a deadly weapon. Shortly after, he was charged with driving without a license and driving under the influence of drugs. After he admitted to the assault with a deadly weapon and driving under the influence charges, the juvenile court granted Hunter conditional probation. In 2018, after multiple reports of probation violations, the juvenile court revoked probation and committed Hunter to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for the maximum term of seven years. Hunter appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the dispositional order and issued the remittitur on August 15, 2019. After the passage of California Senate Bill No. 823, on December 2, 2021, Hunter petitioned to modify the commitment order to the middle term of six years—the maximum confinement permitted under the new law. The District Attorney opposed the petition on the grounds that the new law did not apply to Hunter’s final judgment. The juvenile court agreed with the prosecution and denied Hunter’s petition. Appealing that order, Hunter again argued his juvenile disposition was not a final judgment and because the new law was ameliorative, he was eligible for relief. The Court of Appeal concluded the case was final for purposes of retroactivity of the new law, and affirmed the juvenile court’s order denying his petition for modification. View "In re Hunter W." on Justia Law

Appellant V.R. is the mother of now 11-year-old N.R. Mother appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights as to N.R. Mother argued that the order is unsupported by clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness or child detriment. Specifically, she argued that termination cannot be predicated on earlier, unchallenged findings of parental unfitness or child detriment as to N.R. because, after N.R. and her younger half-sister R.L. were removed from mother’s custody, the juvenile court returned R.L. to mother. According to mother, R.L.’s return to mother “rebutted” the earlier findings as a matter of law. If these earlier findings are disregarded, mother continues, no substantial evidence otherwise supports termination of her parental rights as to N.R.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the juvenile court’s order. The court explained that the record reflects manifest differences between N.R.’s and R.L.’s needs and mother’s ability to parent each child. Throughout the proceedings, the juvenile court carefully considered this evidence and the respective risks the children faced in mother’s care. The court, therefore, rejected mother’s argument that R.L.’s return to mother rebutted or otherwise limited the vitality of prior findings of mother’s unfitness to parent N.R. or the detriment to N.R. of remaining in, or being returned to, mother’s custody. Notwithstanding its order returning R.L. to mother’s custody, due process permitted the juvenile court to rely on such findings at the section 366.26 hearing. View "In re N.R." on Justia Law

Minor K.C. appealed the order imposing a condition of probation that prohibits unconsented sexual touching of another person. K.C. argues that probation condition 6A is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define “sexual touching.” He points out, for example, that lewd or lascivious conduct prohibits touching of a child with the intent to sexually arouse the perpetrator or the child, but the touching need not be done in a sexual manner.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the condition. The court explained that probation condition 6A provides fair warning of the conduct it prohibits. A reasonable person would interpret this provision to proscribe unconsented touching of another person that involves any sexual connotation, either due to the parts of the body involved or K.C.’s intent in touching the person. The term “unconsented” provides guidance and permits K.C. to avoid violating the condition in those instances where he has that person’s consent. That different penal statutes define and proscribe particular sexual crimes in different terms makes no difference; K.C. must avoid all unconsented sexual touching. The condition is sufficiently definite to preclude constitutional infirmity. View "In re K.C." on Justia Law

Jane Doe and two boys were accused of killing Doe’s parents. Even though Doe was a juvenile at the time of the murders, the government charged her with two counts of first-degree murder. The government successfully moved to transfer her case to adult court, where the punishments for first-degree murder are death or mandatory life imprisonment without parole. These punishments would be unconstitutional when applied to a juvenile. Doe argued she could not be transferred to adult court because, even if guilty, there was no statutory punishment available for her alleged crime. She also argued the district court used an incorrect legal standard for transfer from juvenile to adult court and improperly weighed the relevant factors for transfer. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found her constitutional argument was not ripe, the district court applied the correct legal standard, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the transfer factors. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s transfer of Doe’s case from juvenile to adult court. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Defendant's sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Ohio Const. art. I, 9 when he was convicted as a juvenile and the trial court failed to consider his youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing.Defendant was charged with allegedly committing acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offense of complicity to aggravated murder and other crimes. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of several charges, and the trial court sentenced him to an indefinite life sentence in prison with parole eligible after thirty-eight to forty-three years. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's sentence was unconstitutional because the court failed to consider Defendant's youth as a factor in sentencing. View "State v. Morris" on Justia Law

The Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition alleging that the minor had been sexually abused by her father. Mother was not named as an offending parent in the petition. The juvenile court found that the Department failed to prove the sexual abuse allegations against the father but did not dismiss the petition. Instead, the court found that the evidence supported jurisdiction based upon unpleaded allegations of emotional abuse by the mother, a position urged by the minor’s counsel but opposed by the Department. The court subsequently entered a disposition order.The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court violated the mother’s due process rights when it established jurisdiction based on the conduct of a parent the Department never alleged was an offending parent, and on a factual and legal theory not raised in the Department’s petition. Parents have a due process right to be informed of the nature of the proceedings and the allegations upon which the deprivation of custody is predicated so that they can make an informed decision on whether to appear, prepare, and contest the allegations. View "In re S.V." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals determining that Ohio Rev. Code 2152.84(A)(2)(b) was fundamentally unfair as applied to D.R., the juvenile in this case, and thus violated his right to procedural due process, holding that the court of appeals did not err.D.R. was adjudicated delinquent for sexually assaulting his friend when he was sixteen years old. The juvenile court suspended D.R.'s commitment and placed him on probation with conditions. The court classified D.R. as a Tier I offender and notified him that he had a duty to register as a sex offender. At the end of D.R.'s disposition, the magistrate terminated D.R.'s probation but continued his Tier I classification on the grounds that it lacked the statutory authority the terminate the classification. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute was fundamentally unfair as applied to D.R. and violated due process. View "In re D.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal affirming the judgment of the juvenile court finding true that Minor had committed one count of violating Cal. Penal Code 288.5 and order probation, thus rejecting Minor's claims that a community service provision of the disposition violated separation of powers principles and infringed his due process rights, holding that there was no error.In affirming, the appellate court acknowledged that a juvenile court may not delegate to a probation officer the authority to determine that a minor is in violation of probation but held that, in this case, the juvenile court's order permitting the probation officer to offer Minor the option of community service for an alleged violation did not permit the probation department to decide if and when a violation of probation had occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court order authorizing the probation officer to offer Minor on probation the option of performing community service, in an amount chosen by the probation officer up to a maximum set by the court, in the event Minor was alleged to have violated a term of probation, did not violate due process or separation of powers principles. View "In re D.N." on Justia Law

Police arrested 18-year-old high school student Ismael Avalos on a murder charge and questioned him in an interrogation room at a police station. During the interview, a forensic technician removed his shirt, pants, socks, and shoes. The technician gave him a paper gown to wear. After about five hours of questioning by police, Avalos said, “I wanna talk to a lawyer.” After some further dialog, a detective said, “I respect your decision that you wanna talk to a lawyer, but if for some reason you want to change your mind and you wanna talk to me, you can, just ask for me. I don’t care if it’s 2:00, 3:00 in the morning I’ll come back. Okay? Because I care about you getting your story the right way out. Okay?” After spending the night in a holding cell, Avalos told one of the jailers he wanted to speak to the detectives again. Avalos was brought back to the same interrogation room for a second interview, still apparently wearing the same paper gown from the day before. Avalos asked, “Whatever I tell my lawyer, he’s going to tell you the same thing, right?” After waiving his Miranda rights, Avalos admitted shooting the murder victim, stating: “I, I self-defended myself, you know?” Avalos was convicted of murder with a firearm enhancement and a substantive gang crime. On appeal, Avalos contends the trial court erred by admitting the second interview into evidence over his objection. Avalos also argues that due to a recent change in the law, his substantive gang conviction must be reversed. The Court of Appeal concluded after review of the trial court record that Avalos did not make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent Miranda waiver prior to the second interview. The Court further found the admission of the interview into evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Attorney General conceded Avalos’ substantive gang conviction should have been reversed and the Court of Appeal agreed. Thus, it reversed the judgment. View "California v. Avalos" on Justia Law