Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Korsiba Arot was charged in district court with three counts of gross sexual imposition for incidents that occurred in the summer of 2011, the latest of which occurred in August, 2011. Arot moved to dismiss the criminal charges arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because Arot was not eighteen at the time of the incidents. The district court found the State failed to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that Arot was eighteen at the time of the incidents. The charges were dismissed. The State appealed the dismissal of charges. Finding no error in the dismissal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Arot" on Justia Law

Defendants in these cases were both seventeen-year-old offenders who were convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under Cal. Penal Code 190.5(b). After Defendants were sentenced, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama. On review, the California Supreme Court held (1) section 190.5(b), properly construed, confers discretion upon a trial court to sentence a juvenile convicted of special circumstance murder to life without parole, with no presumption in favor of life without parole; (2) Miller requires a trial court, in exercising its sentencing discretion, to consider the distinctive attributes of youth before imposing life without parole on a juvenile offender; (3) section 190.5(b) does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it authorizes and requires consideration of the distinctive attributes of youth highlighted in Miller, once the statute is understood not to impose a presumption in favor of life without parole; and (4) because the trial courts in these cases sentenced Defendants without awareness of the full scope of their discretion conferred by section 190.5(b) and without the guidance set forth in Miller, the cases must be remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a juvenile charged as an adult with attempted first-degree murder with a deadly weapon. After the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Graham v. Florida, Petitioner filed a motion to have a bond set. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing (1) the Florida Constitution provides for pretrial release as a matter of right for a noncapital offense or an offense that does not carry the possibility of a life sentence, and (2) because Graham prohibits the State from sentencing him to life without an opportunity for parole, he was entitled to bond under the provisions of the State Constitution. The court of appeal denied the petition, concluding that Graham does not impact a juvenile defendant's entitlement to bond because the Florida Constitution considers only the classification of the offense, not a defendant's eventual sentence. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that juvenile offenders such as Petitioner were entitled to bond under the Florida Constitution because they cannot be charged with a crime punishable by life imprisonment under Florida's current statutory scheme and Graham. View "Treacy v. Lamberti" on Justia Law

While still a minor, appellant Marcus More was indicted on two counts of malice murder and other crimes relating to two fatal shootings. The State gave appellant notice of its intent to seek the death penalty and of the aggravating circumstance supporting the death penalty on which it intended to rely. A jury found appellant guilty on all charges, and rather than proceed to sentencing, he entered a negotiated plea agreement in which he agreed (inter alia) to waive his rights to appeal and all post-conviction review of his convictions and sentences. For that waiver, the State recommended (and the trial court accepted) a life sentence without the possibility of parole on one malice murder county, and consecutive sentences on the remaining counts. Four years after appellant received his sentence, the federal Supreme Court decided "Roper v. Simmons" (543 U.S. 551 (2005)). Based on that holding, appellant filed a motion to correct void sentence, claiming that Roper removed the death penalty as a sentencing option due to appellant's age. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding both that appellant waived his right to challenge his sentence and even if he had not waived the right, Roper did not apply so as to retroactively invalidate his sentence of life without parole. After its review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded: (1) appellant, despite signing the plea agreement, cannot, according to Georgia case law, "bargain away" the right to challenge an illegal and void sentence; (2) appellant's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was void as a sentence not allowed by law and the trial court's order denying the motion to correct void sentence was reversed.View "Moore v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Because Petitioner tested positive for drugs prior to a hearing in the juvenile drug court, the judge held Petitioner in contempt of court. Petitioner moved to stay the contempt order, contending that she could not be held in direct contempt because she did not not cause any disturbance in the presence of the court or violate any court order. The juvenile court refused to change its contempt ruling. One month after Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court, the juvenile court vacated its order finding Petitioner in direct contempt. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition as moot, holding that because the district court vacated its contempt order, the proceeding was moot, and no exception to the mootness doctrine applied.View "Paley v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was whether Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution applied to a restitution determination in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The youth-defendant in this case argued that he was entitled to a jury trial because recent constitutional and statutory amendments transformed the juvenile restitution statute, ORS 419C.450, into a civil device through which victims of crime could recover monetary damages for their injuries. The Supreme Court held that a restitution determination pursuant to ORS 419C.450 was not civil in nature and that Article I, section 17, therefore did not require a jury trial in the defendant's case. View "Oregon v. N. R. L." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on drug charges. His privately retained attorney appeared at the initial trial court hearing, during which a trial date was set. The trial did not proceed on that day. Defendant continued pro se at the next hearing and the subsequent trial date. Defendant was then assigned a public defender. The court set a hearing date for defendant’s motion to suppress. The public defender informed the court that she could not try the case, but did not formally request an adjournment for change of counsel. Defendant's new public defender was told that he was being transferred from the OPD’s juvenile unit to a new trial team and that he would serve as defendant’s trial counsel. The trial judge denied counsel's request for a continuance to allow counsel additional time for preparation. Defendant’s attorney spent ten to eleven hours preparing for trial, but had no contact with defendant. At issue in this appeal was the propriety of the trial court’s denial of a request for adjournment by a defendant who met his appointed counsel for the first time on the day of trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge’s denial of an adjournment did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to effective representation, was not an abuse of discretion, and did not violate principles of fundamental fairness.View "New Jersey v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2001, Respondent was found guilty of first-degree murder while committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct and first-degree premeditated murder. Respondent was a juvenile when he committed the crime. The district court sentenced Respondent to life without the possibility of release (LWOR) under the mandatory sentencing scheme in Minn. Stat. 609.106(2)(1). After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama in 2012, Respondent filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The postconviction court granted Respondent’s petition and resentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of release after thirty years. The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently issued its decision in Chambers v. State, which held that the Miller rule does not apply retroactively to a juvenile whose sentence of LWOR under section 609.106(2)(1) became final before the Miller rule was announced. Thereafter, in the instant case, the Supreme Court reversed the postconviction court’s order and reinstated the original sentence of LWOR, holding that the postconviction court’s legal conclusion was in direct conflict with Chambers, and the circumstances of this case did not warrant granting relief to Respondent under the Court’s supervisory powers to ensure the fair administration of justice. View "Roman Nose v. State" on Justia Law

The State sought certiorari for review of a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals that reversed the Juvenile Court's decision to deny G.M.'s motion to suppress evidence that G.M. argued was obtained pursuant to an illegal search. The matter was one of first impression for the Supreme Court: whether evidence of a public-school student's association with an individual known to be involved in criminal activity and suspected of being affiliated with a gang, without more, constituted reasonable grounds for a search of the student by a school official under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court concluded that it did not. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment.View "G. M. v. Alabama " on Justia Law

Following the denial of her motion for new trial, Chanell Pitts appealed her convictions and misdemeanor sentences for 2011 violations of OCGA 20-2-690.1(the "mandatory education statute"). Her sole challenge was to the constitutionality of the statute. Finding no error in the trial court’s denial, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pitts v. Georgia" on Justia Law