Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Juvenile was charged with attempted capital murder, aggravated assault on a public servant, and deadly conduct. The jury adjudicated Juvenile of aggravated assault and deadly conduct, assessing determinate sentences for forty years and ten years, respectively. The court of appeals affirmed the aggravated assault adjudication but reversed on deadly conduct, concluding that the trial court committed reversible error by submitting elements of the offense to the jury disjunctively, allowing for a non-uanimous verdict. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's disjunctive jury instruction, given without objection, was not reversible error, as the harm to Juvenile, given the jury's other findings and the evidence, was only theoretical, not actual. View "In re L.D.C." on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for the robbery and murder of Caesaro Gomez. Appellant, who was sixteen years old at the time of the crimes, was tried as a youthful offender and found guilty by a circuit court jury of murder, first-degree robbery, and intimidating a participant in the legal process. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to strike for cause; (2) Appellant's argument regarding the validity of Ky. R. Crim. P. 9.40 was unpreserved for appellate review; and (3) the trial court did not err in sentencing Appellant. View "Grider v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Chicago police responded to a street fight. One yelled “police, stop, stop,” but M.I., then 16, fired multiple gunshots in their direction. A petition to have M.I. adjudicated delinquent was filed, and the state successfully moved to designate the proceedings as an “extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution.” M.I. waived his right to a jury trial. After adjudicating him delinquent the circuit court sentenced him for aggravated discharge of a firearm, to an indeterminate period in the juvenile division of the Department of Corrections, to end no later than his twenty-first birthday. The court also imposed a 23-year adult sentence, stayed pending successful completion of the juvenile sentence. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. M.I. argued that the hearing on designation as an extended jurisdiction juvenile proceeding was not held within the statutory time period, but the supreme court held that the statute is directory rather than mandatory. M.I. raised a constitutional vagueness challenge to the statutory provision that a stay of an adult sentence may be revoked for violation of the “conditions” of a sentence. Such a stay was part of the original sentence, and the state is seeking revocation based on a subsequent drug offense, but this was not the provision under which revocation was sought, so M.I. lacked standing for the challenge. M.I. also claimed that there was a due process violation in imposing a 23-year adult sentence, citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The court found no Apprendi violation, noting that the extended jurisdiction juvenile statute is dispositional rather than adjudicatory. View "In re M.I." on Justia Law

"J.H." appealed an adjudication that she was a child in need of care and supervision (CHINS) for being "habitually and without justification truant from compulsory school attendance." J.H. contended: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the findings; and (2) the court improperly shifted the burden of proof on the question of whether she was habitually truant "without justification." The only witness was a Bennington County deputy sheriff who testified that he served as the County's truancy officer. The officer testified that he ended up transporting J.H. to school on two subsequent days in January. On the third occasion, the officer served a "truancy notice," the purpose of which was to warn a parent or guardian that a truancy case could be brought if their child is continually absent. The officer went to the home twice more in January (the fourth and fifth visits that month) but there was no response from anyone at the residence. At the conclusion of the officer's testimony, J.H.'s counsel moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to establish that J.H. was habitually truant. The trial court denied the motion, finding that five truancy reports within "a matter of weeks . . . meet[s] the definition of being habitually not at school."  The court also observed it had "no evidence . . . of justification for [J.H.] not being in school." Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the record evidence was fundamentally insufficient to establish that J.H. was truant on the days alleged. "Inasmuch as the evidence here was plainly insufficient under [33 V.S.A. 5102(3)(D)], we are compelled to conclude that the adjudication of CHINS based on truancy must be reversed." View "In re J. H." on Justia Law

Defendant was a juvenile who admitted giving hydrocodone to another student. Defendant's confession was made directly in answer to questions from the school assistant principal, who was working with a deputy sheriff (School Resource Officer or SRO), also present. The SRO did not read Defendant his Miranda rights before the questioning. Defendant was subsequently charged with possessing and dispensing a controlled substance, a felony, in a juvenile petition. After unsuccessfully filing a motion to suppress, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. Defendant subsequently appealed the denial of his motion. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a student is entitled to the benefit of the Miranda warnings before being questioned by a school official in conjunction with a law enforcement officer, the SRO, when he is subject to criminal charges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements Defendant made before law enforcement when he was questioned by the assistant principal must be suppressed because he was in custody and was not given the Miranda warnings. View "N.C. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Herring was 16 years old when he was arrested for, and charged with, aggravated robbery. Because he was a juvenile, he was given his Miranda warnings by a magistrate. There was conflicting testimony as to whether two armed police officers were present when appellant was given these warnings. After the warnings, appellant was questioned by two police officers, and he confessed to the charged robbery, as well as other robberies and burglaries. The confession was reduced to writing by one of the officers, and appellant signed it. At trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress the signed statement, and argued, among other things, that the statement was taken in violation of Family Code Section 51.095 because armed law-enforcement officers were present when he was given the magistrate's warnings. The motion was denied, and a jury found appellant guilty, sentencing him to 20 years' confinement. Appellant appealed and asserted that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed appellant's conviction. Appellant argued one issue to the Supreme Court: whether Section 51.095(a)(1)(A) permitted law-enforcement officers to be present when a juvenile is initially read his rights. The Court concluded that Section 51.095(a)(1)(A) does not prohibit the presence of law-enforcement officers, and accordingly affirmed. View "Herring v. Texas" on Justia Law

The State appealed a juvenile court order adopting a judicial referee's findings of fact and order dismissing the State's petition alleging M.H.P. was a delinquent child. The State filed a petition alleging M.H.P. was a delinquent child who committed gross sexual imposition. The judicial referee found M.H.P. was not in need of treatment or rehabilitation as a delinquent child. The judicial referee explained he previously found beyond a reasonable doubt that M.H.P. committed the delinquent act of gross sexual imposition and stated, "Although this fact alone would be sufficient to sustain a finding of a need for treatment and rehabilitation, there was a substantial amount of evidence to the contrary." Based on these findings, the judicial referee dismissed the petition. The juvenile court adopted the judicial referee's findings and order, dismissed the proceeding and concluded the issue of M.H.P. registering as a sexual offender did not need to be addressed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution barred the State from appealing the juvenile court's order. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the juvenile court's findings. View "Interest of M.H.P." on Justia Law

G.C. began attending school in the Owensboro Public School District as an out-of-district student in 2005. In 2009, G.C. was caught sending text messages in class. School officials confiscated his cell phone and read the text messages. Because this was the last in a series of disciplinary infractions, Superintendent Vick revoked G.C.’s out-of-district status, barring him from attending Owensboro High School. G.C. filed suit, raising federal and state-law claims. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on a due process claim that G.C. was denied a hearing prior to expulsion as required by Kentucky statute and a Fourth Amendment claim based on the 2009 search, in which G.C. contends that school officials violated his constitutional rights when they read text messages on his phone without the requisite reasonable suspicion. The court affirmed rejection of a Rehabilitation Act claim that the defendants failed to identify G.C. as disabled under section 504. View "Cain v. Owensboro Pub. Schs." on Justia Law

On November 10, 2010, the State filed a petition in the juvenile court alleging that Appellant carried a concealed weapon on his person and possessed a "pistol, revolver or other form of short-barreled hand firearm." On October 12, 2011, Appellant filed a motion to discharge for failure to adjudicate within the time statutorily required. At the adjudication hearing on October 14, 2011, the juvenile court denied the motion to discharge. The hearing was then continued to December 22, 2011. On November 8, 2011, Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to discharge. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in affirming the decision of the juvenile court; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in not addressing Appellant's constitutional speedy adjudication rights. View "In re Shaquille H." on Justia Law

D.W., age 13, alleged (42 U.S.C. 1983) that state defendants violated his procedural due process rights by listing him on the Tennessee child abuse registry. After an interview with a case manager, D.W. requested review and submitted information regarding the alleged victim’s inconsistent statements, but never was told the evidence against him. Children’s Services upheld the classification. Children’s Services then denied administrative review because the classification did not affect his employment. D.W. claimed that being listed deprived affected his liberty interest in pursuing common occupations, because Tennessee law prohibits his employment with child-care agencies and programs and adult-daycare centers and that the listing prohibits contact with children during the course of state agency employment. The district court held that D.W. did not present a justiciable controversy because the alleged deprivation was the possibility of future harm. The Sixth Circuit reversed. D.W. has standing to seek additional procedures because those procedures, if granted, could result in relief that is sufficiently concrete and particularized. The classification is complete and will not be expunged from state records; this is not a generalized grievance or an injury to a third party. No further facts are needed to determine whether the boy was afforded adequate process. View "Wright v. O'Day" on Justia Law