Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

On November 10, 2010, the State filed a petition in the juvenile court alleging that Appellant carried a concealed weapon on his person and possessed a "pistol, revolver or other form of short-barreled hand firearm." On October 12, 2011, Appellant filed a motion to discharge for failure to adjudicate within the time statutorily required. At the adjudication hearing on October 14, 2011, the juvenile court denied the motion to discharge. The hearing was then continued to December 22, 2011. On November 8, 2011, Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to discharge. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in affirming the decision of the juvenile court; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in not addressing Appellant's constitutional speedy adjudication rights. View "In re Shaquille H." on Justia Law

D.W., age 13, alleged (42 U.S.C. 1983) that state defendants violated his procedural due process rights by listing him on the Tennessee child abuse registry. After an interview with a case manager, D.W. requested review and submitted information regarding the alleged victim’s inconsistent statements, but never was told the evidence against him. Children’s Services upheld the classification. Children’s Services then denied administrative review because the classification did not affect his employment. D.W. claimed that being listed deprived affected his liberty interest in pursuing common occupations, because Tennessee law prohibits his employment with child-care agencies and programs and adult-daycare centers and that the listing prohibits contact with children during the course of state agency employment. The district court held that D.W. did not present a justiciable controversy because the alleged deprivation was the possibility of future harm. The Sixth Circuit reversed. D.W. has standing to seek additional procedures because those procedures, if granted, could result in relief that is sufficiently concrete and particularized. The classification is complete and will not be expunged from state records; this is not a generalized grievance or an injury to a third party. No further facts are needed to determine whether the boy was afforded adequate process. View "Wright v. O'Day" on Justia Law

An incident occurred at West Lauderdale High School which led to the suspension and eventual expulsion of four male students. The principal notified the four students' parents and/or guardians of the immediate suspension. (The four male students were identified herein as C.D., E.F., G.H., and I.J.) The matter was pending before the school board, and if the board approved the recommendation, the students could request a hearing before the school board to continue the suspension until such hearing occurred. Three of the four students, E.F., C.D., and G.H., requested a hearing. Prior to the disciplinary hearing, parents of E.F. and C.D. applied for separate ex parte temporary restraining orders (TROs) in the Lauderdale County Youth Court. The ex parte temporary restraining orders were granted without notice ordering that E.F. and C.D. be allowed to return to school and enjoining the superintendent and school board from expelling them or assigning them to an alternative school. At the hearing for the TROs, the school district objected to reenrollment because the youth court lacked jurisdiction to order the students' return to school. Nonetheless, the court ordered the reenrollment. After a hearing, the school board expelled all four students for one calendar year on the basis that their presence in school was a safety concern for other students. C.D. and E.F., through counsel, moved the youth court for reenrollment. The youth court granted this motion and treated it as an appeal on the record of the expulsion and "not a matter de novo." The school board timely appealed the youth court's decision to the Supreme Court and moved the youth court to stay its judgment pending appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the youth court exceeded its statutory authority by reenrolling C.D. and E.F. in high school because the discretion in this situation lied with the school board. Accordingly, the Court reversed the youth court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lauderdale County School Bd. v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 1995, Defendant was charged with assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. At the time, Defendant was a minor and primarily spoke Khmai. During his plea colloquy, Defendant admitted to sufficient facts and was placed on probation. Defendant was committed to the Department of Youth Services after he violated the terms of his probation. In 2009, as an adult, Defendant sought to vacate his pleas, asserting he did not knowingly and voluntarily admit to sufficient facts where no interpreter was present during his plea colloquy and where he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The juvenile court denied Defendant's motion for a new trial, and the appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity of his plea proceedings and did not demonstrate he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Yardley Y." on Justia Law

In 1996 mother reported to police that, during a visit to her father’s apartment, their 12-year-old (Linda) alleged that father made sexual advances. Mother obtained an order of protection after he twice failed to appear. The county agency classified father as an “indicated” child abuse perpetrator on Pennsylvania’s child abuse registry. Father was charged with indecent exposure and endangering a child’s welfare. He pled guilty to harassment; the remaining charges were dismissed. In subsequent years, Linda denied the incident. Mother and father resumed living together and were allowed, by the agency, to have related children in their home. After mother obtained custody of their grandchild, the agency removed all children from the home, based on father’s listing. By the time father attempted to appeal in 2007, the agency had destroyed its 1996 records. The listing was expunged in 2010. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the agency’s position with respect to the listing did not “shock the conscience” and that there was no showing of a deliberate decision to deprive the plaintiff of due process nor evidence that the agency employs a policy or has a custom of conducting desultory investigations. View "Mulholland v. Cnty. of Berks" on Justia Law

Juvenile entered a plea of guilty to robbery in the second degree. The superior court found Juvenile to be delinquent and ordered him to be committed to the custody of the department of children and families (department) in an out-of-state facility. The department subsequently filed a motion to intervene in the matter, arguing that the court's orders exceeded the court's placement authority pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-140. The court denied the motion to intervene. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order, concluding that section 46b-140 does not give the superior court the authority to place a juvenile in an out-of-state facility. While this appeal to the Supreme Court was pending, the trial court modified Juvenile's probation to permit him to return to Connecticut from his placement out-of-state. The Supreme Court dismissed Juvenile's appeal as moot and not capable of repetition, yet evading review, as the legislature's most recent amendment to section 46b-140 firmly establishes that the statute does not authorize the superior court to order the direct placement of a child committed to the department in an out-of-state residential facility. View "In re Jeffrey M." on Justia Law

Daughter, born in June 2004, suffered medical problems that stunted her growth. In October 2005, Mother took Daughter to Dr. Lindblad, who diagnosed failure to thrive. She was treated inpatient for six days and gained 50 grams per day, a gain normal for a child of Daughter’s age and condition. After returning to Mother’s care, Daughter gained only four grams per day. Lindblad again prescribed inpatient treatment and, in April 2006, concluded that Daughter’s condition was psychosocial; he feared that Daughter was neglected and noted concern about Munchausen by proxy. He spoke to a child welfare caseworker, who was already investigating the situation. A judge ordered Daughter removed to her father’s home, with Mother to have only supervised visitation. Caseworkers thought it unnecessary to hold the hearing that Pennsylvania law would require were Daughter taken into state custody. Mother received no explanation of how to arrange for a hearing. After Daughter was removed, discrepancies in her recorded weights were discovered. Mother’s habeas petition, filed 40 days after removal, was rejected. Mother and father later agreed to share custody. The district court rejected Mother’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded for trial on procedural due process claims. View "B. S. v. Somerset Cnty." on Justia Law

Defendant, who was a juvenile at the time of the offense, was indicted for murder in the second degree. The superior court judge dismissed the indictment on the ground that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to the grand jury to support an indictment of murder in the second degree. A majority of the Supreme Court affirmed the order dismissing the indictment, holding (1) contrary to the superior court judge's ruling, the evidence before the grand jury supported the indictment for murder in the second degree; but (2) the grand jury should have been, but was not, instructed by the prosecutor on the elements of murder and on the legal significance of the mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Walczak" on Justia Law

After a youth violated the terms of his initial probation agreement, the judicial district youth court revoked that agreement and entered a dispositional order that extended the youth's probationary period for an additional three years. The youth appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the youth court did not exceed its statutory authority and correctly and interpreted and applied the Youth Court Act by imposing on revocation an additional three-year probationary term that lasted until the youth's twenty-first birthday; and (2) the imposition of an additional three-year term of probation did not violate the youth's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. View "In re S.M.K." on Justia Law

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, Hickman County, received a referral regarding allegations of abuse concerning the Andrews. A social worker was attempting to make contact when DCS received a second referral concerning the Andrews. Due to references to guns in the home and because the site visit was to be carried out at night, DCSs requested law enforcement to assist. The Sheriff’s Department dispatched two officers. Andrews was outside working when the group arrived and asked the officers to wait outside while he called the sheriff’s office. The Andrews claim that when Mr. Andrews opened the door, he was immediately followed into the house by a “whoosh of presence.” The Andrews claim that they granted permission for interviews of the children because they feared arrest or losing their children. The officers left the house and the Andrews acquiesced to the walk-through. No charges were filed and the assessment was closed as “no services indicated.” The Andrews filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to the social workers, but affirmed with respect to an officer. View "Andrews v. Hickman County" on Justia Law