Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice, runs a number of youth detention facilities. Jamal, age 16, had a history of mental illness and was known to have attempted suicide at least three times when he arrived at one of those facilities in 2008. His intake assessment noted a history of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, major depression, bipolar disorder, psychosis, behavior disorders, and anger and drug abuse counseling. His behavioral history included delinquency, gang affiliations, anger, aggression, setting of fires, cruelty to animals, putting a gun to a cousin’s head, threatening to kill teachers, learning disabilities, alcohol abuse, and cannabis use. Jamal denied that he had manic or depressive symptoms, that he was depressed, or that he had experienced suicidal thoughts since his June 2008 attempt; the intake doctor prescribed Prozac and lithium. Jamal was noncompliant, had disciplinary problems, and was periodically evaluated for suicide risk before he committed suicide by hanging himself from a bunk bed. In his mother’s suit, alleging deliberate indifference to Jamal’s serious mental illness, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Miller v. Nordstrom" on Justia Law

Racine County Human Services Department caseworker Wagner removed Thor, a 12-year-old, from his parents’ home and placed him into protective custody. Thor suffers from cerebral palsy, global developmental delay, and is confined to a wheelchair. Wagner investigated after receiving a referral from personnel at Thor’s school concerning bruising on his arm and leg. A judge issued a probable cause order for removal, based on evidence of Thor’s injuries and that he had been left unattended. Thor suffered additional injuries as a result of accidents that occurred in foster care and at a rehabilitation facility. Thor’s mother and stepfather and Thor sued Wagner, his supervisor, another caseworker, and her supervisor, alleging violations of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on qualified immunity grounds and because plaintiffs failed to establish sufficient evidence of racial animus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for any alleged violation of plaintiffs’ right to familial relations; for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to bodily security and integrity based on the decision to continue his placements; and for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to individualized treatment. View "Xiong v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Respondent was adjudicated delinquent and committed to a state facility. While there, he allegedly battered a group supervisor. The State charged him as an adult with battery by a prisoner under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.481(2)(f), a felony. Citing relevant statutes and Robinson v. State, which broadly holds that "prisoner" as used in section 200.481(2)(f) was meant to only apply in the criminal setting, the district court dismissed the charge, holding that because Respondent's detention was civil, not criminal, he was not a "prisoner" to whom section 200.481(2)(f) could apply. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a juvenile detained for delinquency in a state facility is not a "prisoner" for purposes of section 200.481(2)(f). View "State v. Javier C." on Justia Law

The juvenile court adjudicated Ashley W. as a child within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(1) for possession of marijuana. Ashley appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion. The court of appeals declined to address issues previously raised by Ashley in a motion to suppress, concluding she had failed to preserve the alleged errors. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the juvenile court erred in denying Ashley's motion to suppress and in finding that she had waived her objection to the evidence at the adjudication hearing and that the court of appeals erred in affirming the order of adjudication. View "In re Ashley W." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a juvenile placed on juvenile probation, pleaded guilty to failing to follow an order of probation by violating curfew and failing to obey household rules. The circuit court then placed Petitioner in secure detention. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his sentence was illegal. The second district court of appeal denied Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus and certified conflict with the fifth district court of appeal's decision in M.P. v. State. The Supreme Court (1) approved the decision of the second district court of appeal denying Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus, and (2) disapproved the decision of the fifth district court of appeal in M.P. to the extent it was inconsistent with this opinion. View "J.M. v. Gargett" on Justia Law

S.B., 14 years old, and a four-year-old girl played a game; both got undressed. S.B. was charged as a juvenile with aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Evidence indicated that he suffered mild retardation and functioned as if seven or eight years old, not as a pedophile. The judge found him unfit for trial and set the matter for a “discharge” or “innocence only” hearing. The provision is found in the Code of Criminal Procedure but not in the Juvenile Court Act and allows an unfit individual to be ordered held for treatment. The evidence was found sufficient to support the charge, so S.B. was found “not not guilty.” Following outpatient evaluation, the court found S.B. still unfit, although neither mentally ill nor a threat to public safety, and ordered him to register as a sex offender. Because he had never been adjudicated delinquent, the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute on “discharge” or “innocence only” hearings may be applied to juveniles. S.B. can be required to register. Registration is required after “a finding not resulting in an acquittal,” following a discharge hearing on an applicable charge. The court construed the statute to allow petition for registration termination (not specified in the statute).View "In re S.B." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a juvenile has a statutory right to counsel during a police interrogation conducted before a complaint is filed or an appearance is made in juvenile court. The juvenile in this case was adjudicated delinquent of aggravated robbery with a three-year firearm specification. The juvenile appealed, arguing that the police sergeant violated Ohio Rev. Code 2151.352 in obtaining a written statement before giving the juvenile an opportunity to obtain counsel. The appellate court rejected the juvenile's claim, concluding that a juvenile proceeding does not commence until the filing of a complaint, and because no complaint had been filed against the juvenile at the time he was interrogated and gave the written statement, section 2151.352 did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to section 2151.352, a child is statutorily entitled to representation by legal counsel upon the filing of a complaint in juvenile court or upon initial appearance in the juvenile court; and (2) thus, the right of a juvenile to counsel pursuant to section 2151.352 attaches when the jurisdiction of a juvenile court is properly invoked. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a thirteen-year-old's confession provided outside of the presence of his father should have been suppressed. After it was reported that thirteen-year-old A.W. sexually touched his five-year-old cousin K.P, A.W.'s father voluntarily brought him to the county child advocacy center for an interview. A.W. is bilingual, but because his father speaks very little English, the interview was conducted initially entirely in Spanish. A detective advised A.W. and his father of A.W.'s rights using a pre-printed juvenile rights form, written in Spanish. A.W. initially denied touching K.P. and blamed their other cousin J. At A.W.'s request, the detective permitted him to state what J. had said about touching K.P. in English, but then resumed the questioning in Spanish. Approximately twenty minutes into the interview, A.W. asked in English, "could I tell everything in private, like without my dad here, outside, it will be easier." The detective explained that to his father in Spanish. Although A.W.'s father immediately stood up to leave, the detective advised A.W.'s father that he would need to waive his right to be present during the interview before leaving and that he could return to the interview room at any time. A.W.'s father then signed the required parental waiver form without objection and left the interview room. Thereafter, A.W. continued to deny wrongdoing before eventually admitting that he had touched K.P. sexually. A.W. was charged as a juvenile with two counts of aggravated sexual assault. Considering the totality of the circumstances, A.W.'s father willingly and voluntarily left the interview room, the questioning comported with the highest standards of fundamental fairness and due process, and the confession was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; the Supreme Court concluded A.W.'s confession was admissible. View "In the Interest of A.W." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition that charge D.B. as a principal with theft and criminal trespass for entering a construction site and removing a pair of bolt cutters. The juvenile court adjudicated D.B. a delinquent as an accomplice on both counts. The court of appeals affirmed. D.B. filed a petition for writ of certiorari, claiming that he did not receive adequate Sixth Amendment notice that he may be adjudicated delinquent as an accomplice for the charges. The Supreme Court reversed the delinquency adjudication on the criminal trespass charge but affirmed it on the theft charge, holding (1) D.B. received constitutionally adequate notice through trial testimony that he faced accomplice liability for theft; but (2) the juvenile court adjudicated D.B. delinquent as an accomplice for criminal trespass without notice. Remanded. View "D.B. v. State" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant, who at the time was detained at a juvenile detention center, with one count of battery by detainee in violation of Fla. Stat. 784.03 and 784.082. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, contending that a juvenile could not be lawfully charged with battery by detainee while detained in a juvenile detention facility. The trial court dismissed the charge based on its belief that it was bound to follow the first district court of appeal's decision in T.C. v. State, which held that the battery by detainee offense was inapplicable to juveniles held in juvenile facilities. The fourth district court of appeals reversed, noting that in the past it and the fifth district had affirmed a trial court order adjudicating a juvenile guilty of battery upon a fellow detainee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a juvenile detention center qualifies as a "detention facility" for purposes of section 784.082, and thereby disapproving the first district's decision in T.C. View "Hopkins v. State" on Justia Law