Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent based on findings of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12–13(a)(1)) and attempted robbery (720 ILCS 5/8–4(a), 18–1). The trial court ordered him committed for an indeterminate term, to automatically terminate in 15 years or at age 21. The appellate and state supreme courts affirmed. The evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, despite some inconsistencies in testimony. The court presumed that the trial court did not allow the juvenile to be shackled without a hearing on whether restraint was required, absent any indication in the record that the court was aware that he was in shackles before he was called to testify. Delinquency adjudications are not the equivalent of felony convictions,so it is not unconstitutional that juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial. Imposition of collateral consequences on juveniles adjudicated delinquent for committing felony sex offenses, such as reduced confidentiality, unavailability of expungement, and possibility of involuntary commitment under the Sexually Violent Persons Act,do not negate the rehabilitative purposes of the Act so that a jury trial would be required. View "In re Jonathon C.B., a Minor" on Justia Law

This case involved the placement of juvenile A.B., who was being detained at a juvenile center. The juvenile court concluded that A.B. be placed out of state at Canyon State Academy where A.B. could learn to be independent. The Department of Child Services (DCS) overruled the decision, requiring A.B. to be placed at one of several facilities in Indiana. The trial court entered an order of modification, finding that three sections of the Indiana Code allowing the director of DCS to supplant the juvenile court judge in making dispositional decrees affecting children under his jurisdiction were unconstitutional. DCS appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order regarding the constitutionality of the statues, holding that the three statutes do not violate the separation of powers provision of the Indiana constitution. The Court then held that the DCS requirement that A.B. be placed in Indiana rather than out of state at Canyon State Academy was arbitrary and capricious, upheld the trial court's placement of A.B. at Canyon State Academy, and ordered DCS to pay for the placement. View "A.B. v. State" on Justia Law

In 2005, respondent was charged with delinquency under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. 5031 et seq., for sexually abusing a boy for approximately two years until respondent was 15 years old and his victim was 12 years old. Respondent was sentenced to two years of juvenile detention followed by juvenile supervision until his 21st birthday. In 2006, while respondent remained in juvenile detention, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16902 et seq. In July 2007, the District Court determined that respondent had failed to comply with the requirements of his prerelease program. On appeal, respondent challenged his "special conditio[n]" of supervision and requested that the Court of Appeals "reverse th[e] portion of his sentence requiring Sex Offender Registration and remand with instructions that the district court ... strik[e] Sex Offender Registration as a condition of juvenile supervision." Over a year after respondent's 21st birthday, the Court of Appeals handed down its decision and held that the SORNA requirements violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, section 9, cl. 3, when applied to juveniles adjudicated as delinquent before SORNA's enactment. The Court held that the Court of Appeals had no authority to enter that judgment because it had no live controversy before it where respondent had turned 21 and where the capable-of-repetition exception to mootness did not apply in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit was vacated and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal. View "United States v. Juvenile Male" on Justia Law

Respondents, representing the video game and software industries, filed a preenforcement challenge to California Assembly Bill 1179 (Act), Cal. Civ. Code Ann. 1746-1746.5, which restricted the sale or rental of violent video games to minors. At issue was whether the Act comported with the First Amendment. The Court held that, because the Act imposed a restriction on the content of protected speech, it was invalid unless California could demonstrate that it passed strict scrutiny. The Court held that California had a legitimate interest in addressing a serious social problem and helping concerned parents control their children. The Court held, however, that as a means of protecting children from portrayals of violence, the legislation was seriously underinclusive, not only because it excluded portrayals other than video games, but also because it permitted a parental or avuncular veto. The Court also held that, as a means of assisting concerned parents, it was seriously overinclusive because it abridged the First Amendment rights of young people whose parents think violent video games were a harmless pastime. The Court further held that the overbreadth in achieving one goal was not cured by the overbreadth in achieving the other and therefore, the legislation could not survive strict scrutiny. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit enjoining the Act's enforcement. View "Brown, et al. v. Entertainment Merchants Assn. et al." on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of bank robbery and one count of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. At issue was whether the district court properly assessed too many criminal history points for appellant's juvenile sentences because they were not "sentence[s] to confinement" under U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(d)(2)(A). The court held that the district court properly assessed appellant's criminal history points where that court heard uncontested testimony that appellant was confined and not free to leave while at certain juvenile facilities. Accordingly, the sentence was affirmed. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

After appellant N.D. escaped from a juvenile detention center and attacked a security guard, who later died, the state filed a felony information in circuit court, charging N.C. with capital murder, escape in the first degree, and six other criminal counts. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss and to declare the juvenile-transfer statute, Ark. Code Ann 9-27-318(e), unconstitutional. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to transfer to juvenile court. The circuit court denied appellant's motion to dismiss and to declare the transfer statute unconstitutional and subsequently denied appellant's motion to transfer to juvenile court. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing two witnesses to testify who were not disclosed in discovery, erred in ruling that the transfer statute was constitutional, and erred in denying his motion to transfer. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying appellant's motion to transfer, holding that based on prejudicial discovery violations, the circuit court abused its discretion by not excluding the testimony of the two witnesses. Because the circuit court's decision was reversed on this basis, the Court did not address the remaining arguments on appeal. View "N.D. v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, married couples who worked as house parents to children who were "severely emotionally disturbed" in defendants' homes, sued defendants for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. 203(r)(2)(A). The children attended local public schools and participated in other activities away from the homes. Although, the children participated in group therapy conducted by clinicians in the homes, they received most of their medical and psychological treatment outside the homes. Plaintiffs were not licensed medical or social service professionals. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's conclusion that defendants' homes were covered by the FLSA and were subject to its overtime provisions. The court held that defendants' homes were not covered by the FLSA because they were not an "institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, mentally ill or defective who resided on the premises of such institution." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Probert, et al. v. Family Centered Serv. of AK, et al." on Justia Law

Thirteen-year old D.M. and his friend were arrested after breaking in to a residence and taking several items of personal property. According to his mother, while D.M. was being held in a police cruiser he was prevented from speaking to his mother by police officers. Later D.M. and his mother signed a juvenile waiver acknowledging they understood D.M.'s rights. D.M. then confessed to a detective. The juvenile court found D.M. to be a delinquent child for committing acts that would have been felonies if they had been committed by an adult and placed D.M. on probation. D.M. appealed, arguing that he had not been given an opportunity for meaningful consultation with his mother and that the waiver of his rights was not knowing and voluntary. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted transfer. The Court held (1) the police provided D.M. an opportunity for meaningful consultation with his custodial parent before the waiver of his rights, and (2) there is substantial evidence of probative value that D.M.'s rights were waived voluntarily and therefore the court did not err in admitting D.M.'s confession. View "D.M. v. State" on Justia Law

B.T., the father of L.T., appealed the juvenile court's order that adopted a judicial referee's findings of fact and order committing L.T. to the care of the Division of Juvenile Services following his admissions to gross sexual imposition and ingestion of a controlled substance. During his initial appearance and his pretrial conference, L.T. appeared with court-appointed counsel, but his parents were not separately represented. L.T. admitted to the charges in the State's petition following an amendment. The amendment reduced the felony level of the gross sexual imposition charge against L.T. which allowed him to avoid being tried as an adult. At the dispositional hearing, L.T. and his parents B.T. and H.T. were all represented by separate court-appointed counsel. There was much debate over mandatory registration of L.T. as a sexual offender, but the judicial referee concluded L.T. would be required to register. Neither L.T. nor his mother H.T. appealed the judicial referee's order committing L.T. to Juvenile Services and mandating his registration as a sexual offender. However B.T. appealed, requesting the juvenile court to review the judicial referee's order. B.T. argued the referee erred by not adequately advising B.T. that L.T. would be required to register as a sexual offender after admitting to the State's charges. Furthermore, B.T. contended it was unconstitutional for an indigent parent to be denied court-appointed counsel during the adjudicative phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The juvenile court rejected B.T.'s arguments and adopted the judicial referee's findings and order. On appeal, B.T. argued the State Uniform Juvenile Court Act was unconstitutional, and his constitutional right to counsel was violated in the first of L.T.'s adjudicative hearings. Upon careful consideration of the trial record, the Supreme Court concluded that the right-to-counsel statute in North Dakota's Uniform Juvenile Court Act protects the constitutional rights of parents and juveniles. The Court affirmed the juvenile court's disposition of L.T.'s case. View "Interest of L.T." on Justia Law

J.D.B., a thirteen-year-old seventh-grade student, was taken from his classroom to a closed-door conference room where uniformed police and school administrators questioned him for at least 30 minutes regarding two home break-ins nearby. Before beginning, they did not give J.D.B. Miranda warnings, the opportunity to call his legal guardian, or tell him he was free to leave the room. After J.D.B. subsequently confessed to the break-ins and wrote a statement at the request of police, two juvenile petitions were filed against him. J.D.B.'s public defender moved to suppress his statements and the evidence derived therefrom, arguing that he had been interrogated in a custodial setting without being afforded Miranda warnings and that his statements were involuntary. At issue was whether the age of a child subjected to police questioning was relevant to the custody analysis of Miranda v. Arizona. The Court held that it was beyond dispute that children would often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave. Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality, the Court held that a child's age group properly informed the Miranda custody analysis. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded to the state courts to address whether J.D.B. was in custody when he was interrogated, taking account of all of the relevant circumstances of the interrogation, including his age at the time. View "J. D. B. v. North Carolina" on Justia Law