Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a class of indigent children who suffered from severe emotional and mental disabilities, sued Idaho state officials more than three decades ago, alleging that the officials were providing them with inadequate care in violation of their constitutional and statutory rights. The parties reached agreements intended to remedy deficiencies in care and those agreements were embodied in three consent decrees entered and monitored by the district court. Plaintiffs appealed the 2007 order of the district court finding that defendants had substantially complied with the remaining Action Items, which were specified in an Implementation Plan that resulted from the third consent decree, asserting that it was error for the district court to apply the standard for civil contempt in determining whether to vacate the decrees. Plaintiffs further contended that the district court committed errors in fact and law in issuing protective orders barring them from taking supplemental depositions of appellee and two non-parties. The court held that the district court's application of the contempt standard with the imposition of the burden of proof on plaintiffs was error where the district court accepted the Action Items as the entire measure of compliance with the consent decree. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the district court. The court also held that the district court committed no errors in upholding the assertion of the deliberative process privilege to one non-party and appellee, as well as the legislative privilege to the second non-party. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the protective orders.

Plaintiff, born in September 1983, filed a five-count complaint against defendant, her grandfather, in September 2008 alleging that he raped her on two separate occasions, the first of which occurred when she was either six or seven-years-old and the second incident when she was eight-years-old. At issue was whether section 5-117 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article could be properly applied retroactively to permit a claim that arose before the effective date of section 5-117 and which was barred by the prior statute of limitations. The court held that, assuming arguendo application of section 5-117 to plaintiff's claims represented a retrospective application of the statute, section 5-117 was a procedural and remedial statute, and, accordingly, it could be given such retrospective application to claims that were not-yet barred by the previously-applicable three-year statute of limitations period as of the extended period's effective date on October 1st, 2003.

Defendant, 14-years-old at the time of the offense, was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide and physical abuse of a child for the death of a 13-year-old. At issue was whether defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without parole was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Wisconsin Constitution and, in the alternative, whether defendant's sentence should be modified. The court affirmed the sentence, applying a two-step approach employed by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida, and held that defendant failed to demonstrate that there was a national consensus against sentencing 14-year-olds to life imprisonment without parole when the crime was intentional homicide and that, in the exercise of its own independent judgment, the punishment was not categorically unconstitutional. The court also held that defendant's sentence was not unduly harsh or excessive; that defendant had not demonstrated clear and convincing evidence that the scientific research on adolescent brain development to which he referred constituted a "new factor;" and that defendant had not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court actually relied on the religious beliefs of the victim's family when imposing defendant's sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without parole.

A.S., a California minor, filed a request for a special education due process hearing where he was eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., as an emotionally disturbed child. At issue was which California agency was responsible for funding a special education student's placement in an out-of-state residential treatment facility. The court requested the California Supreme Court exercise its discretion and decide the following certified question, "Whether under California law the school district responsible for the costs of a special education student's education while the student is placed at an out-of-state residential treatment facility is the district in which the student's de facto parent, who is authorized to make educational decisions on behalf of the student, resides."

Plaintiffs, former students of Ithaca High School, claimed that defendants violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by prohibiting the publication of a sexually-explicit cartoon in the Ithaca High School student newspaper ("IHS newspaper") and by prohibiting the on-campus distribution of an independent student newspaper containing the same cartoon. At issue was whether the district court erred in holding that the IHS newspaper was a limited public forum. The court concluded that the IHS newspaper was a limited public form and held that defendants lawfully prohibited the publication of the sexually-explicit cartoon pursuant to the standards for regulation of speech set forth in Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. The court also held that defendants lawfully prohibited the on-campus distribution of the sexually-explicit cartoon in an independent student newspaper pursuant to Fraser and that the court need not reach the question of whether defendants' prohibition of the on-campus distribution of the independent student newspaper was lawful under Tinker v. DesMoines Indep. Cmty. Scho. Dist.

Defendant, then age sixteen, was arrested and charged with ten offenses and arraigned as a youthful offender under General Statutes 54-76c et seq. Following the arraignment, the state filed a motion to transfer defendant's case to the regular criminal docket. At issue was whether the Appellate Court, sua sponte, properly dismissed for lack of a final judgment the interlocutory appeal of defendant from an order of the trial court transferring his case from the youthful offender docket of the Superior Court to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to sections 54-76c(b)(1). The court held that the trial court's order was not an appealable order under State v. Curcio where it did not conclude the rights of defendant regarding his status as a youth offender. Accordingly, the Appellate Court properly dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Defendant appealed from the decision of the trial court granting the state's motion to transfer defendant's case from the youthful offender docket to the regular criminal docket pursuant to General Statutes 54-57c(b)(1). At issue was whether the trial court improperly granted the state's motion to transfer without first holding a hearing on the motion in violation of defendant's right to due process under the federal constitution. The court held that section 54-76c(b) required a hearing on the adult docket prior to the finalization of the transfer of a case from the youthful offender docket to the regular criminal docket, that this statutory requirement satisfied due process, and that neither section 54-76c(b)(1) nor due process entitled defendant to a hearing before the court on the youthful offender docket.

Defendant was charged with rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, and three counts of endangering the welfare of a child. At issue was whether the trial court erred in precluding evidence of the victim's sexual conduct around the time of the incident pursuant to New York's rape shield law and in disqualifying one juror and failing to discharge another. The court held that the county court appropriately accepted defendant's argument that evidence of the complainant's sexual conduct would be relevant to his defense if the prosecution introduced evidence of her bruising caused by sexual contact and attributed such evidence to him. The court concluded that such evidence would have been relevant to both charges of rape but the prosecutor decided not to offer evidence of bruising. The court also held that although the county court failed to make a probing inquiry regarding a sworn juror's ability to render an impartial verdict, its discharge was not error as such action was authorized by CPL 270.15(4) and that there was no error in refusing to disqualify a prospective juror due to a former professional relationship with the prosecutor where the relationship was distant in time and limited in nature.

After a jury found defendant guilty of various federal sex crimes, the district court sentenced her to 120 months in prison and the court reversed the sentence, holding that it was unreasonable. The Supreme Court subsequently granted defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari and vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Pepper v. United States. The court again vacated the 120 month sentence and remanded for resentencing where the district court could consider evidence of postsentencing rehabilitation on defendant's part, including, but not limited to, any rehabilitation after sentencing. The court also ordered the district court to ensure the child victim received any restitution to which she was entitled from defendant.

Appellees, the parents of a child with moderate-to-severe autism, filed due process proceedings against the Sumter County School District #17 ("District") seeking a determination that the District did not provide a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE") to the child as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(A). At issue was whether the district court erred by concluding that the District failed to provide the child with a FAPE and that the program established by the child's parents to educate him at home was appropriate. The court held that that the district court did not err in concluding that the District failed to provide the child with FAPE for the 2005-2006 school year where the district court considered the evidence of the child's small improvements in a few tested areas against the District's conceded failure to provide the hours of therapy required for the child, the evidence that the lead teacher and aides did not understand or use proper techniques, and the evidence that it took one teacher months of working with the child to correct the problems caused by the improper techniques. The court also held that the district court did not err by finding that the District was not capable of providing FAPE to the child where the District's evidence was not compelling enough to establish it's improved capabilities at the time of the due process hearing. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the district court's findings that the home placement was reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.