Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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J.W., a 14-year-old, and two other juveniles were involved in an incident where one of the boys exploded a large firework inside a vacant trailer home, causing significant fire and smoke damage. J.W. initially lied to the police about who caused the fire to protect the other juveniles. He later admitted to a juvenile delinquency petition alleging accessory to a crime. The circuit court ordered J.W. and another juvenile to pay restitution of approximately $15,000 for the damage.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Pennington County adjudicated J.W. as a delinquent child and placed him on probation. The court held a restitution hearing and ordered J.W. to pay restitution, finding that the legislative amendments to the juvenile statutes did not require a causal connection between the damages and J.W.'s criminal act. The court determined that the restitution served a rehabilitative purpose and found no credible evidence that the restitution order would cause J.W. serious hardship.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the legislative amendments to the juvenile restitution statutes now require a causal connection between the juvenile's criminal act and the victim's damages, similar to adult restitution cases. The court found that J.W.'s act of lying to the police occurred after the damage was done and was not causally connected to the fire damage. Therefore, the court reversed and vacated the circuit court's restitution order, concluding that J.W. was not liable for restitution as the damage did not occur as a result of his criminal act. View "Interest Of J.W." on Justia Law

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James Russell Trimble, who was convicted of first-degree murder and other crimes committed when he was 17 years old, filed a motion for a reduction of his sentence under Maryland's Juvenile Restoration Act (JUVRA). This act allows individuals convicted as minors and who have served at least 20 years to seek a sentence reduction. Trimble argued that his age at the time of the offense and his rehabilitation efforts warranted a reduced sentence.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County denied Trimble's motion, finding that his age at the time of the crime did not support a sentence reduction, and that he continued to pose a danger to the public. The court also did not credit the testimony of Trimble's expert, who argued that Trimble's antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) had remitted. The court emphasized the brutal nature of the crime and the lasting impact on the victim's family.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. The appellate court found that the circuit court had adequately considered all the required factors under JUVRA, including Trimble's age, rehabilitation efforts, and expert testimony. The appellate court also noted that the circuit court was not required to give special consideration to any particular factor, including rehabilitation.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that under JUVRA, the circuit court has broad discretion to determine whether an individual is a danger to the public and whether the interests of justice will be served by a reduced sentence. The court is required to consider ten enumerated factors but is not required to give special consideration to any particular factor. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court had properly exercised its discretion in denying Trimble's motion for a reduced sentence. View "Trimble v. State" on Justia Law

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Three juveniles, Frederick F., Angela A., and Manolo M., were adjudicated delinquent on charges of resisting arrest. The events occurred on October 3, 2019, near Brockton High School, where a large crowd of students had gathered, leading to multiple altercations. Frederick yelled profanities at police officers and refused to leave the area, Angela recorded officers with her cell phone while yelling at them, and Manolo attempted to punch an officer and engaged in a physical struggle.The Juvenile Court denied Frederick's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause and denied all three juveniles' motions for required findings of not delinquent. The Appeals Court affirmed the adjudications for resisting arrest but vacated Manolo's adjudication for assault and battery on a police officer due to an error in jury instructions.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the adjudications for resisting arrest. For Frederick, the court found that the circumstances provided a basis for a good-faith judgment to arrest him for disorderly conduct. For Angela, the court concluded that her conduct of thrusting her cell phone within inches of officers' faces and resisting arrest by pulling away constituted the use of physical force. For Manolo, the court determined that his physical struggle with officers on the ground, following his aggressive actions, provided sufficient evidence of using physical force to resist arrest.The court affirmed the adjudications of delinquency for resisting arrest for all three juveniles and remanded for further proceedings on Manolo's vacated adjudication for assault and battery on a police officer. View "Commonwealth v. Manolo M." on Justia Law

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In January 2018, Nycole Amaury Rosario Sánchez, then fifteen years old, and six accomplices committed a series of violent crimes in Puerto Rico, including three robberies, two carjackings, and four murders. Rosario brandished and discharged firearms during these crimes, resulting in multiple injuries and deaths. He was arrested on January 25, 2018, and agreed to be prosecuted as an adult. Rosario pleaded guilty to six counts, including interference with commerce by robbery, carjacking, and using a firearm during a crime of violence causing murder.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico sentenced Rosario to 480 months' imprisonment. Rosario appealed, arguing that the district court failed to consider mitigating factors such as his age, mental and emotional condition, and the sentencing disparity between him and his co-defendants. He also claimed that his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had considered Rosario's age, mental and emotional condition, and other mitigating factors, as evidenced by the sentencing transcript and the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). The court also noted that Rosario's co-defendants were sentenced by a different judge and that Rosario had not provided sufficient information to establish an unwarranted sentencing disparity.The First Circuit held that the district court did not commit procedural error in its consideration of the section 3553(a) factors or in addressing the sentencing disparity. The court also found that Rosario's sentence was substantively reasonable, given the seriousness of his offenses and his behavior while incarcerated. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed Rosario's 480-month sentence. View "United States v. Rosario Sanchez" on Justia Law

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D.D., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for committing second-degree rape at the age of fourteen and was committed to the custody of the Office of Juvenile Justice until his twenty-first birthday. Upon release, he was required to register as a sex offender. D.D. challenged the constitutionality of this registration requirement, arguing it violated the Sixth and Eighth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The juvenile court denied his motion.D.D. appealed to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, which affirmed both the adjudication and the denial of his constitutional claims. D.D. then sought review from the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which granted his writ application.The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the sex offender registration requirement for juveniles does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, as it is a civil regulatory measure intended to protect public safety rather than a punitive action. The court also found that the registration requirement does not implicate the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial, as juvenile proceedings are fundamentally different from adult criminal trials and do not require a jury trial for due process. The court affirmed D.D.'s adjudication and the denial of his motion to declare the registration requirement unconstitutional. View "In re D.D." on Justia Law

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A father was accused of sexually abusing and assaulting his 11-year-old daughter over the course of a single day. The daughter testified to three separate incidents: in the family’s toy room, the father touched her chest through her clothes and showed her a pornographic video; in the school room, he told her they would have vaginal sex that night, described the pain she would experience, touched her vagina through her clothes, and made her touch his exposed penis; later, while driving her to a store, he touched her again, showed more pornographic videos, and, after stopping on a dirt road, moved her onto his lap, sucked on her chest, touched her vagina, kissed her, and asked if she was sure about having sex.A jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma found the father guilty of abusive sexual contact with a minor under 12 and assault with intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse. After the verdict, the district court entered a judgment of acquittal on the assault charge, reasoning that the evidence was insufficient because the father had said the sex would occur later that night, not immediately. The government moved for reconsideration, and the district court reinstated the conviction, concluding that a reasonable jury could have found both assault and the required intent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed three issues: whether the district court plainly erred by not instructing the jury to agree on a specific incident of sexual contact, whether the district court could reinstate the assault conviction after acquittal, and whether sufficient evidence supported the assault conviction. The court held that the omission of a specific unanimity instruction did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights, that the district court could correct its mistaken acquittal without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that sufficient evidence supported the assault conviction. The convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Roark" on Justia Law

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Curtis Walker, who was 17 years old when he committed murder, was sentenced to life in prison with a parole eligibility date set for 2071, effectively making it a life-without-parole sentence. After serving nearly 30 years, Walker sought postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment based on a series of Supreme Court decisions regarding juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole. Walker's request for a "meaningful opportunity" to demonstrate his rehabilitation was denied by the Wisconsin state courts, prompting him to file a federal habeas corpus petition.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals denied Walker's postconviction motion, holding that his sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment because the sentencing judge had considered his youth and its attendant circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. Walker then filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court dismissed as untimely and without merit, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent, particularly in light of the decisions in Miller v. Alabama, Montgomery v. Louisiana, and Jones v. Mississippi. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the state court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as the Supreme Court's precedents did not clearly establish a categorical prohibition against sentencing corrigible juvenile offenders to life without parole. View "Walker v Cromwell" on Justia Law

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In December 2020, Gavin Smith's grandfather discovered Smith's mother, stepfather, and two younger brothers shot to death in their home. Smith, who was sixteen at the time, was later found at his girlfriend's grandmother's house and arrested. Smith's girlfriend, Rebecca Walker, was also charged but entered a plea agreement to testify against Smith in exchange for a reduced sentence.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County transferred Smith from juvenile to adult criminal jurisdiction. A grand jury indicted him on four counts of first-degree murder and four counts of using a firearm during a felony. During the trial, Walker testified about her plea deal and the events of the murders. Smith's counsel cross-examined her about the life sentence she avoided, leading to a court instruction clarifying that Smith would be eligible for parole after fifteen years due to his age at the time of the crime.The jury convicted Smith of three counts of first-degree murder, one count of second-degree murder, and one count of using a firearm during a felony. The court sentenced him to three life terms with mercy plus fifty years, all to run consecutively.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. Smith argued that the circuit court erred by informing the jury about his parole eligibility, which prejudiced the jury. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the circuit court's instruction on parole eligibility was improper and prejudicial. The court held that outside the context of cases involving a recommendation of mercy, it is improper to inform the jury about sentencing possibilities. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated Smith's convictions and the circuit court's sentencing order, remanding the case for a new trial. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

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A 15-year-old male was charged with a Class II felony for allegedly sexually assaulting a 14-year-old female at a high school in Omaha, Nebraska. The incident was reported by the victim, L.S., who stated that the assault occurred within the school premises. Video footage and interviews with the involved parties, including the accused, Jeremiah T., and a witness, G.G., were part of the evidence. L.S. claimed that Jeremiah forcibly assaulted her despite her resistance, while Jeremiah contended that the encounter was consensual. G.G.'s involvement as a lookout was also scrutinized.The district court overruled Jeremiah's motion to transfer the case to juvenile court, citing concerns about public safety and the severity of the offense. The court found that the nature of the crime and the degree of violence involved suggested that Jeremiah might need supervision beyond the age of 19, which the juvenile court could not provide. The court also noted that while Jeremiah was amenable to treatment, the timeline for effective rehabilitation within the juvenile system was uncertain.The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, arguing that the lower court abused its discretion. The appellate court emphasized that the evidence favored Jeremiah's rehabilitation within the juvenile system and that the State did not sufficiently prove a sound basis for retaining the case in adult court. The Court of Appeals highlighted the availability of appropriate services in the juvenile system and questioned the district court's interpretation of the evidence.Upon further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had improperly reweighed the evidence and failed to apply the correct standard of review. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining the case in adult court, as its decision was supported by appropriate evidence and considerations of public safety. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case with directions to affirm the district court's order. View "State v. Jeremiah T." on Justia Law

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A twelve-year-old child disclosed to a school counselor that she had been communicating with a twenty-six-year-old man, later identified as Eric Overton, via Snapchat. The child’s mother confirmed the communication, obtained evidence from the phone, and contacted law enforcement. The investigation revealed that Overton and the child had exchanged nude photographs and sexually explicit messages, and that Overton had picked up the child from her home on three occasions, during which they engaged in sexual intercourse. The child provided detailed testimony at trial regarding these encounters.The Hot Spring County Circuit Court presided over the trial, during which Overton objected to the prosecutor’s voir dire questioning about whether a conviction could be based on the testimony of a single credible witness. The court overruled the objection and denied a subsequent motion for mistrial, emphasizing that the jury would be instructed on the law at the end of the case. The jury was later instructed on the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Overton guilty of rape and internet stalking of a child, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment on each count.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether there was substantial evidence to support the rape conviction and whether the circuit court erred in its handling of voir dire and jury instructions. The court held that the evidence, including the victim’s testimony, was sufficient to support the conviction, and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no prejudicial error in the proceedings. View "Overton v. State" on Justia Law