Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In October 2019, Khrysta Turk reported to the Kalispell Police Department that her stepson, L.S., then 13 years old, had inappropriately touched her four-year-old daughter, E.T. L.S. admitted to the inappropriate touching during a police interview. Following the report, L.S.'s mother placed him in various residential treatment facilities for a total of 728 days. The investigation concluded in December 2019, and the matter was referred to the Eleventh Judicial District Court Office of Youth Services in January 2020. The Youth Court decided to monitor L.S.'s treatment informally without initiating formal proceedings.The State filed a formal petition on January 3, 2022, alleging that L.S. committed acts consistent with felony sexual assault. L.S. was appointed counsel, and the District Court set a trial date. L.S. moved for a continuance due to a discovery violation by the State, which delayed the trial. L.S. also filed motions to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial and for the discovery violation. The District Court denied both motions, noting that the case was atypical due to L.S.'s mother's proactive placement in treatment facilities. The trial was rescheduled multiple times, and L.S. eventually admitted to the allegations while reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motions.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and conducted a speedy trial analysis. The Court determined that the delay of 329 days from the filing of the petition to L.S.'s admission was not extraordinary given the serious nature of the allegations. The Court found that the delays were either institutional or due to L.S.'s request for a continuance. L.S. consistently asserted his right to a speedy trial but failed to demonstrate that the delay prejudiced his defense. The Court concluded that no speedy trial violation occurred and affirmed the District Court's denial of L.S.'s motion to dismiss. View "In re L.S." on Justia Law

In June 2021, the defendant, K.D., stole a car with a one-year-old child inside. She was arrested shortly after and found with the stolen items. K.D. admitted to taking the car and knowing the child was inside. She was charged with kidnapping, child abduction, and vehicle theft. K.D.'s defense counsel raised doubts about her competency, leading to evaluations that diagnosed her with a moderate intellectual disability. She was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the Porterville Developmental Center for treatment. After being declared competent in August 2022, K.D. requested developmental disability diversion.The Mendocino County Superior Court initially denied K.D.'s request for diversion, citing her lack of ties to the community, her criminal history, and concerns about her ability to comply with diversion requirements. The court also noted that K.D. had never received services from the regional center and had a history of probation violations. Despite acknowledging her developmental disability, the court concluded that her disability was not related to the charged offense and that she would not benefit from diversion.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by not properly considering the relationship between K.D.'s developmental disability and the charged offense. The appellate court noted that the trial court failed to ensure that the regional center provided a proper report and diversion plan tailored to K.D.'s needs. The appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new diversion eligibility hearing, instructing the trial court to comply with statutory requirements and consider whether K.D. would benefit from diversion. If K.D. satisfactorily completes diversion, the charges should be dismissed; otherwise, her conviction should be reinstated. View "People v. K.D." on Justia Law

Jonathan Eluterio Martinez-Garcia, a juvenile offender, attacked his 11th-grade English teacher and subsequently pleaded guilty to attempted murder, attempted sexual assault, and battery with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. The district court sentenced him to two consecutive prison terms of 8 to 20 years and a concurrent term of 6 to 15 years, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 40 years with parole eligibility after 16 years. Martinez-Garcia moved to reconsider the sentence, arguing it was illegal and that he was entitled to parole eligibility after 15 years under NRS 213.12135(1)(a). The district court treated the motion as one to correct an illegal sentence and denied it.Martinez-Garcia appealed the district court's decision, contending that his sentence should reflect parole eligibility after 15 years as mandated by NRS 213.12135(1)(a) for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. He argued that the sentence imposed was illegal because it provided for parole eligibility after 16 years, contrary to the statute. The State argued that the sentence complied with the statutes governing the offenses to which Martinez-Garcia pleaded guilty.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that NRS 213.12135(1)(a) provides for parole eligibility for juvenile nonhomicide offenders after 15 years by operation of law, without requiring resentencing or amendment of the judgment of conviction. The court concluded that the statute does not render a sentence illegal if it otherwise conforms to the sentencing statutes for the offenses committed. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order denying Martinez-Garcia's motion to correct an illegal sentence, acknowledging that he will be eligible for parole after 15 years despite the longer parole-eligibility period stated in the judgment of conviction. View "GARCIA VS. STATE" on Justia Law

A juvenile was found delinquent on firearm charges and guilty on a youthful offender indictment for one of the offenses. At the trial, the juvenile was nineteen years old, and the Commonwealth called his mother to testify about events that occurred when he was seventeen. The juvenile argued that the parent-child witness disqualification statute, which prohibits testimony by a parent against their minor child, should have precluded his mother's testimony even though he was no longer a minor at the time of trial. He also claimed that the trial judge made several errors in admitting other evidence and that his sentence was unlawful and unconstitutional.The juvenile was charged in a delinquency complaint with possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, unlawful possession of a large capacity feeding device, and improper storage of a firearm. He was subsequently indicted as a youthful offender for the large capacity feeding device charge. The juvenile filed a motion to prevent the Commonwealth from calling his mother as a witness, invoking the parent-child witness disqualification statute. The motion judge denied the motion, reasoning that the statute applied only to testimony against a minor child, and the juvenile was no longer a minor.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and agreed with the trial judge's interpretation that the statutory prohibition of testimony by a parent against their minor child does not apply once the child has reached the age of eighteen. The court found no prejudicial error in the admission of other evidence, although it concluded that the judge should not have admitted a detective's testimony that a firearm depicted in still images was "identical" to the firearm admitted in evidence, nor two hearsay statements. Regarding the juvenile's sentence, the court agreed that the judge erred in not issuing written findings explaining the sentence but concluded that this error did not prejudice the juvenile. The court affirmed the juvenile's delinquency and youthful offender adjudications and declined to vacate his sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Rajiv R." on Justia Law

L.H. pled no contest to first-degree murder and was committed to a secure youth treatment facility by the juvenile court. The court set his maximum term of confinement to 25 years to life or until he turns 25, whichever comes first, and applied 734 days of precommitment credits to this term. L.H. appealed, arguing that the court incorrectly applied Welfare and Institutions Code section 875 in setting his maximum term of confinement beyond his 25th birthday and erred in applying his precommitment credits against a theoretical maximum term of 25 years. He also claimed that equal protection principles require his precommitment credits to be applied against a term that does not exceed his 25th birthday.The juvenile court adjudged L.H. a ward of the court and committed him to Briones Youth Academy, Secure Pathway. The court determined that L.H.'s remaining custody time was 22 years and 361 days after applying the precommitment credits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the juvenile court correctly applied section 875 in setting the maximum term of confinement. The court interpreted section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(A) as providing a separate cap on the length of a ward’s physical confinement, independent of the maximum term of confinement set by the juvenile court. The court also held that the juvenile court did not err in applying L.H.'s precommitment credits against the maximum term of confinement of 25 years, as required by section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C). The court found no equal protection violation, as the application of precommitment credits was consistent with the statutory requirements.The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s disposition order. View "In re L.H." on Justia Law

Ramiro Munoz, a member of a criminal street gang, was convicted in 2008 of first-degree murder and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, with firearm and gang allegations found true. Munoz, who was 15 years old at the time of the crime, was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison. In 2023, Munoz filed a petition for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole, making him eligible for relief under the statute.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Munoz's petition, stating that he would be eligible for parole under section 3051 in 2029, when he would be 39 years old. Munoz appealed the decision, and the case was reviewed by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven.The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court's decision, holding that Munoz's sentence of 50 years to life is not the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole. The court concluded that section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), applies only to juvenile offenders explicitly sentenced to life without the possibility of parole and does not extend to those with lengthy sentences that may be considered de facto life without parole. The court also noted that Munoz would have a realistic opportunity to obtain release from prison during his expected lifetime, distinguishing his case from others with significantly longer sentences. View "People v. Munoz" on Justia Law

In this case, the State charged an adult with capital murder, alleging he was sixteen at the time of the offense. The juvenile court found it was not practicable to proceed before the adult turned eighteen because the State lacked probable cause to arrest him at that time. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed the case, holding that probable cause existed to arrest him before he turned eighteen, thus the State failed to establish it was impracticable to proceed.The juvenile court granted the State’s motion to transfer the case to adult criminal court, combining elements of two statutory good cause alternatives. The court of appeals vacated the order and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, noting the juvenile court’s findings were difficult to decipher and lacked a “due diligence” finding required by one of the statutory alternatives. The court of appeals concluded that the State had sufficient evidence to establish probable cause before the respondent turned eighteen, and the reasons for delay were not beyond the State’s control.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and largely agreed with the dissenting justice from the court of appeals. The Court held that the development of probable cause alone does not determine whether it is “practicable to proceed” with a juvenile prosecution before a person reaches adulthood. Other reasons beyond the control of the State may support such a finding. The Court found that the juvenile court erred in conflating “practicable to proceed” with the existence of probable cause and remanded the case to the juvenile court for a new transfer hearing. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "IN THE MATTER OF J.J.T." on Justia Law

In March 2023, J.D. was involved in two separate incidents at the Pacific View Mall. In the first incident, J.D. stole a cell phone from Mia M. while she was sitting with friends. Later that day, J.D. and three others attacked Priscilla E., taking her cell phone and assaulting her. Both incidents were captured on mall surveillance, and the victims identified J.D. as the perpetrator.The Ventura County District Attorney's office filed a juvenile petition in July 2023, charging J.D. with the theft of Mia's cell phone. J.D. admitted to the theft in February 2024 and was placed on probation. In March 2024, a subsequent petition was filed, charging J.D. with felony assault for the attack on Priscilla. J.D. filed a motion to dismiss the felony assault charge, arguing that the prosecution should have been aware of both offenses and that they should have been prosecuted together.The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the two incidents were separate and distinct, occurring at different times and locations. The court determined that the evidence needed to prove the assault on Priscilla did not overlap significantly with the evidence needed to prove the theft from Mia.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the offenses were not part of a singular transaction and that the prosecution was not required to join the charges in a single proceeding. The court found no significant overlap in the evidence and concluded that the Kellett rule did not apply, as the incidents were distinct in time, location, and nature. The judgment denying the motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "In re J.D." on Justia Law

The defendant, a seventeen-year-old, was convicted of the abduction and murder of eighty-nine-year-old Elleze Kennedy. Along with his co-defendants, the defendant followed Ms. Kennedy home, assaulted her, and placed her in the trunk of her car. They later set the car on fire, resulting in Ms. Kennedy's death from carbon monoxide poisoning. The defendant was sentenced to life in prison without parole.The Superior Court of Onslow County initially sentenced the defendant to life without parole. The Court of Appeals upheld this sentence, finding no error. The defendant then filed a motion for appropriate relief, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, which requires consideration of a juvenile's age and potential for rehabilitation before imposing a life without parole sentence. The Superior Court held a resentencing hearing and reaffirmed the life without parole sentence, considering the Miller factors.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The court held that the defendant's J.E.B. claim, alleging gender bias in jury selection, was procedurally barred because it was not raised at trial or on direct appeal. The court also affirmed the lower court's decision to sentence the defendant to life without parole, finding that the sentencing court properly considered the Miller factors, including the defendant's age, immaturity, ability to appreciate risks, prior record, mental health, and potential for rehabilitation. The court concluded that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in weighing these factors and that the sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "State v. Sims" on Justia Law

In 2001, a 17-year-old Morris Mullins killed a 78-year-old widow, Amy Davis, and was charged as an adult with rape and aggravated murder. Mullins pled guilty to aggravated murder in exchange for the State dropping the rape charge and not seeking the death penalty. He was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP). At the sentencing, the court considered evidence of Mullins’s dysfunctional upbringing and psychological evaluation but ultimately imposed a juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) sentence.Mullins later challenged his sentence as unconstitutional, citing the Eighth Amendment and the Utah Constitution. In 2013, he filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama. The district court denied his motion in 2016, and Mullins’s appeal was delayed until 2020 due to ineffective assistance of counsel.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the sentencing court properly considered Mullins’s youth and potential for change as required by Miller and subsequent cases. The court found that the sentencing judge’s comments suggested ambiguity about Mullins’s capacity for change, undermining confidence in the constitutionality of the JLWOP sentence. The court vacated Mullins’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, emphasizing the need to consider the constitutional implications of Mullins’s youth and potential for rehabilitation. View "Galassi v. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC" on Justia Law