Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

After adjudicating A. H. delinquent, but finding that he was not in need of treatment, rehabilitation, or supervision, the juvenile court in this case entered an order dismissing the delinquency proceedings under OCGA § 15-11-600 (d) and sealing the record under OCGA § 15-11-701. The State appealed the juvenile court’s decision to seal the record, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that neither OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(1) nor OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(6) authorized the State to appeal the juvenile court’s order. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether “the Court of Appeals err[ed] in concluding that the State was not permitted to appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1(a).” The Supreme Court found with respect to subsection (a)(6), the issue was neither fully litigated below nor briefed by the parties in significant depth to the Supreme Court. "Thus, although this issue is properly before us in a narrow sense, it is not presented in a form that would allow us to clarify the law or otherwise provide meaningful guidance." Accordingly, the writ was vacated, and the petition for certiorari in Case No. S22C1035 was denied. View "In the Interest of A.H." on Justia Law

In 2009, A.B., 13 years old, pled no contest to charges and was declared a ward of the juvenile court. The juvenile court successfully terminated his probation and wardship in 2014. Eight years later, A.B. and the County Probation Department filed an unopposed petition to have his juvenile court and public agency records sealed, Welfare and Institutions Code section 781. Since his juvenile adjudication, A.B. had not sustained any criminal convictions, had married and had a child, and had remained steadily employed.The court granted the petition, finding that A.B. had been rehabilitated and that A.B.’s offenses were not listed in section 707(b). In addition to sealing its own records, the court ordered the five government agencies listed in the petition to seal and ultimately destroy any of A.B.’s juvenile records in their custody. Three months later, A.B. discovered that several public agencies not subject to the original sealing order had retained and could access his juvenile records. A.B. petitioned to seal these additional records, again unopposed. The juvenile court concluded that it lacked the authority to seal additional records after the initial sealing order, acknowledging that, had the additional agencies been listed in A.B.’s first petition, they would have been ordered to seal their records. The court of appeal reversed. Section 781.1 allows a court to grant a petition to seal documents not addressed in an earlier petition. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

The San Bernardino County District Attorney filed a petition against defendant-appellant J.P. alleging he committed second degree robbery, assault with a firearm and carrying a loaded firearm not registered to him in a vehicle. A court found all three allegations true and sustained the petition. On appeal, J.P. argued Welfare and Institutions Code section 875 precluded commitment to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) unless the juvenile’s most recent offense was listed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b), and J.P.’s most recent offense, the gun possession, was not such an offense. The State moved to dismiss the gun possession offense, to which J.P. objected, arguing that the court only had the power to strike the entre petition, not any single allegation. The court granted the State’s motion, dismissed the gun offense, and committed J.P. to an SYTF. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re J.P." on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Rodriguez pleaded guilty to felony offenses committed when he was sixteen years old under a plea and disposition agreement, and following an amenability hearing, the district court imposed an adult sentence. Defendant appealed the amenability determination, and on its own motion, the Court of Appeals held that under the plea and disposition agreement, Defendant waived his right to appeal. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a juvenile waives the right to appeal an amenability determination by entering into a plea and disposition agreement. To this, the Court held that the right was not waived, reversed the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to decide Defendant’s appeal on the merits. View "New Mexico v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Juvenile D.J. appealed a circuit court's finding of delinquency based on a petition alleging that he committed harassment under RSA 644:4, I(b) (Supp. 2021). The victim told the juveniles that they were not supposed to be riding bicycles on the sidewalk. D.J. told the victim to go “f**k himself.” D.J. continued to yell at the victim, who testified that D.J. was “swearing, saying f**k this and f**k that and you’re nothing but an old man.” The victim yelled back at D.J. and asserted that he could do martial arts. D.J. got off his bicycle, provoked the victim to fight, and took off his shirt. The owner of a store across the street from this encounter observed the confrontation and, after it had gone on for approximately five minutes, she began to record it using her cellphone. The store owner also called the police. The incident lasted approximately eight minutes, until a patrol officer arrived at the scene. D.J. argued there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding, and that RSA 644:4, I(b) was unconstitutional as applied and on its face. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re D.J." on Justia Law

A.D. appealed on behalf of her son G.R.D., a court order placing him in the custody of the Division of Juvenile Services (DJS). In September 2022, G.R.D. was charged with committing simple assault on his mother. He was detained at the Grand Forks County Juvenile Detention Center and subsequently adjudicated as a delinquent child. He remained in his mother’s custody and was placed on supervised probation for 12 months and ordered to participate in drug court. In November 2022, G.R.D. was detained based on allegations he violated conditions of probation and committed new offenses. The juvenile court ordered that G.R.D. remain at the juvenile detention center and undergo diagnostic testing. On November 23, 2022, the juvenile court conducted an initial appearance on the probation revocation petition and ordered G.R.D to home detention in the custody of his mother. G.R.D. was alleged to have used methamphetamine within hours of being released into his mother’s custody. On November 28, 2022, the juvenile court conducted a detention hearing and ordered that G.R.D. be detained for again violating his probation. After a detention review hearing on December 27, 2022, the juvenile court found G.R.D. remained a delinquent child and ordered him into the custody of DJS for up to 12 months. The court also ordered DJS to place G.R.D. in a treatment center as soon as possible. A.D. argued the juvenile court erred by granting the DJS custody of G.R.D. instead of her, and the court’s findings were based on stale evidence. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Interest of G.R.D." on Justia Law

Spectrum contracts with Michigan to house children who are ordered to be detained in facilities “similar to a prison setting.” The children are completely restricted in their movements. The state requires Spectrum to monitor them on a 24/7 basis. A court ordered the detention of 15-year-old Quintana at Spectrum’s facility on August 24, 2018. Quintana struggled with depression, anxiety, and difficulty sleeping, among other things. On September 11, 2018, Quintana took his life while alone in his bedroom. No one checked his room in the 45 minutes between the last time he was seen alive and when his body was found, violating a contractual requirement that Spectrum conduct “eye-on checks” every 15 minutes when the children are “outside of the direct supervision of staff.” Spectrum had a policy or custom of skipping many eye-on checks and falsifying supervision logs to reflect that the checks had been performed.Quintana’s estate sued Spectrum under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Spectrum functioned as a state actor and violated Quintana’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissed the dismissal of the suit. The complaint contains adequate facts to establish that Spectrum is a state actor. Spectrum was allegedly engaged in a public function similar to a correctional institution, a traditionally exclusive state function. View "Nugent v. Spectrum Juvenile Justice Services" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Gallimore pleaded guilty to committing three robberies on three consecutive days in different locations at age 16. These convictions pushed his criminal history category to VI under USSG § 4B1.4(c)(2) which, in turn, set his guideline imprisonment range at 188 to 235 months. The statutory range, because of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) enhancement, was fifteen years to life. The ACCA sentencing enhancement applied to defendants with three prior convictions for committing violent felonies on separate occasions. Defendant appealed the calculation of the sentence he received (200 months imprisonment), arguing he committed these robberies on one occasion (which would have reduced the range of his sentence). The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding that the time between each robbery and their different locations both decisively differentiated "occasions" here. View "United States v. Gallimore" on Justia Law

Petitioner Anthony Jones pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary and armed robbery, crimes he committed at the ages of sixteen and seventeen, respectively. Pursuant to subsection 63-19-20(1), South Carolina's definitional statute of chapter nineteen in the Juvenile Justice Code, the circuit court had jurisdiction over Jones's charges, rather than the family court. The circuit court judge sentenced Jones to ten years in prison for armed robbery and fifteen years for first-degree burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. Jones did not file a direct appeal. Instead, he filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") on several grounds, including a challenge to the constitutionality of subsection 63-19-20(1). After a hearing, the PCR court dismissed the application, finding the constitutional challenge was not a cognizable PCR claim and, even if it were, the statute was constitutional. The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded Jones properly brought this challenge in his PCR application and subsection 63-19-20(1) was constitutional. However, in keeping with prior decisions regarding sentencing juveniles, the Court held circuit court judges had to consider the mitigating factors of youth as identified in Aiken v. Byars when sentencing. "Consideration of these factors can be done at sentencing; therefore, a separate Aiken hearing is not required." Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Jones v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jon Smart and his co-defendant, Stephen Hutto, were in custody at a Department of Juvenile Justice detention facility near Rimini in Clarendon County in August 1999 when they brutally murdered a citizen volunteer who graciously allowed the boys to work on his family farm under his supervision as a part of their rehabilitation. Smart and Hutto then stole the man's truck and drove it on a violent crime spree. After Horry County Police officers stopped them for a traffic violation and discovered the truck was stolen, Smart and Hutto led officers on a thirty-mile high-speed chase during which Smart fired shots at pursuing law enforcement vehicles. Smart was sixteen years old. Smart pled guilty in 2001 to murder, armed robbery, grand larceny, criminal conspiracy, and escape. The plea court sentenced him to life in prison for the murder. The issue his appeal presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether a juvenile sentenced to life in prison, bore any burden of proof or persuasion when seeking resentencing under Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014). The Supreme Court held there was no such burden—on either party—and the resentencing court did not impose such a burden. View "South Carolina v. Smart" on Justia Law