Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Glen Robert Anderson pleaded guilty to two counts of production and attempted production of child pornography, one count of enticement of a minor, and one count of interstate communication with intent to extort. The district court sentenced him to 20 years in prison and 12 years of supervised release, which is above the statutory minimum sentence of 15 years. Anderson appealed, contending that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the sentencing. The court had carefully assessed the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and had explained its reasoning for choosing a sentence above the statutory minimum. The court had considered the nature and seriousness of Anderson's crimes as aggravating factors, while also taking into account mitigating factors such as Anderson's history of abuse and mental health issues. The court had not relied solely on the advisory Guidelines, which recommended a life sentence, but had used them as a starting point and then varied downward based on the specific circumstances of the case. Thus, Anderson's sentence was not deemed substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In this case, a Superior Court judge in Massachusetts sought guidance from the Supreme Judicial Court on three questions involving the pretrial confinement of a juvenile charged with murder. The juvenile, who was sixteen years old when he was charged with second-degree murder, was initially held without bail at a Department of Youth Services (DYS) facility due to a "courtesy" arrangement with the county sheriff. As the juvenile neared his eighteenth birthday, he was informed that he would be moved to an adult facility. In response, a Superior Court judge released him on personal recognizance on the murder charge and set bail on a related non-murder charge, ordering that he stay at the DYS facility.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was asked to determine: 1) whether a Superior Court judge can commit a person under age eighteen charged with murder to DYS's care as a pre-trial detainee; 2) if not, can a Superior Court judge set bail on a charge related to, but other than murder, so that the person under eighteen is not held on bail on the murder charge and is committed to DYS's care; and 3) if the answers to questions 1 and 2 are "No," is the last paragraph of G. L. c. 119, § 68 (which mandates that juveniles charged with murder be committed to the custody of the sheriff) unconstitutional?The Supreme Judicial Court declined to answer the third question due to mootness, as the defendant had since turned eighteen and pleaded guilty to manslaughter. Regarding the first two questions, the court referred to its previous ruling in Nicholas-Taylor v. Commonwealth and affirmed that a Superior Court judge does not have the authority to commit a juvenile defendant charged with murder to the custody of DYS, nor can they sidestep this requirement by committing the juvenile to DYS on a related non-murder offense. Therefore, the answers to the first and second questions were "No." View "Commonwealth v. Padilla" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, defendant Nels Jerry Peterson appealed his conviction on the offense of sexual assault against his eleven-year-old step-granddaughter (Q.H.). The main contention was the District Court’s decision to permit evidence of Peterson’s prior sexual conduct with other young girls under M. R. Evid. 404(b) and 403. The court concluded that some of the evidence may have been admissible for a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b), but the potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value as presented. The details of Peterson’s prior sexual misconduct were not more abhorrent than the current charge. However, the frequency and manner of the State’s references to them throughout the trial risked inducing the jury’s hostility toward Peterson, resulting in unfair prejudice. Further, the State did not meet its burden to show no reasonable possibility that its use of the tainted evidence might have contributed to Peterson’s conviction. Therefore, the court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. Peterson" on Justia Law

In early 2022, a three-year-old child, L.C., was taken from his mother, D.C., after she was arrested for transporting fentanyl pills with L.C. in the car. After the juvenile court removed L.C. from his mother's care, D.C. returned to Mexico on the advice of her criminal defense attorney. Despite being in Mexico, D.C. maintained a relationship with L.C. through weekly video calls and completed necessary programs as part of her case plan, including a drug treatment program, individual counseling, and parenting classes. However, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services expressed concerns about the validity of her drug tests performed by Mexico's child protection agency. At a 12-month status review hearing, the juvenile court terminated D.C.'s reunification services, citing her failure to return to California for drug testing and other services, speculation about L.C.'s developmental services in Mexico, and D.C.'s refusal to surrender herself in response to an arrest warrant.L.C. sought relief, arguing that there was no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that returning him to his mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to his safety or well-being. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven agreed with L.C. and found that the mother had complied with her case plan, maintained a bond with L.C., and that Mexico's child protection agency could provide services to the mother and L.C. Therefore, the court granted the petition, vacated the juvenile court's termination of reunification services, and ordered a new review hearing to consider any developments since the last hearing. View "L.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed a case involving Jose Agundez-Martinez, who was prosecuted as an adult for sexual assault and child molestation offenses he committed as a child between the ages of ten and twelve. The crimes came to light after Agundez-Martinez turned eighteen, and he was indicted at the age of twenty-three. Agundez-Martinez argued that the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over him once he turned eighteen, thereby depriving the superior court of its only mechanism for obtaining jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Arizona held that Proposition 102, known as the "Juvenile Justice Initiative," and the legislation implementing it did not prohibit the state from prosecuting adults for crimes committed when they were juveniles. The court stated that a crime is a crime, regardless of the age of the offender at the time of the offense, and the determination of whether it is adjudicated as a "delinquent act" or prosecuted as a criminal charge depends entirely on the status of the offender at the time the state initiates proceedings.Consequently, the court held that the superior court had jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence Agundez-Martinez for his criminal offenses since he was an adult when indicted. However, the court expressed concern about the lengthy adult prison sentences initially imposed for acts committed by a young child and urged the legislature to provide statutory directives for such situations. The case was remanded to the superior court for resentencing. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ" on Justia Law

In this case, the State of North Dakota appealed an order transferring a criminal case involving the defendant, A.J.H., who was charged with six counts of gross sexual imposition, to the juvenile court. The transfer was based on a newly amended definition of "Child" in the North Dakota Century Code, which the district court concluded applied to this case. However, A.J.H. moved to dismiss the State's appeals, arguing that there was no appealable order.The Supreme Court of North Dakota considered whether the transfer order qualifies as an appealable order under the state's laws. The State argued that the transfer order was effectively an order quashing the criminal information, a type of order that it could appeal. However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the district court did not dismiss the case but simply transferred it to the juvenile court. The court also rejected the State's argument that the transfer order was an order made after judgment affecting any substantial right of the state, because no judgment had been entered in the case.Based on these considerations, the Supreme Court held that the State did not have the right to appeal under the relevant statute, and dismissed the appeals for lack of an appealable order. The court also denied A.J.H.'s request for costs and attorney’s fees, finding that the State's appeal was not frivolous. View "State v. A.J.H." on Justia Law

Daniel Paul Sansone, the defendant-appellant, was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 46 months of imprisonment, the upper end of the sentencing guideline range. Sansone challenged the procedural integrity and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed his claims.Sansone had argued that his criminal history score was erroneously inflated due to the inclusion of his juvenile adjudications, asserting that his commitment to the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services (DYS) was not a sentence of confinement. The court rejected this argument, noting that prior case law had upheld the inclusion of such adjudications as constituting sentences of confinement.Sansone also claimed there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that his juvenile adjudications resulted in confinement for at least sixty days, which was necessary for the assignment of criminal history points under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG). The Court of Appeals found that Sansone could not show a plain error in this regard, as the record was ambiguous and did not allow for a clear determination of the length of his confinement.Regarding the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, Sansone argued that the sentencing court had overstated the seriousness of his past criminal record and failed to adequately consider his personal history. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the sentencing court had considered all relevant factors, and Sansone's real complaint was about the weight given to certain factors, not their consideration. The court upheld the sentence, affirming the district court's decision. View "US v. Sansone" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana upheld the decision of the Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, committing the appellant, C.M., a youth, to the custody of the Department of Corrections for placement in a state youth correctional facility until the age of 18. The appellant was charged with sex offenses against three of his high school classmates and he appealed the decision on the grounds that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to make objections to the admission of various hearsay statements.The court concluded that the appellant's counsel's failure to object to the admission of hearsay statements did not result in substantial prejudice. The court noted that the state presented sufficient admissible evidence to the jury that proved the same facts as the prior consistent statements and bus records. Furthermore, the court found that the appellant's counsel vigorously challenged the complaining witnesses' testimony by highlighting inconsistencies and gaps in their testimony, as well as aspects of the investigation. As a result, the court found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance by his counsel and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Matter of C.M" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia had to determine whether a unit-of-prosecution analysis or a required evidence analysis should be used to address the question of merger as to one count of aggravated child molestation and two counts of child molestation. Tony Shropshire was convicted of aggravated child molestation, two counts of child molestation, incest, and first-degree cruelty to children, based on incidents that occurred in 2001 with his five- or six-year-old niece. Shropshire argued on appeal that the two child molestation counts should have merged into the aggravated child molestation conviction. The Court of Appeals applied a unit-of-prosecution analysis and agreed, merging the counts and vacating Shropshire's convictions and sentences for aggravated child molestation and child molestation. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated this part of the Court of Appeals's judgment and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held that a unit-of-prosecution analysis should be applied to determine whether the two counts of child molestation (the same crime) merge. However, as child molestation and aggravated child molestation are different crimes, a required evidence analysis should be applied to determine whether these two different crimes merge. The Court of Appeals erred in applying a unit-of-prosecution analysis rather than a required evidence analysis to this question. The case was remanded for the Court of Appeals to apply the correct analyses. View "THE STATE v. SHROPSHIRE" on Justia Law

This case from the Supreme Court of Iowa involves a juvenile, I.S., who was charged with sexual exploitation of a minor and possession of child pornography. The juvenile court initially waived its jurisdiction over the case, allowing it to be tried in the district court. However, the juvenile court later vacated its waiver and reclaimed jurisdiction over the case. The State sought a review of the juvenile court's decision to vacate its earlier order, arguing that the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction or authority to modify or vacate the waiver order once it had been issued.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the juvenile court did not have the authority to reclaim jurisdiction over the case after it had waived it to the district court. The court found that there was no provision in Iowa law for such a "revocation of waiver." The court reasoned that once a case has been transferred or waived to another court, the transferring court loses jurisdiction over the parties. The court also noted that allowing a juvenile court to reclaim jurisdiction could lead to disruption of proceedings and friction between the district and juvenile courts.Therefore, the court sustained the State's writ, vacated the juvenile court's revocation of its waiver of jurisdiction, and remanded the case, with the expectation that any further proceedings would occur in the district court. View "State of Iowa v. Iowa Juvenile Court for Plymouth County" on Justia Law