Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The State brought a petition before the county court, sitting as a juvenile court, alleging that Christopher T., who was fifteen years old at the time, was a juvenile within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 435-247(3)(b), in that he deported himself so as to injure or danger seriously the morals or health of himself or others, and under Neb. Rev. Stat. 435-247(3)(c), in that he was a mentally ill and dangerous juvenile. The State alleged that Christopher unlawfully subjected his stepbrothers to sexual contact without consent. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the juvenile court did not err in (1) adjudicating under section 435-427(3)(c) using the clear and convincing standard of evidence to find that Christopher was a mentally ill and dangerous person; (2) in finding that the State had adduced sufficient evidence to adjudicate Christopher under either section 435-427(3)(b) or (c); (3) in overruling the objection to certain testimony on Daubert-Schafersman grounds; and (4) finding certain testimony satisfied the reasonable degree of medical certainty standard set forth in In re Interest of G.H. View "In re Interest of Christopher T." on Justia Law

The State appealed a juvenile court order that adopted a judicial referee's decision that minor child D.J. was not required to register as a sexual offender. In March 2009, the State filed a petition in juvenile court, alleging D.J., a sixteen year old, committed an act of gross sexual imposition by engaging in a sexual act with a six-year-old victim. A judicial referee accepted D.J.'s admission that he committed the act, ordered him to complete a sexual offender evaluation and follow all recommendations, and reserved the issue of whether he was required to register as a sexual offender under state law. The referee thereafter issued a written order, concluding the State had the burden of proving D.J. was required to register as a sexual offender and that the State had failed to satisfy its burden of proof. The State requested judicial review of the referee's decision, and the juvenile court adopted the referee's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a juvenile court may order the preparation of a report or evaluation to address requirements for registration as a sexual offender and may require production of the report or evaluation to make findings on the requirements for registration. But because a court-ordered evaluation was not provided to the juvenile court in this case and the court did not make required findings on registration, the Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Interest of D.J." on Justia Law

J.L. was fourteen when he engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with his twelve-year-old girlfriend. A juvenile petition was filed against J.L., and the circuit court adjudicated J.L. as a delinquent under S.D. Codified Laws 22-22-1(1), a statute under which the girlfriend was legally incapable of giving consent and under which J.L. would have been convicted of rape in the first degree had J.L. been an adult. On appeal, J.L. argued that the application of the statute to the facts of this case created an absurd result, one not reasonably intended by the legislature. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that application of the statute to the facts did not suggest an unintended absurdity. View "In re J.L. " on Justia Law

Petitioner, a juvenile, was convicted for trespassing upon the grounds of a school facility in violation of section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes. At issue was whether the prosecution must prove the identity of the individual who warned defendant to leave the grounds of the school, and that individual's authority to restrict access to the property, as essential elements of the trespass offense. The court held that the individual's identity and authority were essential elements of the offense and quashed the decision of the Third District. The court also held that, because in this case the state failed to present any evidence demonstrating that the petitioner was warned to leave by the school's principal or a designee of the principal, petitioner's conviction must be vacated. View "D.J. v. State" on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old Defendant Oden Gutierrez confessed to shooting and killing Thomas Powell in Powell's home and stealing his car. Defendant was charged by criminal information with an open charge of murder, aggravated burglary, armed robbery for stealing a car while armed with a deadly weapon, and unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. A jury found him guilty on all counts and he was sentenced to life in prison plus nineteen and one-half years. Defendant appealed his sentence. He raised several issues which fell into four categories: (1) the suppression of evidence pertaining to his confession; (2) change of venue due to prejudicial pre-trial publicity; (3) a double jeopardy violation for his convictions of both armed robbery and the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle; and (4) an unlawful sentence based on constitutional grounds, mainly that a life sentence was cruel and unusual punishment for a youthful offender. Upon careful consideration of Defendant's arguments, the trial record, and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed Defendant's sentence and remanded the case for re-sentencing with instructions that a pre-sentence report be prepared. The Court also vacated Defendant's conviction for unlawful taking of a motor vehicle because it violated the proscription against double jeopardy in this case. The Court affirmed the district court on all other issues. View "New Mexico v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent based on findings of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12–13(a)(1)) and attempted robbery (720 ILCS 5/8–4(a), 18–1). The trial court ordered him committed for an indeterminate term, to automatically terminate in 15 years or at age 21. The appellate and state supreme courts affirmed. The evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, despite some inconsistencies in testimony. The court presumed that the trial court did not allow the juvenile to be shackled without a hearing on whether restraint was required, absent any indication in the record that the court was aware that he was in shackles before he was called to testify. Delinquency adjudications are not the equivalent of felony convictions,so it is not unconstitutional that juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial. Imposition of collateral consequences on juveniles adjudicated delinquent for committing felony sex offenses, such as reduced confidentiality, unavailability of expungement, and possibility of involuntary commitment under the Sexually Violent Persons Act,do not negate the rehabilitative purposes of the Act so that a jury trial would be required. View "In re Jonathon C.B., a Minor" on Justia Law

Appellant Randy Horton was convicted of nine counts of child molesting and was sentenced to an executed term of 324 years in prison. Horton appealed his conviction on grounds that the trial court improperly admitted certain evidence at trial. Horton also appealed his sentence on grounds that it constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion to sentence him to such a lengthy term and that the term was inappropriately long given his character and the nature of his offenses. The court of appeals rejected these claims and affirmed in all respects. On appeal, the Supreme Court revised Horton's sentence to an aggregate executed term of 110 years, finding that Horton's lack of any other adult criminal history, coupled with the fact that his only juvenile adjudication was for truancy, warranted credit as a mitigating circumstance. Remanded. View "Horton v. State" on Justia Law

In 2005, respondent was charged with delinquency under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. 5031 et seq., for sexually abusing a boy for approximately two years until respondent was 15 years old and his victim was 12 years old. Respondent was sentenced to two years of juvenile detention followed by juvenile supervision until his 21st birthday. In 2006, while respondent remained in juvenile detention, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16902 et seq. In July 2007, the District Court determined that respondent had failed to comply with the requirements of his prerelease program. On appeal, respondent challenged his "special conditio[n]" of supervision and requested that the Court of Appeals "reverse th[e] portion of his sentence requiring Sex Offender Registration and remand with instructions that the district court ... strik[e] Sex Offender Registration as a condition of juvenile supervision." Over a year after respondent's 21st birthday, the Court of Appeals handed down its decision and held that the SORNA requirements violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, section 9, cl. 3, when applied to juveniles adjudicated as delinquent before SORNA's enactment. The Court held that the Court of Appeals had no authority to enter that judgment because it had no live controversy before it where respondent had turned 21 and where the capable-of-repetition exception to mootness did not apply in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit was vacated and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal. View "United States v. Juvenile Male" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of bank robbery and one count of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. At issue was whether the district court properly assessed too many criminal history points for appellant's juvenile sentences because they were not "sentence[s] to confinement" under U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(d)(2)(A). The court held that the district court properly assessed appellant's criminal history points where that court heard uncontested testimony that appellant was confined and not free to leave while at certain juvenile facilities. Accordingly, the sentence was affirmed. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

After appellant N.D. escaped from a juvenile detention center and attacked a security guard, who later died, the state filed a felony information in circuit court, charging N.C. with capital murder, escape in the first degree, and six other criminal counts. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss and to declare the juvenile-transfer statute, Ark. Code Ann 9-27-318(e), unconstitutional. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to transfer to juvenile court. The circuit court denied appellant's motion to dismiss and to declare the transfer statute unconstitutional and subsequently denied appellant's motion to transfer to juvenile court. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing two witnesses to testify who were not disclosed in discovery, erred in ruling that the transfer statute was constitutional, and erred in denying his motion to transfer. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying appellant's motion to transfer, holding that based on prejudicial discovery violations, the circuit court abused its discretion by not excluding the testimony of the two witnesses. Because the circuit court's decision was reversed on this basis, the Court did not address the remaining arguments on appeal. View "N.D. v. State" on Justia Law