Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Thirteen-year old D.M. and his friend were arrested after breaking in to a residence and taking several items of personal property. According to his mother, while D.M. was being held in a police cruiser he was prevented from speaking to his mother by police officers. Later D.M. and his mother signed a juvenile waiver acknowledging they understood D.M.'s rights. D.M. then confessed to a detective. The juvenile court found D.M. to be a delinquent child for committing acts that would have been felonies if they had been committed by an adult and placed D.M. on probation. D.M. appealed, arguing that he had not been given an opportunity for meaningful consultation with his mother and that the waiver of his rights was not knowing and voluntary. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted transfer. The Court held (1) the police provided D.M. an opportunity for meaningful consultation with his custodial parent before the waiver of his rights, and (2) there is substantial evidence of probative value that D.M.'s rights were waived voluntarily and therefore the court did not err in admitting D.M.'s confession. View "D.M. v. State" on Justia Law

J.D.B., a thirteen-year-old seventh-grade student, was taken from his classroom to a closed-door conference room where uniformed police and school administrators questioned him for at least 30 minutes regarding two home break-ins nearby. Before beginning, they did not give J.D.B. Miranda warnings, the opportunity to call his legal guardian, or tell him he was free to leave the room. After J.D.B. subsequently confessed to the break-ins and wrote a statement at the request of police, two juvenile petitions were filed against him. J.D.B.'s public defender moved to suppress his statements and the evidence derived therefrom, arguing that he had been interrogated in a custodial setting without being afforded Miranda warnings and that his statements were involuntary. At issue was whether the age of a child subjected to police questioning was relevant to the custody analysis of Miranda v. Arizona. The Court held that it was beyond dispute that children would often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave. Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality, the Court held that a child's age group properly informed the Miranda custody analysis. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded to the state courts to address whether J.D.B. was in custody when he was interrogated, taking account of all of the relevant circumstances of the interrogation, including his age at the time. View "J. D. B. v. North Carolina" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to violating the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and (b)(1)(B)(ii), and received the mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment. At issue was whether the district court improperly calculated his criminal history score by counting his prior conviction under California Vehicle Code section 23140(a), which made it unlawful for a person younger than twenty-one years of age to drive with a blood-alcohol content of .05% or greater. The court applied a "commonsense" interpretation of the guidelines and the statute at issue, holding that a violation of section 23140(a) was not similar to a juvenile status offense and was properly counted in the calculation of defendant's criminal history score. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Landa" on Justia Law

Defendant Luis Lopez was convicted in 2007 on felony child endangerment charges. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to convict him. The child’s mother found sexually suggestive images of her daughter on Defendant’s cell phone and called police. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant requested the child pose for him when the record revealed the child, when at play, liked to imagine herself as a runway model and "pose" for Defendant. The Supreme Court found that a "rational trier of fact" could have concluded that Defendant solicited the child for the suggestive images. The Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The State appealed an order of the circuit court transferring appellee’s criminal case to the juvenile division of circuit court, asserting that the circuit court’s order granting the transfer was clearly erroneous. According to Ark. R. of App. P. Crim. 3, the appellant may not bring an interlocutory appeal from a juvenile-transfer order. The State argued it was not required to satisfy the requirements of Rule 3, as its right to appeal is derived from Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-318(l), which provides that any party may appeal from a transfer order. Based on precedent, when there is a conflict between the court’s procedural rules and a statutory provision, the statute is given deference only to the extent it is compatible with the rules. The Court held Rule 3 and Section 9-27-318(l) to be in direct conflict with each other and determined that Rule 3 governed the appeal. Because the appeal was not specifically permitted by the rule, the appeal was dismissed. View "State v. A.G." on Justia Law

Harry Kelso was convicted in the Circuit Court of Hanover County of three counts of causing a juvenile to assist in the distribution of marijuana to a third party in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-255(A)(ii). Kelso appealed, arguing that venue in Hanover County was improper because he did not undertake any action relating to the sale of marijuana there. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed. Although Kelso's distribution of marijuana to the juvenile occurred solely in another county, the juvenile distributed the marijuana he received from Kelso to a third party in Hanover County. Because one of the acts which must occur for a violation of 18.2-255(A)(ii) is the juvenile's assistance in the distribution of the contraband to a third party, the Court held that the place where that act occurred is an appropriate venue for prosecution. View "Kelso v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

J.A. was charged with burglary by common scheme and theft by common scheme when he was 17-years-old and placed on probation until February 2009 by the Youth Court. In December 2008, the State filed a petition to revoke probation and transfer supervision of J.A. to district court. The Youth Court issued a summons and, when J.A. did not appear, the court issued a warrant for his arrest. J.A. was not picked up on the warrant until May 2010, when he was 21-years-old. J.A. appealed the order entered by the Youth Court denying his motion for release from custody due to lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the Youth Court Act, section 46-18-203(2), MCA, did not provide for continuing jurisdiction in youth court over revocation proceedings after youth turned 21, even where a petition to transfer had previously been filed and therefore, the court held that it could not extend the Youth Court's jurisdiction beyond what the Legislature had clearly provided. Accordingly, the court held that the Youth Court erred in denying J.A.'s motion and reversed the Youth Court's order, remanding for further proceedings. View "In the matter of J.A. " on Justia Law

D.B. and another boy were under 13 years of age when they engaged in sexual activity. The juvenile court adjudicated D.B. delinquent for rape based on the violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.01(A)(1)(b), which prohibits one from engaging in sexual conduct with a person under the age of 13. On appeal, D.B. argued that application of the statute violated his federal rights to due process and equal protection. At issue was whether a child's constitutional rights are violated when, as a member of the class protected by the statute, the child is adjudicated as a delinquent based upon a violation of the statute. The appeals court affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court held that (1) as applied to offenders who are under 13 themselves, the statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process because arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is encouraged; and (2) application of the statute in this case violates equal protection because only one child was charged with being delinquent, while others similarly situated were not. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

Respondent Cedric Kikuta was convicted by a jury for assault in the third degree after a physical altercation with his stepson. Respondent appealed, arguing that the court erred in failing to instruct the jurors on the parental discipline defense and on whether the assault in the third degree occurred during the course of a scuffle, or affray, entered into by mutual consent. The court of appeals (1) held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the parental discipline defense and (2) chose not to address Respondent's argument regarding a mutual affray instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court regarding the parental discipline defense but vacated the judgment as to the lack of disposition regarding a mutual affray instruction. The Court held that (1) an instruction on the parental discipline defense is not per se precluded by the fact that substantial bodily injury occurred; (2) an instruction on the parental discipline defense must be given if there is some evidence to support each element of the defense; and (3) a mutual affray instruction must be given where there is some evidence the injury was inflicted during a fight entered into by mutual consent. View "State v. Kikuta" on Justia Law

Defendants, minors, committed arson by setting off a firecracker on a brush-covered hillside in Pasadena, causing a fire that burned five acres of forest land. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the requisite mental state of malice, as defined in the arson statutes, because defendants lit and threw the firecracker without intent to cause a fire or any other harm. The court held that, under the circumstances of the case, defendants' acts of intentionally igniting and throwing a firecracker amidst dry brush on a hillside, although done without intent to cause a fire or other harm, were sufficient to establish the requisite malice for arson. View "In re V.V.; In re J.H" on Justia Law