Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A juvenile wardship petition alleged against E.P. alleged two counts of murder, two counts of  attempted murder, and one count of street terrorism. The juvenile court held a fitness hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 707. The court ordered the case transferred to criminal court. Since the hearing, section 707 has been amended.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded for a new fitness hearing pursuant to section 707 as amended. The court explained that the amended section 707 requires the juvenile court to consider all five factors together in determining whether the minor is amenable to rehabilitation. Under the amended statute, like the previous version, the court has the discretion to conclude that one or more of the five factors predominate so as to determine the result, even though some or all of the other factors might point to a different result. The prosecution is entitled to a new fitness hearing so that the court can determine, considering all five factors, whether E.P. is amenable to treatment. View "In re E.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the family court that the prosecution had proven that DM, a minor who stabbed another minor, had committed attempted assault in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt, holding that the family court inadequately assessed the circumstances from DM's perspective in rejecting DM's self-defense defense.After a bench trial, during which DM argued that he lacked intent and acted in self-defense, the family court adjudicated DM as having committed attempted assault in the first degree. DM appealed, challenging the court's self-defense-related findings and conclusions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the family court wrongly rejected DM's defense by inadequately assessing his conduct from his perspective and by misapplying key self-defense elements; and (2) there was not substantial evidence to support the family court's conclusion that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that DM's use of deadly force was unjustified. View "In re DM" on Justia Law

Defendant My Ngo was a “shotcaller” in a Vietnamese gang. At age 19, he was paid $2,000 to commit a murder for hire. In 2021, he filed a motion for a “Franklin hearing”: a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016), for a juvenile offender to preserve evidence of youth-related mitigating factors for purposes of a youthful offender parole hearing to be held in the future pursuant to Penal Code section 3051.2 Under section 3051, juvenile offenders and most youthful offenders were entitled to a youthful offender parole hearing; however, youthful offenders sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) were not. Defendant was a youthful offender sentenced to LWOP, and the trial court ruled that he was not entitled to a Franklin hearing. Defendant contended that section 3051’s distinction between youthful offenders with LWOP and non-LWOP sentences violated equal protection. Alternatively, he contended he should have been granted a hearing to preserve evidence of youth-related mitigating factors for other purposes, such as a hypothetical future resentencing under section 1172.1. The Court of Appeals disagreed with both contentions and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "California v. Ngo" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Hinton was 17 when he was convicted of murder and attempted murder. He received a 37-year standard range adult sentence. In his personal restraint petition (PRP), Hinton argued he was less culpable than an adult when he committed those crimes, so his standard range adult sentence was a disproportionate punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hinton sought collateral relief in the form of a resentencing hearing so he could prove that his lesser culpability entitled him to a lesser sentence. The State argued RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP under RAP 16.4(d). To this, the Washington Supreme Court agreed: RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP because it eliminated the constitutional error that Hinton identified in his original sentence. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton" on Justia Law

This case concerned the adequacy of the Washington early release statute, RCW 9.94A.730, as a remedy to petitioner Erik Carrasco’s alleged unconstitutional sentence for a crime he committed as a juvenile. Carrasco was serving a 93-year sentence imposed without any consideration of his youth. Carrasco was 17 years old and a member of “La Raza,” a Norteño gang in Yakima; he was ultimately convicted of second degree murder, four counts of first degree assault, and second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. He would be eligible to petition for early release under RCW 9.94A.730 after serving 20 years of his sentence. Because Washington v. Scott, 416 P.3d 1182 (2018) was controlling, the Washington Supreme Court concluded Carrasco had an adequate remedy under the statute. The judgment dismissing his personal restraint petition was affirmed. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Carrasco" on Justia Law

When J.W.M. was 17½ years old, he pointed what he thought was an unloaded gun at his friend W.B. and pulled the trigger. The gun was loaded, it discharged, W.B. died two days later. The State charged J.W.M. with first degree manslaughter while being armed with a firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm (UPFA). Because first degree manslaughter was a serious violent offense subject to the Washington “auto-decline” statute, RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A), J.W.M. was tried in adult court, and a jury found him guilty of second-degree manslaughter, a lesser included offense. The trial court found him guilty of UPFA in a bifurcated bench trial. With neither offense being an auto-decline offense, J.W.M. was not sentenced in adult court but instead proceeded to a juvenile disposition hearing. More than two weeks before the disposition hearing, for the first time the State recommended a manifest injustice disposition. The juvenile court imposed the maximum possible manifest injustice upward disposition: confinement until age 25. J.W.M. challenged his disposition on several grounds, including that the juvenile court’s primary reason for imposing the disposition was J.W.M.’s need for treatment and services was an invalid basis under our decision in State v. B.O.J., 449 P.3d 1006 (2019). The Washington Supreme Court agreed a new disposition hearing was required, as a manifest injustice disposition was not justified by a juvenile offender’s need for services. View "Washington v. J.W.M." on Justia Law

In 2016, Hunter W. was charged with attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon, as well as allegations that he personally used a deadly weapon. Shortly after, he was charged with driving without a license and driving under the influence of drugs. After he admitted to the assault with a deadly weapon and driving under the influence charges, the juvenile court granted Hunter conditional probation. In 2018, after multiple reports of probation violations, the juvenile court revoked probation and committed Hunter to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for the maximum term of seven years. Hunter appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the dispositional order and issued the remittitur on August 15, 2019. After the passage of California Senate Bill No. 823, on December 2, 2021, Hunter petitioned to modify the commitment order to the middle term of six years—the maximum confinement permitted under the new law. The District Attorney opposed the petition on the grounds that the new law did not apply to Hunter’s final judgment. The juvenile court agreed with the prosecution and denied Hunter’s petition. Appealing that order, Hunter again argued his juvenile disposition was not a final judgment and because the new law was ameliorative, he was eligible for relief. The Court of Appeal concluded the case was final for purposes of retroactivity of the new law, and affirmed the juvenile court’s order denying his petition for modification. View "In re Hunter W." on Justia Law

Minor K.C. appealed the order imposing a condition of probation that prohibits unconsented sexual touching of another person. K.C. argues that probation condition 6A is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define “sexual touching.” He points out, for example, that lewd or lascivious conduct prohibits touching of a child with the intent to sexually arouse the perpetrator or the child, but the touching need not be done in a sexual manner.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the condition. The court explained that probation condition 6A provides fair warning of the conduct it prohibits. A reasonable person would interpret this provision to proscribe unconsented touching of another person that involves any sexual connotation, either due to the parts of the body involved or K.C.’s intent in touching the person. The term “unconsented” provides guidance and permits K.C. to avoid violating the condition in those instances where he has that person’s consent. That different penal statutes define and proscribe particular sexual crimes in different terms makes no difference; K.C. must avoid all unconsented sexual touching. The condition is sufficiently definite to preclude constitutional infirmity. View "In re K.C." on Justia Law

Jane Doe and two boys were accused of killing Doe’s parents. Even though Doe was a juvenile at the time of the murders, the government charged her with two counts of first-degree murder. The government successfully moved to transfer her case to adult court, where the punishments for first-degree murder are death or mandatory life imprisonment without parole. These punishments would be unconstitutional when applied to a juvenile. Doe argued she could not be transferred to adult court because, even if guilty, there was no statutory punishment available for her alleged crime. She also argued the district court used an incorrect legal standard for transfer from juvenile to adult court and improperly weighed the relevant factors for transfer. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found her constitutional argument was not ripe, the district court applied the correct legal standard, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the transfer factors. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s transfer of Doe’s case from juvenile to adult court. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court certifying Appellant, a juvenile defendant, to stand trial as an adult, holding that nothing in the 2015 amendment to Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.230 limited the juvenile court's authority to certify Appellant charged with violating section 201.230 to be tried as an adult.The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that B.J. committed five counts of lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen. The State filed a certification asking the juvenile court to transfer the case to criminal court. After a hearing, the juvenile court certified B.J. for criminal proceedings as an adult. B.J. appealed, arguing that under section 201.230(5), juveniles who commit lewd acts on children under the age of fourteen cannot be certified as adults for criminal prosecutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) nothing in the 2015 amendments expressly barred the juvenile court from certifying B.J. charged under section 201.230 as an adult; and (2) the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by certifying B.J. as an adult. View "In re B.J.W.-A." on Justia Law