Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Elijah Hall was convicted by jury of six counts of robbery committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang and one count of active gang participation (all committed when he was 15 years old), and he received a sentence of 65 years to life in state prison. Hall appealed, and while his appeal was pending, Proposition 57 raised the minimum age a minor could be tried as an adult in criminal court from 14 to 16. Following the procedure approved in California v. Superior Court (Lara) 4 Cal.5th 299 (2018), the trial judge recalled Hall’s sentence and transferred his case to juvenile court, where the judge “treat[ed the] convictions as juvenile adjudications” and held a hearing to impose an appropriate disposition. After Hall was transferred to the Department of Juvenile Justice, he informed the Court of Appeal he wished to proceed with his appeal, which was reinstated as an appeal of a judgment in a juvenile criminal proceeding. Hall raised two challenges to the criminal trial on which his juvenile adjudications were based: (1) the trial judge violated his due process rights by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 315, which covered eyewitness identification evidence and tells the jury to consider, among other factors, the witness’s level of certainty when making the identification; and (2) Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) required reversal of the true findings on the substantive gang offense and enhancements because the new law increased the proof requirements under the gang statute (Pen. Code 186.22). The Court of Appeal rejected Defendant's first argument under California v. Lemcke, 11 Cal.5th 644 (2021), in which the Supreme Court held that CALCRIM No. 315’s certainty factor did not violate due process. The Court agreed with Defendant's second argument, and remanded the case to give the State an opportunity to retry the substantive charge and enhancement allegations under Assembly Bill 333’s new requirements in a juvenile criminal proceeding, and impose a new disposition in Hall’s case - either at the conclusion of retrial or upon the State's election not to retry him. Judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Hall" on Justia Law

J.B. and other minors happened upon the juvenile victim Joey, then shot and killed Joey, “in the context of gang activity.” They were not specifically looking for Joey. J.B. admitted to committing second-degree murder. Welfare and Institutions Code section 733(c) prohibits commitment to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) if “the most recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be true by the court is not described” in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 707(b) or Penal Code 290.008(c). The juvenile court dismissed two adjudicated petitions involving more recent non-707(b) offenses, pursuant to section 782, which allows a juvenile court to dismiss a petition “if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the person who is the subject of the petition require that dismissal,” or if it finds that he “is not in need of treatment or rehabilitation.”J.B. argued that the juvenile court lacked the authority to dismiss the adjudicated petitions for the sole purpose of committing him. The court of appeal affirmed. Section 733(c) did not bar the juvenile court from exercising its discretion under section 782 and dismissing the adjudicated petitions in the interests of justice and in J.B.’s welfare in order to commit him to DJF. View "In re J.B." on Justia Law

The victim was listening to earphones and looking at his cell phone while walking. He saw individuals with bicycles outside of a 7-Eleven. Minutes later, someone tapped him on one side while another individual, on a bicycle on the other side, grabbed his cell phone. The victim chased and tackled him. After the victim released the thief, someone punched the victim. The victim was surrounded by three individuals in hoodies who were yelling at him. The victim’s boss arrived on the scene; the three left. Police quickly arrested three minors with bicycles: Kevin, age 15, Angel, who had the cell phone in his backpack, and Armando. The victim identified Angel as having taken his phone, and Armando as having punched him. The victim had trouble identifying Kevin.A juvenile wardship petition alleged that Kevin committed second-degree robbery. The victim identified Kevin in court and recalled seeing Kevin among the people at the 7- Eleven and as one of the people who yelled at him after he tackled Angel. The victim otherwise had no clear memory of Kevin. He did not know whether Kevin was there when his phone was taken. The juvenile court sustained the petition, finding that Kevin had aided and abetted the robbery. The court of appeal reversed. The determination was not supported by substantial evidence. View "In re K.M." on Justia Law

In winter 1996, defendant Samuel Ryan (then aged 23) robbed a Bridgeton, New Jersey gas station at gunpoint, stealing $100 and shooting a store clerk in the process. The offense resulted in defendant’s third first-degree robbery conviction, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole pursuant to the Persistent Offender Accountability Act, known as the “Three Strikes Law.” In this appeal, defendant contended the Three Strikes Law violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution. He alleged that, by allowing courts to count crimes committed while under the age of eighteen as predicate offenses in sentencing defendants to mandatory life without parole, the Three Strikes Law ignored the constitutional constraints embodied in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and New Jersey v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017), which prohibited imposition of mandatory life-without-parole sentences or their functional equivalent on juvenile offenders. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that because defendant committed his third offense and received an enhanced sentence of life without parole as an adult, this appeal did not implicate Miller or Zuber. Accordingly, defendant’s sentence was affirmed and the Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the Three Strikes Law. View "New Jersey v. Ryan" on Justia Law

After Cesar, who was then 17 years old and who did not have a driver’s license, pleaded no contest to allegations of alcohol-related reckless driving, he was adjudged a ward of the court and placed on probation subject to conditions, including that he submit to warrantless searches for alcohol and controlled substances and attend DUI programs.The court of appeal upheld the warrantless search condition, rejecting Cesar’s argument that the condition imposed a heavy burden on his privacy with little justification. The court noted that after he started drinking alcohol at age 16, Cesar would regularly engage in binge drinking. Cesar continued to drink and purchase alcohol after the crash and his arrest. He rejected his parents’ efforts to impose limits on his conduct. The search condition is reasonably related to Cesar’s future criminality. The juvenile court could not order Cesar to pay for his attendance at the DUI-related programs, so the court erred in declining to order the probation department to pay the fees for the DUI programs Cesar was required to attend. View "In re Cesar G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Appellant's conviction and vacated the conviction, holding that no adult court had jurisdiction over acts that were charged in but not bound over by the juvenile court.Appellant was sixteen years old when he was charged with committing the category-two offense of aggravated robbery while possessing a deadly weapon. Binding Appellant over to adult court would have been mandatory for counts one and two upon a finding of probable cause. The juvenile court found probable cause as to counts one through three and count five, a misdemeanor. After the case was transferred to the adult court, Appellant pled guilty to several charges. On appeal, Appellant argued that the adult court lacked jurisdiction to consider the charges for which the juvenile court found no probable cause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that in the absence of a juvenile court's finding probable cause or making a finding that the juvenile is unalienable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, no adult court has jurisdiction over acts that were charged in but not bound over by the juvenile court. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to a felon in possession of a firearm offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Defendant was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on his multiple prior felony convictions, including three predicate serious drug offenses. The court rejected defendant's contention that his ACCA enhancement based on a prior juvenile offense violated the Eighth Amendment. Rather, under this court's established precedents, using the juvenile conviction as an ACCA predicate does not violate the Eighth Amendment, U.S. v. Jones, 574 F.3d 546,553 (8th Cir. 2009) and U.S. v. Emmert, 825 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1349 (2017). View "United States v. Winfrey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for third-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment, holding that the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion to transfer his case to juvenile court.Defendant was eighteen years old when the State charged him with offenses that he allegedly committed when he was seventeen years old. When Defendant moved to transfer his case to juvenile court, the State argued that the juvenile court lacked concurrent jurisdiction because Defendant was an adult when the charges were filed against him. The district court dismissed Defendant's transfer motion, concluding that the juvenile court's jurisdiction depended on Defendant's age when he was charged rather than his age when he committed the offense at issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a juvenile court's concurrent jurisdiction under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-6-203(c) depends on an offender's age at the time of the offense, rather than at the time charges are filed. View "Rosen v. State" on Justia Law

Johnathan was adjudicated a delinquent minor under 705 ILCS 405/5-701 after he was found guilty of 10 counts of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault against a seven-year-old victim. During his sex offender evaluation, Johnathan stated that his lawyer did not return calls, that they “didn’t talk” and that he was never prepared for the stand. On appeal, Jonathan argued that the circuit court erred because it did not conduct a “Krankel” preliminary inquiry regarding his pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in not conducting a “Krankel” hearing. The Krankel procedure applies in juvenile proceedings and is triggered when a defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. A pro se defendant only has to bring his claim to the trial court’s attention and is not required to file a written motion. The procedure applies even though the defendant has retained counsel. Johnathan clearly stated that his attorney was not doing something that he should have been doing. A juvenile in a juvenile delinquency proceeding need do nothing more than bring his pro se claim to the attention of the court. View "In re Johnathan T." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition sought by T.J. to dismiss the state's prosecution against him without prejudice so that the circuit court's juvenile division may adjudicate the charges against him, holding that T.J. was not entitled to the writ.The State charged T.J. in the court of general jurisdiction with committing three felony offenses when he was seventeen years old. T.J. filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the juvenile division had the exclusive authority to adjudicate the charges against him pursuant to legislation enacted in 2018. The circuit court overruled the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile division did not have the statutory authority to adjudicate the charged offenses. View "State ex rel. T.J., v. Honorable Cundiff" on Justia Law