Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing without prejudice the state's prosecution against R.J.G., who was alleged to have committed several felony offenses when he was seventeen years old, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing the state's prosecution in the court of general jurisdiction.The state charged R.J.G. with felony offenses in a court of general jurisdiction. R.J.G. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the circuit court's juvenile division had the exclusive statutory authority to adjudicate the charges pursuant to legislation enacted in 2018. The circuit court agreed and sustained the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the law as it existed at the time R.J.G. was alleged to have committed the offenses governed which division had the authority to adjudicate the offenses; and (2) the juvenile division did not have the statutory to adjudicate the offenses in this case, and therefore, the circuit court erred in dismissing the state's prosecution in the court of general jurisdiction. View "State v. R.J.G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed certification order of the family court division releasing and discharging J.T.J. from the jurisdiction of the family court and allowing his case to be transferred to a court of general jurisdiction for trial as an adult, holding that there was no error.A juvenile officer filed a petition in the family court alleging that J.T.J., a juvenile, committed second-degree burglary, first-degree property damages, and misdemeanor stealing. The juvenile officer subsequently filed motions to modify alleging more counts and requesting the transfer of jurisdiction of J.T.J. After a certification hearing, the family court ordered J.T.J. transferred to the court of general jurisdiction. On appeal, J.T.J. argued that the family court erred in entering its certification order because the transfer of jurisdiction of a juvenile is not permitted to allow prosecution under the general law upon the filing of a motion to modify. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that J.T.J. was not prejudiced, and therefore, relief under plain error review was unavailable. View "In re J.T.J." on Justia Law

Defendant Cynthia Rivera admitted to planning and participating in the armed robbery of Justin Garcia, resulting in serious injuries to Garcia and the murder of his friend, Andrew Torres. At the time of the offenses, defendant was eighteen years old and in a relationship with Martin Martinez. Defendant pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter and assault and to conspiracy to commit robbery. At the time of sentencing, defendant was then nineteen years old with no prior criminal history, no juvenile record, and no arrests. Defendant expressed deep regret for her actions and told the court she had severed her relationship with Martinez, who defendant stated was physically, mentally, and emotionally abusive to her. The sentencing court applied two aggravating factors -- the risk defendant would commit another offense; and the need for deterrence-- and two mitigating factors -- the absence of a prior record, and willingness to cooperate with law enforcement. The court did not address mitigating factor nine -- unlikeliness to reoffend -- which the State had conceded. The court weighed aggravating factor three, the risk of reoffense, more heavily than the other factors, relying in large part on defendant’s youth. Thus, the court concluded that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced defendant in accordance with that finding. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted review here to consider whether a defendant’s youth could serve as an aggravating factor in sentencing. The Supreme Court reversed, vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. "Consistent with both this Court’s precedent and the intent of the Legislature in recently adopting youth as a mitigating statutory factor, we hold that a defendant’s youth may be considered only as a mitigating factor in sentencing." Additionally, the Court held that on resentencing, the sentencing court should consider mitigating factor fourteen -- that “the defendant was under [twenty six] years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.” View "New Jersey v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Some time between mid-January and the early part of February 2018, K.S., a 14- year-old student at West Side Career and Technology Center (“WSCTS”), a vocational high school, heard appellant, a 15-year-old student at the school, say he “doesn’t think people deserve to live and everyone should just die.” Appellant’s second statement was made on February 20, 2018, six days after 17 high school students at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida were fatally shot. M.W., a 15-year-old classmate of appellant’s, overheard appellant say “[h]e wanted to beat the record of 19.” M.W. heard this statement from only two or three feet away while in the hallway between classes. Although appellant’s remark was not directed at her, M.W. was unsure whether he was “talking to someone [else], or [if] he just said it” aloud. K.S.,after learning of appellant’s “beat the record” statement secondhand, followed suit and reported what she had heard. The Commonwealth later charged appellant with terroristic threats pursuant to Section 2706(a)(1) and (3) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, and disorderly conduct. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed it “remains an open question” whether the First Amendment to the United States Constitution permitted States to criminalize threats made in reckless disregard of the risk of causing fear. In this opinion, the Court resolved that issue, holding that the First Amendment tolerates a conviction — in this case, under Pennsylvania’s terroristic threats statute, for making a threatening statement even where the speaker did not intend to cause terror. However, after its de novo review of the record, the Court felt constrained to conclude the statements underlying appellant's adjudication, "though perhaps concerning to some because they were uttered in a school hallway only days after a deadly high school shooting," did not cross the constitutional threshold from protected speech to an unprotected true threat. The Court therefore vacated appellant’s adjudication of delinquency. View "In the Interest of: J.J.M." on Justia Law

Jones was a juvenile in 2000 when he pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to 50 years in prison pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement. After unsuccessfully petitioning for postconviction relief, Jones sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging his sentence violated the eighth amendment protections in the Supreme Court’s “Miller v. Alabama” decision.The appellate court affirmed the denial of his motion, finding that Jones’ claims did not invoke the protections provided to juveniles in Miller. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Miller’s additional protections for juvenile offenders apply only when a trial court lacks or refuses to use discretion in sentencing a juvenile offender to life, or to a de facto life, sentence. The mandatory sentencing scheme that applied in Illinois at the time he was sentenced was never applied to Jones. By entering a plea agreement, a defendant forecloses any claim of error. A voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional errors or irregularities, including constitutional ones. Jones has not claimed that the state engaged in any misrepresentation or committed any misconduct. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant Allen Benzler was sentenced in 2014 for offenses he committed when he was 18 years old. He appealed the summary denial of his motion for a "Franklin" hearing under California Penal Code section 1203.01, contending he satisfied the eligibility criteria for such a hearing laid out in In re Cook, 7 Cal.5th 439 (2019), and did not previously have an opportunity to present evidence related to his status as a juvenile offender. To this, the Court of Appeal concurred, reversed the trial court’s order, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "California v. Benzler" on Justia Law

Briones was a leader of a violent gang that “terrorized the Salt River Reservation community.” Briones participated in multiple violent crimes, including a 1994 murder that was committed when Briones was 17 years, 11 months, and eight days old.The Ninth Circuit affirmed his life sentence in 1998. Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in "Miller," (2012), that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentences for juvenile offenders, and Montgomery, (2016), that Miller’s rule applied retroactively on collateral review, Briones was resentenced to LWOP in 2016. A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed in 2018. The en banc court subsequently vacated the sentence. The Supreme Court remanded in light of Jones v. Mississippi, (2021), holding that in cases involving LWOP defendants, a discretionary system—where a sentencer can consider the defendant’s youth and has discretion to impose a lesser sentence—is constitutionally sufficient--and that permanent incorrigibility is not an eligibility criterion for the imposition of juvenile LWOP sentences; a sentencer need not provide an on-the-record explanation with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility.The Ninth Circuit again affirmed the LWOP sentence. The district court did consider Briones’s post-incarceration rehabilitation and there is no independent requirement that a court imposing juvenile LWOP “meaningfully engage” in a permanent-incorrigibility analysis. Briones waived his as-applied challenge to the substantive proportionality of his sentence. The court rejected “Briones’s wholly speculative arguments advocating for categorical bans on juvenile LWOP.” View "United States v. Briones" on Justia Law

Antioch police officers, responding to a call about a prowler, tried to stop a Pontiac sedan that the caller had identified. Officers in different vehicles pursued the Pontiac. At one point, an officer started to exit his vehicle with his firearm drawn. The Pontiac accelerated toward the officers, striking the driver’s door on the first vehicle so that it slammed on the officer’s ankle. The Pontiac hit the bumper on the second vehicle, causing no noticeable damage. The Pontiac sideswiped and scratched the third vehicle. After an extended chase with pursuit by a helicopter, officers apprehended the occupants of the Pontiac, including the driver (the minor).The court sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 602(a) for evasion of a peace officer while driving in willful disregard of others, deadly weapon assault on a peace officer, and force-likely assault. The court of appeal reversed in part. The punishment on the reckless evasion of police count must be stayed because it is based on the same indivisible course of conduct with the same intent and objective as the assault counts. The juvenile court must designate counts 1 and 3 as felonies or misdemeanors. The court rejected an argument that the finding on force-likely assault must be vacated because it is a lesser included offense of deadly weapon assault on a peace officer and is based on the same conduct. View "In re L.J." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to transfer his case to juvenile court, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to transfer the case to juvenile court.Defendant, a minor, was arrested and charged with nine counts of attempted first-degree minor after taking guns and ammunition to his high school planning to shoot nine particular individuals and as many other people as he could. Defendant filed a motion to transfer his case to juvenile court, but the motion was denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court appropriately analyzed and weighed the applicable factors under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-6-237(b) and did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to transfer. View "Warner v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed a postjudgment order denying defendant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 as to his conviction of first degree murder under a theory of felony murder based on his participation in an attempted carjacking. The court agreed with defendant that substantial evidence does not support the trial court's conclusion that he was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.In this case, defendant did not provide the murder weapon, instruct his confederate to shoot, or know of his confederate's propensity toward violence, and the shooting occurred quickly without defendant having a meaningful opportunity to intervene. Although defendant was aware his confederate had a gun and intended to use it in the carjacking, as a 15-year-old he may well have lacked the experience and maturity to appreciate the risk that the attempted carjacking would escalate into a shooting and death, and he was more susceptible to pressure from his fellow gang members to participate in the carjacking. The court also agreed with defendant that Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 apply to defendant's resentencing under section 1170.95 and directed the trial court to transfer the matter to the juvenile court. View "People v. Ramirez" on Justia Law