Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with several offenses, including attempted gross sexual imposition, gross sexual imposition, two counts of child neglect, and indecent exposure, based on allegations that he forced two minor children to consume Nyquil and, in one case, marijuana/THC gummies. The State alleged these actions constituted child neglect under North Dakota law. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the defendant moved for acquittal at the close of the State’s case and again after the defense rested, but both motions were denied. The jury found the defendant guilty on the two counts of child neglect, and the district court entered judgments of acquittal on the remaining charges.The District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial District, presided over the trial and sentencing. On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the child neglect convictions, contending that the statute criminalizes only omissions, not affirmative acts, and that his conduct, if criminal, would constitute child abuse rather than neglect. He also challenged the admission of jail call recordings, arguing improper authentication and hearsay.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the child neglect statute is not limited to omissions but can include affirmative acts that constitute a willful failure to provide proper parental care. The court found sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict and that the district court did not err in denying the motions for acquittal. Regarding the jail call recordings, the court concluded that the State provided sufficient evidence to authenticate the recordings and that the defendant’s failure to object on hearsay grounds at trial precluded reversal on that basis. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the criminal judgment. View "State v. Hendricks" on Justia Law

A sixteen-year-old youth admitted to sexually assaulting his two younger half-siblings, ages six and seven, over a period spanning late 2021 to early 2023. The abuse involved coercion through threats of withholding privileges and included both physical and digital penetration. The youth was charged with multiple counts of felony sexual assault and incest, and a more serious charge was dismissed as part of a plea agreement. A psychosexual evaluation found the youth to be at moderate risk of reoffending and recommended against requiring registration as a sexual offender, suggesting that avoiding registration would better support his rehabilitation. The victims’ family members and therapist, however, advocated for registration due to the trauma suffered.The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, reviewed the psychosexual evaluation, probation officer’s report, and victim impact statements. The court designated the youth as a Level 2 Sexual Offender, committed him to a youth correctional facility until age 18, and placed him on probation until age 21. Despite recommendations against registration from the evaluator and probation officer, the court ordered the youth to register as a sexual offender for life, citing the need to protect the public given the nature of the offenses and the youth’s position of trust.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana considered whether the District Court abused its discretion in imposing the registration requirement. The Supreme Court held that the District Court acted within its discretion, finding substantial evidence supported the decision and that the court properly considered the statutory requirements and public interest. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order requiring the youth to register as a sexual offender. View "In re B.J.B." on Justia Law

The case concerns Kenneth Robinson, who was convicted of malice murder and other offenses related to the shooting death of Devontae Jones and the aggravated assault of Charmisa Witherspoon. The evidence showed that Robinson, age fourteen at the time, was involved with the 9 Trey Bloods gang. After a gang member, Jesus Cintron, disappeared, the gang’s leader plotted to kill Witherspoon and her son, fearing Witherspoon would cooperate with law enforcement. Robinson and other gang members went to Witherspoon’s house, where Robinson participated in the assault. Witherspoon escaped, but her son was killed. Robinson was tried alongside several co-defendants.The Superior Court of Fulton County granted Robinson a directed verdict on several counts and dead docketed one count, later nol prossed. The jury found Robinson guilty on the remaining counts except one. He was sentenced to life plus forty-five consecutive years. Robinson filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. His initial appeal was dismissed due to a pending count, but after that count was nol prossed, he filed an amended notice of appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Robinson argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate a plea offer, that his sentencing procedure violated constitutional and statutory rights, that the trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion, and that certain counts should have merged for sentencing. The court held that trial counsel did communicate the plea offer, so there was no deficient performance. The court also found no constitutional or statutory violation in the sentencing procedure, noting that neither Robinson nor his counsel objected or requested to be heard. Claims regarding the trial court’s sentencing discretion and merger of counts were found to be waived or without merit. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Robinson’s convictions. View "ROBINSON v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Eric Skeens was convicted in Indiana of five counts of child molesting, based almost entirely on the detailed testimony of the child victim, K.W. There was no physical evidence presented at trial, but the prosecution relied on K.W.’s account, as well as supporting testimony from her mother, a school counselor, a therapist, and a sexual assault nurse who explained the absence of physical evidence. During closing arguments, Skeens’s attorney made a statement to the jury, “I believe her,” referring to K.W., which Skeens later argued constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.After his conviction, Skeens appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction and found that the attorney’s statement did not prejudice the outcome, given the strength and detail of K.W.’s testimony. The Indiana Supreme Court declined to review the case, and Skeens’s subsequent state post-conviction and federal habeas petitions were also denied. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied relief, concluding that Skeens had not shown the state court’s decision was unreasonable under federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case, applying the deferential standards required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and Strickland v. Washington. The court held that the Indiana Court of Appeals did not unreasonably determine the facts or unreasonably apply the Strickland standard when it concluded that there was no reasonable probability the outcome would have been different absent the attorney’s statement. The Seventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of Skeens’s habeas petition. View "Skeens v Neal" on Justia Law

In November 2016, D.J., then 15 years old, was involved in a marijuana transaction that resulted in the shooting death of J.S. The State charged D.J. with felony murder, aggravated robbery, and possession of marijuana. D.J. agreed to plead no contest in exchange for the case being designated as an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution (EJJP) rather than being tried as an adult. The court sentenced D.J. to a juvenile correctional facility until he was 22 years, 6 months old, with an adult sentence of life without parole for 25 years for the felony murder count, among other penalties, stayed as long as D.J. complied with his juvenile sentence.In October 2021, D.J. was released on conditional release but was later found in a vehicle with firearms and marijuana, and in July 2022, he was caught driving without a license and possessing marijuana. The State moved to revoke D.J.'s juvenile sentence, and the district court found that D.J. had violated the conditions of his juvenile sentence by possessing firearms and marijuana and eluding law enforcement.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that substantial competent evidence supported the revocation of D.J.'s juvenile sentence. The court also held that under K.S.A. 38-2364, the district court was required to revoke the juvenile sentence and impose the adult sentence upon finding a violation of the juvenile sentence. The court rejected D.J.'s arguments that the district court had discretion to continue the stay of the adult sentence and that the district court could modify the adult sentence under K.S.A. 22-3716.The court also dismissed D.J.'s constitutional proportionality claims, stating that case-specific challenges could not be raised for the first time on appeal and that D.J. failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) for his categorical challenge. Finally, the court declined to review D.J.'s ineffective assistance of counsel claim due to the lack of a Van Cleave hearing and insufficient factual development in the record. View "In re D.J. " on Justia Law

A juvenile, D.W., was charged with child molestation and dissemination of material harmful to minors. During the initial hearing, the juvenile court allowed D.W.'s counsel to waive a formal advisement of rights without personally confirming with D.W. if he agreed to the waiver. After a fact-finding hearing, D.W. was adjudicated delinquent. D.W. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court erred by not providing a formal advisement of rights and that his counsel's waiver was invalid because it was not confirmed that D.W. knowingly and voluntarily joined the waiver.The Marion Superior Court adjudicated D.W. delinquent, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. The Court of Appeals found that the delinquency petition provided sufficient notice of the charges and that any errors in the advisement of rights did not rise to the level of fundamental error. The court also noted that D.W. exercised his constitutional rights during the proceedings.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed that the juvenile court erred by not providing a formal advisement of rights and that the waiver by D.W.'s counsel was invalid because the court did not personally confirm the waiver with D.W. However, the Supreme Court found the error to be harmless because D.W.'s substantial rights were not affected. D.W. was represented by counsel, exercised his constitutional rights, and there was no indication that the lack of formal advisement impacted the outcome of the case. Therefore, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's delinquency adjudication. View "D.W. v. State" on Justia Law

A thirteen-year-old girl, D.C., reported to her stepmother that her stepfather, Edgar Rene Garcia-Limon, had sexually abused her over several years, beginning when she was about four and continuing until she was eleven. During the investigation, D.C. described multiple incidents of abuse, and Garcia-Limon admitted to law enforcement and his wife that he had sexually touched D.C. on several occasions. Law enforcement also found firearms in the home, leading to additional charges.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma indicted Garcia-Limon on four counts: felon in possession of a firearm, aggravated sexual abuse of a minor in Indian Country, abusive sexual contact in Indian Country, and illegal reentry. Garcia-Limon challenged the sufficiency of the indictment for the sexual abuse counts, arguing that the eight-year date range was too broad and that the counts improperly charged a scheme rather than specific acts. The district court denied his motions, finding that the indictment properly charged a scheme of abuse and that the counts were not constitutionally defective or duplicitous. At trial, the jury found Garcia-Limon guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to concurrent terms, including life sentences for the sexual abuse counts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the indictment was constitutionally sufficient, whether the statutes allowed charging a scheme of abuse, whether the indictment was duplicitous, and whether there was a constructive amendment at trial. The court held that the indictment met constitutional requirements, that the statutes permitted charging a scheme of repeated, similar acts in a single count, and that there was no unconstitutional duplicity or constructive amendment. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Garcia-Limon’s convictions on the challenged counts. View "United States v. Garcia-Limon" on Justia Law

B.J.S., a Native American born in 2004, was charged with multiple acts of aggravated sexual abuse against his younger sister L.S. between August 2019 and June 2022, when he was 15 to 17 years old. The government filed a juvenile information and moved to transfer the proceedings to adult court. The charges included causing L.S. to engage in sexual acts by force, engaging in sexual acts with L.S. under 12, and causing sexual contact with L.S. under 12 with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse sexual desire.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota granted the government's motion to transfer the case to adult court. B.J.S. moved to dismiss the transfer motion, arguing that the charges did not qualify as "crimes of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The district court denied his motion and granted the transfer after an evidentiary hearing. B.J.S. appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), 2241(c), and 2244(a)(5) did not qualify as "crimes of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). The court applied the categorical approach, considering only the statutory elements of the offenses. It found that § 2241(a) was overbroad and indivisible, covering more conduct than § 16(a). Similarly, § 2241(c) and § 2244(a)(5) did not require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person. Consequently, the court concluded that none of the charges met the definition of a "crime of violence" for purposes of § 5032 permissive transfer.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case, determining that the transfer to adult court was not justified. View "United States v. B.J.S." on Justia Law

J.W., a 14-year-old, and two other juveniles were involved in an incident where one of the boys exploded a large firework inside a vacant trailer home, causing significant fire and smoke damage. J.W. initially lied to the police about who caused the fire to protect the other juveniles. He later admitted to a juvenile delinquency petition alleging accessory to a crime. The circuit court ordered J.W. and another juvenile to pay restitution of approximately $15,000 for the damage.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Pennington County adjudicated J.W. as a delinquent child and placed him on probation. The court held a restitution hearing and ordered J.W. to pay restitution, finding that the legislative amendments to the juvenile statutes did not require a causal connection between the damages and J.W.'s criminal act. The court determined that the restitution served a rehabilitative purpose and found no credible evidence that the restitution order would cause J.W. serious hardship.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the legislative amendments to the juvenile restitution statutes now require a causal connection between the juvenile's criminal act and the victim's damages, similar to adult restitution cases. The court found that J.W.'s act of lying to the police occurred after the damage was done and was not causally connected to the fire damage. Therefore, the court reversed and vacated the circuit court's restitution order, concluding that J.W. was not liable for restitution as the damage did not occur as a result of his criminal act. View "Interest Of J.W." on Justia Law

James Russell Trimble, who was convicted of first-degree murder and other crimes committed when he was 17 years old, filed a motion for a reduction of his sentence under Maryland's Juvenile Restoration Act (JUVRA). This act allows individuals convicted as minors and who have served at least 20 years to seek a sentence reduction. Trimble argued that his age at the time of the offense and his rehabilitation efforts warranted a reduced sentence.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County denied Trimble's motion, finding that his age at the time of the crime did not support a sentence reduction, and that he continued to pose a danger to the public. The court also did not credit the testimony of Trimble's expert, who argued that Trimble's antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) had remitted. The court emphasized the brutal nature of the crime and the lasting impact on the victim's family.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. The appellate court found that the circuit court had adequately considered all the required factors under JUVRA, including Trimble's age, rehabilitation efforts, and expert testimony. The appellate court also noted that the circuit court was not required to give special consideration to any particular factor, including rehabilitation.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that under JUVRA, the circuit court has broad discretion to determine whether an individual is a danger to the public and whether the interests of justice will be served by a reduced sentence. The court is required to consider ten enumerated factors but is not required to give special consideration to any particular factor. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court had properly exercised its discretion in denying Trimble's motion for a reduced sentence. View "Trimble v. State" on Justia Law