Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that a conviction for failure to register as a sex offender under Ohio Rev. Code 2950.04 does not violate a defendant's due-process and jury-trial rights guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions when the duty to register arises from a juvenile court's delinquency adjudication, holding that such a conviction is not unconstitutional.Appellant was adjudicated delinquent as to what would have been two counts of fourth-degree felony gross sexual imposition if committed by an adult. Appellant was classified as a juvenile-offender registrant and tier I sex offender and was ordered to comply with statutory registration, notification-of-address-change, and verification duties for a period of ten years. Appellant was later convicted for violating a duty to register as a sex offender. On appeal, Appellant argued that his conviction was unconstitutional based on State v. Hand, 73 N.E.3d 448 (Ohio 2016). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) that Appellant's conviction for a violation of section 2950.04 for that arose from a juvenile adjudication did not violate Appellant's rights to a jury or due process under the Ohio Constitution and United States Constitution. View "State v. Buttery" on Justia Law

The events that formed the basis of Nazeer Taylor’s prosecution occurred when he was fifteen years old. In March 2014, the Commonwealth filed a delinquency petition alleging that Taylor committed numerous delinquent acts purportedly stemming from recurring incidents of sexual assault of his then-eleven-year-old foster brother, A.O. This appeal asked whether a minor’s Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was violated when a juvenile court granted the Commonwealth’s request to have a delinquency matter transferred to an adult court for criminal prosecution, based in part upon the minor’s decision not to admit culpability to the delinquent acts alleged. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court judgment and remanded for a determination, in the first instance, whether the harmless error doctrine was applicable to the juvenile court's "constitutionally deficient misapplication" of the Juvenile Act's transfer provisions, and if it was not, or if the error was not harmless, for consideration of the available relief under these circumstances. View "Pennsylvania v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Where a juvenile court vacates its true finding on a generic murder allegation and redesignates it as a finding on an uncharged target offense, and does so before a minor has had the opportunity to contest the court's findings or orders, the minor may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of the redesignated offense on appeal.The Court of Appeal held that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's decision sustaining the allegations that I.A. possessed a concealable firearm and committed vandalism. Therefore, the court reversed the juvenile court's findings, vacating the jurisdiction and disposition order and dismissing the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition. View "In re I.A." on Justia Law

After being charged, fourteen-year-old G.S.S. was detained for more than three months without bail, even though he had not entered a plea and had not been tried on the charges against him. At that point, G.S.S.’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that G.S.S.’s “right to a speedy trial” had been violated under section 19-2-509(4)(b), C.R.S. (2019). The trial court agreed and dismissed the case against G.S.S. with prejudice, and the court of appeals affirmed in Colorado in Interest of G.S.S., 2019 COA 4M, __ P.3d __. The Colorado Supreme Court then granted certiorari to determine the proper remedy for a violation of the sixty-day limit in section 19-2-509(4)(b). The Supreme Court determined the remedy for a section 19-2-509(4)(b) violation was for the trial court to immediately hold a bail hearing and order the juvenile's release. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed. View "Colorado In Interest of G.S.S." on Justia Law

Based on allegations that the minor exposed himself to (Penal Code 314.1) and solicited sex from his 14-year-old female classmate and touched another classmate in a sexual manner (Penal Code 242), the juvenile court placed the minor on probation with multiple conditions. The court of appeal struck an electronics search condition. Nothing in the record establishes that the electronics search condition is valid as “reasonably related to future criminality,” and a treatment provider’s finding of “therapeutic necessity” at some later date is not equivalent to a finding that the burden imposed is proportional to the legitimate interests served by the condition. The court modified conditions relating to fees, the possession of materials or items that have a primary purpose of causing sexual arousal, and the minor’s proximity to the campus or grounds of any school unless enrolled, accompanied, or authorized. The court upheld conditions relating to psychological evaluations and polygraph testing, View "In re David C." on Justia Law

On March 25, 2013, the 18-year-old defendant Clifford Williams shot and killed 15-year-old Ralphmon Green in the 2100 block of Allen Street in New Orleans. The victim was struck by bullets four times and defendant continued to fire at him after he fell to the ground. Eight shell casings found at the crime scene matched a semiautomatic handgun that was later found at defendant’s residence. Several eyewitnesses to the shooting testified that the victim was unarmed. Before trial, the defense was prohibited from introducing evidence of the victim’s juvenile arrest for illegal carrying of a weapon. At trial, the defense unsuccessfully attempted to introduce other evidence of the victim’s character. Specifically, the defense sought to introduce a photograph that depicted the victim holding a gun, evidence that the victim had threatened defendant on social media, and testimony of a witness that the victim had previously threatened defendant. In rejecting defendant’s claim on appeal that the district court erred in excluding this evidence, the court of appeal found that defendant failed to introduce appreciable evidence of a hostile demonstration or overt act on the part of the victim at the time of the offense charged, as required by La.C.E. art. 404(A)(2)(a). Defendant contended the court of appeal erred because testimony of an eyewitness constituted appreciable evidence of an overt act by the victim, and the district court overstepped its bounds in evaluating the credibility of that witness to find the evidence was not appreciable because the witness was not credible. To this point, the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed. However, the Court found the evidence was otherwise inadmissible, and therefore affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Williams" on Justia Law

Louisiana charged D.T. with aggravated battery committed with a firearm, and sought to divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction and to prosecute D.T. as an adult pursuant to Louisiana Children’s Code Article 305(B)(2)(j). In response, D.T. filed a motion with the juvenile court to declare La. Ch.C. art. 305(B)(2)(j) unconstitutional. The juvenile court granted D.T.’s motion. On the state's application to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Supreme Court concurred with the trial court that La. Ch.C. art. 305(B)(2)(j) was indeed unconstitutional, concluding the legislature exceeded its constitutional authority in creating an exception allowing divesture of juvenile court jurisdiction for a child charged with aggravated battery committed with a firearm, where that charge is not among the crimes enumerated in La. Const. art. V, sec. 19. View "Louisiana in the interest of D.T." on Justia Law

Defendant, who was 18 years old at the time of the attempted murders and 21 years old when he committed murder, seeks remand of his cause for a hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, because his counsel stipulated, without his consent, to limit information regarding youth-related mitigating factors to a written submission following the sentencing hearing.The Court of Appeal held that counsel's stipulation to file the Franklin package after the sentencing hearing and without presentation of live testimony did not violate defendant's constitutional rights. The court also held that defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, ordering a correction on the abstract of judgment to reflect the sentence. View "People v. Sepulveda" on Justia Law

On September 20, 2010, at age of 13 appellant, H.R., was adjudicated delinquent for indecent assault of a complainant less than 13 years of age. Appellant was placed on official probation and, pursuant to Section 6352 of the Juvenile Act, was ordered to undergo inpatient treatment at a sex offender residential treatment facility. Appellant remained in treatment when he turned 20 in February 2017 and he was assessed pursuant to Section 6352, the results of which found that involuntary treatment at a sex offender residential treatment facility pursuant to the Court-Ordered Involuntary Treatment of Certain Sexually Violent Persons Statute (Act 21) was still necessary. On January 4, 2018, following a hearing, a trial court denied appellant's motion to dismiss and granted the petition for involuntary treatment, determining appellant was an sexually violent delinquent child (SVDC) and committing him to one year of mental health treatment. On appeal, appeal, appellant argued: (1) Act 21 was punitive in nature, and this its procedure for determining whether an individual was an SVDC was unconstitutional; and (2) retroactive application of amendments to Act 21 made effective in 2011, was also unconstitutional. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined the superior court correctly determined the relevant provisions of Act 21 were not punitive, were constitutional, thus, affirming the trial court's order. View "In re: H.R." on Justia Law

Wilkes was convicted for the attempted murder of Christopher and related crimes. The court of appeal affirmed the conviction but modified the judgment to strike an enhancement for a prior one-year prison term for a grand theft conviction and award presentence conduct credits. The court upheld other enhancements and rejected Wilkes’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that he intended to kill Christopher and that the attempted murder was premeditated and deliberate. There was evidence that Wilkes purposefully fired a gun into the front passenger window of a car, knowing Christopher was in the driver’s seat, and that he fired a subsequent shot at Christopher after Christopher exited the car. The court also rejected Wilkes’s equal protection challenge to a statutory provision rendering youth offenders sentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes Law (Pen. Code 667(b)–(j), 1170.12), such as Wilkes, ineligible for youth offender parole hearings. (section 3051(h).) View "People v. Wilkes" on Justia Law