Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A.M. (juvenile) appealed an unpublished Court of Appeals decision affirming her conviction for possession of a controlled substance. She argued: (1) it was manifest constitutional error for the trial court to admit a detention center inventory form where she signed a sworn statement indicating that a backpack, which was discovered to contain methamphetamine, was her property because it violated her right against self-incrimination; and (2) the affirmative defense of unwitting possession was an unconstitutional burden-shifting scheme that violated her due process rights. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held the admission of the inventory form was manifest constitutional error because it violated her right against self-incrimination and warranted reversal because it was not harmless error. Because the Court found reversible constitutional error, it declined to consider A.M.'s due process argument. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. A.M." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the court of special appeals affirming the judgment of the juvenile court finding that sixteen-year-old S.K. was involved in distributing child pornography, holding that a minor may be adjudicated delinquent under Maryland's child pornography and obscenity statutes as the "person" who is a distributor of child pornography and a displayer of obscene matter when she is also the minor participant in the sex act.S.K. sent a video to her two best friends that showed herself performing fellatio in a male. When the video was later distributed to other students S.K. was charged under Md. Code Crim. Law (CR) 11-207(a)(4) and 11-203(b)(1)(ii). After an adjuratory hearing, the juvenile court found S.K. involved as to distributing child pornography and displaying an obscene item to a minor. The court of special appeals reversed in part, holding (1) a minor legally engaged in consensual sexual activity is not exempted from CR 11-207(a)(4); and (2) the cellphone video was not an "item" covered within CR 11-203(b)(1)(ii). The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) the plain language of CR 11-207(a)(4) subsumes situations where a minor produces and distributes pornographic material of himself or herself; and (2) S.K.'s conduct fell within that contemplated by CR 11-203. View "In re S.K." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's finding that R.C. had committed an unauthorized invasion of privacy pursuant to Penal Code section 647, subdivision (j)(3)(A).The court applied the plain meaning of the word "concealed," and held that "concealed" means "to prevent disclosure or recognition of," and "to place out of sight." Similarly, Merriam-Webster defines "concealed" as "kept out of sight or hidden from view." In this case, the court held that substantial evidence demonstrated that R.C. committed the offense of unauthorized invasion of privacy when he used a concealed cellphone to secretly video-record K.V. in a state of full or partial undress, in a place where she had a reasonable expectation of privacy, with the intent to invade her privacy. In this case. R.C. did not tell K.V. about his intent to video-record them until after he had begun recording, he positioned the cellphone behind K.V. where it was hidden from her view, and K.V. did not realize the cellphone was present until R.C. announced he was recording and she turned her head. View "In re R.C." on Justia Law

Vas Coleman was arrested at his home in Huntsville, Alabama on charges related to the 2015 death of Jose Greer in Fulton County, Georgia. Although Coleman was sixteen years old at the time of his arrest, the Fulton County Superior Court had exclusive jurisdiction over his case pursuant to OCGA 15-11-560 (b) (1) because he was accused of murder. After his arrest, Coleman was held at the Fulton County Youth Detention Center until he was granted a bond on March 24, 2016, and subsequently released. On April 8, 2016, Coleman was indicted by a Fulton County grand jury, along with four co-defendants, for felony murder and burglary in relation to Greer’s death. Almost two years later, on March 20, 2018, Coleman and his co-defendants were re-indicted on the same charges. After the State nolle prossed the April 2016 indictment, Coleman filed a motion to transfer his case to juvenile court, arguing that, because the March 2018 indictment was returned outside the 180-day time limit set by OCGA 17-7-50.1, the Superior Court no longer had jurisdiction. Relying on the Court of Appeals’ decisions in Edwards v. Georgia, 748 SE2d 501 (2013) and Georgia v. Armendariz, 729 SE2d 538 (2012), the trial court granted Coleman’s motion to transfer. The State appealed, arguing that the trial court granted the motion in error. “Reading the statute in its most natural and reasonable way,” the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the 180-day time limitation in OCGA 17-7-50.1 did not apply to a juvenile who was released and remained on bond prior to the running of 180 days. The Court overruled Edwards, and further concluded the trial court erred in transferring Coleman’s case to the juvenile court. View "Georgia v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In this appeal concerning a condition of probation requiring Ricardo P. to submit to warrantless searches of his electronics devices the Supreme Court held that the electronics search condition was not reasonably related to future criminality and was therefore invalid under People v. Lent, 15 Cal.3d 481 (1975).In Lent, the Supreme Court held that "a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality." Ricardo, a juvenile, was placed on probation after admitting two counts of felony burglary. As a condition of his probation, the juvenile court imposed the electronics search. Although there was no indication Defendant used an electronic device in connection with the burglaries, the court imposed the condition in order to monitor Ricardo's compliance with separate conditions. The court of appeals concluded that the condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and should be narrowed but held that the condition was permissible under Lent because it served to prevent future criminality. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the electronics search condition was not reasonably related to future criminality. View "In re Ricardo P." on Justia Law

In 2018, the court of appeal held that a juvenile court’s order committing a minor to the Department of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) must be supported by “some specific evidence in the record of the programs at the DJF expected to benefit a minor.” Citing that case, A.M. challenged the juvenile court’s order committing him to the DJF. A.M. had admitted to driving his brother to a park, knowing his brother intended to commit murder. The court of appeal upheld the commitment order, noting testimony by a DJF official about the programs offered by DJF and DJF publications further describing the programs. The juvenile court could reasonably find that certain DJF programs would benefit Minor: group sessions with other youths, a program to help identify negative peers, impulse control therapy, anger management, and/or individual therapy. Minor apparently argued that he has no need for any of these programs, based on the descriptions in the letters from his family and others. The juvenile court found otherwise, discounting those descriptions as irreconcilable with the nature and circumstances of the offense and with Minor’s performance on probation. Substantial evidence supports that finding. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

The State of New Hampshire filed a petition for original jurisdiction seeking review of a circuit court order denying a request by the Office of the Attorney General (AGO) to release records underlying its investigation into an incident involving minors. According to the AGO, in 2017, there was an incident involving several minors in Claremont, New Hampshire. The AGO, the United States Attorney’s Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Claremont Police Department jointly investigated the incident. Subsequently, the Sullivan County Attorney filed delinquency petitions in the circuit court against one of the juveniles. The AGO asserted that the evidence obtained during the investigation was not confidential under RSA 169-B:35 but, even if it were, “significant policy considerations” allowed disclosure as long as the juvenile’s identity was protected. Following a hearing, the trial court rejected the AGO’s argument that RSA chapter 169-B did not apply to the AGO’s investigatory records. The court stated that “RSA 169-B:35 provides that all case records relative to delinquencies are confidential. Publication of information concerning a juvenile case is strictly prohibited with few legislatively enacted exceptions. None of those exceptions apply in this case.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s ruling that the records were confidential under RSA 169-B:35 (Supp. 2018). View "Petition of the State of New Hampshire" on Justia Law

For the reasons stated in People v. Superior Court (T.D.), the Court of Appeal rejected the district attorney's claim that Senate Bill No. 1391 unconstitutionally amended Proposition 57. The court also addressed issues not before the court in T.D., and held that Senate Bill No. 1391 is not an unconstitutional amendment of Proposition 21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998 (Proposition 21); is not unconstitutionally vague; and applies retroactively. In this case, the court held that the murder charge against real party in interest I.R. allegedly committed when he was age 15 cannot be transferred to criminal court based on a separate felony offense he allegedly committed when he was age 17. Therefore, the court denied the petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandate. View "People v. Superior Court (I.R.)" on Justia Law

Senate Bill No. 1391 does not unconstitutionally amend Proposition 57. Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, eliminated a prosecutor's ability to directly file charges in criminal (adult) court against minors who were 14 years of age or older at the time of their alleged offenses, and instead required prosecutors to obtain juvenile court approval to do so. SB 1391 prohibits the transfer of 14- and 15-year-old offenders to criminal court in virtually all circumstances.The Court of Appeal held that voters intended Proposition 57 to extend as broadly as possible; the amendatory language of section 5 of the Act was ambiguous; and, when the court construed the language and the Act as a whole consistently with the voters' intent, SB 1391 was constitutional. Accordingly, the court discharged the order to show cause previously issued and denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "People v. Superior Court (T.D.)" on Justia Law

A.L. was in a fight with her sister violent enough for police to be called. An officer grabbed A.L.’s arm, stating “I saw you kick her when she was down.” She pulled away. Another officer took her other arm. She dropped to the pavement, kicking and scratching the officer before biting him. He punched A.L. and put her in handcuffs. The District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition under Penal Code sections 243(b) (battery on a peace officer); 69 (resisting a peace officer by force); and 148(a)(1) (resisting a peace officer). Resisting an officer and forcefully resisting an officer require actual knowledge that an officer is engaged in the performance of duty. The juvenile court stated: “Whether you think the police have the right to detain you or stop you or hold onto you, the law in this state says you don’t get to resist” and sustained the allegations. The court of appeal affirmed, finding the judge's comment not so ambiguous as to require reversal. The court may have found that the statutes were violated so long as the officers were performing their duty, without regard to A.L.’s awareness of that fact, or may have been referring only to section 243(b) and correctly describing the law. The court expressly found that the necessary elements for all three offenses had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; those elements include the actual knowledge requirement of sections 69 and 148(a)(1). View "In re A.L." on Justia Law