Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

This case addressed the adequacy of the parole remedy available under RCW 9.94A.730, the Miller "fix" statute. Jai'Mar Scott was convicted by a jury in 1990 of first degree premeditated murder for killing his neighbor, a 78-year-old-woman who suffered from Alzheimer's disease. Scott was 17 years old when he committed the murder. The juvenile court declined jurisdiction, and Scott was tried, convicted, and sentenced as an adult. At sentencing, the parties agreed that the standard range was 240 to 320 months, with 240 months being the mandatory minimum sentence that could be imposed. The State requested an exceptional sentence above the standard range. The defense requested the low end of the standard range. The trial court sentenced Scott to an exceptional sentence of 900 months based on four independent findings: (1) that Scott's conduct constituted deliberate cruelty, (2) that his conduct was an abuse of trust, (3) that the crime involved multiple injuries, and (4) that the victim was particularly vulnerable. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the 900-month sentence imposed was not clearly excessive because the "aggravating factors are both numerous and individually and collectively egregious." The Court of Appeals also rejected Scott's assertion that his exceptional sentence was improper in light of his youth at the time of the crime. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed: consistent with the federal Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), the Washington Court held that RCW 9.94A.730's parole provision was an adequate remedy for a Miller violation, rendering unnecessary the resentencing of a defendant who long ago received a de facto life sentence as a juvenile. View "Washington v. Scott" on Justia Law

Defendant, a juvenile nonhomicide offender, was entitled to resentencing under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), because the sentencing court did not make the required findings at Defendant’s sentencing hearing to comport with chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, and because Defendant’s sentence lacked any review mechanism.Defendant was convicted of one count of attempted felony murder and one count of attempted armed robbery for a crime he convicted when he was fifteen years old. Defendant was sentenced as an adult to thirty years’ imprisonment for the attempted felony murder and fifteen years’ imprisonment for the attempted armed robbery, to be served concurrently. Defendant’s sentence did not provide for judicial review. The Supreme Court ordered that Defendant be resentenced under the juvenile sentencing provisions in chapter 2014-220. View "Morris v. State" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to address whether Georgia’s new Juvenile Code required a party to follow the interlocutory appeal procedures laid out in OCGA 5-6-34 (b) when appealing an order concerning the transfer of a case from juvenile to superior court. The Court held that it did not and, in so doing, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to be decided on the merits. View "In the Interest of K.S., a child" on Justia Law

The juvenile court placed Juan on informal probation (Welfare and Institutions Code 654.2) for misdemeanor petty theft and throwing rocks at a vehicle. Weeks later, a second wardship petition alleged Juan committed second-degree robbery and assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury. Juan admitted committing the second-degree robbery and signed a waiver of rights. The dispositional report indicated Juan was chronically truant, received poor grades, had been suspended from school twice, and was disciplined for sexual harassment and vandalism. His co-participants were admitted gang members. Juan reported using alcohol and marijuana. The probation department recommended Juan be placed on formal wardship probation subject to conditions, including requiring Juan to “[s]ubmit to search of electronic devices at any time … without a warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion … This search should be confined to areas of the electronic devices including social media accounts, applications, websites where such evidence of criminality [or] probation violation may be found. . . . The minor must provide access/passwords.” The juvenile court adjudged Juan a ward of the court and placed him on indefinite supervised probation. Numerous conditions were imposed, including the electronic search condition, and prohibitions on possessing or consuming alcohol and illegal drugs, associating with gang members, and contacting co-participants. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the condition was unreasonable and unconstitutionally overbroad. View "In re Juan R." on Justia Law

Defendant Jasen Suhr was charged with sexual assault, in violation of 13 V.S.A. 3252(a)(1), based on allegations that he forced his girlfriend to have sexual intercourse with him without her consent. At that time, defendant was seventeen, and his girlfriend was sixteen. The criminal court transferred defendant to juvenile court in September 2013, but it reversed that decision the next month, returning defendant to criminal court. In December 2013, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, which was contingent on the family division’s accepting defendant for participation in the youthful-offender treatment program, pursuant to 33 V.S.A. 5281. In February 2014, the family division accepted defendant as a youthful offender and entered the terms of his juvenile probation. The court set a two-year juvenile probationary period, anticipating completion in February 2016. Defendant appealed the trial court’s decision that he violated the terms of his juvenile probation by: failing to attend school, comply with his GPS-monitoring requirements, and participate in a Restorative Justice Panel. Defendant also appealed the trial court’s decision to revoke his youthful-offender status based on these violations. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court determined the trial court’s decision did “not align with the circumstances of this case. … Given that defendant’s underlying conviction was for a sex offense, it was particularly important that treatment include appropriate sex-offender therapy. Based on the court’s findings, defendant was never offered adequate sex offender treatment. His failure to rehabilitate while participating in inappropriate therapy hardly demonstrates that defendant was unamenable to treatment. We find too speculative the court’s prediction that defendant would have violated his probation conditions even if he had received appropriate sex offender therapy. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court exceeded its discretion in revoking defendant’s youth-offender status based, in part, on defendant’s inadequate sex-offender therapy. In determining whether defendant is amenable to rehabilitation on remand, the court should give proper consideration to the adequacy of defendant’s treatment.” The Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusions with respect to defendant’s probation violations for failing to attend school or to comply with GPS monitoring, and for failing to participate in the Restorative Justice Panel, but reversed the trial court’s decision to revoke defendant’s Youthful Offender status. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Suhr" on Justia Law

Defendant Jasen Suhr was charged with sexual assault, in violation of 13 V.S.A. 3252(a)(1), based on allegations that he forced his girlfriend to have sexual intercourse with him without her consent. At that time, defendant was seventeen, and his girlfriend was sixteen. The criminal court transferred defendant to juvenile court in September 2013, but it reversed that decision the next month, returning defendant to criminal court. In December 2013, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, which was contingent on the family division’s accepting defendant for participation in the youthful-offender treatment program, pursuant to 33 V.S.A. 5281. In February 2014, the family division accepted defendant as a youthful offender and entered the terms of his juvenile probation. The court set a two-year juvenile probationary period, anticipating completion in February 2016. Defendant appealed the trial court’s decision that he violated the terms of his juvenile probation by: failing to attend school, comply with his GPS-monitoring requirements, and participate in a Restorative Justice Panel. Defendant also appealed the trial court’s decision to revoke his youthful-offender status based on these violations. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court determined the trial court’s decision did “not align with the circumstances of this case. … Given that defendant’s underlying conviction was for a sex offense, it was particularly important that treatment include appropriate sex-offender therapy. Based on the court’s findings, defendant was never offered adequate sex offender treatment. His failure to rehabilitate while participating in inappropriate therapy hardly demonstrates that defendant was unamenable to treatment. We find too speculative the court’s prediction that defendant would have violated his probation conditions even if he had received appropriate sex offender therapy. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court exceeded its discretion in revoking defendant’s youth-offender status based, in part, on defendant’s inadequate sex-offender therapy. In determining whether defendant is amenable to rehabilitation on remand, the court should give proper consideration to the adequacy of defendant’s treatment.” The Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusions with respect to defendant’s probation violations for failing to attend school or to comply with GPS monitoring, and for failing to participate in the Restorative Justice Panel, but reversed the trial court’s decision to revoke defendant’s Youthful Offender status. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Suhr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order transferring defendant for criminal prosecution as an adult under 18 U.S.C. 5032. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding to transfer where the district court made specific findings with respect to each statutory factor. In this case, the juvenile's age, nature of the offenses, his role in the offenses, and his intellect and maturity weighed in favor of transfer. The court also held that it was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing where the district court accepted the magistrate judge's credibility findings and independently weighed the statutory factors. View "United States v. Juvenile Male" on Justia Law

The Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602(a) petition, alleging that the minor committed felony first-degree burglary of an occupied residence, felony attempted theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle, and possession of burglar’s tools. The juvenile court continued the minor as a ward of the court and placed him on probation. On reconsideration after remand from the California Supreme Court, the court of appeal reversed. The court rejected an argument that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the allegation that the minor attempted to drive or take a vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code 10851(a)). The court remanded for a determination of whether that offense must be reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Cal. Const., art. II, section 10(a)) The California Supreme Court had concluded that Proposition 47 did apply to Vehicle Code section 10851. View "In re J.R." on Justia Law

The Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602(a) petition, alleging that the minor committed felony first-degree burglary of an occupied residence, felony attempted theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle, and possession of burglar’s tools. The juvenile court continued the minor as a ward of the court and placed him on probation. On reconsideration after remand from the California Supreme Court, the court of appeal reversed. The court rejected an argument that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the allegation that the minor attempted to drive or take a vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code 10851(a)). The court remanded for a determination of whether that offense must be reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Cal. Const., art. II, section 10(a)) The California Supreme Court had concluded that Proposition 47 did apply to Vehicle Code section 10851. View "In re J.R." on Justia Law

In New Jersey, juveniles adjudicated delinquent of certain sex offenses were barred for life from seeking relief from the registration and community notification provisions of Megan’s Law. That categorical lifetime bar cannot be lifted, even when the juvenile becomes an adult and poses no public safety risk, is fully rehabilitated, and is a fully productive member of society. Defendant C.K. was adjudicated delinquent for sex offenses committed more than two decades ago and challenged the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g)’s permanent lifetime registration and notification requirements as applied to juveniles. After review of the specific facts of this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded subsection (g)’s lifetime registration and notification requirements as applied to juveniles violated the substantive due process guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. “Permanently barring juveniles who have committed certain sex offenses from petitioning for relief from the Megan’s Law requirements bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective.” The Court determined that in the absence of subsection (g), N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) provided the original safeguard incorporated into Megan’s Law, and a criminal defendant may petition to be released from registration and notification requirements when a superior court judge is persuaded the defendant has been offense-free and does not likely pose a societal risk after a fifteen-year look-back period. Defendant may apply for termination from the Megan’s Law requirements fifteen years from the date of his juvenile adjudication, and be relieved of those requirements provided he meets the standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f). View "New Jersey in the Interest of C.K." on Justia Law