Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jasen Suhr was charged with sexual assault, in violation of 13 V.S.A. 3252(a)(1), based on allegations that he forced his girlfriend to have sexual intercourse with him without her consent. At that time, defendant was seventeen, and his girlfriend was sixteen. The criminal court transferred defendant to juvenile court in September 2013, but it reversed that decision the next month, returning defendant to criminal court. In December 2013, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, which was contingent on the family division’s accepting defendant for participation in the youthful-offender treatment program, pursuant to 33 V.S.A. 5281. In February 2014, the family division accepted defendant as a youthful offender and entered the terms of his juvenile probation. The court set a two-year juvenile probationary period, anticipating completion in February 2016. Defendant appealed the trial court’s decision that he violated the terms of his juvenile probation by: failing to attend school, comply with his GPS-monitoring requirements, and participate in a Restorative Justice Panel. Defendant also appealed the trial court’s decision to revoke his youthful-offender status based on these violations. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court determined the trial court’s decision did “not align with the circumstances of this case. … Given that defendant’s underlying conviction was for a sex offense, it was particularly important that treatment include appropriate sex-offender therapy. Based on the court’s findings, defendant was never offered adequate sex offender treatment. His failure to rehabilitate while participating in inappropriate therapy hardly demonstrates that defendant was unamenable to treatment. We find too speculative the court’s prediction that defendant would have violated his probation conditions even if he had received appropriate sex offender therapy. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court exceeded its discretion in revoking defendant’s youth-offender status based, in part, on defendant’s inadequate sex-offender therapy. In determining whether defendant is amenable to rehabilitation on remand, the court should give proper consideration to the adequacy of defendant’s treatment.” The Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusions with respect to defendant’s probation violations for failing to attend school or to comply with GPS monitoring, and for failing to participate in the Restorative Justice Panel, but reversed the trial court’s decision to revoke defendant’s Youthful Offender status. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Suhr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order transferring defendant for criminal prosecution as an adult under 18 U.S.C. 5032. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding to transfer where the district court made specific findings with respect to each statutory factor. In this case, the juvenile's age, nature of the offenses, his role in the offenses, and his intellect and maturity weighed in favor of transfer. The court also held that it was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing where the district court accepted the magistrate judge's credibility findings and independently weighed the statutory factors. View "United States v. Juvenile Male" on Justia Law

The Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602(a) petition, alleging that the minor committed felony first-degree burglary of an occupied residence, felony attempted theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle, and possession of burglar’s tools. The juvenile court continued the minor as a ward of the court and placed him on probation. On reconsideration after remand from the California Supreme Court, the court of appeal reversed. The court rejected an argument that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the allegation that the minor attempted to drive or take a vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code 10851(a)). The court remanded for a determination of whether that offense must be reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Cal. Const., art. II, section 10(a)) The California Supreme Court had concluded that Proposition 47 did apply to Vehicle Code section 10851. View "In re J.R." on Justia Law

The Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602(a) petition, alleging that the minor committed felony first-degree burglary of an occupied residence, felony attempted theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle, and possession of burglar’s tools. The juvenile court continued the minor as a ward of the court and placed him on probation. On reconsideration after remand from the California Supreme Court, the court of appeal reversed. The court rejected an argument that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the allegation that the minor attempted to drive or take a vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code 10851(a)). The court remanded for a determination of whether that offense must be reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Cal. Const., art. II, section 10(a)) The California Supreme Court had concluded that Proposition 47 did apply to Vehicle Code section 10851. View "In re J.R." on Justia Law

In New Jersey, juveniles adjudicated delinquent of certain sex offenses were barred for life from seeking relief from the registration and community notification provisions of Megan’s Law. That categorical lifetime bar cannot be lifted, even when the juvenile becomes an adult and poses no public safety risk, is fully rehabilitated, and is a fully productive member of society. Defendant C.K. was adjudicated delinquent for sex offenses committed more than two decades ago and challenged the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g)’s permanent lifetime registration and notification requirements as applied to juveniles. After review of the specific facts of this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded subsection (g)’s lifetime registration and notification requirements as applied to juveniles violated the substantive due process guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. “Permanently barring juveniles who have committed certain sex offenses from petitioning for relief from the Megan’s Law requirements bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective.” The Court determined that in the absence of subsection (g), N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) provided the original safeguard incorporated into Megan’s Law, and a criminal defendant may petition to be released from registration and notification requirements when a superior court judge is persuaded the defendant has been offense-free and does not likely pose a societal risk after a fifteen-year look-back period. Defendant may apply for termination from the Megan’s Law requirements fifteen years from the date of his juvenile adjudication, and be relieved of those requirements provided he meets the standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f). View "New Jersey in the Interest of C.K." on Justia Law

Life without parole (LWOP) for juveniles does not always offend the federal or Kentucky Constitutions, so long as it comports with a discretionary scheme and the defendant has a meaningful opportunity for the jury to consider mitigating evidence.Appellant was under the age of eighteen when he participated in the murder of two people and the deadly assault of a twelve-year-old girl. The circuit court sentenced Appellant to LWOP. In this appeal from the denial of relief on Appellant’s third Ky. R. Criminal. P. 11.42 motion and his second Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion, the Supreme Court held (1) Appellant’s sentencing was constitutionally permissible; but (2) under this Court’s more recent rulings regarding penalties allowable under the juvenile code, Appellant’s sentence was statutorily prohibited. Consequently, the Court remanded this case for the trial court to impose the lawful sentence of LWOP for twenty-five years. View "Phon v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the adjudication of delinquency as to a juvenile offender under the age of sixteen, holding that, as applied in these circumstances where the juvenile maintained that he was involved in consensual experimentation with another child, enforcement of the statutory rape charge was constitutional.At the time of the alleged offenses, the juvenile was twelve years old and the victim was eight years old. A jury found the juvenile delinquent of statutory rape. On appeal, the juvenile argued that the imposition of criminal liability on a child for a strict liability offense was fundamentally unfair. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding that the juvenile’s arguments were unable to overcome the presumption that the Legislature acted reasonably and rationally in imposing strict liability for anyone who has sexual intercourse with a child under the age of sixteen. View "Commonwealth v. Wilbur W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the court of appeals that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that K.M. committed first degree sexual assault under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-319.The separate juvenile court adjudicated K.M. as being a juvenile who committed an act that would constitute a felony by committing first degree sexual assault based on the victim’s lack of capacity. The court of appeals concluded that the juvenile court erred in finding that K.M. subjected the victim to sexual penetration because the State failed to prove that K.M. knew or should have known that the victim was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of his conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State failed to prove that the victim actually lacked the capacity to consent. View "In re Interest of K.M." on Justia Law

Evan Bacon, a juvenile, pleaded guilty to second degree robbery and received a suspended disposition. The State challenged the juvenile court's authority to enter such a disposition, arguing that the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA), chapter 13.40 RCW, does not give trial courts the statutory authority to suspend juvenile dispositions (except in specific situations that are absent here). The Court of Appeals agreed, and so did the Washington Supreme Court. The Court therefore affirmed, holding that juvenile court judges lack statutory authority to suspend JJA dispositions, even manifest injustice JJA dispositions, unless the disposition fits under one of the specifically listed exemptions in RCW 13.40.160(10). View "Washington v. Bacon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to modify his original sentence after a new individualized sentencing hearing and remanded for a new individualized sentencing hearing.Defendant was seventeen years old when he and his friend robbed and murdered a hitchhiker. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a consecutive twenty-to-fifty-year sentence for aggravated robbery. Following the decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __ (2016), and Bear Cloud v. State, 294 P.3d 36 (Wyo. 2013), and the Wyoming Legislature’s amendment to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-10-301(c), Defendant was granted parole from his life sentence and began serving his consecutive twenty-to-fifty-year sentence. Defendant received a new individualized sentencing hearing, after which the district court declined to modify Defendant’s original sentence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for an additional sentencing hearing because at the time of the hearing and the district court’s decision, the parties and the district court did not have the advantage of this Court’s rulings concerning the procedure, burdens, and potentially relevant evidence for a Miller determination contained within this opinion. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law