Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged in adult criminal court with sex crimes allegedly committed in 2014 and 2015 when he was 14 and 15 years old. The law then in effect permitted the prosecutor to charge the case directly in adult court. After the charges were filed, the electorate passed Proposition 57, the “Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016,” prohibiting prosecutors from charging juveniles directly in adult court. Such actions must commence in juvenile court. If the prosecution wishes to try the juvenile as an adult, the juvenile court must conduct a “transfer hearing.” Only if the juvenile court transfers the matter to adult court can the juvenile be tried and sentenced as an adult (Welf. & Inst. Code, 707(a)). The Supreme Court of California held that the provision applies retroactively to all juveniles charged directly in adult court whose judgment was not final at the time it was enacted. The possibility of being treated as a juvenile in juvenile court—where rehabilitation is the goal—rather than being tried and sentenced as an adult can result in dramatically different and more lenient treatment, so Proposition 57 reduces the possible punishment for a class of persons, namely juveniles. Nothing in Proposition 57’s text or ballot materials rebuts this inference. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Brian Buckman pleaded guilty to second degree rape of a child. After sentencing, Buckman learned that he had been misinformed of the sentencing range that applied to him. Based on this misinformation, Buckman sought to withdraw his plea as involuntary. Because Buckman's motion to withdraw was a collateral attack on his judgment and sentence, he had to show that his plea was involuntary, and actual and substantial prejudice resulting from that error. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Buckman's plea was involuntary because he was misinformed that he might be sentenced to life in prison despite the fact that the statute provided that a sentence of life in prison could not apply to a 17-year-old (Buckman's age at the time of the offense). But the Court also held he was not entitled to withdraw his plea because he failed to show that the misinformation provided at the time of his plea caused him actual and substantial prejudice. As a result, the Supreme Court denied the motion to withdraw and remanded for resentencing only. View "Washington v. Buckman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which Appellant argued that he should be reentenced because his sentence of life imprisonment imposed for an offense committed when he was a juvenile violated the Eighth Amendment pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 467 U.S. 460 (2012).Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and other crimes stemming from offenses Appellant committed when he was fifteen years old. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Appellant’s habeas petition, holding that because a recent statutory amendment by the Arkansas General Assembly created the possibility of parole for Appellant, Appellant’s sentence did not violate the requirements of Miller. View "Lohbauer v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Where an individual has been released on bail pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58 and there is probable cause to believe the individual committed a crime while released on bail, the Commonwealth may seek to revoke bail under either Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58 or Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58B. The judge must then make a determination as to whether the Commonwealth satisfied the requirements of either section 58 or section 58B, under which it sought to revoke bail.Here, the judge found probable cause to believe that a juvenile had committed a crime while released on bail under section 58. The juvenile argued that the judge erred in applying the ninety-day revocation period under section 58B. Specifically, the juvenile argued that the statutes create an ambiguous bit revocation framework, and therefore, the rule of lenity requires the applicable of the sixty-day revocation period under section 58. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) the bail revocation scheme is not ambiguous in its current form, and therefore, the rule of lenity does not apply; and (2) revoking bail under section 58B where an individual has been released on bail pursuant to section 58 and subsequently commits a crime while on release, does not violate due process. View "Josh J. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At age of 19, defendant Montrell Woods shot Kenny Hernandez to death during a confrontation between the two men at an apartment complex. A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder and of being a felon in possession of a firearm and also found he personally discharged a firearm causing death. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 15 years to life for the murder and to a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53. At the time of defendant’s sentencing, the enhancement statute provided that “[n]otwithstanding [Penal Code s]ection 1385 or any other provision of law, the court shall not strike an allegation under this section or a finding bringing a person within the provisions of this section.” On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to bifurcate the possession of a firearm charge from the murder charge, the court erroneously excluded evidence of the victim’s propensity for violence, the prosecutor committed two acts of misconduct, the court committed multiple instances of instructional error, and cumulative error resulted. Defendant also argued should have been remanded to the trial court so that he can make an adequate record for a future youth offender parole hearing and so that the trial court can exercise its discretion as to whether to strike the firearm enhancement based on a recent change to Penal Code section 12022.53 that took effect on January 1, 2018. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found no merit to defendant’s claims of trial court error and prosecutorial misconduct. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court concluded defendant already had sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing, but agree that remand was necessary to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion as to whether to strike the firearm enhancement under the recent amendment to Penal Code section 12022.53. View "California v. Woods" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a dispositional order entered after the juvenile court sustained allegations that he committed misdemeanor sexual battery when he touched the breast of a female high school classmate. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the condition of probation forbidding him from using, owning or possessing depictions of nudity was unconstitutionally overbroad. View "In re Carlos C." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a dispositional order entered after the juvenile court sustained allegations that he committed misdemeanor sexual battery when he touched the breast of a female high school classmate. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the condition of probation forbidding him from using, owning or possessing depictions of nudity was unconstitutionally overbroad. View "In re Carlos C." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reduced D.N.'s adjudication for felony theft of a vehicle pursuant to Vehicle Code 10851 to a misdemeanor, because the People failed to prove the value of the stolen vehicle exceeded $950. The court held that the People should have been well aware the value of the stolen vehicle was relevant on whether the offense was a felony. The People should have been on notice as of November 5, 2014, the date Proposition 47 and Penal Code 490.2 went into effect, that vehicle theft under Vehicle Code section 10851 was to be a misdemeanor unless the value of the stolen vehicle exceeded $950. View "In re D.N." on Justia Law

C.B. appealed a juvenile court order adopting a judicial referee's order finding C.B. failed to register as a sex offender. In June 2012, C.B. pled guilty to "assault IV with sexual motivation" in Washington state. The adjudication and disposition order did not require C.B. to register as a sex offender in Washington. In the fall of 2012, C.B. moved to North Dakota with his father. At the request of the juvenile court, C.B. registered as a sex offender in North Dakota in November 2013. In May 2015, C.B. updated his registration at the Bismarck Police Department. After updating his registration, an assistant Burleigh County state's attorney issued a juvenile petition to C.B. for committing the delinquent act of failure to register as a sex offender. The petition alleged C.B. failed to timely "alert law enforcement to a new job, a new place of residence, a telephone number or his facebook account." C.B. moved to dismiss the petition, arguing he should not be required to register. At an October 2015 hearing on the motion, an assistant attorney general testified C.B.'s assault IV with sexual motivation in Washington was equivalent to a class A misdemeanor sexual offense in North Dakota that required registration. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judicial referee stated he was dismissing the petition, and issued an order of dismissal. Shortly thereafter, the referee rescinded the order of dismissal, stating he decided the motion wrongly due to a legal error. The judicial referee provided notice to the parties the same day that they had the right to have the order reviewed by a juvenile court judge if the request was made within seven days. C.B. did not request review of the order. C.B. again moved to dismiss the petition in November 2015, arguing the judicial referee exceeded his authority when he rescinded the order dismissing the petition. The referee denied the motion. C.B. sought review of the referee's decision from the juvenile court. The juvenile court adopted the referee's decision denying the motion. C.B. filed another motion to dismiss in December 2015, arguing the State failed to give full faith and credit to the Washington order that did not require C.B. to register as a sex offender. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed: although C.B. was not required to register as a sex offender in Washington, Full Faith and Credit does not prohibit North Dakota from requiring C.B. to register. View "Interest of C.B." on Justia Law

The State of New Mexico appealed the suppression of two statements made by sixteen-year-old Filemon V. Filemon made the first statement to his probation officers. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that, absent a valid waiver, Section 32A-2-14(C) of the Delinquency Act of the Children’s Code precluded the admission of Filemon’s statement to his probation officers while in investigatory detention. The Court affirmed the district court’s order suppressing the use of the statement in a subsequent prosecution. The second contested statement was elicited by police officers at the Silver City Police Department. Filemon was at this point in custody, and entitled to be warned of his Miranda rights. At issue was whether the midstream Miranda warnings were sufficient to inform Filemon of his rights. The Supreme Court concluded the warnings were insufficient under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). Because the statement was elicited in clear violation of the Fifth Amendment and Section 32A-2- 19 14, the district court’s suppression of the statement was affirmed. View "New Mexico v. Filemon V." on Justia Law