Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit held that Nebraska's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4003(1)(a)(iv), did not apply to A.W., as a juvenile delinquent that engaged in conduct constituting first-degree criminal sexual conduct in Minnesota. Under both Minnesota and Nebraska law, an adjudication of delinquency was not a criminal proceeding, nor did it result in a conviction; the plain and ordinary meaning of "sex offender" was to be ascertained with respect to Nebraska law; and "sex offender" was ordinarily understood as a person who has been convicted of a crime involving unlawful sexual conduct. View "A.W. v. Wood" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it by the Second District Court of Appeals, holding that the general division of the court of common pleas must sentence a juvenile under Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 2929 for all offenses for which the juvenile is convicted in a case if, under Ohio Rev. Code 2152.121(B)(4), at least one offense for which the juvenile was convicted was subject to mandatory transfer.Appellee in this case was charged with being a delinquent child for action that would constitute multiple counts of both aggravated robbery and kidnapping if committed by an adult. The case was transferred from the juvenile court to the general division of the court of common pleas under the mandatory transfer provisions of section 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii). Appellee then pled guilty to some charges that were subject to mandatory transfer and some charges that were subject to discretionary transfer. The court of appeals ruled that the charges that were subject to discretionary transfer and resulted in convictions were also subject to the “reverse bindover” provisions of section 2152.121(B)(3). The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the sentence imposed by the trial court for the reasons set forth above. View "State v. D.B." on Justia Law

David participated in the armed robbery of an Oakland pawn shop in 1994 when he was 17 years old. The juvenile court sustained a robbery allegation and he was committed to the California Youth Authority, where he spent three and one-half years. He was honorably discharged from parole in 2002. Three times, the court denied his petitions to have the records pertaining to his robbery offense sealed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 781. In 2016, at age 38, David filed an amended motion to set aside the robbery finding and dismiss the petition, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 782, and to seal his juvenile records, pursuant to section 781. The court set aside the robbery finding and dismissed the petition on the ground that it was “in the interest of justice and welfare to do so” but denied the request to seal his juvenile records. The court of appeal reversed. Because the order setting aside the robbery finding and dismissing the petition under section 782 erased the petition as if it had never existed, the court improperly denied David’s motion to seal his records under section 781 View "In re David T." on Justia Law

In 1988, Palmer, then 17, pled guilty to kidnapping for robbery. Sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, Palmer has gone before the State of California Board of Parole Hearings 10 times, without success. In 2015 he was denied parole with a five-year denial. Palmer claims that the Board wrongfully refused to set a base term and an adjusted base term for Palmer‘s commitment offense, and applied the incorrect standard at Palmer‘s parole hearing by failing to give great weight to the youth offender factors. The court of appeal issued an order to show cause. Six days later, the Board calculated Palmer‘s base and adjusted base terms. The court of appeal then ordered the Board to hold a new hearing. The 2015 hearing did not comply with the requirement of setting a base term and an adjusted base term; the Board must take into account the adjusted base term‘s relationship to time served before deciding to deny parole. The issue of excessive punishment must be factored into the term of the Board‘s denial. The Board did not identify substantial evidence that Palmer is currently dangerous. View "In re Palmer" on Justia Law

In 1983, Carr was convicted capital murder for killing his brother, stepmother, and stepsister when he was 16 years old. He was sentenced to three concurrent terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years. His sentences were imposed without any consideration of his youth. The Missouri Supreme Court granted his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. His sentences violate the Eighth Amendment because, following the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life without parole pursuant to mandatory sentencing schemes that preclude consideration of the offender’s youth and attendant circumstances. Carr was sentenced under a mandatory sentencing scheme that afforded no opportunity to consider his age, maturity, limited control over his environment, the transient characteristics attendant to youth, or his capacity for rehabilitation. Carr must be resentenced so his youth and other attendant circumstances surrounding his offense can be taken into consideration to ensure he will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment. View "Carr v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Willbanks was 17 years old when he was charged with kidnapping, first-degree assault, two counts of first-degree robbery, and three counts of armed criminal action, based on a carjacking. He was convicted and sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 15 years for the kidnapping count, life for the assault count, 20 years for each of the two robbery counts, and 100 years for each of the three armed criminal action counts. On appeal, he argued his sentences, in the aggregate, will result in the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence and that Missouri’s mandatory minimum parole statutes and regulations violate his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in light of the Supreme Court holding in Graham v. Florida (2010). The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Missouri’s mandatory minimum parole statutes and regulations are constitutionally valid under Graham. Graham held that the Eighth Amendment barred sentencing a juvenile to a single sentence of life without parole for a nonhomicide offense. Graham did not address juveniles who were convicted of multiple nonhomicide offenses and received multiple fixed-term sentences. View "Willbanks v. Missouri Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Eight-year-old KV accused her 17-year-old uncle, JAS, of vaginally raping her on tribal land. The FBI interviewed KV, who described the assault to an interviewer who had conducted more than 5,000 such interviews. JAS was charged with an act of juvenile delinquency: sexual abuse of a child under the age of 12, 18 U.S.C. 2241(c). The district court found beyond a reasonable doubt that JAS had sexually assaulted KV as charged. Although the Sentencing Guidelines would have recommended a life sentence had JAS been an adult, his maximum sentence as a juvenile was five years of “official detention,” 18 U.S.C. 5037(c)(2)(A); the district court sentenced him to three. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting JAS’s arguments that the court improperly admitted the video of the victim’s FBI interview and that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he sexually assaulted KV. The court cited Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii), which allows the admission of prior out-of-court statements of a trial witness (KV) if: the statements are consistent with the witness’s testimony; the statements are offered to rehabilitate the witness after an opposing party has tried to impeach her “on another ground”; and the opposing party is able to cross-examine the witness about the prior statements. View "United States v. J.A.S." on Justia Law

The district court did not err in granting the government’s motion for J.C.D. to be tried as an adult for an armed carjacking J.C.D. allegedly committed when he was seventeen years old.J.C.D. was charged with one count of carjacking. The government filed a motion to transfer J.C.D. to adult status. After balancing the statutory factors, the magistrate judge recommended that the government’s motion to transfer the case be denied. The district court granted the government’s motion to transfer, contrary to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, concluding that the statutory factors, when balanced, warranted transfer of J.C.D. to adult status in the interest of justice. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that J.C.D.’s challenges raised on appeal failed. View "United States v. J.C.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the nineteen-year prison sentence imposed on Defendant at resentencing for his involvement in the robberies of three individuals and the kidnapping of one of those individuals when Defendant was sixteen years old. Specifically, the court held (1) Defendant failed to show that the trial court imposed the sentence as a penalty for exercising his right to a jury trial instead of pleading guilty; (2) the sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment because it did not involve the imposition of the harshest possible penalties for juveniles, it was proportionate, and there is no national consensus against imposing mandatory sentences on juveniles tried as adults; and (3) Defendant forfeited his argument that the mandatory sentencing scheme set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2929 violates due process as applied to children. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In State v. Aalim, __ N.E.3d __ (Aalim I), the Supreme Court declared that the Ohio Constitution requires that a juvenile who is subject to mandatory bindover receive an amenability hearing. Implicit in this holding was the conclusion that a juvenile-division judge has discretion in deciding whether to transfer to adult court a juvenile in a case where the juvenile is sixteen or seventeen years old and there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed an offense outlined in Ohio Rev. Code 2152.10(A)(2)(b). The Supreme Court then granted the State’s motion for reconsideration, holding that the decision in Aalim I usurped the General Assembly’s exclusive constitutional authority to define the jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas by impermissibly allowing a juvenile division judge discretion to veto the legislature’s grant of jurisdiction to the general division of a court of common pleas over a limited class of juvenile offenders. The court further held that the mandatory bindover of certain juvenile to adult court under Ohio Rev. Code 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b) does not violate the due course of law clause or the equal protection clause of the Ohio Constitution or the analogous provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. View "State v. Aalim" on Justia Law