Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Javante Scott appealed after the trial court, at a resentencing hearing, imposed the same 120-years-to-life term as at his original sentencing. Defendant was a minor at the time he committed his crimes, but was tried as an adult and convicted of three counts of attempted murder with firearm enhancements. Defendant argued the sentence was cruel and unusual because it imposed a de facto life sentence on him as a juvenile offender. The State argued that a new statute, Penal Code section 3051,1 which guaranteed defendant a future parole eligibility hearing, rendered the sentence constitutional. After review, the Court of Appeals held that section 3051 complied with the central constitutional requirement that the State provide a juvenile offender with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release within his or her expected lifetime. For this reason, the Court affirmed but with directions that the trial court determined whether defendant was afforded an adequate opportunity to make a record that complied with the requirements set forth in "California v. Franklin" (63 Cal.4th 261 (2016)). View "California v. Scott" on Justia Law

Similar to "Colorado v. Johnson," (2016 CO 69 (2016)), at issue in this case were questions involving what a trial court could order when a juvenile seeks a reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. Defendant Brooke Higgins was a juvenile respondent before a magistrate judge. The district attorney requested, and Higgins' then-defense-counsel agreed to, a state administered mental health assessment of Higgins. Because the parties agreed, the magistrate judge ordered the assessment. Later, in front of a trial court, the DA dismissed the juvenile charges against Higgins and charged her as an adult with two counts of conspiracy to commit murder. Higgins sought, and the trial court granted, a reverse-transfer hearing to determine whether she should remain in adult court. Before that hearing, Higgins, now represented by different counsel, filed a motion to suppress the mental health assessment and disqualify the trial court judge. The trial court denied both requests, holding that the parties stipulated to the assessment, and there was independent statutory authority for the magistrate judge to order the assessment. Higgins appealed, arguing the trial court lacked authority to order a juvenile-charged-as-an-adult to undergo a mental health assessment for a reverse-transfer hearing. The Supreme Court found that based on the facts of this case, Higgins' arguments, while loosely related to those in "Johnson," were hypothetical and premature. The Court therefore vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Higgins v. Colorado" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were questions involving what a trial court could order when a juvenile seeks a reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. The district attorney directly filed a criminal complaint against defendant Sienna Johnson in trial court, treating her as an adult and charging her with two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Defendant requested a reverse-transfer hearing, and the trial court granted her request. The State appealed, arguing that C.R.S. 19-2-517(3)(b)(VI) (the reverse-transfer statute) required a trial court to evaluate the petitioner's mental health. The DA requested access to defendant's mental health and psychological records and requested a court-ordered mental health assessment. Defendant responded that she should not have to produce the records because she had not waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege in her request for a reverse-transfer, and the statute did not give the trial court authority to order an assessment. The trial court ruled in favor of the DA on both counts. The Supreme Court concluded after review: (1) nothing in the reverse-transfer statute stated that a juvenile waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege by requesting a reverse-transfer hearing, so the trial court could not order her to produce her mental records; and (2) nothing in the statute gave the trial court explicit authority to order the mental health assessment. The case was therefore remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Minor admitted a violation of grand theft from the person of another, with a stipulated restitution of $20. Minor was ordered to the Correctional Academy for 12 months, consisting of six months of confinement and six months of aftercare under the supervision of probation. It was ordered that Minor could be returned to the Correctional Academy for a one-time remediation of 30 days at any time during the aftercare component due to a violation of probation or program rules. In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that the 30-day remediation violated the statutory protections afforded in the Welfare and Institutions Code as it permitted the probation officer to determine a violation of probation without notice to Minor and an opportunity to be heard. The court further held that it was impermissible for the juvenile court to impose a $50 “Facilities Assessment” pursuant to Government Code section 70372, subdivision (a). The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "In re Gabriel T." on Justia Law

The minor stabbed another young man in the abdomen during a brawl, using a folding pocket knife. The resulting injury required a five-day hospital stay. The minor was charged under Penal Code section 245(a)(1), assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm, and subdivision (a)(4), assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury. The juvenile court found true both violations, and enhancement allegations for personal use of a deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily injury. The minor was committed to the Youthful Offender Treatment Program for a maximum of nine years or until age 21. The court of appeal held that the minor cannot be found to have violated both section because the offense specified in subdivision (a)(4), assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury, is necessarily included within the offense specified in subdivision (a)(1), assault with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm. The court struck the deadly weapon use enhancement as an element of subdivision (a)(1) and directed the entry of a narrower electronic search condition and remanded for recalculation of the minor’s maximum term of confinement and restitution fine. View "In re Jonathan R." on Justia Law

In 2015, the legislature amended the juvenile transfer statute to increase the age of a child whose case was subject to an automatic transfer to the regular criminal docket by one year, to fifteen years old. Automatic transfer is required in cases involving children who have been charged with the commission of a class A or class B felony. At issue in this case was whether that amendment applied retroactively so that the case of a child, such as Defendant, who had been charged with committing a class A or class B felony prior to the amendment for crimes he committed when he was fourteen years old, and whose case had already been transferred to the regular criminal docket, should have his case transferred back to the juvenile docket. The trial court reserved this question of law for the advice of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the request and answered the question in the affirmative, concluding that the legislature intended that the amendment apply retroactively. View "State v. Nathaniel S." on Justia Law

Reyes, then 16, was convicted of the first-degree murder of Ventura and the attempted murders of two others, having discharged a firearm in the direction of a vehicle occupied by the three. Prosecuted as an adult, he received the mandatory minimum sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment for the murder conviction plus 26 years’ imprisonment for each of the two attempted murder convictions. The sentences were required to run consecutively, resulting in aggregate sentence of 97 years’ imprisonment. Under the truth in sentencing statute he was required to serve a minimum of 89 years before he would be eligible for release. In the appellate court, defendant cited Miller v. Alabama (2012), in which the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” The Court clarified that life-without-parole sentences must be based on judicial discretion rather than statutory mandates. The appellate court held that Miller applied only to actual sentences of life without the possibility of parole and not to aggregate consecutive sentences. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime has the same practical effect on a juvenile defendant’s life as would an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole—in either situation, the juvenile will die in prison. Miller makes clear that a juvenile may not be sentenced to a mandatory, unsurvivable prison term without first considering in mitigation his youth, immaturity, and potential for rehabilitation. View "People v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Defendant, 17 years old, committed a residential burglary. Defendant entered the youth rehabilitation center in April 2011 and was granted early release in September 2011, with good reports. A December 2011 review hearing concluded that defendant “has fully complied with the conditions of his probation” and was participating in the GED program, while working part time in a restaurant. As recommended by the probation department, the court ordered defendant’s parole “terminated successfully” and maintained his wardship. No further proceedings were held until January 2016, when defendant was 22. It was reported that defendant “perform[ed] well in the community.” Defendant had not paid restitution ($2,100 plus a $100 fine). Defense counsel cited Welfare & Institutions Code 786(c)(2): “An unfulfilled order or condition of restitution, including a restitution fine that can be converted to a civil judgment under Section 730.6 or an unpaid restitution fee shall not be deemed to constitute unsatisfactory completion of supervision or probation.” The prosecutor argued that the restitution order remained an “unfulfilled” probation condition, preventing a finding that probation was successfully completed. The court, believing it lacked authority to issue a civil judgment because defendant was over 21, terminated probation unsuccessfully. The court of appeal reversed. The court had the authority to enter a civil judgment; defendant agreed that a judgment should have been entered. View "In re J.G." on Justia Law

In 2007, Blackwell, then 17 years old, committed a burglary and attempted robbery with an accomplice and shot and killed Carreno in the course of those offenses. The district attorney elected to directly file the case in adult court under the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d). Blackwell was convicted in 2009 of first-degree murder with a robbery-murder special circumstance (Pen. Code 187(a), 189, 190.2(a)(17)(A)) and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). In 2013 the court of appeal remanded for resentencing pursuant to the constitutional standards announced by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, which held mandatory LWOP sentences for homicide amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment when imposed on a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of the offense. On remand, the trial court considered the factors outlined in Miller, and again imposed an LWOP sentence. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that it was unpersuaded that Blackwell’s LWOP sentence is disproportionate to his individual culpability and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in his particular case. View "People v. Blackwell" on Justia Law

C.H. shoplifted a pair of jeans and was arrested after a physical altercation with a loss prevention officer at Kohl’s Department Store. He was charged with second-degree robbery and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. The robbery and assault charges were dismissed after C.H. admitted to felony grand theft from a person. Later, voters passed Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act; section 1170.18 permits offenders adjudicated of felony grand theft to petition for redesignation of their crimes as misdemeanors. The court redesignated C.H.’s felony as a misdemeanor but denied his request to expunge his DNA sample. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting C.H.'s argument that misdemeanants are not required to provide a DNA sample for the state database and that he is no longer a felon. Proposition 47’s directive to treat a redesignated offense as a misdemeanor “for all purposes” employs words that have a well-defined meaning and have never applied to alter a crime’s original status. The provisions of Proposition 47 can be harmonized with the DNA collection law, Proposition 69. In any event, Proposition 69 controls as the more specific law. The underlying purpose of both measures to protect public safety. View "In re C.H." on Justia Law