Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

DeAngelo M. (Child) was thirteen years and eight days old when, during a custodial interrogation by three law enforcement officers, he made inculpatory statements regarding a burglary, which connected him to a murder. Had Child made his statements nine days earlier, his statements would not have been admissible against him in any delinquency proceedings. Had Child been fifteen years old at the time of his statement, his statement would have been admissible if the prosecution proved by a preponderance that Child’s statement was elicited after waiver of his constitutional and statutory rights. However, because Child was thirteen years old and his statement was given to a person in a position of authority, there was a rebuttable presumption that his statement was inadmissable. The Court of Appeals held that to rebut the presumption, the prosecution had to prove by clear and convincing evidence, through expert testimony, that “Child had the maturity and intelligence of an average fifteen-year-old child to understand his situation and the rights he possessed.” The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress because the prosecution did not meet this burden and remanded for a new trial. The State appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that Section 32A-2-14(F) required the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that at the time a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old child makes a statement, confession, or admission to a person in a position of authority, the child: (1) was warned of his constitutional and statutory rights; and (2) knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived each right. To prove the second element, the recording of the custodial interrogation which resulted in the statement, confession, or admission must prove clearly and convincingly that the child’s answer to open-ended questions demonstrated that the thirteen- or fourteen-year-old child had the maturity to understand each of his or her constitutional and statutory rights and the force of will to insist on exercising those rights. Expert testimony may assist the fact-finder in understanding the evidence or determining the facts, but it is not essential. The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence in this case did not prove that Child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived each right. Therefore, his statement should have been suppressed. View "New Mexico v. DeAngelo M." on Justia Law

Defendant Terrence Roberson was charged with armed robbery and attempted second-degree murder for offenses which allegedly occurred in 2012, when the defendant was sixteen years old. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Juvenile Court’s dismissal of defendant's case for expiration of the time period for adjudication provided in the Children’s Code prevented the District Attorney from later obtaining a grand jury indictment against defendant and bringing the case to District Court. In this case, the District Court quashed the defendant’s indictment on the basis of the Juvenile Court’s prior dismissal of the juvenile petition with prejudice. The Court of Appeal reversed the District Court’s grant of the motion to quash. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Louisiana v. Roberson" on Justia Law

Defendant was serving 35 years to life after a jury convicted him as an adult of attempted murder and other charges for robbing and shooting a woman in the face when he was 15 years old. In this appeal, defendant argued, the State conceded, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that a three-year enhancement for great bodily harm under Penal Code section 12022.71 was unauthorized and should have been stayed. This reduced his sentence to 32 years to life. Defendant also contended his overall sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because the sentencing court did not comply with the requirements in "Miller v. Alabama" (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)) and "California v. Caballero," (55 Cal.4th 262(2012)) that it consider his youth and consequent reduced culpability and impose a sentence reflecting these considerations. While the Court of Appeal recognized that considerations of defendant's youth did not, and by statute could not, play a major part in determining his sentence, the sentence passed constitutional muster because he “shall be eligible for release on parole by the board during his or her 25th year of incarceration at a youth offender parole hearing” pursuant to section 3051. View "California v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Malik, age 17, and others assaulted and robbed three women near the BART station. Malik had admitted a robbery in 2012, and was on probation with a condition that he submit to search without a warrant. The Alameda County District Attorney filed a notice of probation violation alleging that Malik committed three robberies and possessed eight baggies of marijuana. Malik admitted the violations. The court ordered him detained and continued previously ordered terms of probation. Over a defense objection, the court added: “you’re to—and the family—is to provide all passwords to any electronic devices including cell phones, computers and notepads within your custody and control, and submit to search of devices at any time .... And also provide any passwords to any social media sites, including [F]acebook, Instagram, ... with or without a warrant.” The signed order omitted references to Malik’s family and social media sites. The court of appeal modified the condition to omit reference to family and passwords to social media sites, and to authorize warrantless searches of electronic devices in Malik’s custody and control only after the device has been disabled from internet or cellular connection and without utilizing equipment designed to retrieve deleted information that is not readily accessible to users of the device. View "In re Malik J." on Justia Law

After a school counselor found a bag containing 30-45 orange pills, in Erica's purse, left in the counselor's office during a meeting, the counselor took one pill and called the police. The pill tested positive for amphetamine. A juvenile wardship petition (Welfare and Institutions Code 602(a)), alleged that Erica had possessed ecstasy (Health and Safety Code 11377(a)), a felony. The petition was amended to allege misdemeanor possession of ecstasy, which Erica admitted. The juvenile court adjudged Erica a ward of the court and placed her under the supervision of the probation office, with conditions, including that she submit to blood, breath, or urine tests to detect the presence of drugs and to searches of her vehicle, residence, or electronics. The court stated that “part of that search will include giving your passwords to your [probation officer.]” Erica’s counsel objected that the electronic search condition was overbroad, that there had not been any “issue with social media,” and that Erica did not have a cell phone. The court of appeal struck the condition as unreasonable because there was no evidence connecting an electronic device or social media usage to her offense or to a risk of future criminal conduct. View "In re Erica R." on Justia Law

The state filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Q.P. with obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)). Officer Irving testified that he responded to a report of a vehicle burglary in progress, arrived at the scene, and observed a person (Q.P.) matching the description given in the report. Irving placed him in the squad car. Q.P. stated his name was Antwan Ellis and offered to direct Irving to his residence. At the address given by Q.P., Irving spoke to a woman who stated she did not know anyone named Antwan. They approached the squad car and the woman stated she had dated Q.P.’s father and she knew him as Q. P.. Q.P. then gave his correct name, but misspelled both names. Irving transported Q.P. to the police station and discovered that Q.P. was a runaway. The circuit court found Q.P. guilty of obstructing justice. The appellate court reversed, holding that Q.P. was already apprehended when he gave false information, and a person already apprehended cannot act with the intent to prevent apprehension. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Q.P. gave false information shortly after he was placed in the squad car. At that point, Irving did not know about the juvenile warrant. Q.P. told a police detective that he gave the false name because he knew there was a warrant for his arrest. A rational trier of fact could have found Q.P. provided the false name with the intent to prevent his apprehension on the juvenile warrant. . View "In re Q.P." on Justia Law

Then 23-year-old Fiveash was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault, based on his sexual penetration of the vagina and mouth of his 6-year-old cousin, P.A., in 2003, when he was 14-15 years old. Fiveash was certified to teach grades 6 through 12 and had been teaching part-time at two schools. He moved to dismiss, arguing that the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-120) gave the juvenile court “exclusive jurisdiction” over offenses allegedly committed when he was 14, barring prosecution in criminal court, and that he could not be prosecuted in juvenile court because he was over 21. The trial court dismissed, finding the result “unjust, absurd, and clearly unfair to the victim.” The appellate court construed the language in section 5-120 as barring criminal proceedings only against defendants under the age of 21 for offenses they allegedly committed while under the age of 17. Because defendant was 23 when indicted, the court concluded section 5-120 did not apply, and reversed and remanded for trial in adult criminal court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Section 5-120 does not bar prosecution in criminal court for offenses allegedly committed when a defendant was 14 or 15 but not charged with until he was over 21 and not subject to the Act. View "People v. Fiveash" on Justia Law

Delinquent minor Albert W. timely appeals from an order committing him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). The minor was made a ward at age 12 based on his May 1, 2008, admission to second degree robbery, after which a petition alleging residential burglary and knowing receipt of stolen property was dismissed with the understanding those charges could be used at disposition. The minor was sent to live with his father in Louisiana under the supervision of the probation department. Two sustained Louisiana petitions followed, alleging simple burglary, simple criminal damage, and disturbing the peace. In Spring 2010, Louisiana authorities closed the minor's case and returned him to his mother in California. Throughout 2011 and 2012, the minor would have multiple run-ins with the law including threatening his mother with a sawed-off shotgun, more burglary charges, and taking a loaded firearm to school. At a dispositional hearing in 2013, the juvenile court committed the minor to DJF for up to five years. On appeal, the minor argued: (1) insufficient evidence supported the finding that he was competent; (2) the most recent sustained petition filed against him was a Louisiana petition that precluded a DJF commitment; (3) he was misadvised about the possible consequences of his admission; and (4) the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to the DJF. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the minor's commitment. View "In re Albert W." on Justia Law

J.T., a juvenile, was charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon for carrying a broken pistol in his waistband that was no longer capable of firing a round. J.T. was found delinquent. The Supreme Court vacated the finding of delinquency, holding (1) an inoperable pistol that is not used as a bludgeoning implement is not a “deadly weapon” for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 2923.12, which prohibits carrying a concealed weapon; and (2) therefore, there was insufficient evidence in this case to support J.T.’s finding of delinquency for carrying a concealed weapon. View "In re J.T." on Justia Law

The State appealed the magistrate court's dismissal of the State's motion for contempt brought against Luis Juarez for failing to make payments ordered in a juvenile proceeding. In 2002, Juarez admitted to committing an offense that would have been a misdemeanor if he had been an adult. Much time passed and the court entered several orders directing Juarez to pay fees and restitution in varying sums. Eventually, on October 6, 2005, the magistrate court entered its Amended Financial Judgment and Order directing Juarez to pay restitution. Juarez failed to pay, and would fail to appear twice, resulting in bench warrants for his arrest being issued both times. By the second time Juarez came before the magistrate judge, he was over 26-years old, and outside of the juvenile court's jurisdiction. The court reasoned that now that Juarez had been brought in for an adult felony charge, it could no longer hear the contempt proceedings for failing to pay restitution. The district court reasoned that contempt was not available to compel payment of a restitution obligation arising from a proceeding under the JCA because the magistrate court's jurisdiction was conveyed by operation of Idaho Code section 20-505 and withdrawn by operation of Idaho Code section 20-507. The Supreme Court reversed the district court, concluding: (1) the magistrate court had jurisdiction over a charge of misdemeanor contempt under Idaho Code section 18-1801 (and if the offender was under eighteen years of age at the time of the criminal contempt, and the juvenile court exercises its discretion to treat the offense under the JCA, then Idaho Code section 20-507 would operate to terminate the juvenile court's jurisdiction as the proceedings would arise out of the JCA); (2) based on the State's own affidavit, the alleged crime was committed more than four years before these proceedings were commenced; (3) although this action was processed as a criminal case, no complaint was ever filed; (4) despite the lack of a complaint and without a finding of probable cause, the magistrate court issued warrants which resulted in Juarez's arrest; (5) the court's written "Statement of Rights and Explanation of Procedures for Contempt of Court" erroneously advised Juarez that the State bore the burden of proving the contempt "by a preponderance of the evidence;" (6) the court erroneously advised Juarez of the potential penalties upon conviction for misdemeanor contempt (18-1801 did not prescribe the penalty for misdemeanor contempt); (7) the magistrate court did not appear to recognize that Juarez had a right to a jury trial for misdemeanor contempt; and (8) Juarez appeared before the court without counsel, and Juarez discussed his case with the prosecutor without a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision affirming the magistrate court's order dismissing the State's motions for contempt. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Juarez" on Justia Law