Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009, E.J.D. entered a plea of no contest to battery on juvenile detention officers. The court determined that the proceedings should be designated as an extended-jurisdiction juvenile prosecution and sentenced E.J.D. to a term in a juvenile correction facility and to an adult criminal sentence. The court stayed the adult criminal sentence on the condition that E.J.D. not violate the provisions of the juvenile sentence and on the condition that he not commit a new offense. The State subsequently moved to revoke the stay of execution of the adult sentence based on numerous disciplinary violations committed by E.J.D. Thereafter, E.J.D. moved for a lesser sentence and a durational departure from his sentence. The district court denied E.J.D.’s motion and ordered him committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutory scheme does not allow modification of an adult sentence after a determination that a juvenile has violated the terms and conditions of an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that the evidence supported the district court’s decision to revoke the stay of execution of the adult sentence. View "In re E.J.D." on Justia Law

In 2006, the Alameda County District Attorney filed a wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) alleging Keith, then age 15, took and drove a van owned by Thomas (Veh. Code, 10851(a)) and received, withheld, or concealed the stolen van (count two, Pen. Code, 496). The juvenile court determined the amount of restitution was $2,180 and amended count two to charge misdemeanor receiving stolen property. Keith admitted that charge in exchange for dismissal of count one. The court adjudged Keith a ward of the court, placed him on probation, and ordered him to pay the restitution. Keith did not appeal. Keith appeared at status hearings, but defaulted on his restitutionary debt. In 2011, Keith failed to appear. The court issued a warrant for his arrest “to expire on [Keith’s 21st birthday, in December 2011].” The warrant was never served. Keith did not appear at any subsequent hearings. In 2014 the court ruled that it had authority to issue an abstract of judgment permitting collection of Keith’s unpaid restitutionary debt. The court recalled the outstanding warrant, terminated Keith’s probation “unsatisfactorily,” dismissed his wardship, and issued an abstract of judgment requiring Keith to pay restitution. The court of appeal held that the court had authority to do so. View "In re Keith C." on Justia Law

In 1992, while he was still a minor, Appellant was adjudicated delinquent for committing the equivalent of an operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OVI) offense. Appellant was not represented by counsel during the adjudication. In 2011, Appellant was convicted of OVI offenses that became felonies under the enhancing provision of Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(d). The State added Appellant’s juvenile OVI adjudication to his four prior adult convictions to reach the “five or more” offenses threshold required to enhance his sentence under section 4511.19(G)(1)(d). Appellant moved to suppress the evidence of his juvenile adjudication, arguing that the adjudication violated his constitutional right to counsel. The trial court overruled the motion to suppress. Appellant was subsequently convicted of two counts and used Appellant’s 1992 juvenile adjudication as an OVI enhancement tool. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding that an adjudication of delinquency may not be used to enhance the penalty for a later offense under section 4511.19(G)(1)(d) when the adjudication carried the possibility of confinement, the adjudication was uncounseled, and there was no effective waiver of the right to counsel. View "State v. Bode" on Justia Law

In 1999, Willover was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, attempted premeditated murder, mayhem, and giving false information to a peace officer. The jury found true special circumstances and firearm enhancements. The trial court sentenced Willover, who was 17 years old at the time he committed the offenses, to two consecutive terms of life without possibility of parole (LWOP) for the murders and stayed the terms for the remaining counts and enhancements. The court of appeal modified the sentence for the attempted premeditated murder to life with the possibility of parole. In 2014, Willover filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that he is entitled to be resentenced because the trial court improperly presumed that LWOP was the appropriate sentence for the murders, in violation of Miller v. Alabama, in which the Supreme Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” The court of appeal vacated the sentence and remanded. The transcript of the sentencing hearing does not “clearly indicate” that the trial court would have reached the same result if it had applied the Miller factors. View "In re Willover" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree for the shooting of a fourteen-year-old. Defendant was seventeen years and five months old at the time of his arrest for the shooting. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress incriminating statements that he made to the police after waiving his Miranda rights, arguing that their introduction at trial was error given the common-law rule that, ordinarily, a juvenile must be given a meaningful opportunity to consult with an interested adult before waiving his Miranda rights, an opportunity he did not have. Several years after Defendant was convicted, the Legislature enacted St. 2013, ch. 2013 (2013 act), which amended various statutory provisions to treat seventeen year olds as juveniles. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the 2013 act did not affect this case because it is prospective in its application and does not modify the interested adult rule; but (2) the interest adult rule is now extended, on a prospective basis, to seventeen year old defendants. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

In this case, the Third District Court of Appeal read Graham v. Florida as creating a homicide-case exception to the categorical rule against sentencing a juvenile offender to life without parole for a nonhomicide crime. The court’s reading would permit a juvenile to be sentenced to life without parole for a nonhomicide offense if the juvenile also committed a homicide in the same criminal episode. Applying this homicide-case exception, the Third District held that Defendant’s life-without-parole sentences for certain nonhomicide offenses committed as a juvenile were constitutional under Graham because Defendant also committed a homicide in the same criminal episode. The Supreme Court quashed the Third District’s decision, holding that Graham’s categorical rule leaves no room for the homicide-case exception recognized by the state’s Second, Third, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal. Remanded with instructions that Lawton be resentenced for the nonhomicide offenses of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm and armed robbery with a firearm. View "Lawton v. State" on Justia Law

A Minnesota jury convicted Martin of first-degree murder, committed at age 17. Martin received a mandatory life sentence without possibility of release. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed and rejected a challenge to the jury’s composition under Batson. Martin filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. While it was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory life sentences without parole for defendants who commit homicide before age 18 violate the Eighth Amendment. Martin argued that Miller applied retroactively to him. The district court denied the petition. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Miller does not apply retroactively on collateral review. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not unreasonably determine that the trial court properly rejected Martin’s Batson challenge. View "Martin v. Symmes" on Justia Law

In August 2000, when Jimmy Williams, Jr. was 15 years old, he was convicted of murder made capital because it was committed during a robbery. In accordance with the applicable law at the time of Williams's sentencing, the trial court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the only possible sentence and one that was mandatory. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Williams's conviction and sentence. In June 2013, Williams petitioned the circuit court, asserting that under the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)), the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole to which he was sentenced in 2000 for an offense committed when he was 15 years old was unconstitutional and, consequently, that he was entitled to be resentenced based on the individualized sentencing factors discussed in Miller. The issue in this case presented for the Alabama Supreme Court's review was whether "Miller" applied retroactively to Williams' case. Because Miller did not categorically forbid a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a juvenile defendant and because Miller did not apply retroactively, Williams's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was legal. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in denying Williams the relief he requested. View "Ex parte Jimmy Williams, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Javante Scott appealed the sentence he received at a resentencing hearing, when the trial court imposed the same 120-years-to-life term as at his original sentencing. Defendant was tried as an adult and convicted of three counts of attempted murder with firearm enhancements. Defendant argued the sentence is cruel and unusual because it imposed a de facto life sentence on him as a juvenile offender. The State argued that a new statute, Penal Code section 3051,1 which guaranteed defendant a future parole eligibility hearing, rendered the sentence constitutional. After review, the Court of Appeal held that section 3051 complied with the central constitutional requirement that the State provide a juvenile offender with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release within his or her expected lifetime. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "California v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 1994, at age 14, Ruelas admitted committing felony assault with a deadly weapon and misdemeanor annoying or molesting a child. Three years later, while Ruelas was still a minor, the juvenile court found true allegations that he had committed three felonies: robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and vehicle theft and committed Ruelas to the California Youth Authority. Upon his release, Ruelas was required to register as a sex offender because of his section 647.6 adjudication. In 2012, Ruelas sought relief on equal protection grounds, arguing that mandatory sex offender registration for a juvenile who is adjudicated of violating Penal Code section 647.61 and committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities only after committing another offense, but not for a juvenile who is adjudicated of violating section 647.6 and never committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities, violated the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. The trial court rejected the argument. On rehearing, the court of appeal affirmed. Ruelas is not similarly situated for purposes of mandatory sex offender registration to juvenile violators of section 647.6 who were never committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities. View "Ruelas v. Superior Court.\" on Justia Law