Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was a juvenile charged as an adult with attempted first-degree murder with a deadly weapon. After the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Graham v. Florida, Petitioner filed a motion to have a bond set. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing (1) the Florida Constitution provides for pretrial release as a matter of right for a noncapital offense or an offense that does not carry the possibility of a life sentence, and (2) because Graham prohibits the State from sentencing him to life without an opportunity for parole, he was entitled to bond under the provisions of the State Constitution. The court of appeal denied the petition, concluding that Graham does not impact a juvenile defendant's entitlement to bond because the Florida Constitution considers only the classification of the offense, not a defendant's eventual sentence. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that juvenile offenders such as Petitioner were entitled to bond under the Florida Constitution because they cannot be charged with a crime punishable by life imprisonment under Florida's current statutory scheme and Graham. View "Treacy v. Lamberti" on Justia Law

While still a minor, appellant Marcus More was indicted on two counts of malice murder and other crimes relating to two fatal shootings. The State gave appellant notice of its intent to seek the death penalty and of the aggravating circumstance supporting the death penalty on which it intended to rely. A jury found appellant guilty on all charges, and rather than proceed to sentencing, he entered a negotiated plea agreement in which he agreed (inter alia) to waive his rights to appeal and all post-conviction review of his convictions and sentences. For that waiver, the State recommended (and the trial court accepted) a life sentence without the possibility of parole on one malice murder county, and consecutive sentences on the remaining counts. Four years after appellant received his sentence, the federal Supreme Court decided "Roper v. Simmons" (543 U.S. 551 (2005)). Based on that holding, appellant filed a motion to correct void sentence, claiming that Roper removed the death penalty as a sentencing option due to appellant's age. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding both that appellant waived his right to challenge his sentence and even if he had not waived the right, Roper did not apply so as to retroactively invalidate his sentence of life without parole. After its review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded: (1) appellant, despite signing the plea agreement, cannot, according to Georgia case law, "bargain away" the right to challenge an illegal and void sentence; (2) appellant's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was void as a sentence not allowed by law and the trial court's order denying the motion to correct void sentence was reversed.View "Moore v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was whether Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution applied to a restitution determination in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The youth-defendant in this case argued that he was entitled to a jury trial because recent constitutional and statutory amendments transformed the juvenile restitution statute, ORS 419C.450, into a civil device through which victims of crime could recover monetary damages for their injuries. The Supreme Court held that a restitution determination pursuant to ORS 419C.450 was not civil in nature and that Article I, section 17, therefore did not require a jury trial in the defendant's case. View "Oregon v. N. R. L." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on drug charges. His privately retained attorney appeared at the initial trial court hearing, during which a trial date was set. The trial did not proceed on that day. Defendant continued pro se at the next hearing and the subsequent trial date. Defendant was then assigned a public defender. The court set a hearing date for defendant’s motion to suppress. The public defender informed the court that she could not try the case, but did not formally request an adjournment for change of counsel. Defendant's new public defender was told that he was being transferred from the OPD’s juvenile unit to a new trial team and that he would serve as defendant’s trial counsel. The trial judge denied counsel's request for a continuance to allow counsel additional time for preparation. Defendant’s attorney spent ten to eleven hours preparing for trial, but had no contact with defendant. At issue in this appeal was the propriety of the trial court’s denial of a request for adjournment by a defendant who met his appointed counsel for the first time on the day of trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge’s denial of an adjournment did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to effective representation, was not an abuse of discretion, and did not violate principles of fundamental fairness.View "New Jersey v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2001, Respondent was found guilty of first-degree murder while committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct and first-degree premeditated murder. Respondent was a juvenile when he committed the crime. The district court sentenced Respondent to life without the possibility of release (LWOR) under the mandatory sentencing scheme in Minn. Stat. 609.106(2)(1). After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama in 2012, Respondent filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The postconviction court granted Respondent’s petition and resentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of release after thirty years. The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently issued its decision in Chambers v. State, which held that the Miller rule does not apply retroactively to a juvenile whose sentence of LWOR under section 609.106(2)(1) became final before the Miller rule was announced. Thereafter, in the instant case, the Supreme Court reversed the postconviction court’s order and reinstated the original sentence of LWOR, holding that the postconviction court’s legal conclusion was in direct conflict with Chambers, and the circumstances of this case did not warrant granting relief to Respondent under the Court’s supervisory powers to ensure the fair administration of justice. View "Roman Nose v. State" on Justia Law

A 14-year-old was the subject of a petition to have her adjudicated delinquent based on unlawful consumption of alcohol and other offenses. She pled guilty to the misdemeanor of unlawful consumption of alcohol in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges and was sentenced to 18 months of probation. Later that year, the state filed a petition to revoke her probation, claiming that drug testing revealed that she had consumed marijuana and cocaine. She was conveyed to a Department of Juvenile Justices facility. Her sentence has been served. Addressing the issue under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute does not permit a minor to be committed to the Department after being adjudicated delinquent for unlawful consumption of alcohol, being placed on probation with conditions, and then having that probation revoked for violation of those probation conditions. Sentencing for underage drinking is limited by a Juvenile Court Act provision stating that a minor may be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice “only if a term of incarceration is permitted by law for adults found guilty of the offense for which the minor was adjudicated delinquent.” Underage drinking is not an offense of which an adult may be guilty. The court rejected a claim that this juvenile could be incarcerated for having “violated a court order” by noncompliance with probation terms.View "In re Shelby R." on Justia Law

The State sought certiorari for review of a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals that reversed the Juvenile Court's decision to deny G.M.'s motion to suppress evidence that G.M. argued was obtained pursuant to an illegal search. The matter was one of first impression for the Supreme Court: whether evidence of a public-school student's association with an individual known to be involved in criminal activity and suspected of being affiliated with a gang, without more, constituted reasonable grounds for a search of the student by a school official under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court concluded that it did not. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment.View "G. M. v. Alabama " on Justia Law

Defendant, twelve years old at the time of the offense, appealed his conviction for sexually abusing his six year old cousin. The court concluded that the certification that the government filed in the district court met the requirements of 18 U.S.C. 5032 by certifying that "the juvenile court or the state does not have jurisdiction over the juvenile with respect to the alleged act of juvenile delinquency," even though it was missing a page and did not include a statement of the government's substantial federal interest in this case. Guided by the United States v. Kim factors, considering the totality of the circumstances of defendant's detention, and taking into account defendant's status as a juvenile, the court concluded that a reasonable person in defendant's position would not have felt free to terminate the questioning and leave the police station. Therefore, defendant was "in custody" during his interrogation by the detective. Defendant was never read his Miranda rights and his inculpatory statements during his interrogation by the detective must be suppressed. Defendant's younger brother, who was seven at the time of trial and five at the time of the offense, was competent to testify as a witness. The evidence at trial, including defendant's inculpatory statements, was not insufficient to support the conviction. The court reversed and remanded, however, because the inculpatory statements were obtained in violation of defendant's Miranda rights and should have been suppressed. View "United States v. IMM" on Justia Law

Robert Lee Colton Dietsch appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a twelve-year-old girl. Dietsch was seventeen at the time of the alleged assault. The State charged Dietsch as an adult. Dietsch moved to transfer prosecution from the district court to the youth court. The district court denied the motion. Dietsch later entered into a plea agreement whereby he agreed to plead guilt to one count of sexual assault in exchange for the State's agreement to drop a sexual consent without consent charge. Ultimately Dietsch received a deferred sentence of six years and sixty days. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Dietsch argued the district court abused its discretion in refusing to transfer his case to the youth court. The Supreme Court concluded sufficient evidence supported the district court's decision. However, the Court concluded the district court erred in its imposition of certain conditions on Dietsch, including setting an indeterminate amount for restitution, and failing to retain jurisdiction over the case until Dietsch reached age 21. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Montana v. Dietsch" on Justia Law

In 1990, defendant, then 14 years old, was arrested for two fatal shootings. Following a discretionary hearing under the Juvenile Court Act, the court allowed defendant to be prosecuted under the criminal laws. He was convicted of two first degree murders, attempted first degree murders of two others, and home invasion. Because defendant was convicted of murdering more than one victim, the Unified Code of Corrections, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c), required a term of natural life imprisonment, with parole not available. He was also sentenced to 30 years for each attempted murder and home invasion, all to run concurrently. The appellate court affirmed. In 1996-1998 defendant filed three post-conviction petitions. All were dismissed; the appellate court affirmed the dismissals. In 2002, defendant filed another petition, arguing that the natural life sentence was unconstitutional because defendant did not actually participate in the act of killing; that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment; and that the statute requiring a mandatory life sentence violated the Illinois Constitution as applied to a 14-year-old. The circuit court dismissed, noting that defendant carried a weapon and actually entered the abode where the murders occurred. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant another petition in 2011, arguing violation of the Eighth Amendment in light of the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision, Graham v. Florida, and ineffective assistance because counsel failed to interview an eyewitness before the juvenile hearing. The court denied the petition. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided in Miller v. Alabama (2012), that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” The appellate court concluded that Miller applies retroactively on post-conviction review and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, but upheld denial of the ineffective assistance claim. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. View "People v. Davis" on Justia Law