Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A minor child was adjudicated neglected and committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families in Connecticut. After her removal from her parents, the child was placed with licensed foster parents in Connecticut, with whom she developed a strong bond and thrived. Despite this, the Commissioner later proposed a permanency plan for the child to be adopted by her paternal grandparents, who lived in Florida, and sought court approval for the child’s out-of-state placement. The child’s attorney objected, emphasizing her attachment to her foster parents and arguing that a move would not be in her best interests.The Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, granted the Commissioner’s motion for out-of-state placement, finding it in the child’s best interests and reasoning that it would maintain her connection to her paternal family. The court’s subsequent articulation stated that the same facts supporting its best interests finding also established good cause for out-of-state placement. The child appealed, but the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in finding good cause under the statutory standard.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the Appellate Court erred by not recognizing a statutory presumption in favor of in-state placement under § 46b-129 (j) (4). The Supreme Court clarified that out-of-state placement requires the proponent to rebut this presumption by proving good cause, which must be established independently from the child’s best interests. The Court also held that the trial court did not properly apply this good cause standard, as it conflated it with the best interests analysis and failed to address relevant statutory considerations. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings applying the correct legal standard. View "In re Dynastie D." on Justia Law

An infant, K.B., was removed from her mother’s care after a police officer witnessed the mother acting abusively toward K.B. and expressing suicidal thoughts. The Baltimore County Department of Social Services filed a petition alleging K.B. was a child in need of assistance (CINA) due to abuse, neglect, and the mother’s history of mental health issues and prior terminations of parental rights. At the adjudication and disposition hearing, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County declared K.B. a CINA, committed her to the Department’s custody, and established supervised visitation. The court’s order included a standard notice that the permanency plan of reunification could later be changed.At a subsequent initial review hearing, the Department recommended changing K.B.’s presumptive plan of reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption. A magistrate adopted this recommendation, and the juvenile court overruled the mother’s exceptions, ordering the concurrent plan. The mother appealed. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, holding that the juvenile court had improperly established a permanency plan before the required permanency plan hearing and without considering the statutory factors or providing proper notice.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed whether the juvenile court could change the permanency plan at the initial review hearing. It held that the presumptive plan of reunification established at disposition is not a permanency plan as defined by Maryland law. The court ruled that a permanency plan must be determined at a hearing that complies with statutory requirements, including consideration of specific factors and provision of reasonable notice to all parties about the date, time, and purpose of the hearing. The court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the case for proper proceedings. View "In re: K.B." on Justia Law

A child, A.R.H., was born in November 2022 to Latisha H. and Redonn Malone. At birth, both the child and the mother tested positive for illegal drugs, and Malone was incarcerated on felony charges. As a result, the Jackson County Youth Court placed A.R.H. in the custody of Child Protection Services (CPS), appointed a guardian ad litem, and adjudicated the child as neglected. During subsequent hearings, the youth court found that Latisha was absent and that Malone’s paternity was confirmed. The court was presented with evidence of Malone’s extensive criminal history, including violent offenses, and his ongoing incarceration.The Jackson County Youth Court determined that Malone's criminal history constituted “aggravated circumstances” sufficient to bypass efforts to reunify the child with his father under Mississippi Code Section 43-21-603(7)(c). CPS recommended a service plan aiming for reunification, but the intake officer and guardian ad litem recommended bypassing reunification. The youth court ultimately ordered that reasonable efforts for reunification with Malone would not be required and moved toward termination of Malone’s parental rights. Malone appealed, arguing that the statute was misapplied because his criminal acts had not involved A.R.H. or any child. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the youth court’s decision, applying a deferential standard of review and concluding the court did not err in its findings or reliance on evidence.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo and concluded that Section 43-21-603(7)(c)(i) requires the parent to have subjected the child to aggravated circumstances. The Court held that because Malone had not subjected A.R.H. to his past criminal conduct, bypassing reunification on this basis was not supported by the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of both the youth court and the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Interest of A.R.H. v. Jackson County Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law

The case involved Christopher J., the natural father of three children, whose parental rights were challenged following their removal from his care in January 2021. This removal came after allegations by the children of physical abuse, exposure to domestic violence, and substance abuse. Prior to this, in 2016, a juvenile court case involving the family had resulted in the children being returned to Christopher’s care for five months before the subsequent removal. The children's mother had previously had her parental rights terminated and was not involved in this appeal.After the 2021 removal, the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County adjudicated the children under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a). Christopher appealed the adjudication, but the Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s decision in March 2022. Following adjudication, Christopher’s visitation with the children was initially permitted but later suspended pending a psychological evaluation. Despite attempts, visitation never resumed, due in part to Christopher’s lack of engagement with services and the therapists’ recommendations. In September 2023, the State filed to terminate Christopher’s parental rights, presenting evidence of neglect, failure of reunification efforts, prolonged out-of-home placement, aggravated circumstances, and the children’s best interests.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. It found clear and convincing evidence that the statutory basis for termination was satisfied, specifically that the children had been in out-of-home placement for 15 or more months of the most recent 22 months. The Court held that termination of Christopher’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children, citing his refusal to acknowledge past abuse and inability to rehabilitate. The Court rejected Christopher’s argument of improper delegation regarding visitation decisions, concluding no such delegation occurred. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. View "In re Interest of Bosileo D." on Justia Law

Stephanie Stephens and Demetrius Kovacs were involved in contentious family and juvenile court proceedings concerning custody of their two minor children. Following allegations of abuse and parental alienation, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) removed the children from both parents and initiated a dependency action. The juvenile court initially found the children dependent as to both parents, but after the children later admitted to being coached by Kovacs, the dependency was dismissed and the children were returned to Stephens.The Superior Court of Maricopa County dismissed Stephens’s wrongful institution of civil proceedings (WICP) claim against DCS and its employees under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding she failed to allege that the dependency action was initiated or maintained without probable cause, a required element of the claim. The court distinguished between the vacatur of the dependency finding and the initial determination of probable cause for removal, noting that the latter was never vacated. The court later denied Stephens’s motion for a new trial.The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Stephens had adequately alleged both absence of probable cause and malice, based on claims that DCS intentionally concealed material facts regarding parental alienation and coaching. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case de novo, vacated the appellate court’s decision, and affirmed the superior court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that prior adjudications in the removal and dependency proceedings—unless obtained by fraud, perjury, or corrupt means—establish probable cause as a matter of law. Stephens’s allegations did not plausibly indicate DCS knowingly presented false evidence or suppressed material facts. Therefore, she failed to state a viable WICP claim. View "STEPHENS v. STATE" on Justia Law

Three children were removed multiple times from the home of their parents, S.S. and T.C., due to concerns about drug use and domestic violence. Initially, two children were removed in 2018, and all three children were subsequently placed in and out of care between 2018 and 2023. After a guardianship arrangement expired in 2023, law enforcement again found evidence of drug use in S.S.’s home, leading to another removal of the children in early 2024. The children were placed in the care of the Mountrail McKenzie Human Service Zone (MMHSZ).The State petitioned in 2025 to terminate the parental rights of both S.S. and T.C. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District, found that the children were in need of protection and had been in care for the statutory number of nights required under North Dakota law. The juvenile court issued an order terminating S.S.’s parental rights. S.S. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court abused its discretion by not making a specific finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify him with his children.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that, under the relevant statutes, a specific finding on reasonable efforts to reunify is not required at the time of termination of parental rights when the statutory criteria of need for protection and number of nights in care are met. The court further concluded that the juvenile court’s findings demonstrated sufficient consideration of the efforts made by social services and that its decision to terminate S.S.’s parental rights was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination order. View "Interest of W.S." on Justia Law

Four children were removed from their parents’ custody after reports of exposure to domestic violence and methamphetamine use. Both parents tested positive for methamphetamine, and the father had a recent suicide attempt and a history of violent incidents, including an incident where he was charged with strangulation. The children had previously tested positive for methamphetamine and had been removed from the home in a prior proceeding but were later returned after the parents complied with treatment plans. Following the 2023 removal, the father was offered a court-approved treatment plan with requirements such as chemical dependency treatment, drug testing, mental health counseling, and stable housing and income. The father failed to meaningfully engage with the treatment plan for nearly a year, continued to use methamphetamine, and was inconsistent with drug testing and other requirements. Despite eventual partial compliance, concerns remained regarding his substance use, lack of protective capacity, and minimal progress addressing mental health issues.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court in Yellowstone County adjudicated the children as youths in need of care and approved the Department’s petitions for removal and temporary custody. The father stipulated to the treatment plan, but failed to comply with its requirements. The Department petitioned for termination of parental rights based on chronic abuse/neglect and failure to complete the treatment plan. Following a multi-day hearing, the District Court found the father’s unfitness was unlikely to change within a reasonable time, given his delayed engagement, ongoing substance use, and inability to protect the children from their mother’s influence.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Court held that the father waived his right to challenge the appropriateness of the treatment plan by failing to object to it when it was created. The Court found that substantial evidence supported termination under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, and the District Court was not required to consider guardianship before termination. View "Matter of A.J.C." on Justia Law

A petitioner sought temporary custody of her nephew, a Guatemalan-born minor, after he entered the United States and was released to her care by the Office of Refugee Resettlement. The petitioner, the child's maternal aunt, resided with him in Central Falls, Rhode Island. She was granted guardianship by the Central Falls Probate Court and then filed a petition with the Rhode Island Family Court for temporary custody and special findings of fact, which were necessary for her nephew’s Special Juvenile Immigration petition. The petition was filed before the child’s eighteenth birthday but was not heard until after he turned eighteen. The biological parents consented to the proceedings and did not oppose the petition.The case was first considered by a magistrate of the Family Court, who, after noting that the child had turned eighteen before the hearing, determined that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because its statutory authority extended only to persons under eighteen. The magistrate dismissed the petition and found that the court could not issue an order nunc pro tunc to the petition’s filing date. On appeal to the Chief Judge of the Family Court, the decision was upheld, with the Chief Judge concurring that the court lacked jurisdiction once the child was no longer a minor under Rhode Island law.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the appeal. The Court held that, under the statutory framework in effect at the time of the hearing, the Family Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the individual was no longer under eighteen years of age. The Court also rejected the petitioner’s arguments for nunc pro tunc relief and for retroactive application of a subsequent statutory amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s dismissal of the petition. View "In re DDH" on Justia Law

A mother’s parental rights were terminated after her child was born drug-affected, prompting the Department of Health and Human Services to seek a child protection order. The mother, struggling with opioid use disorder, spent significant periods in jail and various treatment facilities. Despite participating in an Adult Treatment and Recovery Court program, she experienced multiple relapses and did not complete her treatment programs. At the time of the termination hearing, she remained in treatment with no clear plan for when she could care for her child.The District Court (Springvale) conducted a hearing on the Department’s petition to terminate parental rights. The court received evidence that the mother had a long-standing substance use disorder and inconsistent participation in treatment. The guardian ad litem (GAL) assigned to the case did not meet several statutory obligations, including meeting the mother in person, observing visits, attending family meetings, and filing timely reports. Nevertheless, the court found the mother unfit based on statutory criteria and concluded that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother appealed, arguing that the court misunderstood addiction and that deficiencies in the GAL’s performance undermined the best interest determination.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case for clear error and abuse of discretion. The court held that the evidence supported a finding of parental unfitness under at least one statutory ground, and deficiencies in the GAL’s performance did not prevent the trial court from independently determining the child’s best interest. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to explicitly consider a permanency guardianship. Accordingly, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights. View "In re Child of Danielle H." on Justia Law

A child was removed from the care of their mother in Utah after the mother experienced a mental health crisis, leading to the Utah Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) taking protective custody of the child. The father, living in Georgia, sought custody. The juvenile court ordered DCFS to request a home study from Georgia officials via the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). Georgia attempted to conduct the home visit twice, but was unable to complete it because the father lacked a stable residence. The court found the child could not safely be returned to the father and ultimately terminated his parental rights.The Second District Juvenile Court in Weber County initially adjudicated the child dependent as to the mother and neglected as to the father due to abandonment, later revising the finding to dependency after the father argued he had been denied access by the mother. Despite the father's efforts to establish paternity and seek visitation, the court maintained the child in DCFS custody with a goal of reunification. After two failed ICPC home studies due to the father's unstable housing, the court changed the permanency goal to adoption and terminated reunification services. DCFS then filed to terminate the father’s parental rights, and after trial, the juvenile court issued an order terminating those rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case on certification from the Utah Court of Appeals. The father argued that his appointed counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the use of the ICPC process or proposing alternatives for the required home visit. The Supreme Court held that counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable under the Strickland standard, noting that the ICPC was commonly used in these circumstances and alternatives were impractical or unlikely to be accepted. The court affirmed the termination of the father’s parental rights. View "In re B.G." on Justia Law