Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Now four-year-old M.G. is fed through a G-tube due to his diagnoses of esophageal reflux, generalized intestinal dysmotility, and laryngomalacia. He is also eligible for Regional Center Services due to a developmental disability. Both parents are Regional Center consumers due to their developmental disabilities and are former foster children. During a medical appointment, the parents did not know M.G.’s feeding schedule and told the treating physician they were aggressive and hit each other. M.G. was temporarily placed in a medical foster home. DCFS filed a petition. The court found that the parents have violent altercations and mental and emotional problems and developmental delays rendering them incapable of caring for M.G., ordered M.G. removed from the custody of his parents, and ordered reunification services and monitored visitation for both parents. Ultimately, the court terminated their parental rights.The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court did not conduct a correct beneficial parent-child relationship analysis as set out by the California Supreme Court in “Caden C.” (2021) and instead considered factors Caden C. deems improper. Substantial evidence does not support the finding of “no bond.” The focus is not on whether M.G.’s parents can assume their parental roles but on whether M.G. will be harmed by the termination of the relationship. View "In re M.G." on Justia Law

Appellant the mother of six-year-old M.B., appealed the August 31, 2021 order terminating her parental rights, contending the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services failed to adequately investigate her claim of Indian ancestry through interviews with maternal relatives and the notices sent to the Blackfeet Tribe failed to include the birthdates of M.B.’s maternal grandfather and great-grandfather as required by federal regulations implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. Section 1901 et seq.) and related California law.   The Department argued that Appellant’s appeal of the adequacy of its investigation has been mooted by further interviews with maternal relatives and that any omission of required information from the ICWA-030 notices sent to the Blackfeet Tribe was harmless because its post-appeal investigation established ICWA notices were not required.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the May 13, 2021 order denying Appellant’s section 388 petition. However, the court conditionally affirmed the August 31, 2021 section 366.26 order terminating Appellant’s parental rights. The court explained that rather than attempt to moot Appellant’s appeal by belatedly conducting the investigation required by section 224.2, the Department’s proper course of action was to stipulate to a conditional reversal with directions for full compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related California law.   Further, the court wrote for its part, the juvenile court failed to ensure the Department adequately investigated M.B.’s Indian ancestry, far more is required than passively accepting the Department’s reports as fulfilling its statutory obligations. View "In re M.B." on Justia Law

Parents of the two children at issue in a juvenile dependency case repeatedly denied having any American Indian heritage. The social services agency spoke with several of the parents’ relatives but never asked those relatives whether the children had any American Indian heritage. Nearly 30 months into the proceedings and on appeal from the termination of her parental rights, the biological mother objected that the agency did not discharge its statutory duty to inquire whether her children might be “Indian children” within the meaning of the state’s broader version of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”).   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The court explained that there is no dispute that the agency did not properly discharge its statutory duty. However, the critical inquiry is whether the error was harmless and how harmlessness is to be assessed. The court offered a fourth rule: An agency’s failure to discharge its statutory duty of initial inquiry is harmless unless the record contains information suggesting a reason to believe that the children at issue may be “Indian child[ren],” in which case further inquiry may lead to a different ICWA finding by the juvenile court.   Here, the court held that the error was harmless, because the record contains the parents’ repeated denials of American Indian heritage, because the parents were raised by their biological relatives, and because there is nothing else in the record to suggest any reason to believe that the parents’ knowledge of their heritage is incorrect. View "In re Dezi C." on Justia Law

Santa Cruz County Human Services Department filed a juvenile dependency petition, Welfare & Institutions Code section 361(c), concerning an 11-year-old girl, then residing with her father. The whereabouts of her mother were unknown. It was alleged that father had physically abused the minor. The juvenile court ordered the minor detained, found the allegations of the petition true, and adjudged the minor a dependent of the court. Father received family reunification services for 17 months. The court found legal guardianship with the minor’s maternal grandparents to be the appropriate permanent plan, found that visitation of the minor by father would be detrimental, and ordered that father have no contact with the minor.After a contested six-month post-permanency review hearing in which the court heard testimony, it reaffirmed the detriment finding and denied visitation. Father renewed his request for visitation at the 12-month post-permanency review hearing. The juvenile court denied father’s request for a contested hearing, reaffirmed the detriment order, and denied his request for visitation. The court of appeal affirmed. Father, as the parent of a child where the permanent plan is legal guardianship, did not have an unqualified statutory right nor an unfettered due process right to a contested post-permanency review hearing. The juvenile court did not err in requiring him to make an offer of proof in support of his request for a hearing. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders pertaining to her children, citing the court’s findings that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. 1901) did not apply to the dependency proceedings. She argued that evidence of her children’s Native American ancestry triggered the duty under state law (Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2(e)) to further investigate whether her children come within the federal Act.The court of appeal vacated and remanded. The Department of Family and Children’s Services failed to comply with the statutory duty to further investigate whether the children are Indian children; the juvenile court’s negative ICWA findings were based on insufficient evidence. The social worker’s initial inquiry established a reason to believe the children are Indian children; both the mother and the maternal grandfather stated that “a maternal great grandfather may have Native American ancestry in Minnesota.” The court rejected an argument that further inquiry would be futile, and specifically that contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the State Department of Social Services would be an idle act. View "In re I.F." on Justia Law

Mother appealed an order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She argued that the Department of Children and Family Services and the court failed to comply with Code section 224.2 by inquiring whether her child is or might be an Indian child within the meaning of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Mother had “denied Native American ancestry for the family.”The court of appeal affirmed, finding any error harmless. The maternal grandmother is the only person Mother identified as a person who should have been asked about Indian ancestry; she had expressed her desire to adopt the child and to have the child placed with her. Under ICWA, when an Indian child is the subject of foster care or adoptive placement proceedings, “preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with .. a member of the Indian child’s extended family,” 25 U.S.C. 1915(a), (b). Maternal grandmother, Mother’s counsel, and the child.’s counsel, each of whom requested placement with the maternal grandmother, would have had a strong incentive to bring to the court’s attention any facts that suggest that she is an Indian child. Their failure to do so implies that the maternal grandmother is unaware of such facts. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

Maria appealed the termination of her parental rights over her three children, who all have the same father, arguing that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to interview her extended family members about their Indian ancestry. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. 1901, gives Indian tribes concurrent jurisdiction over state court child custody proceedings that involve Indian children living off of a reservation; where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian community. California Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2 lists requirements to effectuate the Act’s policies. The court of appeal affirmed. The record does not support Maria’s argument that readily obtainable information would have shed meaningful light on whether the children are Indian children. There was a prior juvenile court finding that two of Maria’s children are not Indian children, the juvenile court asked Maria, the father, and paternal aunt about Indian ancestry, both parents eschewed Indian ancestry, and Maria was living with extended family members whom she could have asked about potential Indian ancestry. It was unlikely that any further inquiry of family members would have yielded information about Indian ancestry. View "In re Darian R." on Justia Law

The juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3002 petition that alleged the mother (S.V.) had brandished a knife and pushed a female companion in the now-three-year-old child’s presence.A social worker inquired of S.V. about the child’s Indian ancestry; she did not give the social worker any reason to believe the child was or might be an Indian child. In preparing the detention report, a social worker interviewed the child’s maternal great-grandmother and maternal great-grandfather. It is not clear whether the social worker asked any relatives about the child’s Indian ancestry. S.V. filed a form stating that she did not have any Indian ancestry as far as she knew. If that changed, S.V. was to inform the court and the social worker. The juvenile court then inquired whether S.V. knew if alleged the father had Indian ancestry. She indicated that he did not have Indian ancestry. The court found it had no reason to know that the alleged father had Indian ancestry; his whereabouts were unknown.The court of appeal remanded. The first-step inquiry duty under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1903(2), requires the Department to interview, among others, extended family members and others who had an interest in the child. View "In re H.V." on Justia Law

Eight-year-old Katherine was in dependency court for five years while her parents struggled with significant ongoing issues of domestic violence and substance abuse. Following multiple failed efforts at reunification, the juvenile court terminated services and the parental rights of both parents rejecting her father’s claim of a “beneficial parental relationship” (Welfare and Institutions Code 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i)). While recognizing that he had maintained regular visitation, the juvenile court concluded that these visits created only an “incidental benefit” to Katherine, while his ongoing instability had caused additional instability and trauma.The court of appeal affirmed, noting that the father had previously concealed a crash caused by driving under the influence and then refused to implement protective measures for Katherine’s benefit. He refused to move out of his parents’ home, which resulted in a series of abrupt changes in Katherine’s placement. He physically assaulted his mother, in the presence of Katherine, resulting in multiple facial injuries requiring medical assistance, which he concealed and downplayed. Katherine had confided at times she feared her father and did not want to speak to him. The negative impact of the father’s unresolved issues on Katherine was antithetical to the kind of beneficial parental relationship required by section 366.26. View "In re Katherine J." on Justia Law

After the juvenile court removed her from her parents at eight weeks old, Abigail lived with Heather for almost two years. The juvenile court declared Abigail a dependent child of the court and denied her parents family reunification services. Abigail had a 12-year-old half-sister, Anahi, who was also a dependent of the juvenile court. Heather let Anahi move in with her and Abigail. The relationship deteriorated. Anahi and Heather made allegations against each other. Anahi was ultimately placed with her aunt and uncle in Arizona. Heather filed a request for de facto parent status with respect to Abigail. The Department would not recommend Heather as the prospective adoptive parent of Abigail and notified Heather it intended to place Abigail with Anahi in Arizona. The court placed Abigail on an extended visit with Anahi in Arizona, denied Heather’s request for de facto parent status, and described her motion as “moot.” Abigail has been placed with Anahi’s relatives in Arizona since November 2020.The court of appeal reversed. Heather’s request was not moot and she did not receive proper notice of the hearing. She retains a limited interest in “the companionship, care, custody and management” of Abigail, which was not extinguished when the juvenile court placed Abigail with Anahi’s relatives. View "In re Abigail L." on Justia Law