Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Alameda County Social Services recommended termination of the parental rights of Mother so that her son, Christian, could be adopted by Christian’s paternal grandmother and her husband, who live in Denmark. The juvenile court agreed, selecting adoption as the permanent plan, and ordered a case plan calling for Christian to undergo weekly therapy. Because of delays and scheduling issues, Christian attended fewer sessions than planned. In the meantime, his grandparents visited Christian several times in the U.S. Christian was upset when his visits with his mother were suspended and he was informed that he would be moving to Denmark. At a post-permanency review hearing, Christian’s counsel argued that Christian needed additional services to prepare for the move and that a planned trip should be delayed; the court nonetheless approved an extended trip to Denmark, while agreeing that Christian would benefit from additional therapy. In the meantime, the court of appeal reversed the order terminating parental rights because Mother had met her burden of establishing the beneficial-relationship exception to adoption. The court of appeal then concluded that approving the trip was proper under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3(g) to protect Christian’s stability and to facilitate and expedite his adoption. View "In re Christian K." on Justia Law

K.S. was detained by the San Francisco Human Services Agency shortly after her birth in January 2017, due to a referral indicating that mother had tested positive for methamphetamines during a recent prenatal visit. The dependency petition cited mother’s long history of substance abuse for which she failed to receive treatment; the termination of mother’s parental rights with respect to four older children based on her untreated polysubstance abuse; the parents’ history of domestic violence; father’s history of substance abuse, for which he failed to seek treatment until June 2017; and the termination of father’s parental rights to three other children. Mother and father challenged the juvenile court order denying them reunification services with respect to K.S., their only child in common, and setting a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Under section 361.5(b)(10) and (b)(11), reunification services need not be offered to a parent if the court has previously terminated reunification services or parental rights with respect to a sibling or half-sibling of the child and the parent “has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal.” The court of appeal affirmed; the record sufficiently supports the juvenile court's determinations and declining to apply a “best interests” analysis. View "Jennifer S. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The juvenile court is statutorily required to appoint counsel for the parent of a child who is in an out-of-home placement if the parent is presently financially unable to afford and cannot for that reason employ counsel unless the court finds that the parent has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court's error in failing to timely appoint counsel for mother in a Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 hearing resulted in a miscarriage of justice. In this case, mother was without representation for more than two years, the child resided primarily in a group home during that time, and she had requested reappointment of counsel. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to the juvenile court with directions. View "In re J.P." on Justia Law

Father lived the child and her mother, outside of Maine, until 2008, when the child was about six months old. After that time, he maintained regular contact with the child, who resided primarily in New York, but was never her primary caregiver. In 2016 Mother moved to Maine with the child. Father, who is incarcerated in Massachusetts, did not oppose the move. While he was incarcerated the child asked a neighbor for help and the Maine Department of Health and Human Services commenced a child protection proceeding. Father made no effort to take responsibility. The Department obtained a preliminary protection order, 22 M.R.S. 4032-4036, and placed the child in foster care after hospitalization for psychiatric care. Father was served with notice and provided with appointed counsel, who moved to dismiss the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction because Father is not a Maine resident, has never traveled to Maine,and otherwise lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Maine. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the court’s rejection of that motion. The court was not required to have jurisdiction over Father to have authority to issue a jeopardy order to protect the child. View "In re Emma B." on Justia Law

Under Indiana Code section 31-25-2-5, no family case manager at the Indiana Department of Child Services can oversee more than 17 children at a time who are receiving services. The statute does not require the Department to perform any specific, ministerial acts for achieving that number. Price, a family case manager, filed a proposed class action. She alleged that her caseload was 43 children and sought an “order mandating or enjoining [D]efendants to take all necessary steps to comply with [Section 5].” The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Price’s claim prior to class certification. Judicial mandate is an extraordinary remedy—available only when the law imposes a clear duty upon a defendant to perform a specific, ministerial act and the plaintiff is clearly entitled to that relief. The statute at issue does not impose a specific, ministerial duty. View "Price v. Indiana Department of Child Services; Director of Indiana Department of Child Services" on Justia Law

The first clause of Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 300(b)(1) authorizes a juvenile court to exercise dependency jurisdiction over a child without a finding that a parent is at fault or blameworthy for her failure or inability to supervise or protect her child. The court of appeal also concluded that section 300(b)(1)’s first clause does not require such a finding. In this case, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition to declare then seventeen-year-old R.T. a dependent of the juvenile court on the ground that she faced a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness as a result of Mother’s failure or inability adequately to supervise or protect her. The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over R.T. The court of appeal affirmed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a child’s behavior places her at substantial risk of serious physical harm and a parent is unable to protect or supervise that child, the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction is authorized under section 300(b)(1). View "In re R.T." on Justia Law

The Mendocino County Department of Social Services filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 petition concerning three minors, alleging their mother was unable to care for them, and that Father’s whereabouts were unknown. Mother and Minors were enrolled members of the Hopland Band of Pomo Indians. The case was governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901). The Department located Father in a Florida jail. He requested services. Father was released and submitted evidence that, while incarcerated, Father had completed substance abuse classes and a dog training program. The court sustained an allegation that Father “has a pattern of criminal behaviors that includes a drug-related arrest and conviction in 2014 that severely impairs his ability to care for” his children. He had not seen Minors in more than five years nor spoken to them in two years. At a six-month hearing, Father argued reasonable services were not provided, citing a delay in creating Father’s case plan and failure to provide drug testing or regular phone visitation. The court found reasonable services had been provided; that Father had not complied; and the Department made active efforts to prevent the Indian family's breakup. The court ordered continued services with weekly telephone visits. The court of appeals reversed, finding that, although the likelihood of reunification may be low, the Department was obliged to provide services, regardless of Father’s out-of-state location View "In re T.W." on Justia Law

N.S. was placed in foster care at age 11. After she turned 18 in 2014, she remained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a nonminor dependent. (Welf. & Inst. Code 11400(v)), having been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and depressive disorder. She was participating in therapy and taking medication. The report indicated that N.S. would be enrolled in an educational program. A 2015 report indicated that N.S. qualified for extended foster care because her mental health, prevented her from participating in education or an employment program. In 2016, the Agency recommended that N.S.’s dependency be dismissed because her exact whereabouts were unknown and she had not participated in any services. N.S. had admitted she was using methamphetamine. She was not interested in treatment referrals or placement. She was meeting with her therapist, Chan, sporadically. At the contested hearing, both N.S. and Chan testified. Counsel asked Chan about N.S.’s diagnosis; she and N.S. asserted the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The juvenile court concluded the privilege did not apply because N.S. had put her mental state at issue. The court of appeal disagreed, rejecting an argument that the Agency and the court will be unable to verify the eligibility requirement without information from Chan. It is the Agency’s position that it is N.S.’s substance abuse, and not her mental health condition, that prevents her from meeting the criteria. View "N.S. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Kentucky’s Health and Family Services commenced a Dependency, Neglect, and Abuse proceeding. The mother stipulated to neglecting her children. Kentucky placed both boys in foster care. R.O., the mother’s aunt, sought custody of the children. The state conducted a standard home evaluation and criminal background check on R.O. and eventually both children were placed in her home by court order. The family court closed the action and granted joint custody to the mother and R.O., though the boys remained living with R.O., who sought foster care maintenance payments. The family court declined to rule on the issue, “indicating that permanency had been achieved.” R.O. then sued the state, arguing that the federal Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. 672(a), required the state to provide maintenance payments, and that the failure to make payments violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The state removed the case to federal court. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the Child Welfare Act provides no privately enforceable rights, that the family lacked a property interest in the payments, and that Kentucky’s scheme rationally distinguished between relative and non-relative foster care providers. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the Act creates a private right of action. View "D.O. v. Glisson" on Justia Law

Mother‘s childhood was marked by abuse and neglect. When she was 13 years old she began an abusive relationship with Carl, a 20-year-old dropout. Their child, Carl Jr., was born when Mother was 14. While still a minor, Mother left Carl, started a relationship with Kevin, and gave birth to Harmony in 2012 and Melody in 2013. The family, including both fathers, had at least 13 referrals for physical and emotional abuse and neglect before Melody died in 2015, as a result of acute methadone toxicity. The Agency filed petitions on behalf of the surviving children, alleging failure to protect because: parents allowed them to live in a home where dangerous medications were within easy access despite Carl Jr.‘s earlier methadone poisoning; Mother failed to adequately supervise the children by frequently leaving them with Grandmother or Carl Sr. despite earlier incidents and warnings from the Agency; and Kevin was living in a residential facility. The court found that Mother‘s neglect contributed to Melody's death and that there was no clear and convincing evidence that reunification services were in the children’s best interest. The court of appeal upheld the court‘s jurisdictional findings and the bypass of services to Mother, but reversed the dismissal of Carl Jr.‘s dependency case. View "In re Carl H." on Justia Law