Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The minor, then three years old, became the subject of a dependency petition after his stepfather, Donald, assaulted his mother, in the minor’s presence. The minor’s paternity was the subject of separate family court proceedings filed by Michael and Joel, the minor’s biological father. Michael is the man with whom mother was living at the time of the minor’s birth. The family court ruled that both Michael and Joel qualify as presumed parents under Family Code section 7612(c), which authorizes multiple presumed parents. When the juvenile court inquired into the minor’s paternity, all three men sought to be declared presumed parents. Michael and Joel based their claims on the family court’s order, while Donald argued that he had served as the minor’s father for 20 months before his assault on mother. Considering itself bound by the family court’s order, the juvenile court found all three to be presumed parents. The court of appeal concluded that the juvenile court erred in finding Michael to be a presumed parent; section 316.2 grants exclusive jurisdiction over paternity issues to the juvenile court upon the filing of a dependency petition. The court upheld the designation of Donald as a presumed parent, as supported by substantial evidence. View "In re Alexander P." on Justia Law

The Del Norte County Department of Health and Human Services received a referral after police searched Mother’s residence and found mushrooms, meth pipes, marijuana paraphernalia, concentrated cannabis, brass knuckles and butterfly knives. It appeared the occupants were hoarders. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, benzodiazepines, and marijuana. Her children (ages five and 11) were removed from her custody. The court ordered parenting education, random drug screening, substance abuse assessment and any recommended treatment, with supervised visitation. In subsequent reports, the Department noted that, despite her admitted daily marijuana and occasional methamphetamine use, Mother denied she had a substance abuse problem and had not “involved herself in any of the services” offered. After mother accepted a plea bargain, the Department recommended that services be terminated. None of the hearing participants knew how long mother would be incarcerated, or what prison programs would be available. The court concluded that there was an “extremely low” likelihood of reunification, and ordered services terminated. The court of appeal reversed. Mother was statutorily entitled to 12 months of services, which could be shortened only under circumstances described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 61.5,(a)(2). The juvenile court did not terminate services in accordance with those provisions. View "M.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A 14-year-old ran away from her mother’s home. Mother asked that she be taken into the custody of Child Protective Services, stating a need for therapy for herself, minor, and her younger daughter. The court ordered reunification services for “the child and to the mother.” At the six-month review the agency recommended that minor remain in out-of-home placement. Minor wanted to return home and participate in therapy. The agency and mother were concerned about minor’s previous molestation of her younger sister. The court ordered reunification services continued. At the 12-month review, the agency recommended and the court ordered that minor remain in out-of-home placement and reunification services be continued. Sister’s treating psychiatrist had recommended that visits between minor and her sister be suspended. At the 18-month review, the agency recommended that minor remain in out-of- home placement and that reunification services be terminated because her sister continued to be “triggered” by minor. The court expressed concern about failure to provide services specifically targeted at resolving the impediment to reunification, minor’s sexual abuse of her sister, and ordered services continued up to 24 months. The court of appeal affirmed. Although significant services were provided, they were not tailored to the family’s particular needs arising out of the unique circumstances. Amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 361.5 and 366.221 did not restrict the court’s section 352 authority to extend reunification services to 24 months upon a showing of good cause. View "In re J.E." on Justia Law

Father appealed the juvenile court's order on his petition under Welf. & Inst. Code 388 giving his minor son sole discretion whether Father will have visits with him. The court concluded that where, as here, the juvenile court has not ordered reunification services because, under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(1) and (d), the parent’s whereabouts were unknown for more than six months after the child’s out-of home placement, the parent has no right to visitation. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the juvenile court may order visitation in the exercise of its discretion under section 362, subdivision (a), on a finding that such visitation will serve and protect the child’s best interests. But, as is the rule when visitation is ordered as part of a reunification plan, the court concluded that the juvenile court cannot give the child sole discretion to determine whether such visitation will occur. Rather, once the juvenile court determines that visitation is in the child’s best interests, the juvenile court must, as part of its duty to protect and serve those interests, ensure that such visitation occurs under terms set by the juvenile court. Otherwise, the court concluded that, by placing sole discretion whether visitation will occur in the hands of the child, the juvenile court will have ceded to the child the determination whether visitation is in the child’s best interests. Accordingly, the court reversed the order and remanded for reconsideration. View "In re Korbin Z." on Justia Law

After his stepfather, Donald, assaulted his mother, Heidi, in Alexander’s presence, Alexander, then three years old, became the subject of a dependency petition. At the time, Donald, Alexander’s biological father, Joel, and Michael, the man with whom Heidi was living at the time of Alexander’s birth, had competing motions pending. Two weeks after the dependency petition was filed, the family court ruled that both Michael and Joel qualified as presumed parents and designated both under Family Code section 7612(c), which authorizes multiple presumed parents. Considering itself bound by that order, the juvenile court found both Michael and Joel to be presumed parents, but subsequently denied Michael visitation. The court found that Donald also satisfied the requirements for presumed parent status and designated him as such. The court of appeal held that the juvenile court erred in finding Michael to be a presumed parent. Because Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2 grants exclusive jurisdiction over paternity issues to the juvenile court upon the filing of a dependency petition, the family court order on which the juvenile court relied, issued subsequent to the filing, was void. The court found no error in the designation of Donald as a presumed parent, which was supported by substantial evidence. View "In re Alexander P." on Justia Law

A daughter was born to Carey and Knight in 2010. The child was hospitalized with a serious illness when she was about a month old. Knight ended his relationship with Carey and removed himself from his daughter’s life. Carey moved into Kilborn’s home when the child was two months old; they married weeks later, including an informal “adoption” ceremony. They held the child out as Kilborn’s “adopted” daughter. Kilbourn actively participated in the child’s life, including providing day-to-day care. The couple discussed formal adoption, but he understood that Knight was unwilling or unable to consent. Kilborn and Carey had two children together. The children were raised as full siblings.Carey’s daughter refers to Kilborn as “daddy.” Kilborn's parents have acted as grandparents to all three children. In 2014, Kilborn sought a divorce and requested that he be declared the de facto father of Carey’s daughter. Carey opposed Kilborn’s request and denied him access to the child, though he had visitation with his biological children. She attempted to reintroduce Knight into the child’s life. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child’s life would be substantially and negatively affected by Kilborn’s absence and that Kilborn had satisfied his burden of showing that he is the child’s de facto parent. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, noting that the Maine Parentage Act, 19-A M.R.S. 1831-1938, will soon take effect and mirrors precedent. View "Kilborn v. Carey" on Justia Law

The father of Woodard’s child died seven months after the child’s birth. There is no evidence that Woodard is an unfit parent. Dorr, the mother of the deceased father, sought court-ordered visitation with Woodard’s child, alleging a sufficient existing relationship between herself and the child, or, in the alternative, that she had made a sufficient effort to establish a relationship, 19-A M.R.S. 1803(1)(B), (C). Before the child’s birth, Dorr attended a baby shower. Dorr was in the hospital on the evening that the child was born—September 3, 2012. Dorr had additional, unspecified contact with the child until Dorr’s son died and Woodard ceased contact with Dorr. Mediation was unsuccessful. Woodard moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Act infringes on her fundamental right to govern the care, custody, and control of her child, and is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied. The court dismissed Dorr’s petition, finding that the affidavit did not establish a sufficient existing relationship with the child or a sufficient effort to establish such a relationship, and did not make an initial showing of “urgent reasons” that would justify infringement on the mother’s rights. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, finding that Dorr lacked standing, given the lack of “urgent reasons.” View "Dorr v. Woodard" on Justia Law

In 2014, Hailey’s mother petitioned the Cumberland County Probate Court for Hailey’s paternal grandparents to be appointed as guardians so that Hailey could attend school in Freeport. She withdrew the petition weeks later, stating that the arrangement was “for an educational purpose that [was] no longer needed.” .Weeks later, the grandparents petitioned to have themselves appointed as guardians of the child, stating that the child needed a safe and supportive environment and had threatened to run away from her mother’s house. The child began to live with her grandparents in January 2015. The child’s father consented to the guardianship, but her mother did not. The court heard testimony from the child, then 15 years old; her parents; and a clinician who had provided treatment services to the child and her mother, and entered a judgment finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother had created a living situation that was at least temporarily intolerable for the child and that a guardianship with the grandparents was in the child’s best interest; mother had shown an inability to meet the child’s needs that threatened the child. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting challenges to the court’s findings and to the award of a full, rather than limited, guardianship, with no arrangement for transition back to mother’s home. View "Guardianship of Hailey M." on Justia Law

B.V.G., a young woman with intellectual disabilities, has been in the sole custody of her father for many years. He was named her temporary guardian when B.V.G. reached age 18. Her maternal grandfather sought to intervene in B.V.G.'s father's permanent guardianship proceedings, asserting that his relationship with B.V.G. has been restricted by her father, that B.V.G. has indicated expressly her desire to communicate with him and has sought contact with him via social media, and that such a relationship is in B.V.G.'s best interests. Concluding that the grandfather lacked standing because he was not an "interested person" within the meaning of G.L. 190B, 5-306(c), a judge denied the motion. The Appeals Court affirmed the denial, on different grounds. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, first holding that the grandfather had standing. The statute is intended to provide a means by which an individual interested in the welfare of an incapacitated person can advocate on behalf of that person and the Massachusetts implementation of the Uniform Probate Code encourages a broad right of advocacy in favor of an incapacitated person's protected interest in a limited guardianship. Once a judge has concluded that a proposed intervener is an "interested person," nothing more is required to establish that person's entitlement to intervene. View "Guardianship of B.V.G." on Justia Law

When Mother was about one-month pregnant, she and N.S.’s father were arrested for illegally growing and possessing marijuana for sale in their Hayward home. About two weeks after N.S. was born, they were again arrested for possessing marijuana for sale in their home. The Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a dependency petition alleging that N.S. faced a substantial risk of harm (Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)). N.S. was placed with a maternal relative who lived in a two-unit building in Union City. Mother moved into the other unit. Visits between Mother and N.S. went well. Mother regularly attended a support group, participated in therapy, repeatedly tested negative for drugs, had no contact with Father, and moved out of the Hayward home, listing it for sale. N.S. had no medical issues and was not alleged to have suffered any physical harm in her parents’ care. The Agency nonetheless recommended that the juvenile court take jurisdiction because Mother had been arrested twice for serious charges. The court sustained the dependency petition, concluding that there was a current risk of harm. While appeal was pending, the juvenile court dismissed dependency jurisdiction, awarding custody to Mother, with supervised visits for Father. The court of appeal dismissed an appeal, noting that Mother suffered no harm as a result of the jurisdictional findings below. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law