Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Four children were referred to the Mendocino County Human Services Agency, based on neglect. Their mother, who had a substance abuse problem, disappeared for days and left the children with their maternal uncle, Rafael, who was unable to provide adequately for their needs due to disabilities. The Agency had received seven prior referrals for mother and her children, members of the Cloverdale Rancheria of Pomo Indians. The Agency contacted Cloverdale's Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901, who stated that Cloverdale Rancheria opposed placement with Rafael. Mother was eventually arrested; the children were taken into protective custody. Rafael indicated that he loved the children and had provided care since they were born. Social workers helped him apply for relative placement. No Indian homes were available. Mother initially requested that Rafael be considered for placement. The children, who were found to have multiple developmental, physical, and emotional problems, were ordered into long-term foster care. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Rafael’s claims that he was not given mandatory ICWA notices as an Indian custodian; that active efforts were not provided to prevent the breakup of the Indian family; that the detriment finding was defective; and that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the juvenile court failed to promptly investigate his Indian custodian status, any errors were harmless, given that mother revoked the custodianship. View "In re E.R." on Justia Law

A social services agency removed a toddler from his parents’ custody when his mother ran out of medication and experienced a relapse of schizophrenic episodes that involved violent hallucinations of harming their child. The agency was concerned that father was in denial about the gravity of mother’s illness. The law requires a court to decide, at six months, whether a parent has been offered “reasonable services" to aid in overcoming the problems that led to the removal, Welfare and Institutions Code 366.21(e). The agency apparently did not try to diagnose the mother as part of a case plan or help the parents more effectively manage her medication. The agency got court approval for psychiatric examinations, not in order to facilitate reunification services, but to potentially bypass reunification. Mother had a treating psychiatrist, but that individual was not called as a witness. Her social worker did not know if mother was on the right medication; there was no evidence the agency offered services to improve mother’s ability to take her medication as prescribed. The court of appeal reversed the six-month order terminating reunification services and setting a hearing to establish a permanent plan for adoption. No substantial evidence supported findings that adequate reunification services were provided to either parent. View "Patricia W. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

K.S. was removed from an abusive home at age four. At age five she was placed with Andrea, who adopted her. K.S., has reactive attachment disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and a learning disorder, which qualified K.S. for the Adoption Assistance Program. When K.S. was nine a Program assessment identified problems including chronic lying and stealing, aggression, property destruction, enuresis, and sexualized behavior. K.S. carried a knife to school. In ninth grade, she was assaulted. K.S. ran away several times and a suspect in a burglary. After one run-away incident, school staff found a note K.S. had written saying “When you get this I will be dead!” A crisis counselor determined K.S. was not a danger to herself or others. Mother disagreed and felt K.S. should be placed on a psychiatric hold. She refused custody of K.S. Police were called and K.S. was placed in protective custody. K.S. was in foster care for two months. Andrea unsuccessfully requested that the petition be dismissed because she planned to move with K.S. to Sacramento where K.S. would have extended family support. The court of appeal affirmed K.S.’s placement with her biological aunt, rejecting Andrea’s challenges the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction over K.S., and the disposition order. View "In re K.S." on Justia Law

A family member reported to Michigan Children’s Protective Services (CPS) that Barber was neglecting J.B. Miller, a CPS social worker, interviewed J.B. at his public elementary school without a court order or Barber’s consent. Miller interviewed Barber, who defended his marijuana and prescription-drug use as medically authorized. Days later, Miller again interviewed J.B. at school without a court order or parental consent and spoke with J.B.’s paternal grandmother. Miller obtained a court order, placing J.B. in protective custody pending a hearing, Mich. Comp. Laws 722.638, and picked J.B. up from school. After a hearing, the judge found probable cause to support the petition, but returned J.B. to Barber’s custody conditioned on: Barber’s abstaining from marijuana, submitting to drug screening, and ensuring that J.B. has constant adult supervision. Barber sued Miller under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating his substantive due process rights by interviewing J.B. without a court order or parental consent; falsehoods in the petition; and removing J.B. from school, and challenged the statute as facially unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal on grounds of absolute and qualified immunity and found that Barber lacked standing for his constitutional challenge to the statute. View "Barber v. Miller" on Justia Law

Appellant, 16 years old when the petition underlying this appeal was filed, had a troubled history. Since 1999, her family has had 36 child welfare referrals from Lake, Shasta, Siskiyou and Solano Counties; it had five voluntary family maintenance cases between 2002 and 2014 but did not fulfill any of the suggested or requested services. Appellant appealed juvenile court orders continuing her as a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and committing her to the custody of the probation officer for placement in "New Foundations." She argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that she resisted or obstructed a peace officer; (2) the court erred in failing to dismiss the section 602 petition (which she claimed impermissibly increased her maximum confinement time); and (3) the court abused its discretion in terminating her status as a section 300 dependent child and adjudging her a delinquent minor. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with her first contention and therefore reversed the orders. View "In re Amanda A." on Justia Law

The Juvenile Court found R.G., a nonminor dependent within the transition jurisdiction of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 450), ineligible for extended foster care support payments between January 13 and March 13, 2015, because he was neither employed at least 20 hours per week nor participating in a program or activity that promoted or removed barriers to employment, as is required to receive financial support pursuant to section subdivisions (b)(4) and (b)(3) of section 11403 of the California Fostering Connections to Success Act, under which certain youth in foster care may continue receiving financial assistance after turning 18. The court of appeal agreed and reversed. The undisputed evidence indicated that R.G.’s activities, which were primarily self-directed, included formulating a specific job search plan; applying online and in person to numerous jobs; following up with prospective employers; receiving feedback from an independent living skills program specialist on how to improve his resume and job applications; and maintaining contact with the social worker on his progress. This evidence showed that he was working toward his goals during the period in question as contemplated by the statute. View "In re R.G." on Justia Law

The Alameda County Juvenile Court sustained the allegation that Alberto C., the presumed father, had sexually molested I.C., his four-year-old daughter. Several weeks later, the court declared I.C. a dependent child, and placed her in the custody of her mother. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the lengthy period between the jurisdictional and the dispositional hearings was excessive, unjustified, and contrary to section 352 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The court acknowledged the problem of a minor child’s accusation of parental molestation, especially when there is no direct or tangible proof that any molestation occurred, but noted that the hearsay statement was found in the caseworker’s report and was also contained in the video recording of the minor being interviewed. Iin viewing it the juvenile court was exercising its power to judge credibility. The juvenile court’s decision to receive evidence of the minor’s statement—both in the form of words in the caseworker’s report and the recording—was supported by substantial evidence and properly served as the basis for asserting the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor as a dependent child. View "In re I.C." on Justia Law

The Alameda County Juvenile Court sustained the allegation that Alberto C., the presumed father, had sexually molested I.C., his four-year-old daughter. Several weeks later, the court declared I.C. a dependent child, and placed her in the custody of her mother. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the lengthy period between the jurisdictional and the dispositional hearings was excessive, unjustified, and contrary to section 352 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The court acknowledged the problem of a minor child’s accusation of parental molestation, especially when there is no direct or tangible proof that any molestation occurred, but noted that the hearsay statement was found in the caseworker’s report and was also contained in the video recording of the minor being interviewed. Iin viewing it the juvenile court was exercising its power to judge credibility. The juvenile court’s decision to receive evidence of the minor’s statement—both in the form of words in the caseworker’s report and the recording—was supported by substantial evidence and properly served as the basis for asserting the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor as a dependent child. View "In re I.C." on Justia Law

Mother appeals from the juvenile court's permanent restraining order against her requiring her to stay away from the father of their six-year-old daughter. Mother contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the inclusion of the daughter in the restraining order as a protected person. The court agreed and concluded that the juvenile court erred by including the daughter as a protected person in the restraining order where there is no evidence that Mother failed to obey the visitation order or in any way abused her visitation rights. Because the restraining order requires Mother here to stay away from Father, Mother necessarily is required to stay away from the daughter when the child physically is in father’s presence. Accordingly, the court remanded for modification of the restraining order. View "In re N.L." on Justia Law

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition, alleging that four minors were at risk of physical harm and emotional damage due to their mother’s conduct. The petition stated that mother had regularly complained (or prompted others to complain) that father physically or sexually abused the children, that these complaints were false, and that mother’s conduct subjected the children to repeated sexual assault examinations and law enforcement interviews, all of which had severe negative consequences on the children: All four had expressed suicidal thoughts; two were placed in involuntary mental health holds; one had gained 40 pounds; and all four were chronically absent from, or tardy to, school. Mother moved to dismiss the petition because she and father are already litigating custody in family court. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeal reversed, stating that to rob the Department of its chance to prove its allegations is to elevate judicial economy above the protection of children, in contravention of the Legislature’s express declaration that dependency jurisdiction be construed broadly. View "In re Nicholas E." on Justia Law