Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services petitioned for wardship of M.I., a minor, 705 ILCS 405/2-3, alleging that M.I.’s mother had neglected her and that M.I.’s father had an extensive criminal history. The juvenile court granted the petition, finding M.I. to be neglected. The court ordered father to obtain a drug and alcohol assessment, submit to random drug testing twice monthly, undergo a psychological examination, and complete a parenting class. Until he dropped out of high school, father was enrolled in special education courses for learning disabilities. He had been unemployed since 2007. Father had been incarcerated on eight different occasions for approximately 18-19 years in total but had not been incarcerated since 2005. He suffers from bipolar disorder and admitted to regular marijuana use, indicating that he had been clean for two months. Father is functionally illiterate, and possesses an IQ of 58. The state asserted that he did not attend drug testing or participate in a drug and alcohol evaluation and refused to provide an address to his caseworker. The court found both parents unfit. Thereafter, at five different permanency hearings, the juvenile court found that father had failed to make reasonable efforts to achieve the service plan and permanency goal. The court appointed DCFS as guardian. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the termination of father’s rights. The statute, 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), does not contain a willfulness requirement. The juvenile court considered father’s intellectual disability and other circumstances, such as his sporadic attendance at visitation, when it found him unfit under subsection (b). View "In re M.I." on Justia Law

D.R., born in November 2004, lived with her maternal grandmother since she was an infant and was “thriving” in her grandmother’s care. D.R.’s two half siblings lived separately with mother and their father in the same apartment building. Dependency proceedings were initiated in 2013, following a violent incident involving the father of D.R.’s two half-siblings. Mother failed to comply with reunification plans. D.R.’s father, who initially was described as “whereabouts unknown,” eventually was located living at the home of his mother and stepfather. Father had been convicted of statutory rape of D.R.’s mother and did not see D.R. after he was released from incarceration. His name was not on D.R.’s birth certificate. Father visited D.R. for a four-month period during the dependency proceedings, after which he stopped visiting. Father did not attend conjoint therapy with D.R. As D.R.’s permanent plan, the juvenile court selected legal guardianship over adoption by her grandmother. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court was required to select the more permanent plan of adoption. No substantial evidence supported the court’s rationale for selecting legal guardianship instead of adoption. View "In re D.R." on Justia Law

The juvenile court adjudicated twin brothers LeVanta S. and LeRonn S. under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(c) as mentally ill and dangerous. The brother were placed in out-of-home care. The juvenile court later changed the brothers’ permanency objective from family reunification to guardianship. Mother and Father appealed from this order in both cases. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the juvenile court’s order affected a substantial right of the parents, and therefore, the order was a final, appealable order; and (2) the juvenile court exceeded its authority by adopting the permanency plan of guardianship in these cases where there had been no adjudication under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). Remanded. View "In re Interest of LeVanta S." on Justia Law

The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) sought wardship of 9-and-10-year-old children, 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b). The minors then lived with their father, Larry, who had a criminal history. Larry entered into an agreed order of protection, allowing the minors to reside with their paternal grandparents. Larry subsequently disclosed the name of the mother, who filed an answer. No information concerning mother was presented at the hearing. The court found that the minors were neglected and that mother did not contribute to the injurious environment. A subsequent report stated that mother had stable housing and had obtained a certified nursing assistant certificate. She was not addicted to alcohol or illegal substances, had passed a random drug screening, and had never been arrested. She takes prescription medication for bipolar disorder, anxiety, and depression. Mother completed a parenting class and a domestic violence class, had engaged in an intact family program and indicated a willingness to participate in services. The caseworker took no position as to who should be appointed guardian. The state and the guardian ad litem agreed that mother was fit, but argued that DCFS should be appointed guardian. Mother requested custody and guardianship. The court ordered DCFS appointed as guardian, found mother to be fit, and found that placement was necessary, “based on all that was presented in the materials for my review for this disposition and upon considering argument.” The appellate court concluded that the trial court violated 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed and remanded. The Act does not authorize placing a ward of the court with a third party absent a finding of parental unfitness, inability, or unwillingness to care for the minor. View "In re M.M." on Justia Law

Contra Costa County Children and Family Services filed petitions concerning P.W., then 12 years old, and his sister, M.W., 11, alleging Mother caused P.W. serious physical harm during an altercation and her untreated mental condition impaired her ability to adequately parent. The children reported that they did not feel safe. Family members and close friends reported concern for the children’s well-being and had asked Mother to seek treatment, suspecting she might be bipolar. The children were placed in foster homes. Mother was granted supervised visitation. The disposition report advised that Mother had several previous dependency cases since 1994. Her parental rights to two other children had been terminated. There was an earlier dependency case involving P.W. and M.W., which concluded in reunification. Mother did not appear at a continued permanency review hearing 18 months later. The court found that returning the children to Mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the children’s safety and physical or emotional well-being, remarking this was “not even a close call.” It found Mother had been offered reasonable reunification services and declined to continue the matter, noting that the children still feared Mother and opposed visitation. The court scheduled a hearing for terminating Mother’s reunification services. The court of appeal declined Mother’s petition to set aside the order scheduling that hearing. View "N.M. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The minor, then three years old, became the subject of a dependency petition after his stepfather, Donald, assaulted his mother, in the minor’s presence. The minor’s paternity was the subject of separate family court proceedings filed by Michael and Joel, the minor’s biological father. Michael is the man with whom mother was living at the time of the minor’s birth. The family court ruled that both Michael and Joel qualify as presumed parents under Family Code section 7612(c), which authorizes multiple presumed parents. When the juvenile court inquired into the minor’s paternity, all three men sought to be declared presumed parents. Michael and Joel based their claims on the family court’s order, while Donald argued that he had served as the minor’s father for 20 months before his assault on mother. Considering itself bound by the family court’s order, the juvenile court found all three to be presumed parents. The court of appeal concluded that the juvenile court erred in finding Michael to be a presumed parent; section 316.2 grants exclusive jurisdiction over paternity issues to the juvenile court upon the filing of a dependency petition. The court upheld the designation of Donald as a presumed parent, as supported by substantial evidence. View "In re Alexander P." on Justia Law

The Del Norte County Department of Health and Human Services received a referral after police searched Mother’s residence and found mushrooms, meth pipes, marijuana paraphernalia, concentrated cannabis, brass knuckles and butterfly knives. It appeared the occupants were hoarders. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, benzodiazepines, and marijuana. Her children (ages five and 11) were removed from her custody. The court ordered parenting education, random drug screening, substance abuse assessment and any recommended treatment, with supervised visitation. In subsequent reports, the Department noted that, despite her admitted daily marijuana and occasional methamphetamine use, Mother denied she had a substance abuse problem and had not “involved herself in any of the services” offered. After mother accepted a plea bargain, the Department recommended that services be terminated. None of the hearing participants knew how long mother would be incarcerated, or what prison programs would be available. The court concluded that there was an “extremely low” likelihood of reunification, and ordered services terminated. The court of appeal reversed. Mother was statutorily entitled to 12 months of services, which could be shortened only under circumstances described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 61.5,(a)(2). The juvenile court did not terminate services in accordance with those provisions. View "M.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A 14-year-old ran away from her mother’s home. Mother asked that she be taken into the custody of Child Protective Services, stating a need for therapy for herself, minor, and her younger daughter. The court ordered reunification services for “the child and to the mother.” At the six-month review the agency recommended that minor remain in out-of-home placement. Minor wanted to return home and participate in therapy. The agency and mother were concerned about minor’s previous molestation of her younger sister. The court ordered reunification services continued. At the 12-month review, the agency recommended and the court ordered that minor remain in out-of-home placement and reunification services be continued. Sister’s treating psychiatrist had recommended that visits between minor and her sister be suspended. At the 18-month review, the agency recommended that minor remain in out-of- home placement and that reunification services be terminated because her sister continued to be “triggered” by minor. The court expressed concern about failure to provide services specifically targeted at resolving the impediment to reunification, minor’s sexual abuse of her sister, and ordered services continued up to 24 months. The court of appeal affirmed. Although significant services were provided, they were not tailored to the family’s particular needs arising out of the unique circumstances. Amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 361.5 and 366.221 did not restrict the court’s section 352 authority to extend reunification services to 24 months upon a showing of good cause. View "In re J.E." on Justia Law

Father appealed the juvenile court's order on his petition under Welf. & Inst. Code 388 giving his minor son sole discretion whether Father will have visits with him. The court concluded that where, as here, the juvenile court has not ordered reunification services because, under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(1) and (d), the parent’s whereabouts were unknown for more than six months after the child’s out-of home placement, the parent has no right to visitation. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the juvenile court may order visitation in the exercise of its discretion under section 362, subdivision (a), on a finding that such visitation will serve and protect the child’s best interests. But, as is the rule when visitation is ordered as part of a reunification plan, the court concluded that the juvenile court cannot give the child sole discretion to determine whether such visitation will occur. Rather, once the juvenile court determines that visitation is in the child’s best interests, the juvenile court must, as part of its duty to protect and serve those interests, ensure that such visitation occurs under terms set by the juvenile court. Otherwise, the court concluded that, by placing sole discretion whether visitation will occur in the hands of the child, the juvenile court will have ceded to the child the determination whether visitation is in the child’s best interests. Accordingly, the court reversed the order and remanded for reconsideration. View "In re Korbin Z." on Justia Law

After his stepfather, Donald, assaulted his mother, Heidi, in Alexander’s presence, Alexander, then three years old, became the subject of a dependency petition. At the time, Donald, Alexander’s biological father, Joel, and Michael, the man with whom Heidi was living at the time of Alexander’s birth, had competing motions pending. Two weeks after the dependency petition was filed, the family court ruled that both Michael and Joel qualified as presumed parents and designated both under Family Code section 7612(c), which authorizes multiple presumed parents. Considering itself bound by that order, the juvenile court found both Michael and Joel to be presumed parents, but subsequently denied Michael visitation. The court found that Donald also satisfied the requirements for presumed parent status and designated him as such. The court of appeal held that the juvenile court erred in finding Michael to be a presumed parent. Because Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2 grants exclusive jurisdiction over paternity issues to the juvenile court upon the filing of a dependency petition, the family court order on which the juvenile court relied, issued subsequent to the filing, was void. The court found no error in the designation of Donald as a presumed parent, which was supported by substantial evidence. View "In re Alexander P." on Justia Law