Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The Juvenile Court found R.G., a nonminor dependent within the transition jurisdiction of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 450), ineligible for extended foster care support payments between January 13 and March 13, 2015, because he was neither employed at least 20 hours per week nor participating in a program or activity that promoted or removed barriers to employment, as is required to receive financial support pursuant to section subdivisions (b)(4) and (b)(3) of section 11403 of the California Fostering Connections to Success Act, under which certain youth in foster care may continue receiving financial assistance after turning 18. The court of appeal agreed and reversed. The undisputed evidence indicated that R.G.’s activities, which were primarily self-directed, included formulating a specific job search plan; applying online and in person to numerous jobs; following up with prospective employers; receiving feedback from an independent living skills program specialist on how to improve his resume and job applications; and maintaining contact with the social worker on his progress. This evidence showed that he was working toward his goals during the period in question as contemplated by the statute. View "In re R.G." on Justia Law

The Alameda County Juvenile Court sustained the allegation that Alberto C., the presumed father, had sexually molested I.C., his four-year-old daughter. Several weeks later, the court declared I.C. a dependent child, and placed her in the custody of her mother. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the lengthy period between the jurisdictional and the dispositional hearings was excessive, unjustified, and contrary to section 352 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The court acknowledged the problem of a minor child’s accusation of parental molestation, especially when there is no direct or tangible proof that any molestation occurred, but noted that the hearsay statement was found in the caseworker’s report and was also contained in the video recording of the minor being interviewed. Iin viewing it the juvenile court was exercising its power to judge credibility. The juvenile court’s decision to receive evidence of the minor’s statement—both in the form of words in the caseworker’s report and the recording—was supported by substantial evidence and properly served as the basis for asserting the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor as a dependent child. View "In re I.C." on Justia Law

The Alameda County Juvenile Court sustained the allegation that Alberto C., the presumed father, had sexually molested I.C., his four-year-old daughter. Several weeks later, the court declared I.C. a dependent child, and placed her in the custody of her mother. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the lengthy period between the jurisdictional and the dispositional hearings was excessive, unjustified, and contrary to section 352 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The court acknowledged the problem of a minor child’s accusation of parental molestation, especially when there is no direct or tangible proof that any molestation occurred, but noted that the hearsay statement was found in the caseworker’s report and was also contained in the video recording of the minor being interviewed. Iin viewing it the juvenile court was exercising its power to judge credibility. The juvenile court’s decision to receive evidence of the minor’s statement—both in the form of words in the caseworker’s report and the recording—was supported by substantial evidence and properly served as the basis for asserting the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor as a dependent child. View "In re I.C." on Justia Law

Mother appeals from the juvenile court's permanent restraining order against her requiring her to stay away from the father of their six-year-old daughter. Mother contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the inclusion of the daughter in the restraining order as a protected person. The court agreed and concluded that the juvenile court erred by including the daughter as a protected person in the restraining order where there is no evidence that Mother failed to obey the visitation order or in any way abused her visitation rights. Because the restraining order requires Mother here to stay away from Father, Mother necessarily is required to stay away from the daughter when the child physically is in father’s presence. Accordingly, the court remanded for modification of the restraining order. View "In re N.L." on Justia Law

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition, alleging that four minors were at risk of physical harm and emotional damage due to their mother’s conduct. The petition stated that mother had regularly complained (or prompted others to complain) that father physically or sexually abused the children, that these complaints were false, and that mother’s conduct subjected the children to repeated sexual assault examinations and law enforcement interviews, all of which had severe negative consequences on the children: All four had expressed suicidal thoughts; two were placed in involuntary mental health holds; one had gained 40 pounds; and all four were chronically absent from, or tardy to, school. Mother moved to dismiss the petition because she and father are already litigating custody in family court. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeal reversed, stating that to rob the Department of its chance to prove its allegations is to elevate judicial economy above the protection of children, in contravention of the Legislature’s express declaration that dependency jurisdiction be construed broadly. View "In re Nicholas E." on Justia Law

Andrew is the biological father of Emilio, born in July 2013. Katherine is Emilio’s biological mother. Andrew and Katherine never married. Before Emilio was born, Andrew and Katherine had broken up. Katherine had become aware that Andrew could be violent and unpredictable. In September 2012, he yelled at and pushed Katherine’s mother; he pled guilty to possession of metal knuckles and trespassing and was put on probation. After Katherine became pregnant, several incidents occurred that confirmed her belief that Andrew could be violent and unpredictable. Katherine sought to have Emilio adopted by a couple in San Francisco, who filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Andrew. After a trial, the court found that although Andrew was Emilio’s biological father, he had not established that he was Emilio’s presumed father within the meaning of Adoption of Kelsey S., with the attendant right to withhold consent to Emilio’s adoption. The court concluded it would be would be in Emilio’s best interests to terminate Andrew’s parental rights. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that substantial evidence supported a finding that Andrew is not a “Kelsey S. father,” and that the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Andrew’s parental rights. View "Adoption of Emilio G." on Justia Law

The juvenile court declared A.R., age four, a dependent of the court and ordered him to remain in the custody of both parents under the supervision of the Department of Family and Children’s Services. A.R.’s presumed father and mother were not married. At disposition in January 2014, the court ordered family maintenance services for both parents. In March 2014, father moved out of the home not pursuant to any court order. He eventually disengaged from services without addressing his alcoholism or marijuana use. Using the Request to Change Court Order form (JV-180), the Department requested modification of the dispositional order. A September 2014 order made removal findings, continued A.R. under the care, custody, and control of mother under the Department’s supervision, provided family maintenance services for only A.R. and mother, and provided supervised visitation for father. The court of appeal affirmed. There was evidence of changed circumstances sufficient to justify the court’s modification of its prior order. Although the removal findings were not supported by substantial evidence, the error was harmless. At the time of the findings, father had already moved out of the home and A.R. was no longer actually in father’s physical custody. View "In re A.R." on Justia Law

R.T. was born in 1996. When R.T. was 14, she began running away for days at a time, not attending school, falsely reporting that her mother abused her, and at least once throwing furniture. R.T. began having children when she was 15. Mother went looking for R.T. whenever she left home; arranged for R.T. to live with mother’s parents because R.T.’s grandfather used to work with troubled juveniles and because R.T.’s false reports were made when R.T. and mother were alone; called the police for help; and asked the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services for assistance. She declined to voluntarily submit R.T. to the Department’s jurisdiction. R.T. remained “out of control.” The Department filed a petition to declare then-17-year-old R.T. a dependent of the juvenile court under Welf. & Inst. Code 300(b)(1). The court asserted jurisdiction, denying mother’s motion to dismiss, and issued a dispositional order authorizing the Department to place R.T. elsewhere while reunification services were provided. The Department placed her back with her grandparents. The court of appeal affirmed. Regardless of parental blameworthiness, when a child faces a substantial risk of serious physical harm, a parent’s inability to supervise or protect a child is enough to invoke dependency jurisdiction. View "In re R.T." on Justia Law

A petition filed in 2008 by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) alleged that D.A., born late 2007, and his half-brother Z.S., born early 2006, were at risk of harm under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The children had been living with mother, who had a history of violent altercations with father in the children’s presence and were placed together in foster care. In 2009 father was incarcerated. DCFS recommended that family reunification services be terminated. Mother gave birth to K.A. in 2009. Father was found to be K.A.’s presumed father. K.A. had tested positive for marijuana at birth and mother’s marijuana use interfered with her ability to care for him. In 2013 the court terminated parental rights and finalized the adoptions of the children. The court of appeal dismissed father’s appeal as untimely and an appeal by maternal grandmother for lack of standing. Father, who failed to maintain contact with DCFS, visited the children only sporadically, and often did not appear at noticed hearings even while not incarcerated, did not explain how the result of the hearing would have been different if there had been perfect compliance with notice requirements. View "In re Z. S." on Justia Law

Aaron S. was adjudged a dependent minor when he was 16 years old and became a non-minor dependent when he turned 18,Welf. & Inst. Code, 11400(v). The juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction shortly before Aaron turned 19, finding that by not enrolling in school or having a job, Aaron failed to participate in his Transitional Independent Living Case Plan. Aaron claimed that the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services did not provide him a 90-day transition plan. The court of appeal affirmed. Even assuming the issue was not forfeited, termination without proof of a 90-day transition plan was harmless here because the Department separately provided information to Aaron regarding each of the categories that would have been included in the plan. For housing, employment, educational and continuing support services information, the emancipation letter that was mailed to Aaron before the termination hearing referred him to his Independent Living Program case manager and provided contact information for Transitional Housing Program providers. That letter also informed Aaron he was eligible for health benefits through Medi-Cal, and the section 391 report indicated the Department mailed Aaron a copy of the advanced health care directive form. View "In re Aaron S." on Justia Law