Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Mother, age 19, was released from jail and needed a place to stay, so she moved in with A., age 45, who had an extensive criminal history. Mother began prostituting at A.’s request. Both were arrested. A. remained incarcerated until November, 2010. Mother was released, learned she was pregnant, and notified A. In March 2010 mother began living with new boyfriend, B. A. unsuccessfully sought to obtain a declaration of paternity form. B. was present at the baby’s birth and married mother two months later. Mother filed a parentage action naming A. as father. Days later, A. was released and attempted to file a paternity action, but was informed that an action already was pending. Mother never served A. and nothing happened until A. filed a response a year later. A. saw the baby three times before he was incarcerated again and gave mother $20 for diapers. Mother had another child with B. The children moved in with B’s mother, who would not allow A. to see the baby and who sought guardianship of both children due to mother’s substance abuse. A DNA test confirmed that A. is the child’s biological father. As of January 2013, mother and B. had obtained an apartment and were employed. The court ruled that A.’s status controlled. The appeals court reversed, noting that A. provided only minimal financial support, threatened the baby’s caregivers, and did not vigorously assert his legal rights until the Department was required to step in. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

Dana Fuller appealed a Family Court decision denying her petition for expungement of her juvenile record because she had committed three traffic violations as an adult. In this case, the Family Court held that Fuller's violations of Title 21, which governs motor vehicles, were "subsequent . . . adult convictions." But the Family Court has reached different conclusions in other cases as to whether a traffic violation under Title 21 of the Delaware Code is a subsequent adult conviction that precludes expungement of a juvenile record. On appeal, Fuller argued that Title 21 offenses were not "subsequent adult convictions" and the denial of her expungement was therefore erroneous. After review, the Supreme Court held that a "subsequent adult conviction” is a later conviction only for a crime in violation of Title 4, 7, 11, 16, or 23 of the Delaware Code, and does not include a violation of Title 21. Accordingly, we reverse the Family Court's decision. View "Fuller v. Delaware" on Justia Law

San Mateo County Human Services received referrals indicating that Jaden (age 7), was chronically tardy and absent from school and routinely picked up late from his after-school program. His school behavior had deteriorated rapidly, including: refusing to go to class; hiding; throwing items; failing to complete assignments; grinding against another student; leaving school grounds; peeing in a sink; growling and clenching his fist when confronted for misbehaviors; and altercations with other students. Jaden had no close friendships. He refused to eat at his class table in the cafeteria, saying the smell of other foods made him gag. According to school staff, Jaden was exhibiting symptoms of anxiety and depression. Jaden admitted to hitting his mother; his mother had not pursued recommended health services. According to school staff, mother was“struggling with anxiety, and probable substance use. Mother took Jaden to the Daly City Police Department, stating that she could no longer handle him; she took Jaden home, but left him with his father for several days. The Agency had significant evidence that mother had an ongoing substance abuse problem. Domestic violence was a concern. Ultimately, the juvenile court terminated discretionary reunification services mother was receiving (Welfare and Institutions Code 361.2). The appeals court affirmed. When a minor is placed with a previously noncustodial parent at disposition under section 361.2, a reasonable services finding need not be made at subsequent hearings monitoring that placement. View "In re Jaden E." on Justia Law

Mother appealed from a juvenile court order declaring her two daughters dependents of the court based on mother's failure to provide for the children. The court concluded that, because jurisdiction was proper based on Father's conduct, the court need not consider whether it was also proper based on Mother's conduct. In the alternative, the court concluded that Mother waived the issue of whether substantial evidence supported jurisdiction based on her failure to provide. Further, there was sufficient evidence regarding Mother's failure to protect the minors from Father's conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdictional order. View "In re A.R." on Justia Law

Mother appealed from an order terminating her parental rights to her son, contending that the juvenile court erred in finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901-1963, did not apply. Mother had the right to appeal the juvenile court's order at the dispositional hearing but she did not do so. She only challenged the juvenile court's failure to provide notice under the ICWA approximately one and a half years later which was after the juvenile court terminated parental rights. Accordingly, the court held that Mother failed to timely appeal the juvenile court's order and affirmed the judgment. View "In re Isaiah W." on Justia Law

Mother challenged a juvenile court order terminating jurisdiction over her son and ordering regular visitation for the son's paternal grandmother, contending that the visitation order impermissibly infringed on her fundamental parenting rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mother also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her petition requesting that the court terminate or modify the order for the son to visit the paternal grandmother. The court concluded that the juvenile court did not violate Mother's fundamental parenting rights by issuing an order granting the paternal grandmother visitation where the juvenile court was authorized by statute to issue a visitation order, the visitation order did not infringe on Mother's fundamental right to parent; and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's petition seeking modification of the visitation order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re J.T." on Justia Law

Father appealed the juvenile court's order removing his three-year-old daughter from his custody for a single occasion of disciplining her by spanking her with a belt on her legs and buttocks. The court concluded that, given all the circumstances, the evidence with respect to the risk of harm to the child if Father were allowed back to the home, does not satisfy the requisite "clear and convincing" standard of proof. Further, there may be less drastic alternatives than an order requiring Father to leave the home. Accordingly, the court reversed the order to the extent it requires Father to remain outside the home and otherwise affirmed the remaining findings. View "In re A.E." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile dependency court's jurisdictional orders based on its findings that Mother has a history of substance abuse which renders her incapable of providing her teenage daughter with regular care and supervision. The dependency court further found that Mother's drug abuse endangered her daughter's health and safety, and places her daughter at risk of physical harm. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the dependency court's finding that Mother suffers from a substance problem. The court concluded, however, that the evidence does not support the dependency court's finding that her substance abuse has caused or is causing a substantial risk of harm to the daughter. Accordingly, the court reversed the dependency court's orders. View "In re Rebecca C." on Justia Law

Mother appealed from an order entered at the last contested section 364 of the Welfare and Institutions Code hearing at which the juvenile court maintained jurisdiction over her 17-month-old son despite the recommendation of the Department to terminate jurisdiction. The court concluded that there is substantial evidence submitted by the Department and in the record that supports the juvenile court's determination not to terminate jurisdiction. Among other things, Mother still struggled with providing the son with everything he needed; a counselor reported that Mother will benefit from continued treatment; the parenting and mental concerns that brought Mother to the attention of the Department and Children's court remain a work in progress; and there is no evidence concerning mother's capacity to live independently. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "In re J.F." on Justia Law

S.L., the daughter of Julia, born in 2002, was adjudicated abused or neglected in 2007, and was made a ward of the court in January 2008, pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b). The conditions that gave rise to her removal were insect bites, apparent dog bites, substantial bruising to her shoulder and groin, and unclean living conditions. At each of five subsequent permanency hearings, the goal was for S.L. to return to Julia within 12 months, while custody remained with the Department of Children and Family Service. In July 2010, the goal was changed to substitute care pending termination of parental rights. Julia was continuously represented by counsel. In November 2011, the state sought termination of parental rights, alleging that Julia failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal and was unable to discharge parental responsibilities de to mental impairment. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s finding of unfitness because the state did not file a separate notice under the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(iii), identifying which nine-month periods were the subject of the termination proceeding. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the finding, noting that Julia did not allege any harm as a result of the defect in notice. Failure to file the separate notice pleading was a pleading defect, not a failure to state a cause of action, and was forfeited by Julia because she failed to raise the issue in the trial court.View "In re S.L." on Justia Law