Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

R.T. was born in 1996. When R.T. was 14, she began running away for days at a time, not attending school, falsely reporting that her mother abused her, and at least once throwing furniture. R.T. began having children when she was 15. Mother went looking for R.T. whenever she left home; arranged for R.T. to live with mother’s parents because R.T.’s grandfather used to work with troubled juveniles and because R.T.’s false reports were made when R.T. and mother were alone; called the police for help; and asked the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services for assistance. She declined to voluntarily submit R.T. to the Department’s jurisdiction. R.T. remained “out of control.” The Department filed a petition to declare then-17-year-old R.T. a dependent of the juvenile court under Welf. & Inst. Code 300(b)(1). The court asserted jurisdiction, denying mother’s motion to dismiss, and issued a dispositional order authorizing the Department to place R.T. elsewhere while reunification services were provided. The Department placed her back with her grandparents. The court of appeal affirmed. Regardless of parental blameworthiness, when a child faces a substantial risk of serious physical harm, a parent’s inability to supervise or protect a child is enough to invoke dependency jurisdiction. View "In re R.T." on Justia Law

A petition filed in 2008 by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) alleged that D.A., born late 2007, and his half-brother Z.S., born early 2006, were at risk of harm under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The children had been living with mother, who had a history of violent altercations with father in the children’s presence and were placed together in foster care. In 2009 father was incarcerated. DCFS recommended that family reunification services be terminated. Mother gave birth to K.A. in 2009. Father was found to be K.A.’s presumed father. K.A. had tested positive for marijuana at birth and mother’s marijuana use interfered with her ability to care for him. In 2013 the court terminated parental rights and finalized the adoptions of the children. The court of appeal dismissed father’s appeal as untimely and an appeal by maternal grandmother for lack of standing. Father, who failed to maintain contact with DCFS, visited the children only sporadically, and often did not appear at noticed hearings even while not incarcerated, did not explain how the result of the hearing would have been different if there had been perfect compliance with notice requirements. View "In re Z. S." on Justia Law

Aaron S. was adjudged a dependent minor when he was 16 years old and became a non-minor dependent when he turned 18,Welf. & Inst. Code, 11400(v). The juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction shortly before Aaron turned 19, finding that by not enrolling in school or having a job, Aaron failed to participate in his Transitional Independent Living Case Plan. Aaron claimed that the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services did not provide him a 90-day transition plan. The court of appeal affirmed. Even assuming the issue was not forfeited, termination without proof of a 90-day transition plan was harmless here because the Department separately provided information to Aaron regarding each of the categories that would have been included in the plan. For housing, employment, educational and continuing support services information, the emancipation letter that was mailed to Aaron before the termination hearing referred him to his Independent Living Program case manager and provided contact information for Transitional Housing Program providers. That letter also informed Aaron he was eligible for health benefits through Medi-Cal, and the section 391 report indicated the Department mailed Aaron a copy of the advanced health care directive form. View "In re Aaron S." on Justia Law

Mother had legal and physical custody; Father had visitation. Mother obtained a restraining order, prohibiting Father from harassing or contacting Mother except to facilitate visitation, and requiring him to stay 100 yards away from her, her home, her workplace and her vehicle. In 2013, Mother submitted a declaration that Father contacted her through calls and texts every day; followed her; waited outside her house; harassed her in the street; picked up the children without informing her; and denigrated her to the children. The restraining order was made permanent. A month later, the Department of Children and Family Services received a report that Mother had left the children (ages 12 and 10) unsupervised and allowed them to ride their bicycles around the neighborhood unsupervised. In interviewing Mother, the caseworker learned of domestic violence committed by Father before their separation and that Father had repeatedly violated the restraining order, which was traumatizing to the children, especially when she called the police to report violations. Mother reported that Father did not mistreat the children. The court of appeal reversed the juvenile court’s order asserting jurisdiction. A finding that Father’s conduct placed the children at risk of emotional injury could not support jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b), which requires proof of physical harm or substantial risk of such harm. View "In re Jesus M." on Justia Law

In 2011, 16-year-old Roxanne exhibited signs of emotional problems. Her parents failed to pursue counseling, after being advised to do so. Roxanne later told her teachers that she had suicidal thoughts because she was being bullied. Despite a counselor’s advice, Mother was unsupportive and angry. Roxanne was taken to a hospital and placed on a section 5585 hold for psychiatric evaluation. Mother told the counselor that she was going to remove Roxanne f against medical advice. Roxanne did not continue with therapy. Roxanne was hospitalized three more times in 2013. Mother “appeared not [to] care and stated that she could not leave work because no one was going to pay her bills.” Mother did not visit Roxanne and refused home services. Father cursed at Roxanne about her hospitalization. Mother then began taking her to therapy and sought an individualized education plan at her school. Roxanne began consistently taking antidepressants and attending counseling. DCFS filed a section 300 petition, alleging that the Parents caused Roxanne serious emotional damage. The juvenile court found it had jurisdiction over Roxanne. The court of appeal affirmed, finding substantial evidence that Roxanne was suffering from serious emotional damage and at risk of further serious emotional damage due to Parents’ failure to obtain mental health services. View "In re Roxanne B." on Justia Law

At the start of the dependency proceedings, the juvenile court and Ventura County Human Services Agency believed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901, did not apply to Eskimo families. Father and mother appealed from the order terminating parental rights to their two minor children and selecting adoption as the permanent plan, Welf. & Inst. Code 366.26. The court of appeal reversed. Evidence submitted for the first time on appeal established that the children are Indian children under ICWA. The federal definition of "Indian" includes "Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska." The Noorvik Native Community, a federally-recognized Alaskan Indian tribe confirmed that the minors are tribe members. Before terminating parental rights to an Indian child, the juvenile court must satisfy ICWA requirements, including finding that "active efforts" were made to provide services designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and that parents' continued custody of minors "is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage." Having found ICWA inapplicable, the juvenile court did not consider these requirements before terminating parental rights; NNC was not afforded an opportunity to intervene. View "In re H.G." on Justia Law

In November 2013 the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services filed a dependency petition on behalf of Elizabeth’s three children, ages 10, eight and six, alleging Elizabeth had a history of substance abuse and had tested positive for methamphetamines and marijuana; the father of Heather (Allan) had abused marijuana; and the home Allan shared with Elizabeth and the children was filthy and unsanitary. The detention report indicated previous referrals had been received in 2004 and 2006 alleging drug use by Elizabeth. The juvenile court entered jurisdiction findings and disposition orders declaring the children dependents of the juvenile court, removing them from Elizabeth’s care and custody and placing them with their respective fathers under the supervision of the Department. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Elizabeth’s arguments that the juvenile court deprived her of due process by assuming the function of an advocate rather than an impartial tribunal; violated Welfare and Institutions Code section 3521 by continuing the jurisdiction/disposition hearing without good cause; and violated section 350(c), by improperly considering evidence submitted after the Department had presented its case-in-chief. View "In re Emily D." on Justia Law

Israel was born in Mexico in 1999 and is not a U.S. citizen. He came to the U.S. with his mother in 2005 and has no contact with his father in Mexico He was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court as a result of admitting to misdemeanor receiving of stolen property. Israel requested that the court make findings that would qualify him for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status under federal law (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J), which would allow Israel to pursue regularization of his immigration status. The juvenile court declined to make findings that reunification “with one or both” parents was not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment; that Israel was a dependent of a juvenile court or committed or placed with a state agency; and that it was not in his “best interest” to be returned to Mexco. The court of appeal remanded. USCIS currently interprets and applies section 1101(a)(27)(J) to include, as “SIJ eligible children” those who may be living in this country “with a foster family, an appointed guardian, or the non-abusive parent” and the trial court did not make a finding on whether it is in Israel’s best interest to return to Mexico. View "In re Israel O." on Justia Law

Mother, age 19, was released from jail and needed a place to stay, so she moved in with A., age 45, who had an extensive criminal history. Mother began prostituting at A.’s request. Both were arrested. A. remained incarcerated until November, 2010. Mother was released, learned she was pregnant, and notified A. In March 2010 mother began living with new boyfriend, B. A. unsuccessfully sought to obtain a declaration of paternity form. B. was present at the baby’s birth and married mother two months later. Mother filed a parentage action naming A. as father. Days later, A. was released and attempted to file a paternity action, but was informed that an action already was pending. Mother never served A. and nothing happened until A. filed a response a year later. A. saw the baby three times before he was incarcerated again and gave mother $20 for diapers. Mother had another child with B. The children moved in with B’s mother, who would not allow A. to see the baby and who sought guardianship of both children due to mother’s substance abuse. A DNA test confirmed that A. is the child’s biological father. As of January 2013, mother and B. had obtained an apartment and were employed. The court ruled that A.’s status controlled. The appeals court reversed, noting that A. provided only minimal financial support, threatened the baby’s caregivers, and did not vigorously assert his legal rights until the Department was required to step in. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

Dana Fuller appealed a Family Court decision denying her petition for expungement of her juvenile record because she had committed three traffic violations as an adult. In this case, the Family Court held that Fuller's violations of Title 21, which governs motor vehicles, were "subsequent . . . adult convictions." But the Family Court has reached different conclusions in other cases as to whether a traffic violation under Title 21 of the Delaware Code is a subsequent adult conviction that precludes expungement of a juvenile record. On appeal, Fuller argued that Title 21 offenses were not "subsequent adult convictions" and the denial of her expungement was therefore erroneous. After review, the Supreme Court held that a "subsequent adult conviction” is a later conviction only for a crime in violation of Title 4, 7, 11, 16, or 23 of the Delaware Code, and does not include a violation of Title 21. Accordingly, we reverse the Family Court's decision. View "Fuller v. Delaware" on Justia Law