Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Mother challenged a juvenile court order terminating jurisdiction over her son and ordering regular visitation for the son's paternal grandmother, contending that the visitation order impermissibly infringed on her fundamental parenting rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mother also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her petition requesting that the court terminate or modify the order for the son to visit the paternal grandmother. The court concluded that the juvenile court did not violate Mother's fundamental parenting rights by issuing an order granting the paternal grandmother visitation where the juvenile court was authorized by statute to issue a visitation order, the visitation order did not infringe on Mother's fundamental right to parent; and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's petition seeking modification of the visitation order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re J.T." on Justia Law

Father appealed the juvenile court's order removing his three-year-old daughter from his custody for a single occasion of disciplining her by spanking her with a belt on her legs and buttocks. The court concluded that, given all the circumstances, the evidence with respect to the risk of harm to the child if Father were allowed back to the home, does not satisfy the requisite "clear and convincing" standard of proof. Further, there may be less drastic alternatives than an order requiring Father to leave the home. Accordingly, the court reversed the order to the extent it requires Father to remain outside the home and otherwise affirmed the remaining findings. View "In re A.E." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile dependency court's jurisdictional orders based on its findings that Mother has a history of substance abuse which renders her incapable of providing her teenage daughter with regular care and supervision. The dependency court further found that Mother's drug abuse endangered her daughter's health and safety, and places her daughter at risk of physical harm. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the dependency court's finding that Mother suffers from a substance problem. The court concluded, however, that the evidence does not support the dependency court's finding that her substance abuse has caused or is causing a substantial risk of harm to the daughter. Accordingly, the court reversed the dependency court's orders. View "In re Rebecca C." on Justia Law

Mother appealed from an order entered at the last contested section 364 of the Welfare and Institutions Code hearing at which the juvenile court maintained jurisdiction over her 17-month-old son despite the recommendation of the Department to terminate jurisdiction. The court concluded that there is substantial evidence submitted by the Department and in the record that supports the juvenile court's determination not to terminate jurisdiction. Among other things, Mother still struggled with providing the son with everything he needed; a counselor reported that Mother will benefit from continued treatment; the parenting and mental concerns that brought Mother to the attention of the Department and Children's court remain a work in progress; and there is no evidence concerning mother's capacity to live independently. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "In re J.F." on Justia Law

S.L., the daughter of Julia, born in 2002, was adjudicated abused or neglected in 2007, and was made a ward of the court in January 2008, pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b). The conditions that gave rise to her removal were insect bites, apparent dog bites, substantial bruising to her shoulder and groin, and unclean living conditions. At each of five subsequent permanency hearings, the goal was for S.L. to return to Julia within 12 months, while custody remained with the Department of Children and Family Service. In July 2010, the goal was changed to substitute care pending termination of parental rights. Julia was continuously represented by counsel. In November 2011, the state sought termination of parental rights, alleging that Julia failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal and was unable to discharge parental responsibilities de to mental impairment. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s finding of unfitness because the state did not file a separate notice under the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(iii), identifying which nine-month periods were the subject of the termination proceeding. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the finding, noting that Julia did not allege any harm as a result of the defect in notice. Failure to file the separate notice pleading was a pleading defect, not a failure to state a cause of action, and was forfeited by Julia because she failed to raise the issue in the trial court.View "In re S.L." on Justia Law

In August 2012, then-sixteen-year-old Appellant Stephen W. was charged with possession of marijuana. At the adjudicatory hearing, Appellant moved for a jury trial, claiming that he was entitled to a jury trial under the United States and South Carolina Constitutions. The family court denied Appellant's motion. The family court adjudicated Appellant delinquent and ordered that Appellant spend six consecutive weekends at the Department of Juvenile Justice, complete an alternative educational program, and continue with his prior probation for a period of time not to exceed his eighteenth birthday or until he obtained a G.E.D. Appellant directly appealed to the Supreme Court. He argued that the family court erred in denying his motion for a jury trial in a family court juvenile proceeding. Because there was no constitutional right to a jury trial in a family court juvenile proceeding, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Interest of Stephen W." on Justia Law

Without holding a hearing, the juvenile court denied two requests by a mother (Karen) to modify an order denying her services to reunify with her three-year-old son and seven-month-old daughter, who had 13 fractures. Later, after holding a hearing, the court terminated her parental rights. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the failure to hold a hearing on the modification requests did not amount to reversible error. On the first request, Karen failed to allege a prima facie case. On the second request, Karen was given an opportunity to be heard, and the court made findings negating the appropriateness of reunification services. Her parental rights were properly terminated because substantial evidence supports showed that the potential benefit to the children from a continuing relationship with mother was outweighed by the benefits of adoption. View "In re G.B." on Justia Law

The day after N’s birth, the baby’s mother, Nichole, and her boyfriend, Alfred, executed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity (VAP), expressly imposing responsibility on Alfred to provide financial support. The VAP did not grant Alfred a right to custody or visitation, but it did provide him the right to seek custody or visitation. Alfred was also entitled to notices of adoption proceedings. Both Nichole and Alfred had the right to rescind the VAP within 60 days. The VAP explicitly waived Alfred’s right to genetic testing. Three days later, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) took N into protective custody. DCFS filed a petition alleging juvenile neglect, identifying Nichole as N’s mother and Alfred as N’s father. The circuit court entered an order for temporary shelter care, placed N in the custody of DCFS, appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL), entered an order identifying Alfred as the “legal” father based on the VAP, and appointed separate counsel for Nichole and Alfred. Following genetic testing, the court granted the state’s motion and dismissed Alfred, based on evidence that he is not N’s biological father. The appellate court reversed, holding that the state did not have standing in a juvenile neglect proceeding (705 ILCS 405/1-1) to challenge the paternity of a man who signed a VAP under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (750 ILCS 45/1). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re N.C., a Minor" on Justia Law

MF was adjudicated a child in need of supervision (CHINS) shortly before his sixteenth birthday. Four months before MF's seventeenth birthday and after MF twice violated his probation, the juvenile court ordered that MF remain in the custody of the Department of Family Services and on probation until his eighteenth birthday. MF appealed, arguing that any CHINS order must terminate when the minor child turns seventeen. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the juvenile court's order to the extent the order purported to have effect beyond MF's seventeenth birthday, holding that the juvenile court did not have the authority to issue a CHINS order that imposed conditions beyond MF's seventeenth birthday.View "In re MF" on Justia Law

Michael and April are the biological parents of Avalyn, born out of wedlock in 2002. A court ordered Michael to pay child support but did not order visitation. In 2005, the state took temporary emergency custody of Avalyn after April attempted suicide. The county sought an adjudication under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a), but did not give Michael notice. Avalyn was placed in foster care with her maternal grandmother in April’s home. Michael claims that because he was paying support through the state, caseworkers knew or should have known how to contact him. About six months after the disposition he received notice and intervened. The court placed Avalyn with Michael until November 2007, when the parties stipulated that Avalyn should be placed with April but divide her time between her parents. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Michael alleged that in failing to notify him of the juvenile proceedings, the defendants interfered with constitutional rights to familial integrity, substantive due process, and equal protection and that the Nebraska statutes were unconstitutional. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that claims against state defendants for monetary damages were barred by sovereign immunity; qualified immunity shielded employees from liability in their individual capacities because they did not violate a clearly established right. Claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were not barred. In a juvenile proceeding alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard for a child’s known adjudicated or biological father who is providing substantial and regular financial support; the statutes at issue are not facially unconstitutional, but cannot be constitutionally applied to avoid notification. View "Michael E. v. State" on Justia Law