Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose from a dependency-neglect proceeding. After a permanency-planning hearing was set, the circuit court discovered that the Department of Human Services (DHS) had failed to draft and put into place a case plan. The court then ordered that, as the case worker had forty-one cases on her caseload and fifty juveniles in fostercare, DHS should rectify the issue in five days. DHS subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, asserting that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction and violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by issuing an order that DHS alleged invaded the discretionary functions of the executive branch. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court was within its jurisdiction to act to protect the integrity of the proceedings and to safeguard the rights of the litigants before it when it ordered DHS to correct problems that were preventing work and services. View "Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Shelby" on Justia Law

The baby was exposed to cocaine in utero; the state took the child into protective custody and filed a petition pursuant to 705 ILCS 405/2-13. The petition did not seek termination of parental rights. Mother was personally served; abode service was made on father by leaving the summons and petition with his mother at the house they shared. The circuit court made the baby a ward of the court. By the time of the permanency hearing, mother's whereabouts were unknown. Although father did not comply with all aspects of the service plan, the court continued to set return to the family as the permanency goal. When the baby was about 18 months old, the court allowed foster parents to intervene and the state to begin termination proceedings and subsequently entered a default judgment against father. The appellate court reversed because the state had made no attempt to serve father. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The court noted many procedural defects and that father had made progress in meeting goals during nine months following the adjudication of neglect. Because he was not found to be deficient until after that period, the petition for termination was untenable as a matter of law. View "In re Haley D." on Justia Law

The state filed a neglect petition, naming Long, the legal guardian of her grandchildren along with the children's biological mother and father, as respondents. The biological father waived adjudication. Long and the biological mother stipulated that the children were neglected. The trial court terminated the guardianship and dismissed Long from the case. The appellate court reversed, holding that the legislature could not have intended that a guardian could be dismissed from the case based simply upon her dismissal as guardian. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1), once the court directs the removal or dismissal of a guardian, that individual no longer is a guardian and, thus, no longer a party respondent to the proceedings. The appellate court erred in looking to the children's best interests in deciding that Long would remain a party to the case even after she was dismissed as the children’s guardian. She is not without recourse; pursuant to section 1-5(2)(a), she may have the right to be heard as a previously appointed relative caregiver interested in the minors.View "In re C.C." on Justia Law

Termination proceedings began with 2006 charges that children, living with their mother, were neglected. The mother received Social Security benefits, but no effort was made to determine their source or to obtain a release of Social Security information. Later that year, a proceeding to collect child support from the father was initiated in the same prosecutor's office, with a complaint signed by a caseworker in the termination proceeding. In the collection matter, the father's birth date, Social Security number and description were listed The state located the father at a treatment center and obtained consent to a support order using funds from his disability benefits.The father challenged the termination of parental rights for lack of personal jurisdiction, claiming that, under the Juvenile Court Act, it was improper to serve him only by publication after attempts at personal service or service by certified mail were unsuccessful. The appellate court upheld the order. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that the state’s ability to obtain information in the child support action cast significant doubt on the diligence of inquiry in the termination proceedings and that relying on a computerized database search of a parent's name while ignoring, or not investigating, other potentially useful information, does not constitute a diligent inquiry. View "In re Dar. C. and Das. C., Minors" on Justia Law

Thomas M. was adjudicated to be a juvenile who had committed acts which would constitute a felony and misdemeanors and who was mentally ill and dangerous. The juvenile court ordered Thomas to be placed in the custody of DHHS and committed to detention. The court then ordered DHHS to identify appropriate placement, including counseling, for Thomas. The court subsequently found DHHS in contempt of the order. In a second order, the court stated that DHHS would be in contempt of court if it did not provide satisfactory evidence that certain future billings related to Thomas' placement were timely paid. DHHS appealed both orders. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the issues surrounding the first order were moot but could be considered under the public interest exception; and (2) the second order was not a final, appealable order because it did not affect a substantial right of DHHS. View "In re Interest of Thomas M." on Justia Law

R.G., father of A.L., appealed a juvenile court order confirming a judicial referee's decision to terminate his parental rights to four minor children. In 2003, R.G. was placed on criminal probation, and in March 2009, his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to a three-year prison term. In September 2009, R.G.'s four children involved in this action were all less than four years old and were residing with their mother when the children were taken into protective custody by Benson County Social Services and placed in foster care after the mother left the children with relatives and did not return. In May 2010, the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of R.G. and the mother. In August 2010, the juvenile court terminated the mother's parental rights and also found the children were deprived as to R.G., but the evidence was not sufficient to terminate his parental rights. The juvenile court stated R.G. was anticipating being paroled in January 2011 with release to a halfway house for three to four months. The court also stated R.G.'s early release was contingent upon his completion of a drug and alcohol treatment program. After a hearing, a judicial referee terminated R.G.'s parental rights to the four children, finding R.G. was not granted his early parole as anticipated because he had not yet completed his drug and alcohol treatment program due to his conduct in the prison facility. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court did not clearly err in finding the children were deprived, and did not abuse its discretion in terminating R.G.'s parental rights. View "Interest of A.L." on Justia Law

Defendant Ben Simons appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an order of the Department of Human Services which found that he had abused his two-year-old child and that services were required. Defendant and his wife Traci required their children to always respond to a parent in a respectful manner and to use the phrases "yes, sir" or "yes, ma'am." In 2009, while the Simons family was attending church, their two-year-old child refused to use the phrases "yes, sir" and "yes, ma'am" when responding to his parents. Defendant took the child outside and swatted him twice on his bottom. When they went back inside, Traci Simons was able to get the child to say "yes, sir" and "yes, ma'am." Later that evening, after returning home, the child again refused to respond to Defendant with "yes, sir." Defendant took the child to an upstairs bedroom and explained to him that he would be spanked if he did not say "yes, sir." When the child continued his refusal, Defendant placed him over his knee and struck him on his buttocks three times with a wooden backscratcher. The child was wearing pants and a diaper. Defendant then hugged and consoled the child for approximately fifteen minutes, explained the consequences if he refused to say "yes, sir," and emphasized to the child that he needed to show respect to his parents. He then gave the child the opportunity to say "yes, sir," and the child again refused. Defendant repeated the three swats with the wooden backscratcher, and again consoled and spoke with the child for approximately fifteen minutes. Two days later, Stark County Social Services received a report of suspected child abuse regarding the child. A social worker investigated the report and observed the bruises on the child's buttocks. Upon completion of the investigation, Stark County Social Services found the child was an abused child and issued a "services required" finding. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the Department's findings that Defendant had inflicted bodily injury upon the child and used unreasonable force were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and the relevant statutory provisions governing child abuse were not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. View "Simons v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

The juvenile court found that Respondent J.L.B. (Father) had abandoned A.B. (Child) and that therefore the Child was available for adoption by Petitioner D.P.H. (Stepfather). The juvenile court also determined that the fact that Father had filed parenting-time motions in the dissolution court did not outweigh overwhelming evidence of abandonment, including the fact that Father had not seen the Child in the twenty-one months prior to the filing of the adoption proceeding. Father appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed. The court determined that a finding of abandonment was precluded by the fact that Father had filed motions for parenting time in the dissolution court. The court also concluded that the juvenile court should have delayed the adoption determination until the parenting-time motions were resolved. Upon review of the case by the Supreme Court, the Court concluded that the "[i]t is the trial court's responsibility to consider the totality of the circumstances and to make this factual determination, which is to be disturbed only if it is clearly erroneous. ...It was therefore error for the court of appeals to determine that a single circumstance (the father's filing of a parenting-time motion) precluded a finding of intent to abandon, essentially as a matter of law." In addition, the Court found it was unnecessary for a trial court to delay adoption proceedings until a parenting-time motion in another court is resolved, so long as the trial court adequately considered the parenting-time motion in making its abandonment determination. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "D.P.H. v. J.L.B" on Justia Law

Steve Wolt appealed from an order denying his motion to amend a divorce judgment. In January 2010, the juvenile court found the two oldest Wolt children deprived because of Steve Wolt's "intentional and systematic efforts to alienate the children from [their mother] Kathy and to undermine Kathy's custody, authority and control of the children." The court found "these actions motivated [the two older children] to engage in unruly conduct, which in turn, caused them to be adjudicated as unruly children and placed in foster care." The juvenile court also found that "[w]ith regard to Kathy, the children are deprived because the alienation and disrespect that Steve has instilled in [the oldest children] towards Kathy, have caused such a serious disruption in their relations that Kathy can no longer provide proper parental care and control for [them], even though she obviously wishe[d] to do so." Steve Wolt argued the district court erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing on his motion to amend the judgment to change primary residential responsibility with regard to his third child who remained in his ex-wife's custody. He argued he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he established a prima facie case under state law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing on his motion to award him primary residential responsibility of his children and did not err in awarding Kathy Wolt attorney's fees. The Court also concluded, however, the district court erred in denying Steve Wolt a hearing on his motion to amend his parenting time. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wolt v. Wolt" on Justia Law

The state agency took a 15-month-old away from his home and parents and into temporary protective custody, following an accident and a hospital visit. Protective custody involved a safety plan that limited the parents' access to the child; the parents claimed to have been threatened into accepting the plan. In the parents' suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court determined that child welfare workers could have reasonably believed that taking temporary protective custody of the child was supported by probable cause and that the seizure did not violate a clearly established right. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the Fourth Amendment, substantive due process, and procedural due process claims premised on the initial removal, but vacated with respect to the Fourth Amendment and substantive due process claims premised on the continued withholding of the child as well as the substantive due process and procedural due process claims premised on the safety plan. View "Hernandez v. Foster" on Justia Law