Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, Hickman County, received a referral regarding allegations of abuse concerning the Andrews. A social worker was attempting to make contact when DCS received a second referral concerning the Andrews. Due to references to guns in the home and because the site visit was to be carried out at night, DCSs requested law enforcement to assist. The Sheriff’s Department dispatched two officers. Andrews was outside working when the group arrived and asked the officers to wait outside while he called the sheriff’s office. The Andrews claim that when Mr. Andrews opened the door, he was immediately followed into the house by a “whoosh of presence.” The Andrews claim that they granted permission for interviews of the children because they feared arrest or losing their children. The officers left the house and the Andrews acquiesced to the walk-through. No charges were filed and the assessment was closed as “no services indicated.” The Andrews filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to the social workers, but affirmed with respect to an officer. View "Andrews v. Hickman County" on Justia Law

In 2010, the younger child, a boy aged 2½ years, was brought to the emergency room by his mother. He had second-degree burns on his face. His mother had found him, injured, at the home of her boyfriend, who had been babysitting her two children. She did not live with the boyfriend. The children were determined to be neglected based on a finding of “environment injurious to their welfare.” The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court, noting that the evidence did not show that the mother had any prior indication that the boyfriend would not provide a safe environment and also noting that she immediately took the child to the hospital. The finding of neglect was against the manifest weight of the evidence. View "In re A.P." on Justia Law

Racine County Human Services Department caseworker Wagner removed Thor, a 12-year-old, from his parents’ home and placed him into protective custody. Thor suffers from cerebral palsy, global developmental delay, and is confined to a wheelchair. Wagner investigated after receiving a referral from personnel at Thor’s school concerning bruising on his arm and leg. A judge issued a probable cause order for removal, based on evidence of Thor’s injuries and that he had been left unattended. Thor suffered additional injuries as a result of accidents that occurred in foster care and at a rehabilitation facility. Thor’s mother and stepfather and Thor sued Wagner, his supervisor, another caseworker, and her supervisor, alleging violations of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on qualified immunity grounds and because plaintiffs failed to establish sufficient evidence of racial animus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for any alleged violation of plaintiffs’ right to familial relations; for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to bodily security and integrity based on the decision to continue his placements; and for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to individualized treatment. View "Xiong v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Erick M., a juvenile, requested that the juvenile court enter an order finding that under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J), he was eligible for "special immigrant juvenile" (SIJ) status. SIJ status allows a juvenile immigrant to remain in the United States and seek lawful permanent resident status if federal authorities conclude that the statutory conditions are met. The conditions include a court order determining that the juvenile's reunification with "1 or both" parents is not feasible because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The juvenile court found Erick did not satisfy that requirement. At issue on appeal was the meaning of the phrase "1 or both" parents. Erick lived only with his mother when the juvenile court adjudicated him as a dependent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when ruling on a petitioner's motion for an eligibility order under section 1101(a)(27)(J), a court should generally consider whether reunification with either parent is feasible; and (2) therefore, the juvenile court did no err in finding that because reunification with Erick's mother was feasible, he was not eligible for SIJ status. View "In re Interest of Erick H." on Justia Law

K.H. appealed juvenile court order that extended the placement of his daughter T.H. in the custody and control of Barnes County Social Services and an order that denied his motion to dismiss. On appeal, K.H. argued the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction, applied the wrong standard of proof in finding the child was deprived in 2008, erred in allowing his plea to the allegations of deprivation, the duration of the deprivation proceedings was excessive, and in finding the child continues to be deprived. Finding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Interest of T.H." on Justia Law

This case arose from a dependency-neglect proceeding. After a permanency-planning hearing was set, the circuit court discovered that the Department of Human Services (DHS) had failed to draft and put into place a case plan. The court then ordered that, as the case worker had forty-one cases on her caseload and fifty juveniles in fostercare, DHS should rectify the issue in five days. DHS subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, asserting that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction and violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by issuing an order that DHS alleged invaded the discretionary functions of the executive branch. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court was within its jurisdiction to act to protect the integrity of the proceedings and to safeguard the rights of the litigants before it when it ordered DHS to correct problems that were preventing work and services. View "Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Shelby" on Justia Law

The baby was exposed to cocaine in utero; the state took the child into protective custody and filed a petition pursuant to 705 ILCS 405/2-13. The petition did not seek termination of parental rights. Mother was personally served; abode service was made on father by leaving the summons and petition with his mother at the house they shared. The circuit court made the baby a ward of the court. By the time of the permanency hearing, mother's whereabouts were unknown. Although father did not comply with all aspects of the service plan, the court continued to set return to the family as the permanency goal. When the baby was about 18 months old, the court allowed foster parents to intervene and the state to begin termination proceedings and subsequently entered a default judgment against father. The appellate court reversed because the state had made no attempt to serve father. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The court noted many procedural defects and that father had made progress in meeting goals during nine months following the adjudication of neglect. Because he was not found to be deficient until after that period, the petition for termination was untenable as a matter of law. View "In re Haley D." on Justia Law

The state filed a neglect petition, naming Long, the legal guardian of her grandchildren along with the children's biological mother and father, as respondents. The biological father waived adjudication. Long and the biological mother stipulated that the children were neglected. The trial court terminated the guardianship and dismissed Long from the case. The appellate court reversed, holding that the legislature could not have intended that a guardian could be dismissed from the case based simply upon her dismissal as guardian. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1), once the court directs the removal or dismissal of a guardian, that individual no longer is a guardian and, thus, no longer a party respondent to the proceedings. The appellate court erred in looking to the children's best interests in deciding that Long would remain a party to the case even after she was dismissed as the children’s guardian. She is not without recourse; pursuant to section 1-5(2)(a), she may have the right to be heard as a previously appointed relative caregiver interested in the minors.View "In re C.C." on Justia Law

Termination proceedings began with 2006 charges that children, living with their mother, were neglected. The mother received Social Security benefits, but no effort was made to determine their source or to obtain a release of Social Security information. Later that year, a proceeding to collect child support from the father was initiated in the same prosecutor's office, with a complaint signed by a caseworker in the termination proceeding. In the collection matter, the father's birth date, Social Security number and description were listed The state located the father at a treatment center and obtained consent to a support order using funds from his disability benefits.The father challenged the termination of parental rights for lack of personal jurisdiction, claiming that, under the Juvenile Court Act, it was improper to serve him only by publication after attempts at personal service or service by certified mail were unsuccessful. The appellate court upheld the order. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that the state’s ability to obtain information in the child support action cast significant doubt on the diligence of inquiry in the termination proceedings and that relying on a computerized database search of a parent's name while ignoring, or not investigating, other potentially useful information, does not constitute a diligent inquiry. View "In re Dar. C. and Das. C., Minors" on Justia Law

Thomas M. was adjudicated to be a juvenile who had committed acts which would constitute a felony and misdemeanors and who was mentally ill and dangerous. The juvenile court ordered Thomas to be placed in the custody of DHHS and committed to detention. The court then ordered DHHS to identify appropriate placement, including counseling, for Thomas. The court subsequently found DHHS in contempt of the order. In a second order, the court stated that DHHS would be in contempt of court if it did not provide satisfactory evidence that certain future billings related to Thomas' placement were timely paid. DHHS appealed both orders. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the issues surrounding the first order were moot but could be considered under the public interest exception; and (2) the second order was not a final, appealable order because it did not affect a substantial right of DHHS. View "In re Interest of Thomas M." on Justia Law