Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Family Law
In re J.H.K. and J.D.K.
Following a termination of parental rights (TPR) hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating both parents' parental rights to J.H.K. and J.D.K. The father appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in conducting the TPR hearing when the minor children's non-attorney guardian ad litem (GAL) volunteer was not physically present in court. The court of appeals reversed, concluding the children were not represented by a GAL at a critical stage of the termination proceedings pursuant to the juvenile code. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a local GAL program represents a juvenile within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-601 and 7B-1108 by performing the duties listed in section 7B-601 and that the non-lawyer GAL volunteer is not required to be physically present at the TPR hearing. The Court concluded that the GAL met its obligations in the present case under the statutes. View "In re J.H.K. and J.D.K." on Justia Law
State v. Kikuta
Respondent Cedric Kikuta was convicted by a jury for assault in the third degree after a physical altercation with his stepson. Respondent appealed, arguing that the court erred in failing to instruct the jurors on the parental discipline defense and on whether the assault in the third degree occurred during the course of a scuffle, or affray, entered into by mutual consent. The court of appeals (1) held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the parental discipline defense and (2) chose not to address Respondent's argument regarding a mutual affray instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court regarding the parental discipline defense but vacated the judgment as to the lack of disposition regarding a mutual affray instruction. The Court held that (1) an instruction on the parental discipline defense is not per se precluded by the fact that substantial bodily injury occurred; (2) an instruction on the parental discipline defense must be given if there is some evidence to support each element of the defense; and (3) a mutual affray instruction must be given where there is some evidence the injury was inflicted during a fight entered into by mutual consent. View "State v. Kikuta" on Justia Law
In Re: N. A., I. A., C. P. and M. P.
In 2009, a petition for abuse and neglect was filed in circuit court regarding N.A, I.A, C.P. and M.P. The petition was filed against the children's biological mother and their maternal grandparents, all of whom were alleged to have care and custody of the children as they all resided at the grandparents' home. The petition was based on allegations of domestic abuse between the mother and grandfather in the presence of the children. At an adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court found that the children's mother had neglected her children. The circuit court ordered that the Department of Health and Human Resources retain legal custody of the children while physical custody remained with the grandparents so long as the mother had no contact with them. DHHR found that the grandparents consistently violated the "no-contact" order of the court. The children were eventually placed in foster care. "Joshua G." was listed on the petition, but was not accused of any abuse. Joshua was the biological father of M.P. He petitioned the court for sole custody of M.P. The court denied his request. Among the issues all parents brought on appeal were whether the circuit court erred by (1) denying Joshua custody of M.P.; and, (2) denying the grandparents' request for physical custody of all the children. The Supreme Court declined to rule on the issues presented on appeal. Rather, the Court remanded the case for additional hearings at the circuit court. The Court considered that though the record reflects the extent to which the children were abused, it acknowledged that the children still have strong bonds with their grandparents. "It is imperative . . . that the circuit court focus on whether such continued contact [with the grandparents] is in the best interest of the children." The Court advised DHHR to develop a permanency plan for the children so that the siblings remain together. "The lower court faces a Herculean task of requiring wisdom, compassion and the strength to protect the children to the greatest degree possible from physical and emotional harm, and to create stability and safety."
In re Dependency of K.N.J.
K.N.J. was born in 2005 to Marquesha Everett and Petitioner Michael Jenkins. K.N.J. suffered extreme abuse at the hands of her mother. After discovery of the abuse, K.N.J. was removed from her mother's care and placed in foster care. Petitioner was served with a summons and petition for a dependency hearing. A judge pro tempore presided over the initial hearing. The mother consented to the judge's hearing the case. Petitioner did not appear and was not represented by counsel. The judge pro tempore entered a default order of dependency despite her status and Petitioner's lack of consent. Subsequent hearings were held, and an elected judge presided over them. Petitioner did not appear until the permanency planning hearing. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case, asserting that the original dependency order was void because Petitioner did not consent to a judge pro tempore. The trial court denied Petitioner's motion to dismiss and terminated his parental rights. Petitioner appealed the termination to the Supreme Court. The Court found that K.N.J.'s dependency was amply proved at the termination trial where Petitioner was present and represented by counsel. Furthermore the trial court's findings supported the termination of Petitioner's parental rights. The Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court.
Camreta v. Greene, et al.; Alford v. Greene, et al.
Nearly a decade ago, petitioners, a state child protective services worker and a county deputy sheriff, interviewed then 9-year-old S.G. at her Oregon elementary school about allegations that her father had sexually abused her. Her father stood trial for that abuse but the jury failed to reach a verdict and the charges were later dismissed. S.G.'s mother subsequently sued petitioners on S.G.'s behalf for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the in-school interview breached the Fourth Amendment's proscription on unreasonable seizures. The Ninth Circuit held that petitioners' conduct violated the Fourth Amendment but that they were entitled to qualified immunity from damages liability because no clearly established law had warned them of the illegality of the conduct. Although judgment was entered in petitioners' favor, they petitioned the Court to review the Ninth Circuit's ruling that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. At issue was whether government officials who prevailed on grounds of qualified immunity could obtain the Court's review of a court of appeals' decision that their conduct violated the Constitution. Also at issue was, if the Court could consider cases in this procedural posture, did the Ninth Circuit correctly determine that this interview breached the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that it could generally review a lower court's constitutional ruling at the behest of a government official granted immunity but could not do so in this case for reasons peculiar to it. The case had become moot because the child had grown up and moved across the country and so would never again be subject to the Oregon in-school interviewing practices whose constitutionality was at issue. Therefore, the Court did not reach the Fourth Amendment question in this case and vacated the part of the Ninth Circuit's opinion that decided the Fourth Amendment issue.
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law, Family Law, Juvenile Law, U.S. Supreme Court
In re Interest of Meridian H.
Meridian H. is a 3-year-old girl who had been in foster care for all but a few weeks of her life. Her presumed biological father had died before she was born, and her biological motherâs parental rights were terminated. She had two minor siblings who were adopted before she was born. Meridianâs adoptive parents, on behalf of the siblings, intervened in the juvenile courtâs proceedings to request that Meridian be placed in their home in Minnesota to keep the siblings together. Meridianâs maternal grandparents also intervened and filed a cross appeal seeking custody. The juvenile court denied the requests, and the adoptive parents and maternal grandparents appealed. The Supreme Court was ânot persuaded that it would be logical or prudent to conclude that a constitutionally protected sibling relationship somehow [rose] from the ashes of a lawfully terminated or relinquished parent-child relationship.â The Court concluded that neither the adoptive parents, the siblings nor the maternal grandparents had standing to challenge the juvenile courtâs ruling. The Court dismissed the appeals.
Martin Stern v. Michelle Stern
Appellant petitioned for his son's transfer to Israel for custody adjudication alleging that his son had been wrongfully detained in Iowa by the child's mother. At issue was whether the district court erred in finding that the parties' intention was to make Iowa the habitual residence where the district court emphasized the son's perspective that the settled purpose of his relocation to Iowa was to reside there habitually. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that the parties' intent at the time of the move was to make Iowa the son's habitual residence whether the district court emphasized the son's perspective or the parents' perspectives; that the parties maintained no home in Israel after coming to Iowa and appellant spent two months closing down his business before rejoining his family in the United States; that it appeared that the family did intend to "abandon" Israel; and any agreement of the pair to return to Israel would have involved staying in the United States for the indefinite amount of time it would take the mother to finish her doctorate.
In the Matter of the Adoption of RMS
The biological mother of the child at issue appealed from the order allowing the father and stepmother's petition to adopt the minor child to proceed without the mother's consent because she did not pay child support for a year before the petition was filed. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by allowing the petition for adoption to proceed without the consent of the mother and whether evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the mother had willfully failed to pay child support. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that the mother willfully failed to support her child where she failed to take the necessary steps to become employed and support her child and that she failed to demonstrate that, through whatever means were available to her, she had not forgotten her legal obligation to support her child. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's findings.
In the Matter of Afton C. v Dutchess County Dept. of Social Services
The Duchess County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed neglect petitions pursuant to Family Court article 10 against respondents, a mother and a father, alleging that father neglected his children because he was an "untreated" sex offender whose crimes involved victims between 13 and 15 years-old and mother allegedly failed to protect the children from father. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that respondents' children were neglected pursuant to article 10 of the Family Court Act. The court affirmed the Appellate Division and held that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove neglect where DSS failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that father posed an imminent danger to his children and therefore, DSS necessarily failed to prove that mother neglected the children by allowing father to return home.
In Re: Shirley B.
Petitioner Ms. B. and Mr. T. are the biological parents of Shirley, Jordan, Davon and Cedric (collectively, "the Children"). In 2005, the Children were referred to Prince George's County Department of Social Services following reports of neglect and sexual abuse. A subsequent psychological evaluation revealed that Ms. B. was cognitively impaired, and that the Children had special needs of their own. Ms. B. was largely unresponsive to the Department's assistance, and she allowed vital benefits to lapse. She also allowed unauthorized adults to move into her home, exposing the Children to drug use and sexual activity. After a violent altercation between Ms. B., Mr. T. and Shirley, the Department sought to remove the Children from Ms. B.'s care. Proceedings at juvenile court ended with the Children being permanently removed from their home. Ms. B. appealed the decision, arguing the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite her with her children, claiming she did not receive any specialized parenting services. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the lower courts' records and affirmed their decisions: "the Department actively tried to connect the mother with services that could potentially assist her in her parental role⦠Accordingly, it made reasonable efforts toward unification."