Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

C.S. appealed from a juvenile court's order that found his child T.S., a delinquent and unruly child for committing disorderly conduct. At the hearing, the State presented evidence about the two alleged acts of disorderly conduct. The State asserted the first act of disorderly conduct involved a classroom incident. T.S.'s second-grade teacher testified that while attending class, T.S. started screaming words that were not making sense. T.S. later kicked the aide after a short "time out." The second act of disorderly conduct took place on a school bus. The bus driver testified that while driving the special needs bus, she heard T.S. scream the "N" word. She asked T.S. to go to the front of the bus but he refused and called her "a**hole" and "fat a**." The bus driver used physical force to restrain T.S. The juvenile court found T.S. a delinquent child and an unruly child in need of treatment and rehabilitation. The court concluded it was in the best interest of T.S. to be removed from the care of his father and be placed in the care, custody, and control of Stutsman County Social Services for one year. On appeal, C.S. argued that insufficient evidence was presented to support the juvenile court's findings of fact. Furthermore, C.S. asserted the juvenile court violated T.S.'s constitutional rights by failing to sua sponte conduct a competency hearing. Upon careful consideration of the juvenile court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the court's finding. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the juvenile court did not violate T.S.'s due process rights by failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing. The Court affirmed the juvenile court's order. View "Interest of T.S." on Justia Law

R.A. appealed a juvenile court order that transferred its jurisdiction to the district court and the district court's order affirming the transfer. In March 2010, a delinquency petition and notice of intent to transfer to district court was filed, alleging R.A. committed the offenses of gross sexual imposition and terrorizing. The State alleged R.A. engaged in a sexual act with another juvenile, A.H., by compelling A.H. to submit by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury. The State alleged R.A. sent A.H. text messages and other messages through the Internet that contained threats. After a hearing on the transfer request, the judicial referee found there was probable cause to believe R.A. committed the offenses and ordered the case be transferred to district court. R.A. requested a district court judge review the judicial referee's findings and order, arguing the evidence did not support a finding of probable cause, the judicial referee misinterpreted or misapplied the transfer statute because the statute requires the threats be to the victim and not another person, and his confrontation rights were violated. The district court affirmed and adopted the judicial referee's findings and order. On appeal to the Supreme Court, R.A. argued there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause because the threats of physical harm were threats of future conduct and were not imminent. The Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court did not err in finding there was probable cause R.A. committed the offenses. The Court affirmed the lower courts' orders. View "Interest of R.A." on Justia Law

B.T., the father of L.T., appealed the juvenile court's order that adopted a judicial referee's findings of fact and order committing L.T. to the care of the Division of Juvenile Services following his admissions to gross sexual imposition and ingestion of a controlled substance. During his initial appearance and his pretrial conference, L.T. appeared with court-appointed counsel, but his parents were not separately represented. L.T. admitted to the charges in the State's petition following an amendment. The amendment reduced the felony level of the gross sexual imposition charge against L.T. which allowed him to avoid being tried as an adult. At the dispositional hearing, L.T. and his parents B.T. and H.T. were all represented by separate court-appointed counsel. There was much debate over mandatory registration of L.T. as a sexual offender, but the judicial referee concluded L.T. would be required to register. Neither L.T. nor his mother H.T. appealed the judicial referee's order committing L.T. to Juvenile Services and mandating his registration as a sexual offender. However B.T. appealed, requesting the juvenile court to review the judicial referee's order. B.T. argued the referee erred by not adequately advising B.T. that L.T. would be required to register as a sexual offender after admitting to the State's charges. Furthermore, B.T. contended it was unconstitutional for an indigent parent to be denied court-appointed counsel during the adjudicative phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The juvenile court rejected B.T.'s arguments and adopted the judicial referee's findings and order. On appeal, B.T. argued the State Uniform Juvenile Court Act was unconstitutional, and his constitutional right to counsel was violated in the first of L.T.'s adjudicative hearings. Upon careful consideration of the trial record, the Supreme Court concluded that the right-to-counsel statute in North Dakota's Uniform Juvenile Court Act protects the constitutional rights of parents and juveniles. The Court affirmed the juvenile court's disposition of L.T.'s case. View "Interest of L.T." on Justia Law

G.K.T. appealed the district court's judgment granting T.L.T.'s motion for summary judgment and dismissing his complaint against T.L.T. and T.K. for intentional infliction of emotional distress. T.M.T. was born in 1997 to T.L.T. and T.K., the child's biological mother and father. T.L.T. and T.K. did not have a continuing relationship. G.K.T. moved to a house near T.L.T. and they became friends. In 1998, they began to live together with the child, and they married in 2000. G.K.T. adopted the child with T.K.'s consent in 2001. In 2007, G.K.T. and T.L.T. divorced; the court awarded T.L.T. primary residential responsibility and G.K.T. received parenting time. According to G.K.T., the divorce occurred because T.L.T. tried to re-establish T.K.'s relationship with the child. In 2008, T.L.T. began a new relationship with T.K., who began to spend time with the child. G.K.T. believed his relationship with his adopted child deteriorated because of the new relationship between T.L.T. and T.K, whom he sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress. He claimed T.L.T. and T.K. tried to "spoil and ruin [his] father-daughter relationship." G.K.T. asserted, as a result, that he "lost the love and affection of his daughter who is now acting in a hateful manner towards [him by] stating [he] is not her father." G.K.T. asserted that T.L.T. and T.K. acted outrageously, causing him to experience severe emotional distress. G.K.T. claimed to have lost sleep, experienced heartache and stress, and lost his job as a result of his emotional distress. On appeal to the Supreme Court, G.K.T. argued the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of T.L.T. and T.K. because it did not consider the differences between the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the elements of alienation of affections in a parent-child relationship. He also argued the district court erred as a matter of law by failing to recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress as an actionable tort in North Dakota. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that G.K.T.'s his claims against T.L.T. and T.K. did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision dismissing the case. View "G.K.T. v. T.L.T." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the Juvenile Court's determination that her daughter was in need of care and protection and dispensed with the need for the child's parents' consent to adoption, guardianship, custody, or other disposition of the child, which effectively terminated the parents' rights. At issue was whether G.L.c. 233, section 82, which in certain circumstances allowed the admission into evidence in a civil proceeding of "out-of-court statements of a child under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact performed on or with the child," applied where the child was under the age of ten when she made the statements but ten years of age or older at the time of trial. The court held that the statute applied where the child was under the age of ten when she made the statements, regardless of her age at the time of the trial. Therefore, the court held that the hearsay statements made by the child when she was under the age of ten but admitted in evidence when she was eleven years of age were properly admitted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Juvenile Court's decree. View "Adoption of Daisy" on Justia Law

Following a termination of parental rights (TPR) hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating both parents' parental rights to J.H.K. and J.D.K. The father appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in conducting the TPR hearing when the minor children's non-attorney guardian ad litem (GAL) volunteer was not physically present in court. The court of appeals reversed, concluding the children were not represented by a GAL at a critical stage of the termination proceedings pursuant to the juvenile code. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a local GAL program represents a juvenile within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-601 and 7B-1108 by performing the duties listed in section 7B-601 and that the non-lawyer GAL volunteer is not required to be physically present at the TPR hearing. The Court concluded that the GAL met its obligations in the present case under the statutes. View "In re J.H.K. and J.D.K." on Justia Law

Respondent Cedric Kikuta was convicted by a jury for assault in the third degree after a physical altercation with his stepson. Respondent appealed, arguing that the court erred in failing to instruct the jurors on the parental discipline defense and on whether the assault in the third degree occurred during the course of a scuffle, or affray, entered into by mutual consent. The court of appeals (1) held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the parental discipline defense and (2) chose not to address Respondent's argument regarding a mutual affray instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court regarding the parental discipline defense but vacated the judgment as to the lack of disposition regarding a mutual affray instruction. The Court held that (1) an instruction on the parental discipline defense is not per se precluded by the fact that substantial bodily injury occurred; (2) an instruction on the parental discipline defense must be given if there is some evidence to support each element of the defense; and (3) a mutual affray instruction must be given where there is some evidence the injury was inflicted during a fight entered into by mutual consent. View "State v. Kikuta" on Justia Law

In 2009, a petition for abuse and neglect was filed in circuit court regarding N.A, I.A, C.P. and M.P. The petition was filed against the children's biological mother and their maternal grandparents, all of whom were alleged to have care and custody of the children as they all resided at the grandparents' home. The petition was based on allegations of domestic abuse between the mother and grandfather in the presence of the children. At an adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court found that the children's mother had neglected her children. The circuit court ordered that the Department of Health and Human Resources retain legal custody of the children while physical custody remained with the grandparents so long as the mother had no contact with them. DHHR found that the grandparents consistently violated the "no-contact" order of the court. The children were eventually placed in foster care. "Joshua G." was listed on the petition, but was not accused of any abuse. Joshua was the biological father of M.P. He petitioned the court for sole custody of M.P. The court denied his request. Among the issues all parents brought on appeal were whether the circuit court erred by (1) denying Joshua custody of M.P.; and, (2) denying the grandparents' request for physical custody of all the children. The Supreme Court declined to rule on the issues presented on appeal. Rather, the Court remanded the case for additional hearings at the circuit court. The Court considered that though the record reflects the extent to which the children were abused, it acknowledged that the children still have strong bonds with their grandparents. "It is imperative . . . that the circuit court focus on whether such continued contact [with the grandparents] is in the best interest of the children." The Court advised DHHR to develop a permanency plan for the children so that the siblings remain together. "The lower court faces a Herculean task of requiring wisdom, compassion and the strength to protect the children to the greatest degree possible from physical and emotional harm, and to create stability and safety."

K.N.J. was born in 2005 to Marquesha Everett and Petitioner Michael Jenkins. K.N.J. suffered extreme abuse at the hands of her mother. After discovery of the abuse, K.N.J. was removed from her mother's care and placed in foster care. Petitioner was served with a summons and petition for a dependency hearing. A judge pro tempore presided over the initial hearing. The mother consented to the judge's hearing the case. Petitioner did not appear and was not represented by counsel. The judge pro tempore entered a default order of dependency despite her status and Petitioner's lack of consent. Subsequent hearings were held, and an elected judge presided over them. Petitioner did not appear until the permanency planning hearing. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case, asserting that the original dependency order was void because Petitioner did not consent to a judge pro tempore. The trial court denied Petitioner's motion to dismiss and terminated his parental rights. Petitioner appealed the termination to the Supreme Court. The Court found that K.N.J.'s dependency was amply proved at the termination trial where Petitioner was present and represented by counsel. Furthermore the trial court's findings supported the termination of Petitioner's parental rights. The Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court.

Nearly a decade ago, petitioners, a state child protective services worker and a county deputy sheriff, interviewed then 9-year-old S.G. at her Oregon elementary school about allegations that her father had sexually abused her. Her father stood trial for that abuse but the jury failed to reach a verdict and the charges were later dismissed. S.G.'s mother subsequently sued petitioners on S.G.'s behalf for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the in-school interview breached the Fourth Amendment's proscription on unreasonable seizures. The Ninth Circuit held that petitioners' conduct violated the Fourth Amendment but that they were entitled to qualified immunity from damages liability because no clearly established law had warned them of the illegality of the conduct. Although judgment was entered in petitioners' favor, they petitioned the Court to review the Ninth Circuit's ruling that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. At issue was whether government officials who prevailed on grounds of qualified immunity could obtain the Court's review of a court of appeals' decision that their conduct violated the Constitution. Also at issue was, if the Court could consider cases in this procedural posture, did the Ninth Circuit correctly determine that this interview breached the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that it could generally review a lower court's constitutional ruling at the behest of a government official granted immunity but could not do so in this case for reasons peculiar to it. The case had become moot because the child had grown up and moved across the country and so would never again be subject to the Oregon in-school interviewing practices whose constitutionality was at issue. Therefore, the Court did not reach the Fourth Amendment question in this case and vacated the part of the Ninth Circuit's opinion that decided the Fourth Amendment issue.