Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Minor Petitioners Latisha Head and Ashley McCoy through their mothers Shirley Russell and Shirley McCoy (collectively Petitioners) filed a complaint against the Jackson Public School District (JPS), the City of Jackson, the Jackson Police Department and several school officials because of a skirmish that occurred at Watkins Elementary School. Petitioners' complaint alleged assault and battery against a school official as a result of an altercation with Ms. Head. Four years would pass between Petitioners' initial complaint and the discovery phase of the case for various reasons by both parties' counsel. JPS moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute. The circuit court denied the motion, and from this denial, JPS appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no inexcusable delay and that JPS suffered no actual prejudice. The Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of JPS' motion, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jackson Public Sch. Dist. v. Head" on Justia Law

This case involved the placement of juvenile A.B., who was being detained at a juvenile center. The juvenile court concluded that A.B. be placed out of state at Canyon State Academy where A.B. could learn to be independent. The Department of Child Services (DCS) overruled the decision, requiring A.B. to be placed at one of several facilities in Indiana. The trial court entered an order of modification, finding that three sections of the Indiana Code allowing the director of DCS to supplant the juvenile court judge in making dispositional decrees affecting children under his jurisdiction were unconstitutional. DCS appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order regarding the constitutionality of the statues, holding that the three statutes do not violate the separation of powers provision of the Indiana constitution. The Court then held that the DCS requirement that A.B. be placed in Indiana rather than out of state at Canyon State Academy was arbitrary and capricious, upheld the trial court's placement of A.B. at Canyon State Academy, and ordered DCS to pay for the placement. View "A.B. v. State" on Justia Law

Appellee Brooke Nelson brought suit against elementary public school teacher Dianne Turner after allegations that Nelson's five-year-old daughter had been sexually assaulted by another student. The complaint alleged, among other causes of action, that Turner failed to report to enforcement officials the alleged sexual assault. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Turner, concluding that Turner was entitled to qualified official immunity because her action, i.e., determining whether the facts constituted abuse, was discretionary in nature. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with directions to reconsider the mandatory abuse reporting obligation of Kan. Rev. Stat. 620.030. On remand, the trial court again found qualified official immunity applicable. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the reporting requirement of the statute was mandatory and therefore ministerial, obviating any application for qualified official immunity. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the trial court properly granted Turner's motion for summary judgment because Turner's actions were discretionary in nature rather than ministerial and, therefore, she was entitled to the defense of qualified official immunity under law. View "Turner v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, married couples who worked as house parents to children who were "severely emotionally disturbed" in defendants' homes, sued defendants for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. 203(r)(2)(A). The children attended local public schools and participated in other activities away from the homes. Although, the children participated in group therapy conducted by clinicians in the homes, they received most of their medical and psychological treatment outside the homes. Plaintiffs were not licensed medical or social service professionals. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's conclusion that defendants' homes were covered by the FLSA and were subject to its overtime provisions. The court held that defendants' homes were not covered by the FLSA because they were not an "institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, mentally ill or defective who resided on the premises of such institution." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Probert, et al. v. Family Centered Serv. of AK, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners Daniel and Lisa B. appealed the decision of the New Hampshire State Board of Education (Board) that upheld a thirty-four day suspension imposed on their daughter Keelin B. Keelin opened an email account under another studentâs name, and then sent sexually suggestive, lewd and threatening email messages to the principal of her school and one teacher. When the deception was discovered, the Board âsentencedâ Keelin to a thirty-four day suspension. Keelinâs parents appealed to the School Board, but the Board upheld the suspension. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Keelinâs âsentenceâ exceeded the Boardâs maximum allowable suspension under these kinds of circumstances. The Court reduced Keelinâs suspension to twenty days, but affirmed the Boardâs decision in all other respects.

The Duchess County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed neglect petitions pursuant to Family Court article 10 against respondents, a mother and a father, alleging that father neglected his children because he was an "untreated" sex offender whose crimes involved victims between 13 and 15 years-old and mother allegedly failed to protect the children from father. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that respondents' children were neglected pursuant to article 10 of the Family Court Act. The court affirmed the Appellate Division and held that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove neglect where DSS failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that father posed an imminent danger to his children and therefore, DSS necessarily failed to prove that mother neglected the children by allowing father to return home.