Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a child who was removed from his parents due to domestic violence, the father’s criminal history, and the mother’s untreated mental illness. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services placed the child with a caretaker and provided reunification services to the parents, but these efforts were unsuccessful. Parental rights were ultimately terminated, and adoption was set as the permanent plan. Throughout the proceedings, the Department investigated whether the child might have Native American heritage, as required under California law analogous to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the Department’s efforts to determine the child's possible Native American ancestry. The parents had initially denied any such heritage, but at one point the father suggested there might be Native American ancestry. The Department interviewed or attempted to contact numerous relatives and family associates about possible Native American ancestry, but did not contact four specific known relatives. After reviewing the Department's inquiry, the juvenile court found there was no reason to know that ICWA applied in this case.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the adequacy of the Department’s inquiry under the deferential standard established by the California Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal held that the Department had adequately discharged its duty of reasonable inquiry by asking those persons it would normally contact whether the child might have Native American heritage, and was not required to contact every possible relative. The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s order, explicitly disagreeing with a contrary approach that would impose broader duties on the Department. View "In re K.G." on Justia Law

Four juveniles were found jointly and severally liable for victim restitution in the amount of $15,850.54, after an incident involving Jane Doe and her family. Two of the minors, J.L. and O.V., appealed the restitution order, specifically challenging a portion related to childcare expenses incurred by Doe’s mother. Both minors accepted the legitimacy of some childcare costs but argued for reductions in the total awarded based on their interpretation of supporting evidence. Additionally, J.L. and O.V. sought apportionment of the total restitution among the four co-offenders, referencing a recent amendment to the Welfare and Institutions Code that eliminated joint and several liability in juvenile delinquency restitution matters, effective January 1, 2025.The Superior Court of Marin County initially heard the matter. The juvenile court found that the People had established the restitution amount by a preponderance of the evidence and ordered all four minors jointly and severally liable for the total sum. J.L. and O.V. subsequently appealed the restitution order to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the evidentiary record and legal arguments. The appellate court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $3,850 for childcare expenses, finding sufficient factual support for the amount claimed. Regarding apportionment, the appellate court concluded that the recent statutory amendment to eliminate joint and several liability for victim restitution applies prospectively and not retroactively. Thus, J.L. and O.V. were not entitled to have their restitution obligations apportioned under the new law. The judgment of the juvenile court was affirmed. View "In re J.L." on Justia Law

Two minor children, J.C. and S.C.Y., both enrolled members of the Mandan Hidatsa Arikara Nation, were placed in the care of Ward County Human Service Zone after repeated removals due to concerns about their mother, P.D.'s, ability to provide proper care. The children were found to be in need of protection and had spent substantial periods in foster care. The State sought termination of P.D.’s parental rights, alleging persistent issues that endangered the children’s well-being, including P.D.'s instability, incomplete compliance with service plans, ongoing substance abuse, and involvement in criminal activity.The Juvenile Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, reviewed the petitions and held a trial. The court considered testimony from various witnesses and documentary evidence, including progress reports and judicial notice of prior protection proceedings. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of protection, the causes for protection were likely to continue, and the children had suffered harm. The court also found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that returning the children to P.D. would likely cause them serious emotional or physical harm. The court terminated P.D.’s parental rights.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s factual findings and conclusions regarding the need for protection and likelihood of ongoing harm. However, the Supreme Court found that the juvenile court failed to make the required specific findings under N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01(2), which mandates detailed findings that “active efforts” were made to provide remedial and rehabilitative services to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and that these efforts were unsuccessful. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded the case for the juvenile court to make these necessary findings, allowing additional evidence if required. View "Interest of S.C.Y." on Justia Law

A petition was filed seeking to adjudicate a juvenile, Jerel, as having committed an act that would constitute the felony of terroristic threats under Nebraska law. The incident at issue involved Jerel, then placed in foster care with Lanslot Pyne, allegedly threatening Pyne with violence during a confrontation in the night. Pyne testified that Jerel, while holding a knife, stated he had considered ways to kill Pyne and made explicit threats to harm or kill him. Jerel presented a different account, denying the threats and claiming he was attempting to prompt a change in his placement by displaying items to Pyne.The Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster County heard the case. On the day of the adjudication hearing, Jerel’s counsel moved to disqualify the judge and for a continuance, citing late discovery of related documents and lack of time to meet with Jerel. Both motions were denied. At trial, the court found Pyne’s testimony credible and Jerel’s not believable, ultimately adjudicating Jerel as a juvenile under the relevant statute for committing an act constituting terroristic threats. Jerel appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of the continuance, and alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo, giving weight to the juvenile court’s credibility determinations. The court held that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Jerel committed an act constituting terroristic threats, as Pyne’s credible testimony established both the threats and the intent to terrorize. The court found no ineffective assistance of counsel under any applicable standard, as Jerel showed neither deficient performance nor prejudice. The denial of the continuance was also upheld, as no prejudice was demonstrated. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the adjudication. View "In re Interest of Jerel S." on Justia Law

A teenage boy was found delinquent for committing second-degree sexual assault against his five-year-old half-niece. On Thanksgiving Day 2022, while staying at the victim’s home, the boy digitally penetrated the child’s rectum on a living room couch. The incident ended when the victim’s mother entered the room. Later that day, the child disclosed the assault to her parents, who contacted police and took her to the hospital. A sexual-assault nurse found no observable injury but collected rectal swabs and underwear, both of which tested positive for male DNA, though not in sufficient quantity to identify a specific individual. About a week later, the victim gave a recorded forensic interview detailing the assault.The State of Arkansas filed a delinquency petition in the Saline County Circuit Court, Juvenile Division. At the bench trial, the victim testified about the assault. The defense sought to impeach her credibility by playing selected segments of her prior forensic interview, suggesting inconsistencies. The State moved to admit the full recording under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 803(25), arguing it was necessary for context. The circuit court admitted the entire recording after in camera review, found the victim credible, and adjudicated the boy delinquent for second-degree sexual assault.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of the entire recorded interview. The court held that substantial evidence, including the victim’s testimony, corroboration by her parents, and the DNA evidence, supported the delinquency adjudication. The court further held that, although Rule 803(25) did not authorize admitting the full recording, it was admissible for rehabilitation and context in light of the defense’s impeachment attempt. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the adjudication. View "MINOR CHILD v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

After the birth of G.W., he resided with his mother at her parents’ home, and the father was frequently present. DCYF investigated an earlier incident involving the child rolling off a couch and closed it as unfounded. When the child was approximately five weeks old, he was seen by his pediatrician after his parents reported bleeding in his mouth, but no cause was identified. Later that day, following an argument, the mother witnessed the father throw the child onto a bed but left him in the father’s care overnight. The next day, the mother noticed the child’s left arm was immobile; she delayed seeking medical care despite advice from a pediatric nurse, only taking the child to the emergency room after further prompting. Medical examination revealed a broken left humerus, healed oral injuries, and a minor eye hemorrhage, with no medical explanation other than trauma.The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed petitions alleging abuse and neglect against both parents. At the 9th Circuit Court-Goffstown Family Division, a hearing was held on these petitions. The mother moved to suppress her statements to child protective service workers, arguing statutory violations during the investigation. The trial court denied the motion and, after hearing testimony from both parents, medical experts, and other witnesses, found by a preponderance of the evidence that the mother had both abused and neglected the child.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether there was sufficient evidence for both findings and whether the statutory violations by DCYF required exclusion of certain evidence. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the mother committed an abusive act under circumstances indicating harm or threatened harm to the child’s life, health, or welfare, and reversed the abuse finding. However, it found sufficient evidence of neglect and determined that any statutory violations by DCYF were harmless error. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire thus affirmed the neglect finding and reversed the abuse finding. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

The case concerns a mother whose conduct toward her children led to a juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding of child abuse. The events arose after a series of family disputes, culminating in a physical confrontation at the mother's home involving her two older daughters. During the incident, the mother struck her middle daughter with a shovel and brandished a knife, claiming self-defense. As a result, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services removed the middle and youngest daughters from her care and initiated dependency proceedings.The Los Angeles County Superior Court sustained the petition, finding that the mother’s response was unreasonable and escalated the situation, thus supporting jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The court ordered removal of the children, counseling for the mother, and monitored visitation. After subsequent review hearings, the daughters were returned and jurisdiction was terminated. The mother appealed the jurisdictional finding. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, determined the appeal was moot after termination of jurisdiction and dismissed it, reasoning that the findings were limited and lacked lasting stigma.The Supreme Court of California reviewed whether the mother’s appeal survives mootness when the underlying allegation is reportable to the California Child Abuse Central Index (CACI). The Court held that a parent’s appeal is not moot if the challenged finding is reportable for CACI inclusion, as reversal could remove the parent from the CACI or preserve the right to a grievance hearing. The Court reversed the dismissal of the mother’s appeal and remanded for further proceedings, confirming that demonstration of a legal consequence—such as CACI listing—requires merits review of the appeal. View "In re S.R." on Justia Law

A student at Dearborn School in Boston was found in possession of a nine millimeter Glock pistol with six rounds of ammunition during an administrative search. The juvenile, who had previously been subject to threats and assaults while commuting to school, did not have a license to carry the firearm but did possess a valid firearm identification card. After his arrest, the juvenile was readmitted to school, graduated, and subsequently completed occupational training and part-time employment.The Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department issued a delinquency complaint charging the juvenile with unlawful possession of a firearm, carrying a loaded firearm without a license, and unlawful possession of ammunition. During plea negotiations, the juvenile recommended a continuance without a finding (CWOF) on the firearm counts, while the Commonwealth sought commitment to the Department of Youth Services (DYS) until the juvenile’s nineteenth birthday. Both parties agreed to dismiss the ammunition charge. The judge allowed the CWOF on the firearm counts and dismissed the ammunition count, rejecting the Commonwealth’s argument that a CWOF was prohibited for the firearm charge. The judge subsequently denied the Commonwealth’s motion to revise or revoke the sentence, and the Commonwealth appealed.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed whether a Juvenile Court judge may impose a CWOF for a juvenile charged with carrying a firearm without a license under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). The court held that the statutes governing juvenile proceedings permit the judge to impose a CWOF for this offense, as the prohibition against CWOFs applies only to certain enumerated sex offenses and not to firearm offenses under § 10 (a). The order denying the Commonwealth’s motion to revise or revoke the sentence was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Q." on Justia Law

Two children, R.D. and S.D., were the subject of a dependency and neglect case initiated in Tennessee in 2019 due to their mother’s substance abuse and their father’s incarceration for assaulting the mother. The Tennessee court placed the children with their maternal grandmother, then later with their aunt and uncle, T.V. and R.V., in West Virginia after the grandmother’s death. In February 2022, the Tennessee court granted T.V. and R.V. full legal and physical custody but did not terminate the parents’ rights. T.V. and R.V. subsequently petitioned for adoption in West Virginia, mistakenly asserting that parental rights had been terminated.The Circuit Court of McDowell County, West Virginia, granted the adoption petitions in June 2022, believing the Tennessee court had terminated parental rights. The Tennessee court later clarified that it had not done so and transferred jurisdiction to the West Virginia court in April 2023. The circuit court consolidated all related proceedings, and various motions followed, including amended adoption petitions and requests to terminate parental rights. In June 2024, the circuit court upheld the prior adoption orders and, alternatively, modified the Tennessee disposition to terminate the father’s parental rights.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to make custody determinations or terminate parental rights in June 2022, rendering those adoption orders void. However, the court affirmed the circuit court’s later modification of disposition and termination of parental rights after jurisdiction was properly transferred from Tennessee. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "In re R.D. and S.D." on Justia Law

A.H., a minor, was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court after admitting to grand theft and violating probation conditions, including disobeying his mother, leaving home without approval, and violating curfew. After further violations—failing to attend mentorship meetings and testing positive for THC—the probation department recommended out-of-home placement in a short-term residential therapeutic program (STRTP), citing A.H.’s mental health conditions and his mother’s unwillingness to house him due to safety concerns. The probation department did not submit a statutorily required case plan before the disposition hearing, although it later provided one after the court’s order.The Superior Court of Contra Costa County held several hearings, ultimately ordering A.H.’s placement in an STRTP without first reviewing a case plan as required by Welfare and Institutions Code sections 706.5 and 706.6, and relevant California Rules of Court. A.H.’s counsel objected to the lack of a case plan, but the court proceeded with the placement order and deferred consideration of certain recommendations pending receipt of the case plan. The case plan was provided at a subsequent hearing, but the court did not indicate it had reviewed it before proceeding.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. While the appeal became moot when the juvenile court vacated the placement order, the appellate court exercised its discretion to address the issue due to its public importance and likelihood of recurrence. The court held that the statutory scheme requires probation to submit, and the juvenile court to consider, a case plan before ordering foster care placement. The failure to do so constituted an abuse of discretion. After deciding the merits, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law