Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Juvenile Law
State v. Jeremiah T.
A 15-year-old male was charged with a Class II felony for allegedly sexually assaulting a 14-year-old female at a high school in Omaha, Nebraska. The incident was reported by the victim, L.S., who stated that the assault occurred within the school premises. Video footage and interviews with the involved parties, including the accused, Jeremiah T., and a witness, G.G., were part of the evidence. L.S. claimed that Jeremiah forcibly assaulted her despite her resistance, while Jeremiah contended that the encounter was consensual. G.G.'s involvement as a lookout was also scrutinized.The district court overruled Jeremiah's motion to transfer the case to juvenile court, citing concerns about public safety and the severity of the offense. The court found that the nature of the crime and the degree of violence involved suggested that Jeremiah might need supervision beyond the age of 19, which the juvenile court could not provide. The court also noted that while Jeremiah was amenable to treatment, the timeline for effective rehabilitation within the juvenile system was uncertain.The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, arguing that the lower court abused its discretion. The appellate court emphasized that the evidence favored Jeremiah's rehabilitation within the juvenile system and that the State did not sufficiently prove a sound basis for retaining the case in adult court. The Court of Appeals highlighted the availability of appropriate services in the juvenile system and questioned the district court's interpretation of the evidence.Upon further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had improperly reweighed the evidence and failed to apply the correct standard of review. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining the case in adult court, as its decision was supported by appropriate evidence and considerations of public safety. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case with directions to affirm the district court's order. View "State v. Jeremiah T." on Justia Law
Overton v. State
A twelve-year-old child disclosed to a school counselor that she had been communicating with a twenty-six-year-old man, later identified as Eric Overton, via Snapchat. The child’s mother confirmed the communication, obtained evidence from the phone, and contacted law enforcement. The investigation revealed that Overton and the child had exchanged nude photographs and sexually explicit messages, and that Overton had picked up the child from her home on three occasions, during which they engaged in sexual intercourse. The child provided detailed testimony at trial regarding these encounters.The Hot Spring County Circuit Court presided over the trial, during which Overton objected to the prosecutor’s voir dire questioning about whether a conviction could be based on the testimony of a single credible witness. The court overruled the objection and denied a subsequent motion for mistrial, emphasizing that the jury would be instructed on the law at the end of the case. The jury was later instructed on the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Overton guilty of rape and internet stalking of a child, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment on each count.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether there was substantial evidence to support the rape conviction and whether the circuit court erred in its handling of voir dire and jury instructions. The court held that the evidence, including the victim’s testimony, was sufficient to support the conviction, and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no prejudicial error in the proceedings. View "Overton v. State" on Justia Law
BREAK v. STATE OF ARKANSAS
Terry Break was convicted in 2021 of multiple child sexual abuse offenses, including rape, second-degree sexual assault, and sexual indecency with a child, involving three minor victims. He received six life sentences plus 488 years in prison and $425,000 in fines. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Break then filed a Rule 37 petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds.The Boone County Circuit Court denied Break's petition. The court found that the State had provided sufficient evidence of "sexual gratification or desire" for the offenses, and thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge this element. The court also found that the prosecutor's comment during closing arguments, referring to Break as a "proven liar," was based on Break's own admissions and was not improper. Additionally, the court determined that the prosecutor's opening statement did not shift the burden of proof, as it referred to Break's demeanor during a recorded interview rather than his silence at trial. Lastly, the court acknowledged that the prosecutor's biblical reference during closing arguments was improper but concluded that Break failed to show that trial counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that Break failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was deficient or that any alleged deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of his trial. The court emphasized that Break did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims of ineffective assistance and that the decisions made by his trial counsel fell within the range of reasonable professional judgment. View "BREAK v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law
In re D.B.
A juvenile court in a dependency proceeding granted a restraining order requested by a mother, K.B., against her 17-year-old dependent child, D.B. The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services had received multiple referrals over the years concerning D.B.'s well-being due to alleged abuse and neglect by the mother. D.B. had a history of physical altercations with her mother and was placed in protective custody after her mother refused to allow her back home following an arrest for assault.The Santa Clara County Superior Court assumed jurisdiction over D.B. and declared her a dependent child. The court adopted a case plan that included supervised visitation with the mother. However, D.B. struggled in her placement and exhibited behavioral issues. The mother later requested termination of reunification services, which the court granted with D.B.'s agreement.Subsequently, the mother filed for a restraining order against D.B., citing threats and harassment. The court issued a temporary restraining order and later a one-year restraining order after a hearing. The court found that section 213.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code authorized it to issue restraining orders against a dependent child and determined that it was in D.B.'s best interest to do so.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The appellate court held that section 213.5, subdivision (a), grants the juvenile dependency court authority to issue restraining orders against a dependent child, provided the child's best interest is considered. The court found substantial evidence supporting the restraining order and concluded that it did not violate D.B.'s constitutional rights, as reunification services had already been terminated with D.B.'s consent. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law
People ex rel. B.C.B. v. A.B.
A child, B.C.B., was born in a car where his parents were living. After being transported to a hospital, both B.C.B. and his mother tested positive for methamphetamine. The El Paso County Department of Human Services conducted a safety assessment and took temporary custody of B.C.B. due to the positive drug test. The Department filed a petition alleging that B.C.B. was dependent or neglected under Colorado law.The El Paso County District Court held an adjudicatory trial, where evidence was presented that B.C.B. had difficulty latching to breastfeed and exhibited symptoms potentially related to methamphetamine exposure. Three pediatricians testified about the potential long-term risks of methamphetamine exposure, although they could not definitively link the symptoms to the drug exposure. The jury found that B.C.B. was born affected by substance exposure and that his health or welfare was threatened by substance use. The trial court adjudicated B.C.B. as dependent or neglected and ordered continued custody with the Department.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's adjudication, concluding that the Department had not provided sufficient evidence to show that B.C.B. was adversely affected by substance exposure at birth. The majority held that a positive drug test alone was insufficient to establish dependency or neglect under the amended statute.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that a positive drug test at birth satisfies the first prong of the statute, indicating that the child was affected by substance exposure. The Court also found that the Department provided sufficient evidence to show that B.C.B.'s health or welfare was threatened by substance use, either directly or due to the mother's inability to care for the child properly. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and upheld the jury's finding that B.C.B. was dependent or neglected. View "People ex rel. B.C.B. v. A.B." on Justia Law
In re L.C
Respondent, the mother of a two-year-old child named Layla, has a history of alcohol and illegal drug abuse. Both respondent and Layla tested positive for methamphetamine and THC at Layla's birth. Respondent admitted to using marijuana and unprescribed Valium on the same day she gave birth to her twin children. Layla lived with respondent and respondent's girlfriend, in a home that respondent claimed was infested with rats. A social worker from Swain County Department of Social Services (DSS) observed respondent behaving erratically and under the influence of drugs. Despite signing a safety plan that prohibited unsupervised contact with Layla, respondent violated the plan within days.The District Court of Swain County adjudicated Layla as a neglected juvenile based on respondent's continued drug abuse, erratic behavior, and failure to follow the safety plan. The court's findings included respondent's drug use, the unsafe living conditions, and the violation of the safety plan. Respondent appealed the adjudication order to the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the trial court's order, stating that the trial court's findings lacked specific factual details about how respondent's actions impaired or risked impairing Layla's welfare. The appellate court required additional findings to support the conclusion of neglect.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings were sufficient to support the conclusion of neglect. The court emphasized that while specific written findings of a substantial risk of impairment are not required, the trial court's findings must logically support the conclusion of neglect. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's findings, including respondent's drug abuse and unsafe living conditions, adequately supported the adjudication of Layla as a neglected juvenile. View "In re L.C" on Justia Law
Village of Lincolnshire v. Olvera
A 16-year-old high school student was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) of cannabis following a bench trial in the circuit court of Lake County, Illinois. The student was also convicted of improper lane usage, possession of cannabis, and reckless conduct under local ordinances. The incident occurred during a driver's education class, where the instructor noticed erratic driving behavior and reported it to school officials. A subsequent search revealed a marijuana cigarette, and field sobriety tests conducted by a school resource officer and later at the police station indicated impairment.The student appealed to the Appellate Court, Second District, arguing that the Village of Lincolnshire improperly prosecuted him without providing proof of written permission from the State's Attorney, as required by the Illinois Vehicle Code. The student also contended that the evidence was insufficient to prove DUI beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding no requirement for the Village to submit proof of its authority to prosecute into the trial record and determining that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the Village needed to establish its written permission to prosecute in the trial record and whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the student was under the influence to a degree that rendered him incapable of driving safely. The court held that the statute did not require the Village to submit its written permission into the record and that the failure to do so did not constitute plain error. Additionally, the court found that the evidence, including testimony and field sobriety tests, supported the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, upholding the student's conviction. View "Village of Lincolnshire v. Olvera" on Justia Law
Guardianship of Wilson
Two children in the custody of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) appealed the dismissal of guardianship petitions filed by their great-aunt and great-uncle, who reside in Pennsylvania. The Juvenile Court dismissed the petitions, citing the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), as Pennsylvania had denied the placement due to the great-uncle's felony convictions from the 1990s. The children argued that the ICPC does not apply to out-of-state relatives seeking guardianship, while DCF contended that the appeal should be dismissed because the great-aunt and great-uncle, who are indispensable parties, did not appeal the dismissal.The Juvenile Court granted DCF's motion to dismiss the guardianship petitions, concluding that allowing the guardianship would violate the ICPC. The court noted that Pennsylvania's denial was based on the great-uncle's ineligibility to work or volunteer with children due to his felony convictions. The children filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. They then filed timely notices of appeal, but the great-aunt and great-uncle did not.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that the absence of the great-aunt and great-uncle, who are indispensable parties, compelled the dismissal of the appeal. The court emphasized that it could not proceed without the relatives, whose rights would be affected by the decision. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "Guardianship of Wilson" on Justia Law
Care and Protection of Eve
A child was temporarily removed from her parents' care shortly after birth and placed in the custody of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) due to concerns about domestic violence. DCF sought to vaccinate her according to an age-based immunization schedule, but her parents, practicing Rastafarians, objected on religious grounds. A Juvenile Court judge allowed DCF to facilitate vaccinations for the child. The parents sought to stop future vaccinations, arguing that vaccinating their child over their religious objections violated their constitutional rights.The Juvenile Court judge found that the parents' religious beliefs were outweighed by the child's best interests and allowed DCF to vaccinate the child. The parents petitioned the Appeals Court for interlocutory relief, which was denied. The parents then appealed to the Appeals Court panel, and the child sought direct appellate review in the Supreme Judicial Court, which was granted.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the order allowing the child to be vaccinated violated the parents' constitutional rights. The court concluded that the parents' sincerely held religious beliefs were substantially burdened by DCF's vaccination efforts. The court applied the State constitutional protections afforded to parents exercising their free exercise rights and determined that DCF failed to demonstrate that exempting the child from vaccinations would substantially hinder the fulfillment of DCF's interests in promoting child health. The court noted the Commonwealth's allowance of religious exemptions from vaccination requirements for parents who have not lost custody and DCF's inconsistent exercise of its authority to order vaccinations for children in its care. The order allowing the joint motion by DCF and the child to facilitate the vaccination of the child was reversed. View "Care and Protection of Eve" on Justia Law
Holman v. County of Butte
Ryan Holman sued the County of Butte, alleging it breached mandatory duties under Government Code section 815.6 related to the evaluation, investigation, and cross-reporting of a child abuse referral against him. Holman claimed the County failed to conduct an in-person investigation or cross-report the abuse allegations, leading to years of abuse and subsequent psychological issues. The County argued its employee exercised discretion in deciding to "evaluate out" the referral without further investigation, thus invoking discretionary immunity.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the County's employee was exercising discretion protected by immunity when deciding to close the referral without an in-person investigation or cross-reporting. The court found no mandatory duty was breached, and the County was not liable under Government Code section 815.6.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the County had a mandatory duty under section 11166, subdivision (j), to cross-report the child abuse referral to law enforcement and other agencies. The court determined that the duty to cross-report is triggered by the receipt of a mandated child abuse report and does not involve discretionary judgment. The appellate court found a triable issue of fact regarding whether the County breached this mandatory duty by failing to cross-report the referral, thus reversing the summary judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Holman v. County of Butte" on Justia Law