Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. The offense was committed in 1979, when petitioner was 17 years old. In 1982, at age 20, he pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer and possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner and was sentenced to four years, to be served consecutively to his life sentence. In 2015, after serving 35 years in prison, petitioner was found suitable for parole as a youthful offender under Penal Code 3051, effective in November 2015. Petitioner claimed that his release date was recalculated as November 2, 2017, based on a correction in his credit earning status. In June 2016, petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the legality of his continuing incarceration. The trial court denied relief, concluding that section 3051 does not exempt a youthful offender granted parole from serving a consecutive sentence for an offense committed in prison, citing section 1170.1(c), which provides that a consecutive sentence for an in-prison offense “shall commence from the time the person would otherwise have been released.” The court of appeal granted relief; section 1170.1(c), does not apply to petitioner’s case because his in-prison offense was committed before he was 23 years old, so he was entitled to release at the end of his indeterminate sentence pursuant to section 3051(d). View "In re Trejo" on Justia Law

Seventeen-year-old Defendant was charged with two counts of sexual intercourse without consent. Defendant filed two motions to transfer each charge to Youth Court. The district court denied both transfer motions. Defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of sexual intercourse without consent. Defendant was sentenced to fifty years in prison, with ten years suspended. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s refusal to transfer the charges to Youth Court, holding that the district court did not err in denying the transfer motions; and (2) remanded for entry of an amended judgment and review of the sentence as provided by law, holding that the district court erred by not including the requirements found in Mont. Code Ann. 41-5-2503(1) in Defendant’s sentence. View "State v. Talksabout" on Justia Law

Appellant challenged the district court's decision to grant the federal government's motion to dismiss the information filed against him in a juvenile delinquency proceeding without prejudice, and its decision to deny Appellant's motion to dismiss the information with prejudice. Appellant also challenged the district court's decision to authorize the federal government to disclose two confidential documents and Appellant's identity to third-parties, contending that the disclosed information should have been kept private. The court dismissed as interlocutory the appeal over the dismissal of the information without prejudice and the denial of Appellant's motion for dismissal with prejudice; affirmed the district court's authorization of disclosure of the confidential documents; and, because the court believed that the controversy surrounding the disclosure of Appellant's identity was moot on appeal, the court vacated the district court's decision to authorize disclosure of that information. View "United States v. Under Seal" on Justia Law

Garcia died in August 2011 after receiving multiple stab wounds. Mendoza, Martell, and Ramirez were convicted following a joint trial, for second degree murder (Pen. Code 187, 189) with gang enhancements (section 186.22(b)) for killing Garcia. On rehearing, the court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred by: excluding statements of a co-perpetrator; allowing the prosecutor to commit misconduct during the opening statement; admitting unduly prejudicial evidence of gang-related intimidation; failing to properly instruct the jury regarding voluntary intoxication, the required mental state for guilt as an aider and abettor, and the evidence necessary to prove the gang enhancement; allowing the prosecution to commit misconduct during its examination of a prosecution witness; admitting unduly prejudicial out-of-court statements; admitting unduly prejudicial evidence of prior convictions to prove a pattern of criminal gang activity; and allowing the gang expert to show unduly prejudicial slides in the slideshow that accompanied his expert testimony. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance and a claim that Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, should be applied retroactively to Ramirez because he was 16 years old at the time of the offense and his judgment was not final when voters approved Proposition 57. View "People v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

A.T. is enrolled in high school. Her attendance is regular; she earns passing grades. She was riding with another minor in a car driven by her brother, also a minor with no delinquent history. Police stopped the car because its registration had expired. No one inside the vehicle possessed a valid driver’s license. Police arrested her brother for driving without a license. During an inventory search, officers found a handgun inside a backpack, in the trunk. A.T. waived her Miranda rights, and told police that her brother had found the gun that morning; they had agreed to put it in her backpack inside the car trunk to show to their father. The father of her brother’s girlfriend subsequently reported the gun was stolen from him. The juvenile court denied A.T.’s request to be released to her mother’s custody pending the disposition of charges. A.T. alleges the court improperly considered her refusal to accept a “package-deal” plea bargain and the suitability of the Vallejo neighborhood where her mother lives in an apartment, in deciding to detain her. The girl was released, upon pleading guilty to a misdemeanor, after serving 16 days in custody. A.T. moved to withdraw her plea. The court of appeal directed the lower court to decide that motion, considering that “[t]he Legislature has indicated that children should be released except under certain specific conditions of ‘immediate and urgent necessity’” and that the record reveals no such necessity. View "A.T. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted murder. Defendant was sixteen years old at the time of the offense. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, including a mandatory minimum term of incarceration. Defendant was also ordered to pay $150,000 in mandatory restitution to the victim’s estate. Defendant was later resentenced and received immediate parole eligibility because the mandatory minimum period of incarceration had been deemed unconstitutional. The restitution was left in place. Defendant appealed, challenging the $150,000 in restitution to the victim’s estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the $150,000 mandatory restitution for juvenile homicide offenders is not facially unconstitutional; and (2) the $150,000 mandatory restitution was not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant. View "State v. Breeden" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the offense. The district court sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate term of incarceration and ordered Defendant to pay $150,000 in mandatory restitution to the victim’s estate. Defendant appealed, challenging the $150,000 restitution award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Iowa Code 901.5(14) does not authorize the district court to modify a restitution award otherwise required by Iowa Code 910.3B(1), and restitution under chapter 910 is mandatory; and (2) section 910.3B is not unconstitutional either as applied to all juvenile homicide offenders or as applied to Defendant. View "State v. Richardson" on Justia Law

A family magistrate of the circuit court for Baltimore County found that Cody H. had committed the delinquent act of assault by punching a sixteen-year-old victim in the face and breaking his jaw. The magistrate judgment made a recommendation for a restitution award of $1,489 to the victim for medical expenses but did not award restitution for lost earnings. The State filed exceptions to the recommendation. A juvenile court judge sustained the State’s exception and imposed an additional restitution amount of $5,000 for loss of earnings. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the loss of earnings restitution award in this case was proper under the restitution statute, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. 11-603. View "In re Cody H." on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Keighton Budder was convicted by an Oklahoma jury of several violent nonhomicide crimes committed when he was sixteen years old. After sentence modification on direct appeal, he received three life sentences and an additional sentence of twenty years, all to run consecutively. He was not be eligible for parole under Oklahoma law until he served 131.75 years in prison. Budder filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. In support, he cited “Graham v. Florida,” (560 U.S. 48 (2010)), which held that sentencing juvenile offenders who have not committed homicide crimes to life in prison without a meaningful opportunity for release was unconstitutional. The district court denied Budder’s petition, and he appeals. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant Budder’s petition. The Court found under the categorical rule clearly established in “Graham,” Budder’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. “The [Oklahoma Supreme Court’s] judgment was contrary to this clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant Budder’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, to vacate Budder’s sentence, and to direct the State of Oklahoma to resentence Budder within a reasonable period.” View "Budder v. Addison" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the juvenile court's adjudication order declaring him a ward of the court and sustained a petition filed by the People alleging that defendant had committed vandalism charges based on his "tagging" of buildings. The court agreed with defendant that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding on the felony vandalism count, under Penal Code 594, subdivision (b)(1) & (2), that defendant caused $400 or more in property damage, which was the amount of damage necessary to punish vandalism as a felony rather than as a misdemeanor. In this case, the court concluded that the people provided insufficient evidence of the actual cost of repair to the property damage defendant caused, and the graffiti cost removal list failed to satisfy the criteria for use of average costs in restitution cases. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and remanded. View "In re Kyle T." on Justia Law